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GREETINGS
foREWoRD
The Eurasian Development Bank is an integration bank; an essential part of its 
mission is to advance economic integration between its member states. The 
Bank’s projects focus on fostering mutual trade and investments and its portfolio 
comprises over 50 projects in different economic sectors, including agriculture, 
metallurgy, energy and transportation. 
The EDB’s activities in the region, however, are not only limited to financial 
investments in development and integration. The Bank developed rigorous and 
vibrant researches into a wide range of integration issues, thereby contributing 
to integration by its high-level expertise and multifaceted analysis. The EDB 
Centre for Integration Studies, opened in 2011 with the purpose of undertaking 
research into regional economic integration, has implemented a number of 
research projects to date, ranging from corporate integration and the impact 
of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space on regional economies 
to the likelihood of creating common labour market in the area and assessing 
public attitudes towards Eurasian integration. The Centre’s figures on the CU’s 
macroeconomic impact have by now become a standard assessment. 
The findings of these research projects along with those of other important 
analytical studies are presented in the 5th edition of the EDB Eurasian Integration 
Yearbook, which the Bank has published annually since 2008. The series is a 
compilation of authoritative papers and in-depth studies examining the most 
important aspects of Eurasian integration. I am happy to confirm the EBD’s 
continued commitment to research on regional integration. 
Igor finogenov
Eurasian Development Bank
Chairman of Executive Board
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GREETINGS
DEAR READERS, 
2012 has been marked by the intensification of integration trends in the post-
Soviet space. The Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union (CU) expanded 
into the Single Economic Space (SES), bringing into action a set of seventeen 
agreements ranging from the coordination of macroeconomic and fiscal policies 
to labour migration, energy and technical regulation. The SES’ key goal is to 
promote four basic economic freedoms – the free movement of goods, capital, 
services and people. The Eurasian Economic Commission, a supra-national 
body with extensive powers, has been set up to facilitate efficient operation of 
SES, with appointed commissioners in charge of each functional dimension of 
integration. 
An efficient Eurasian bloc will facilitate efficient economic cooperation with 
both developed markets and emerging economies. It will increase competition 
and promote equal conditions for businesses and investors from different 
regions. The SES will help to effectively reduce and eventually eliminate the 
practice of restrictive national rules at all stages of doing business. The SES 
will also guarantee an upgrade of technical regulations and standards. The 
transition towards modern standards will ensure their full compliance with 
WTO standards as well as a high degree of compatibility with EU and ISO 
standards, which will facilitate technological integration for all manufacturers, 
including investors from outside of the SES, and across the EU/SES areas. In the 
mid-term perspective, Eurasian integration will be developing in two directions 
– the present integration initiatives will be gaining further depth whilst also 
widening their geography. The manifesting success of the CU and SES can 
be explained by the clear focus on well-defined, manageable and concrete 
tasks of integration. Furthermore, the specifics of the post-Soviet integration 
is its thorough and stable foundation, made up of a multitude of intertwined 
economic ties, which can be put to good use in the new integration projects. 
The interconnections of production factors, for example, like those of labour 
and capital, are showing an impressive dynamics today, which is proving that 
the intensification of integration trends is in demand.
The Eurasian Development Bank has truly become an important engine of 
economic integration. With the launch of the EDB Centre for Integration Studies 
last year, the Bank has significantly expanded its research and policy analysis 
of regional integration. The Eurasian Economic Commission welcomes this 
initiative as a very timely and expedient step to advance research in an area that 
has become extremely important for today’s political and economic agenda of 
the region. The EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook is there to supply the global 
expert audience with information and analysis on Eurasian integration.
tatyana Valovaya 
Eurasian Economic Commission, Member of the Board, 
Minister for Macroeconomics and Principal Directions of Integration
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INTRODUCTION
the Customs union  
and the Single Economic Space: 
towards the Eurasian Economic 
union
The Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia was established in 2010. 
It expanded into the Single Economic Space in 2012, based on a comprehensive 
set of agreements covering subjects from the coordination of macroeconomic 
and fiscal policies to labour migration, energy and technical regulation. Regional 
integration will be taken a step further through the planned creation, by 2015, of 
the Eurasian Economic Union. The Customs Union was the first major systemic 
integration initiative to make it as far as the implementation stage. Importantly, 
the Eurasian Economic Commission may also come to represent the first truly 
supranational institution in the region’s 20 years of post-Soviet reintegration 
attempts. 
The primary goal of the SES is to promote the free movement of goods, capital, 
services and people. It will increase competition and create equal conditions 
for all businesses and investors, regardless of their country of origin. The SES 
will reduce and ultimately eliminate the structures of national legislation at 
every stage of the business transaction and guarantees an overhaul of technical 
regulations and standards. The adoption of improved standards will ensure that 
Evgeny Vinokurov – Ph.D., Director of the EDB Centre for 
Integration Studies.
Evgeny 
Vinokurov 
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org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/siei/
INTRODUCTION
Evgeny Vinokurov. “The Customs Union and the Single 
Economic Space: Towards the Eurasian Economic Union”
the SES complies fully with WTO standards and that there is a high degree 
of compatibility with EU and ISO standards. This will facilitate technological 
integration between manufacturers, including investors from outside 
the SES. 
The EDB System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration1 shows that the decline 
of integration in the post-Soviet space in the 2000s and the general trend of 
the 1990s have not been reversed. The composite index of integration in the 
post-Soviet space suggests that integration levels have generally been falling, 
but that Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus have in fact become more integrated. 
This counter-process genuinely stands out. These three economies form an 
‘integration core’ in the post-Soviet space, which, during the first decade of the 
21st century, has developed from the bottom up, with its roots in enterprises 
and households. In 2009-2010 the formation of this integration core gained 
momentum, largely due to the global economic crisis, and culminated in the 
establishment of the CU. 
The development of the CU and the SES is crucial for the success of regional 
economic cooperation. It encompasses vital processes such as the trade in goods 
and services, movement of labour, macroeconomic coordination, financial 
integration, common technical regulations, and regulatory convergence. 
Applied economic research is, in turn, crucial for a deeper understanding and 
appropriate management of these complex processes. The Eurasian Integration 
Yearbook, published for the fifth consecutive year, attempts to move in this 
direction. 
tWo EuRASIAN INtEGRAtIoNS
Further development of regional integration may include a deep and 
comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) between the European Union and the 
SES. Such a DCFTA would represent a huge step forward by removing barriers 
to trade in goods and services, improving the management of intellectual 
property and the mobility of labour and capital. Furthermore, the SES is already 
taking its first steps towards free trade with its Asian and Pacific partners. 
Smaller economies (Vietnam, New Zealand, etc.) as well as large economies 
(South Korea, India, and China) immediately spring to mind. Spilling over the 
boundaries of the former Soviet Union entails ‘another’ Eurasian integration, 
distinct from the post-Soviet one. 
As the post-Soviet space forms part of the greater Eurasian ‘super-continent’, 
regional integration in Northern and Central Eurasia should be viewed in the 
context of wider economic and political interconnection. Continent-wide 
Eurasian integration is gradually becoming a reality. This spreads ‘from the 
16 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
INTRODUCTION
bottom up’, with minimal support from national governments. We think that 
an important task for the 2010s – both for researchers and practitioners – will 
be to reconcile both kinds of ‘Eurasian integration’, the post-Soviet and the 
continental one. The latter we take to be the qualitative growth of economic 
links between various sub-regions of the Eurasian continents – Europe, East 
Asia, South Asia, West Asia, and Northern and Central Eurasia (i.e., the post-
Soviet space).
In our view, Eurasian continental integration could become a key driver of 
development, motivated by the integration of energy trade, non-energy trade 
and transport, capital and labour flows, tourism, pharmaceuticals trade and 
epidemiological threats. A key question is whether or not the main continental 
powers will allow this integration – which represents a catch-up process in the 
historic worldwide drive for globalisation – to proceed smoothly and efficiently 
by cooperating in the establishment of transport networks, opening up access 
to natural and human resources and creating institutions that support collective 
action in the pursuit of regional benefits and the alleviation of regional 
disadvantages. Or, conversely, will competition over resources, boundaries 
and allegiances, or disagreements over values and political systems drive deep 
wedges between countries and sub-regions across Eurasia, as they had in the 
past. 
Although potentially vital for all countries involved, Eurasian integration has 
particular significance for Russia and Central Asia. These countries have much 
to gain from Eurasian integration that is constrained within the boundaries of 
the post-Soviet area. Therefore, it is valid to argue in favour of open regionalism 
in Eurasia as an economically optimal component of post-Soviet integration. 
The ‘two Eurasian integrations’ should supplement each other. 
REVIEW of CoNtRIButIoNS
The 20 contributions in this volume are divided into four sections.
The section on the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space features 
papers relating to economic impact, including that of potential enlargement. 
The first paper presents the results of a large-scale project, which combined 
the forces of three institutions – the Moscow-based Institute for Economic 
Forecasting, the Kyiv-based Institute for Economy and Forecasting, and the EDB 
Centre for Integration Studies. The results of the project provide a coherent and 
nuanced picture of the long-term economic impact of the CU. It also extrapolates 
the model to Ukraine and the potential impact of the country’s accession 
to the CU. The paper by Alexander Pavlov analyses the potential impact of 
Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU. It is followed by an incisive commentary by 
Nazik Beishenaly based on the independent research into the same issue. The 
section includes an important paper by Tatyana Valovaya, a Minister of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission. Her paper outlines the history and principles 
17Eurasian Development Bank
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of Eurasian post-Soviet integration. This paper provides comprehensive insight 
into the general patterns of regional integration in the post-Soviet space and 
how the extensive experience of the European Union is being carefully re-
thought by its eastern neighbours.  
The section on The Economics of the Post-Soviet and Eurasian Integration 
aims to knit together what we call the ‘two Eurasian integrations’ – that is, 
the post-Soviet and continental ones. Evgeny Vinokurov and Alexander Libman 
summarise the findings of their two monographs, each of which focused on one 
of these two types of Eurasian integration. Throughout the last two decades, the 
term ‘Eurasia’ has been used more and more by scholars and practitioners, but 
the definition of the term has remained unclear. This lack of clarity is amplified 
for the concept of Eurasian integration. The authors elaborate on the concept 
of Eurasia and Eurasian integration, distinguishing between three notions of 
‘Eurasia’ and corresponding views of Eurasian integration, and evaluate their 
importance in literature and possible research developments. The next paper by 
Johannes Linn, a well-known and influential proponent of Eurasian integration, 
delves into the intricacies of Central Asia. Based on the large body of research, 
Linn elaborates on the opportunities provided by this region, which could well 
serve as the laboratory of continental integration in Eurasia.
The following three contributions bring us back to the post-Soviet space, 
covering three complex issues: public finances (Elvira Kurmanalieva and 
Konstantin Fedorov); mutual investments (Alexey Kuznetsov); and EDB 
Integration Barometer (by Igor Zadorin). All three papers originate from the 
projects undertaken by the EDB Centre for Integration Studies. Alexey 
Kuznetsov’s account in particular presents the database on mutual investment 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which includes around 600 
examples. 
The section on Advanced Economic Cooperation in Sectors and Industries 
features three sectors: air transportation and electric power (Aigul Absametova); 
and hydropower and water management in Central Asia (Vladimir Yasinskiy, 
Alexander Mironenkov and Tulegen Sarsembekov). Based on our assuredness 
that robust integration is formed primarily ‘from the bottom up’ by means of 
substantial cooperation, the EDB continues to publish a series of reports on 
cooperation in particular sectors and industries throughout the post-Soviet 
space. 
The fourth section, Data and Reviews, reflects the structure of previous 
Yearbooks representing a very substantial source of information for researchers 
and students. It includes a chronicle of regional integration by Natalia 
Maqsimchook, a structured digest on the main events in post-Soviet integration 
in 2011. The Key Macroeconomic Indicators in CIS Countries complement the 
Chronicle. Ella Baibikova’s overview of international and regional development 
bank activity in the CIS rounds off this section. Multilateral development banks 
Evgeny Vinokurov. “The Customs Union and the Single 
Economic Space: Towards the Eurasian Economic Union”
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represent both the objects of integration and its subjects, since they proactively 
shape economic interaction between countries, for example, by investing in 
crucial cross-border infrastructure. Therefore, this overview is highly relevant 
for all research on regional integration.
Overall, the Yearbook is an attempt to provide a dynamic overview of integration 
processes in the post-Soviet ‘Eurasian’ space and of the challenges to which the 
Northern and Central Eurasian states will have to provide adequate responses. 
I genuinely hope that the EDB’s annual Eurasian Integration Yearbook will 
become a reliable companion to those studying regional integration. Once 
again I am pleased to direct readers to the EDB website (www.eabr.org), where 
this volume, previous Yearbooks, the Journal of Eurasian Economic Integration 
(in Russian) and a number of reports and stand-alone papers relevant to regional 
integration are available to download free of charge.
INTRODUCTION
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INtRoDuCtIoN
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the severing of a multitude of economic 
ties, which exacerbated the crisis of the 1990s. In recent years, the desire to 
recover from these losses and utilise the surviving industrial and technological 
potential has driven integration processes in the post-Soviet area – this time on 
the basis of new, market-based principles.
Reconstructive integration processes can play an important role in adding 
impetus to the advancement of the largest post-Soviet countries. On the one 
hand, economic reintegration will produce standard synergistic effects such as 
reduced transaction costs in bilateral and multilateral cooperation, improved 
terms of trade and investment exchange, gains from the transnational division 
of labour, and the creation of new market opportunities. On the other hand, the 
relative uniformity of the technological arena and the common linguistic and 
cultural environment allow the mechanisms of interaction between post-Soviet 
countries to be greatly simplified.
The economic growth in almost all post-Soviet countries made it possible to 
develop successful interaction and form the necessary resources that can be 
used to speed up integration.
In recent years, tangible prerequisites have emerged for the formation and rapid 
development of an economic union between the region’s countries. In 2010, 
the Customs Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia began to operate. 
Seventeen agreements that form the basis of the Single Economic Space are 
entering into effect in 2012. In 2015, the SES states intend to establish the 
Eurasian Economic Union, which other post-Soviet countries can join.
The study of fundamental conditions and practical effects of Eurasian integration 
are an important research and expert objective addressed by the Comprehensive 
Assessment of the Macroeconomic Effects of Various Forms of Deep Economic 
Integration of Ukraine and the Member States of the Customs Union and the 
Single Economic Space2. This survey continued the three-year cooperation 
between the Eurasian Development Bank, the Institute of Economic Forecasting 
at the Russian Academy of Sciences (IEF RAS), and the Institute of Economics 
and Forecasting at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (IEF NASU)3.
This survey is the most comprehensive analysis of the effects of deep economic 
integration between the economies of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus 
prepared in the past twenty years.
2 Full version of the report is available at: http://www.eabr.org/r/research/analytics/centre/projects/ukraine/. Please refer to this 
link for literature and complete methodology of the project. 
3 Scientific and Technological Interaction between Russia and Ukraine: Forecasting Opportunities and Mechanisms for Their 
Implementation; Assessment of Macroeconomic Effects of Ukraine Joining the Customs Union and the Single Economic 
Space within the Framework of EurAsEC.
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MEtHoDoLoGY
The issues relating to the creation of economic unions between nations are 
critical elements of long-term economic policies that cannot be implemented 
without a comprehensive analysis of the consequences of the decisions under 
consideration. At the same time, there is a palpable lack of the type of work 
that would provide quantitative assessments of the possible macroeconomic 
and sectoral effects of the expansion of integration processes in the post-Soviet 
area. In accordance with this, research was carried out to test and produce a 
numerical estimate for various hypotheses of the possible integration scenarios 
between the Customs Union countries and Ukraine.
A quantitative assessment of integration effects of the economic unions of 
various types and scales is associated with significant theoretical and technical 
difficulties. Even with respect to European integration, although it has a history 
of over fifty years, the economic science still lacks uniform approaches to 
assessing integration effects of the creation and functioning of the European 
Community. In addition, integration processes in the post-Soviet area have their 
own significant peculiarities.
The key objectives of the research were to determine the status quo and outlooks 
for the advancement of integration ties between Ukraine, Russia and Russia’s 
partners within the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space; to develop 
methodological tools to assist in the selection of the efficient forms and areas 
for the development of integration processes; and to assess, in a sound and 
comprehensive manner, the economic effects of Ukraine joining the SES, for 
Ukraine itself and for Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.
Methodologically, the assessment of integration effects was carried out using 
a model analytical and forecasting set, which includes intersectoral 
macroeconomic models for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and a 
trade model which forms export and import flows in the countries under 
consideration in their mutual trade and their trade with other countries.
Before developing the model analytical and forecasting set a comparative 
analysis of the existing approaches to the quantitative assessment of integration 
effects was carried out. These approaches used in the world practice include 
computable general equilibrium models, gravity models, dynamic input-output 
models for intersectoral production, and multiple regression models.
The statistics used in the model set are official data from national statistics 
agencies and international institutions.
The input and output tables of the countries were adjusted to a single 
classification of sectors based on the 45th sectoral structure of the input and 
output table of the Russian Federation. A correspondence matrix was prepared 
for each country, with coefficients showing which sectors in the initial input 
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and output table are included in a sector of the baseline table or are distributed 
between several sectors in a certain proportion.
The coefficients for the correspondence matrix (each country had its own matrix) 
were calculated using the data provided in national accounts, which present the 
sectoral structure of the economies in the most detailed manner.
In addition, data on foreign trade between the SES countries and Ukraine 
have been prepared and aligned and the process of the formation of scenario 
conditions for the forecast has been modelled.
SCENARIo AppRoACH
Integration effects can be provisionally divided into instant and long-term 
effects. The first group is connected primarily to the reaction of an economy 
to a reduction or abolishment of customs barriers. As a rule, instant effects are 
a change in the volume of foreign trade flows. However, their impact on the 
economic dynamics discontinues almost completely in a short period of time. 
Instant integration effects are relatively easier to assess because they are directly 
connected to the historical elasticity of foreign trade flows against changes in table 1.1.
Integration scenarios 
considered
Scenario Impact Objective
1 Baseline 0 Contains baseline inertial macroeconomic 
scenarios for Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and 
Ukraine. Does not provide for the creation 
of the SES or intensification of integration 
processes in the post-Soviet area
Formation of the baseline characteristics of 
economic development for the countries 
under analysis; creation of a basis for 
the analysis of the SES effects on Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus
2 Baseline 1 Provides for the creation of the SES of Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus in 2012, the removal 
of all mutual trade barriers, and technological 
convergence between the countries in the 
forecast period
Formation of the effects of SES creation by 
three countries: Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus
3 CIS FTA Ukraine joins the CIS FTA on the terms of the 
agreement signed on October 18, 2011  
in St. Petersburg (with exceptions)
Assessment of the impact of the CIS FTA, 
in its current form, on the economic 
development of the countries under analysis
4 CIS FTA+EU FTA 
for Ukraine
Ukraine joins the European Union FTA;  
CIS FTA countries take foreign trade 
protective measures envisaged by the 
agreement dated October 18, 2011
Assessment of the impact of the creation of 
the EU FTA on the Ukrainian economy with 
a simultaneous deterioration of trade and 
economic relationships with the SES countries
5 SES+Ukraine Ukraine joins the framework SES Agreements Assessment of the impact of the complete 
removal of foreign trade barriers between the 
countries, the expansion of cooperation, and 
technological convergence on the Ukrainian 
economy and the SES countries
6 SES+Ukraine 
(exchange rate 
unification)
Ukraine joins the framework SES agreements; 
the countries unify the currency system within 
the SES and implement a single currency 
policy
Assessment of the impact of exchange rate 
unification, within the framework of deeper 
integration, on the Ukrainian economy and 
the SES countries
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customs tariffs. Long-term integration effects are connected to dynamic and 
structural changes in economies caused by changes in the efficiency parameters, 
the creation of cooperation ties, and the expansion of markets.
To produce a quantitative assessment of integration effects, several scenarios 
need to be considered. An analysis and comparison of these calculations make 
it possible to formulate conclusions on the significance of integration processes 
for economies.
The possible scenarios of integration in the post-Soviet area were calculated 
using a set of intersectoral macroeconomic models of Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Belarus and Ukraine developed in the course of research.
The scenarios that have been considered are presented in Table 1.1.
The calculations make it possible to produce an incremental assessment of the 
effects of integration in the post-Soviet area for a number of current scenarios 
that factor in trade (instant) effects and technological convergence (long-term 
effects).
SES-3
The calculations suggest that the creation of the Single Economic Space between 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus would have a positive effect on the development 
of the countries involved. Given the existing economic structure, the primary 
directions of foreign trade relationships, and the scale of the economies, it is 
expected that the greatest effects will be observed in Belarus.
By the end of the forecast period, exports to the SES countries are expected to 
account for up to 35% of Belarusian GDP. By 2030, the GDP gain in this option 
is forecasted to outrun the baseline by up to 15%. Therefore, the calculations 
show that, in the long run, the success of integration processes in the post-
figure 1.1.
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Soviet area will be of vital importance to the advancement of the Belarusian 
economy. The share of mechanical engineering and food processing in the 
country’s industrial structure is expected to grow.
Kazakhstan’s economy remains dependent, to a significant extent, on the 
dynamics of hydrocarbon production. This situation is largely associated with 
the fact that Kazakhstan continues to enjoy relatively high potential for the 
expansion of oil and gas production. Though increasing, exports to the SES 
countries remain at a relatively low level compared to GDP. At the same time, 
due to technological convergence and a reduction in the energy and material 
intensity of production, integration processes allow reaching an additional GDP 
of 4% compared to the baseline scenario by the end of the forecast period.
figure 1.1.
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The share of mining sectors and metallurgy in the Kazakh economy will 
gradually decline. A rapid growth in the service sector, mechanical engineering, 
transportation and communications will result in the growth of their respective 
shares in gross output.
As the scale of the Russian economy cannot be compared with those of other 
SES countries, integration processes in the post-Soviet area are not expected to 
produce a determining impact on the dynamics of Russian GDP. In addition, the 
gradual devaluation of the Belarusian rouble, against the backdrop of increasing 
energy prices, will have an additional adverse effect on the trade and economic 
relationships within the SES (first and foremost, on the trade between Russia 
and Belarus).
figure 1.2.
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figure 1.3.
Effects of SES 
creation on Russia
b) Additional 
increase in Russian 
GDP under the 
SES-formation option 
(2010, $ billion)
The development of integration ties will allow Russia to reap an additional 
annual gain of more than 2% of the baseline GDP by the end of the forecast 
period.
The three countries’ cumulative gain from the formation of the SES, compared 
to the non-integration scenario, is shown in Figure 1.4. As for the aggregate 
GDP of the SES countries, the difference between the options is expected 
to exceed 2.5% by 2030. In 2030, the GDP gain over the baseline option 
is expected to reach $75 billion for Russia (in 2010 prices), $13 billion for 
Kazakhstan, and $14 billion for Belarus. From 2011 to 2030, the cumulative 
effect of the development of integration ties can be estimated at $632 billion 
(in 2010 prices) for Russia, $106.6 billion for Kazakhstan, and $170 billion for 
Belarus.
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uKRAINE, SES-3 AND ftA, SES-4
The baseline scenario for the development of the Ukrainian economy assumes 
that the key trends of the economic development observed in recent years will 
continue.
The main problem, which Ukraine is expected to encounter in the baseline 
scenario, is that, given the growing energy prices4, the necessary level of 
competitiveness of producers can only be maintained if energy intensity is 
reduced in an accelerated manner. A radical reduction in energy intensity 
requires, in turn, large investments. Revenue losses against the backdrop of 
rising costs maintain the relatively low fixed capital accumulation rates. At the 
same time, production growth is restricted because of the gradual retirement of 
“old”, idle capital. Therefore, the economy faces an acute problem of limited 
capital. Nevertheless, the remaining potential to achieve growth using ageing 
facilities enables the Ukrainian economy to demonstrate higher economic 
growth than Belarus, which is experiencing an acute deficit of fixed capital. 
table 1.2.
Average annual 
growth rates of 
ukrainian GDp 
and the main 
components of the 
end demand  
(in constant prices,%)
Source: Calculations 
by IEF RAS and IEF 
NASU
2011-2015 2016-2020 2021-2025 2026-2030
Household consumption 6.1 5 4.3 3.6
Government consumption 2.7 2.4 2 1.7
Investments in fixed capital 11 8.5 7.2 5.1
Export 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.3
Import 8.4 7 5.7 4.3
GDP 4.4 3.8 3.9 3.6
4 A “window of opportunity” associated with the extension of various energy price discounts to Ukraine will unavoidably 
close following Russia’s transition to the principle of equal return on natural gas supplies to the domestic and foreign markets 
(in this scenario, taking place in 2015).
It should be noted that while the lack of significant changes to the structure 
of the economy causes a slowdown in economic growth, it is impossible to 
accelerate the growth in output in exporting sectors. Ukrainian GDP in the 
baseline scenario is expected to drop in the long term from 4.4% in 2010-2015 
to 3.6% in 2025-2030.
As (in the scenario under consideration) Ukraine joins neither the European 
Union Free Trade Area nor the Single Economic Space, slower growth in exports 
is expected to have a significant effect on its economy as a whole.
By 2030, the production of electric power is forecasted to increase by 30% 
to 276 billion kWh. Gas imports are forecasted to grow insignificantly to 
43 billion m3, 116% of 2010. This will be possible if gas is substituted by 
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coal in Ukraine’s energy balance, the energy intensity of production is reduced 
and domestic production grows to 30 billion m3. Oil imports are forecasted to 
increase by 50% on 2010 to 23 million tonnes (see Table 1.3). The country’s 
higher dependence on energy imports is expected to boost growth in capital 
investments aimed at the modernisation of production facilities and at reducing 
energy intensity.
table 1.3.
production and 
import of energy 
resources in ukraine 
(baseline scenario)
Source: Calculations 
by IEF RAS and IEF 
NASU
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
oil (million tonnes)
Production 4 5 5 5 5
Import 8 9 9 10 10
Share of imports in domestic consumption 64.7% 66.3% 65.5% 67.6% 67.9%
Gas (billion m3)
Production 20 26 28 29 30
Import 37 37 38 39 43
Share of imports in domestic consumption 65.2% 59.2% 57.3% 57.4% 58.9%
Coal and peat (million tonnes)
Production 56 62 68 75 82
Import 12 15 18 20 21
Share of imports in domestic consumption 17.8% 19.3% 21% 21.4% 20.7%
Electric power (billion kWh)
Production 193 220 245 264 276
Import 2 2 2 2 2
Share of imports in domestic consumption 1.1% 1% 0.9% 0.8% 0.8%
Traditional exporting industries continue to account for a high share in the 
Ukrainian economy. The baseline scenario is premised on rather high rates of 
agricultural growth (up to 4-5% a year), which is expected to make agriculture 
to account for approximately 7.4% of the Ukrainian gross output by the end 
of the forecast period. The shares of metallurgy and chemical production also 
remain high.
To assess the impact of intercountry trade on economic development, estimates 
were generated for a number of scenarios that differ in terms they envision for 
Ukrainian integration with the SES countries.
The first scenario envisions Ukraine joining the CIS Free Trade Area (CIS 
FTA) in 2012, with exceptions (preservation of trade barriers with respect to 
agricultural products, the fuel and energy sector and metallurgy). According to 
estimates, this course of events is not expected to have a significant effect on 
the economies of Russia and Kazakhstan, since the bulk of trade between the 
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table 1.4.
Sectoral composition 
of the ukrainian 
economy in constant 
prices  
(% of gross output)
Source: Calculations 
by IEF RAS and IEF 
NASU
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Agriculture 8.1 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.4
Mining 5.8 5.4 5 4.7 4.5
Food processing (including beverages and 
tobacco)
9.5 9.9 10.1 10.2 10.2
Textiles and garment manufacturing 
(including leather manufacturing)
1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2
Forestry, timber and pulp-and-paper 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9
Coke and petroleum products 4.2 2.8 1.7 1 0.5
Chemical production 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 5
Production of other non-metal mineral 
products
1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4
Metallurgy 9.2 8.7 8.5 8.3 8.2
Mechanical engineering 5.9 6.5 6.9 7.3 7.6
Electric power 4.9 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.7
Construction 3.5 4.6 5.7 6.6 7
Transport and communications 9 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.4
Commerce 10.5 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.8
Services 20.6 20.6 20.5 20.4 20.3
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
table 1.5.
Change in key 
macroeconomic 
indicators compared 
to the baseline 
option 
(scenario envisioning 
Ukraine joining the 
CIS FTA,  
with exceptions;
% of baseline 
volumetric indicators)
Source: Calculations 
by IEF RAS
Russia 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Import 0 0 0 0.01
GDP 0 0 0 0
Kazakhstan 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0 0 0.01 0.01
Import 0 0 0.02 0.02
GDP 0 0 0 0
Belarus 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Import 0 0 0 0
GDP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Ukraine 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 2.38 2.07 1.77 1.51
Import 0 0 0.03 0.05
GDP 0.65 0.56 0.48 0.4
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two countries and Ukraine is in the sectors where the levels of trade barriers 
remain virtually constant. Belarus’ exports and its GDP are expected to grow 
insignificantly. The most significant gain is forecasted for Ukraine’s production, 
with GDP outpacing the baseline option by an average of 0.5%.
Thus, an unequivocal conclusion is that if Ukraine joins the CIS FTA with 
exceptions across a number of key sectors this is not expected to have a 
significant effect on trade and economic relationships in the post-Soviet area. 
In essence, this option could be deemed the preservation of its status quo with 
an insignificant positive effect from lifting certain barriers to trade with the CIS 
countries.
table 1.6.
Change in key 
macroeconomic 
indicators compared 
to the baseline 
option
(scenario envisioning 
Ukraine joining the 
SES; only effects of 
improvements in 
trade with the SES 
countries; 
% of baseline 
volumetric indicators)
Source: Calculations 
by IEF RAS
Russia 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05
Import 0 0 0 0.01
GDP 0 0.01 0.01 0.01
Kazakhstan 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Import 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03
GDP 0 0 0.01 0.01
Belarus 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Import 0 0.06 0.06 0.06
GDP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Ukraine 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 4.15 3.66 3.14 2.68
Import 0.16 0.16 0.2 0.26
GDP 1.15 0.99 0.85 0.73
In the scenario that envisions Ukraine joining the Single Economic Space without 
exceptions, the GDP gains for Russia and Kazakhstan are expected to be more 
appreciable than those under the scenario envisioning the creation of the CIS 
FTA. In this scenario, Belarusian GDP is expected to remain almost unchanged 
compared to the scenario envisioning Ukraine’s partial joining the SES. For 
Ukraine itself, the impact on GDP is expected to increase by approximately 
50% compared to the previous scenario because of price reductions, lower 
production costs and increased exports of metallurgical and agricultural products 
(see Table 1.6).
Another option was considered as a scenario in which Ukraine, instead of 
joining the Single Economic Space, creates a free trade area with the European 
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Union. This assumes the reciprocal lifting of customs duties between Ukraine 
and the EU countries. At the same time, the SES countries are expected to 
establish customs duties for Ukraine at the levels that are used in trade with 
European countries. Ukrainian exports to the EU are forecasted to grow by 10% 
and imports from the EU by 15%.
The trade turnover between the SES countries and Ukraine is forecasted to 
decrease by approximately 2.5%. Compared to the baseline scenario, this 
option forecasts lower economic growth for Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, 
triggered by a decline in exports to Ukraine. Ukrainian GDP is also expected to 
be lower than in the baseline scenario because of a reduction in exports to the 
SES countries and a growth in imports from the EU, which is expected to exceed 
the increases in exports to the EU (see Table 1.7).
The main adverse effects on the Ukrainian economy are expected to be caused 
by:
•  a reduction in the aggregate exports of mechanical engineering products;
•  the impossibility, because of limited industrial capacity, to accelerate 
growth in production and in the export of metallurgical, chemical and 
agricultural products;
•  continued dependence on the importation of energy commodities from the 
SES countries, in a situation characterised by the low price elasticity of 
consumption; in other words, expenditures of the Ukrainian economy on 
energy resources are expected to grow significantly.
table 1.7.
Change in key 
macroeconomic 
indicators compared 
to the baseline 
option 
(scenario envisioning 
Ukraine’s joining the 
EU FTA;  
% of baseline 
volumetric indicators)
Source: Calculations 
by IEF RAS
Russia 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0 0 0 0
Import 0 0 0 0
GDP 0 0 0 0
Kazakhstan 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0 0 0 0
Import -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
GDP 0 0 0 0
Belarus 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0 0 0 0
Import 0 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
GDP 0 0 0 0
Ukraine 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export -0.19 -0.08 0.09 0.27
Import 4.22 4.03 3.83 3.54
GDP -1.28 -1.22 -1.03 -0.94
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The formation of the Single Economic Space means not only the expansion 
of intercountry trade, but also deeper industrial cooperation between the 
enterprises of the countries involved. In addition, the lifting of customs barriers 
is expected to encourage competition among post-Soviet enterprises that 
are roughly equivalent in terms of their capacity and potential. All this will 
stimulate technological convergence between the economies, which will lead, 
inter alia, to an equalisation of the indicators of energy and material intensity 
and to the attainment of closer productivity in terms of the utilisation of primary 
resources. This scenario assumes that the energy and material intensity of the 
Ukrainian economy will decline at faster rates, levelling off at the standard of 
the currently more advanced Russian economy. This will cause a reduction 
in energy consumption and, therefore, lower dependency on energy imports. 
In addition, lower production costs are expected to enhance opportunities for 
reducing prices for the purposes of stimulating demand and higher production. 
The same factor conditions the additional growth in exports.
table 1.8.
Change in key 
macroeconomic 
indicators compared 
to the baseline 
option 
(scenario envisioning 
Ukraine’s joining 
the SES and 
technological 
convergence;
% of baseline 
volumetric indicators)
Source: Calculations 
by IEF RAS
Russia 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0.03 0.1 0.1 0.1
Import 0 0 0 0.01
GDP 0 0.01 0.01 0.01
Kazakhstan 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08
Import 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03
GDP 0 0.01 0.01 0.01
Belarus 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0.15 0.34 0.39 0.41
Import 0 0.06 0.06 0.06
GDP 0.06 0.15 0.18 0.2
Ukraine 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 4.35 4.35 3.73 3.09
Import -2.19 -5.7 -5.41 -5.28
GDP 2.81 5.94 6.65 6.57
In this scenario, the Ukrainian economy is expected to see the greatest effects, 
as the impact of technological convergence within the SES was already factored 
in the baseline scenario envisioning the unification of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan.
The formation of a unified currency system – or maintaining constant exchange 
rates for the SES national currencies – could become another element of the 
Single Economic Space. On the one hand, this would minimise currency 
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risks of the member states in mutual trade. On the other hand, advantages in 
bilateral trade will become impossible if a national currency devaluates. At first 
glance, currency integration seems less advantageous to the net importers of 
energy resources who cannot offset the trade balance deficit with changes in 
exchange rates. Thus, it is important to understand whether the effects of the 
lifting of customs duties and enhanced industrial cooperation will offset the 
losses associated with the need to use a unified currency system. The estimates 
generated for this scenario, which encompasses all of the aforementioned 
factors, indicate that the Ukrainian economy will preserve its gain, though lower 
compared to the baseline scenario. Given that by 2030 the positive impact of 
these effects on Belarusian GDP is expected to reach approximately 6% of 
the baseline GDP, it can be asserted that, in the long term, joining the Single 
Economic Space with the unification of the currency system will yield a greater 
gain than that offered by the scenario envisioning the independent setting of 
exchange rates.
These forecasts reflect the existing integration risks associated with the formation 
of a single currency and financial system in the post-Soviet area (see Table 
1.9). 
table 1.9.
Change in key 
macroeconomic 
indicators compared 
to the baseline 
option 
(scenario envisioning 
Ukraine’s joining the 
SES with a unified 
currency system 
and technological 
convergence;  
% of baseline 
volumetric indicators)
Source: Calculations 
by IEF RAS
Russia 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0 0.03 0.18 0.98 1.45
Import 0 -0.25 -0.86 -1.48 -2.11
GDP 0 0.02 0.11 0.29 0.41
Kazakhstan 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0 0.1 0.27 0.78 1.52
Import 0 -0.37 -1.29 -2.14 -2.92
GDP 0 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.46
Belarus 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0 0.13 0.16 -0.08 -0.32
Import 0 0.62 2.29 3.92 7.7
GDP 0 0.03 -0.14 -0.63 -0.74
Ukraine 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Export 0.05 2.51 1.56 -1.35 -3.4
Import 0 -1.49 -3.44 -1.26 0.79
GDP -0.05 2.56 5.78 3.87 1.98
In addition to the quantitative estimate of the overall macroeconomic effects of 
different integration scenarios in the post-Soviet area it is important to assess 
possible changes in sectors.
Viktor Ivanter, Valery Geets, Vladimir Yasinskiy, Alexander Shirov, 
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As regards mutual trade in energy commodities Kazakhstan and Russia will 
clearly remain net exporters in the foreseeable future and Ukraine and Belarus 
net importers.
In the context of the existing trade and economic relationships it appears that 
integration will not have a significant effect on trade in primary commodities. 
The distribution of product flows from these sectors in trade within the SES 
and between the SES and third countries will depend on demand. It should be 
assumed that, in the foreseeable future, the production capacities in the primary 
sectors will continue to significantly exceed domestic demand in post-Soviet 
countries. This will keep sectors such as metallurgy, chemical production, and 
fuel and energy export-oriented.
A more complex and pressing task is to provide scenarios for mutual trade in 
high value-added products, primarily mechanical engineering products. 
At present, 70-90% of all mechanical engineering products are imported to the 
SES countries and Ukraine from other countries. In 2010, Russia imported 92% 
of all of its mechanical engineering products from third countries, Ukraine 83%, 
Belarus 75%, and Kazakhstan 72%.
The high share of third countries in equipment imports by the SES countries and 
Ukraine is explained primarily by the gap in technological development and 
efficiency of their mechanical engineering sectors.
In terms of energy intensity of GDP, Russia lags significantly behind Europe. 
In 2010, Russia’s energy expenditures per $1 of GDP (in constant 2005 prices 
recalculated to reflect purchasing power parity) were almost 300% higher than 
those of European OECD countries. Importantly, these are the countries that 
are the main suppliers of mechanical engineering products to the SES countries 
and Ukraine.
table 1.10.
Assessment of the 
gap in economic 
efficiency and 
scientific and 
technological 
development 
compared to the 
oECD countries 
(Europe, times)
Source: EIA, 
calculations by IEF 
RAS
2010 2020 2030
Russia 3.7 2.7 2.5
Kazakhstan 4.3 2.9 2.5
Belarus 4.9 3.2 2.5
Ukraine 5.4 3 2.5
5 http://www.eia.gov
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of primary resources in the SES countries and Ukraine make it possible to 
assess their technological gap compared to European OECD countries (see 
Table 1.10).
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In assessing the possible development of trade in mechanical engineering 
products it can be assumed that mutual trade in these goods between the SES 
countries and Ukraine has potential to replace imports from third countries to 
the extent to which the scientific and technological gap can be bridged. In other 
words, bridging this gap would mean that the SES countries and Ukraine will 
be able to reduce the share of imports of mechanical engineering products from 
third countries.
table 1.11.
Assessment of 
integration effects 
at the sectoral level6 
(%)
Source: Calculations 
by IEF RAS
Machinery and equipment production 2010 2020 2030
Share in Ukraine’s total output
Share in Ukraine’s exports 6.33 11.31 14.84
Share in Ukraine’s exports to the SES 8.12 14.07 18.31
Share of Ukraine’s imports in the total sectoral imports (Russia) 3.78 4.97 6.55
Share of imports from Russia in the total sectoral imports (Ukraine) 11.7 11.03 10.53
Shipbuilding
Share in Ukraine’s total output 0.35 0.48 0.61
Share in Ukraine’s exports 0.89 1.23 1.51
Share in Ukraine’s exports to the SES 0.44 0.89 1.25
Share of Ukraine’s imports in the total imports 2.78 4.46 6.4
Share of imports from Russia in the total sectoral imports (Ukraine) 0.71 0.46 0.32
Aircraft manufacturing and space technology
Share in Ukraine’s total output 0.27 0.71 1.1
Share in Ukraine’s exports 0.7 2.5 3.8
Share in Ukraine’s exports to the SES 2.58 4.69 6.27
Share of Ukraine’s imports in the total sectoral imports (Russia) 2.4 3.5 4.7
Share of imports from Russia in the total sectoral imports (Ukraine) 4.15 3.91 3.74
6 Structural indicators are calculated in constant prices.
Viktor Ivanter, Valery Geets, Vladimir Yasinskiy, Alexander Shirov, 
and Andrey Anisimov. “The Economic Effects of the Creation  
of the Single Economic Space and Potential Accession of Ukraine”
CUSTOMS UNION 
AND THE SINGLE ECONOMIC SPACE
If the technological gap between the SES countries and Ukraine and third 
countries is bridged, the share of mechanical engineering imports from the SES 
countries and Ukraine in Russia’s aggregate mechanical engineering imports is 
expected to grow from 8.3% in 2010 to 17.1% in 2030, in Kazakhstan from 
28.3% to 46.6%, in Belarus from 24.7% to 39.1%, and in Ukraine from 16.9% 
to 26.4%. As for trade with Ukraine, sectoral agreements entered into within 
the framework of its bilateral relationships with Russia or in the process of the 
country’s joining the SES can focus on the sectors that have potential for the 
production of competitive products in post-Soviet markets. These sectors include 
aircraft manufacturing, shipbuilding, power engineering, and the production of 
conventional weapons.
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It should be noted that the positive trade and economic relationships between 
Russia and Ukraine would provide potential for a significant intensification of 
interaction in developing mechanical engineering. For example, the supply of 
Ukrainian aircraft engines will remain vital for Russian helicopter manufacturers 
at least through 2017-2018. The available alternative – the construction of 
factories in Russia – involves high financial and technological risks.
In the area of aircraft manufacturing, the Antonov Design Centre has engineering 
potential and competencies that Russian manufacturers lack. Moreover, the 
massive production of aircraft designed in Ukraine is currently impossible 
without Russian parts and assembly sites.
In addition, a great deal of the defence and dual-purpose equipment that is 
currently in use in the SES countries features Ukrainian-made parts. The 
servicing of this equipment will also contribute to the on-going cooperation in 
the mechanical engineering sector. However, these ties can only be maintained 
and advanced if new types of equipment are created. The development of 
cooperation in aircraft manufacturing will boost turnover in the sector. By 2030, 
the share of aircraft equipment in Ukraine’s exports to the SES could reach 
7%.
Given the deficit in the shipbuilding production capacities, as well as the 
country’s dominant positions in the post-Soviet area in the development and 
manufacture of gas-turbine engines for navy, commercial, and passenger 
vessels, there are significant prospects for cooperation in the shipbuilding 
sector. By 2030, the share of shipbuilding products in Ukrainian exports to the 
SES countries is expected to grow to 1.2%.
As for machinery and equipment production, Ukraine’s main opportunities are 
associated with the utilisation of its potential to develop power engineering 
and with the development and manufacture of equipment for the production 
and transportation of natural resources, conventional weapons, and military 
equipment. Additional opportunities for the development of mechanical 
engineering can arise following the rollout of production focused on the SES 
markets and providing industrial assembly and subsequent localisation. The 
most promising areas are the production of investment equipment, construction 
machinery and equipment, agricultural equipment, and rolling stock. The 
utilisation of the existing mechanical engineering potential, combined with the 
launch of industrial assembly projects, can increase the share of mechanical 
engineering in Ukraine’s exports to the SES countries to 20% by 2030.
A comparison of estimates shows that the greatest growth in exports and GDP 
compared to the baseline scenario (where Ukraine joins neither the EU Free 
Trade Area nor the SES) is expected in the option envisioning Ukraine’s joining 
the SES with technological convergence but without the formation of a unified 
currency system.
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High export growth is also expected in the scenario where Ukraine forms a free 
trade area with the EU; however because of the significant increase in imports 
and a reduction in exports to the SES countries in this case Ukrainian GDP is 
expected to dip slightly. 
A significant increase in GDP is typical of the scenarios that provide for 
technological convergence. Export growth is expected in the scenarios 
envisioning Ukraine’s joining the SES or the EU FTA. The scenario envisioning 
the fixing of the exchange rate entails significant negative effects for the 
Ukrainian economy because of worsened balance of payments. In essence, 
this prompts the necessity to invest in improvements to economic efficiency, 
first and foremost in reducing the energy intensity of production. Otherwise, 
a mechanism must be envisioned for the transfer of capital flows within the 
SES in order to minimise distortions in the balance of trade and payments. 
The proposed scenarios suggest that the main criteria for improving the GDP 
dynamics when selecting customs policies are associated with the expansion 
of markets for manufacturers and a reduction in expenditures on raw materials 
and energy commodities through the introduction of new technologies and a 
reduction in the share of customs payments in their cost. For this reason, Ukraine 
joining the SES appears to be a more advantageous option compared to the 
scenario envisioning the formation of a free trade area with the EU, because it 
affords Ukrainian industries more competitive advantages in the contemplated 
figure 1.5.
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common market. This makes it possible to secure financial resources for making 
the necessary capital investments and modernisation, which will help to further 
expand trade in the global market.
Over the period of 2011-2030, the maximum cumulative positive effect of 
integration on the Ukrainian economy is estimated at $219 billion in 2010 
prices.
In assessing the significance of integration effects on the structure of the 
Ukrainian economy it appears that the scenario featuring the fullest utilisation 
of the integration opportunities offered by the SES provides for a marked 
diversification of the economy. The share of mechanical engineering in the 
aggregate gross output is expected to reach 7.7% by the end of the forecast 
period. The shares of metallurgy and agriculture are expected to dip slightly. 
Overall, it is expected that the structure of the Ukrainian economy will become 
increasingly balanced.
table 1.12.
Sectoral breakdown 
of the ukrainian 
economy, 
in constant prices 
(technological 
convergence 
scenario,%)
Source: Calculations 
by IEF RAS
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Agriculture 8.1 8.1 7.9 7.6 7.4
Mining 5.8 5.2 4.3 4 3.7
Food processing (including beverages and tobacco) 9.5 10 10.4 10.4 10.5
Textiles and garment manufacturing (including leather manufacturing) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
Forestry, timber and pulp-and-paper 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9
Coke and petroleum products 4.2 2.6 1.3 0.7 0.3
Chemical production 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.1
Production of other non-metal mineral products 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.4
Metallurgy 9.2 8.9 8.5 8.4 8.3
Mechanical engineering 5.9 6.6 7 7.5 7.7
Electric power 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.5 3.1
Construction 3.5 4.6 5.8 6.7 7.1
Transport and communications 9 9.1 9.3 9.4 9.5
Commerce 10.5 10.7 10.8 10.9 11
Services 20.6 20.6 20.8 20.7 20.6
Total 100% 100% 100% 100.1% 100%
Over the period of 2011-2030, the ultimate effect of the creation of the SES and 
Ukraine joining it can be assessed for the four countries at $1.1 trillion in 2010 
prices (see Figure 1.6).
By the end of the forecast period, the integration of the SES countries would 
ensure a gain in the four countries’ aggregate GDP of up to 2.8% over the 
baseline option (see Figure 1.7).
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figure 1.6.
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CoNCLuSIoNS
The following key conclusions can be drawn based on the findings of our 
research:
1. The intensification of integration within the SES of Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus through the fostering of trade ties, industrial cooperation, and 
technological convergence will help increase their aggregate annual GDP 
by the end of the forecast period by approximately 2.5% compared to their 
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aggregate GDP if they do not integrate. Over the period of 2011-2030, 
the total cumulative effect from the creation of the SES, without Ukraine, is 
estimated at $900 billion (in 2010 prices).
2. Because of the existing structure of the Belarusian economy and the main 
directions of its foreign economic ties, integration in the post-Soviet area 
is of vital importance to the country, since Belarusian exports to the SES 
countries can reach up to 35% of the national GDP in the future.
3. Ukraine’s avoidance of the integration processes in the post-Soviet area will 
lead to the preservation of its current sectoral breakdown and, as a result, to 
a potential slowdown in its economic growth because of the impossibility 
to accelerate export growth.
4. Ukraine’s joining the CIS FTA with the current exceptions will have no 
appreciable impact on foreign trade within the CIS, the growth rates of 
the Ukrainian economy, or the country’s economic structure. In essence, 
Ukraine’s joining the CIS FTA in this format can be viewed as the preservation 
of its status quo with insignificant positive effects for its economy.
5. Ukraine’s joining the EU FTA would worsen the terms of trade in the 
post-Soviet area. In this case the SES countries can mitigate the negative 
consequences of such a move by Ukraine by raising median customs tariffs. 
Because of a reduction in exports to the SES countries and an increase in 
imports from the EU (only partially offset by a certain increase in exports to 
the EU), Ukraine in this scenario can lose up to 1.5% of its baseline GDP.
6. The greatest change in the structure of the Ukrainian economy for the 
sectors with higher processing levels is expected in the scenario envisioning 
the country’s joining the SES with subsequent technological convergence. 
In this case, the share of mechanical engineering in Ukraine’s gross output 
is expected to climb from 6% to 9%.
7. Ukraine joining the SES means that, owing to trade effects, its annual GDP 
will exceed the baseline GDP by 1% by the end of the forecast period. 
With technological integration and the fostering of cooperation ties taken 
into account, the economic effect can be estimated to reach 6-7% of GDP 
by 2030. In this scenario, by the end of the forecast period, Ukraine’s GDP 
is expected to exceed its GDP in the scenario avoiding integration with 
the SES by approximately 6-7%. At the same time, the share of mechanical 
engineering in Ukraine’s GDP is expected to increase from 6% to 9%. In 
addition, the share of machinery and equipment in Ukraine’s total output is 
forecasted to reach 6% by 2030 and their share in Ukraine’s exports to the 
SES 20%. The fostering of cooperation in aircraft manufacturing will boost 
turnover in this sector. In the structure of Ukrainian exports to the SES, the 
share of aircraft equipment is expected to grow to 7% by 2030. The share 
of shipbuilding products in Ukrainian exports to the SES is forecasted to 
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climb to 1.2%. Over the period of 2011–2030, the total positive effect 
of this integration option on the Ukrainian economy is estimated at $219 
billion in 2010 prices.
8. One of the key challenges of integration is the development of a uniform 
currency and financial policy for the SES countries. According to estimates, 
if the SES countries continue their non-coordinated currency policies 
this can significantly weaken the positive effects of integration. At the 
same time, the harmonisation of exchange rates can create significant 
problems for the SES countries that are dependent on the import of energy 
commodities (particularly when prices rise). Alternatively, mechanisms can 
be envisioned for the transfer of capital flows within the SES countries in 
order to minimise distortions in the balance of trade and payments. If these 
mechanisms are created the harmonisation of exchange rates would be the 
most advantageous scenario for further intensification of integration in the 
post-Soviet area.
9. Over the period of 2011-2030, the total cumulative effect of the creation 
of the SES and Ukraine joining it on the four countries can reach $1.1 
trillion in 2010 prices. Broken down by countries, this effect is expected 
to approximate 14% of Belarusian GDP, 6% of Ukrainian GDP, 3.5% of 
Kazakh GDP, and 2% of Russian GDP. Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
are expected to benefit from integration to the greatest extent in terms of 
per capita effects while Russia is expected to benefit from it to the greatest 
extent in absolute terms.
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Over twenty years ago, on December 8-10, 1991, two very important 
geopolitical events happened in Europe and Eurasia.
On December 8, 1991, a decision to dissolve the Soviet Union was taken in 
Belovezhskaya Pushcha. And on the next day in Maastricht, leaders of the 
European community decided to create the European Union (EU).
The coincidence in the timing of these two events allows me to reword the 
famous proclamation of the French royal ritual: “The Union is dead, long live 
the Union!”
Indeed, the Soviet Union died, but another union emerged on the globe – the 
European Union, which is, obviously, built on absolutely different economic 
and political principles. When new independent states began to search for ways 
of interaction after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, they used (and continue 
to use), the European Union as a reference point, as opposed to the Soviet 
one.
This is a very important, key aspect – one that is practically disregarded. 
All initiators of the integration processes in the post-Soviet space chose and 
continue to choose the European Union as a model, despite its own problems, 
which have become very acute. However, this is the only functioning integration 
model that is used as an example in Eurasia, Latin America and other parts of 
the world.
The history of Eurasian integration is actually an attempt to build something 
similar to the EU.
This history is meandering, complicated, controversial and sometimes very 
dramatic.
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…The very next morning after the breakdown of the USSR, the former Soviet 
republics understood that they needed each other’s assistance in building their 
sovereignty and independence. They had been a single economic mechanism 
for too long a time to begin to function independently overnight. The beginning 
of the 1990s was flagged with various integration initiatives, including the 1993 
Agreement on the Formation of the Economic Union, the 1994 Agreement on 
the Formation of the Free Trade Area, and the 1994 Agreement on the Payment 
Union, in an attempt to preserve the shrinking, as la peau de chagrin, rouble 
zone.
In the mid-1990s, it became clear that not all of them were interested in real 
integration and a multilevel structure began to form in the post-Soviet space.
In 1995, first agreements on the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan were signed, to which Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were later added. 
These were, to a significant extent, framework agreements or memoranda of 
intent. Yet, a higher level of interaction emerged – a core of the states that 
were ready for more advanced forms of cooperation. At this stage, however, 
they did not understand that they would have to sacrifice their sovereignty for 
these purposes or, to put it more precisely, to transfer a part of their sovereignty, 
on a purely voluntary basis, to a supranational level. For the moment, these 
“advanced” countries were living to an “integration plus sovereignty” 
principle.
In 1999, the five countries signed the agreement to form the Customs Union 
and the Single Economic Space. The same year, Russia and Belarus created the 
Union State with the aim of making it a fully-featured economic, currency and 
political union. Thus, another level of integration appeared.
In 2000, the five countries transformed into Eurasian Economic Community, 
and the “triad” of the Commonwealth of Independent States, EurAsEC and the 
Union State emerged in the post-Soviet space. These three unions adopted 
hundreds of documents, a host of plans of actions, and several institutional 
reforms. However, no real integration happened despite their statements. No 
one went beyond the level of a free trade frea.
The main reason for the inefficiency of all these projects was that they formally 
copied the models of European integration, with the creation of similar institutes 
and the proclamation of similar objectives. In essence, however, these first 
attempts of integration disregarded the key laws of the integration process. In 
spite of this fact, these first attempts were not useless as they established a basis 
for making integration practical.
The turning point was marked in 2003, with the launch of a project to create 
the Single Economic Space across four states: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan. It was clear from the very beginning that this project did not have 
much chance of success. For this reason, the participants focused primarily on 
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the “intellectual” side of the issue. The preparation of the SES Blueprint and 
Agreement were not viewed as traditional interstate negotiations where they 
could bargain over their positions or concessions. The objective was to prepare 
a comprehensive and viable project that could be implemented, given the 
existence of political will as a matter of course.
This was a revolutionary document for the post-Soviet area. It provided for the 
creation of a supranational body, the transfer of a part of national authority to it 
and the adoption of decisions subject to the economic weight of the states. All 
these are universal laws and principles of integration, which were at this point 
acknowledged for the first time by post-Soviet states.
The SES Agreement was signed and ratified in 2003 and although Ukraine later 
withdrew from it, the remaining three participants continued to fulfil it. This 
process could have continued until now if the global financial crisis had not 
taken place. When all countries in the world began to look for mechanisms to 
minimise its consequences in 2008, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan saw the 
consolidation of economic effects and deep economic integration as one of the 
possible tools.
Therefore, we should “thank” the global economic crisis for the successful 
development of integration over the past four years. It was the crisis that 
made these countries able to understand the significance and necessity of 
integration.
The CU of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia was formed on the existing base (in 
a rather accelerated fashion) on January 1, 2010. This was an unexpected turn 
of events for many people, including those abroad. This was not because timely 
information had been unavailable, quite the opposite – there had been many 
talks at different levels but no one had believed them. As a quick reminder, 
the creation of the CU had been in discussion since early 1990s and everyone 
tended to see these talks as traditional political statements or wasted words that 
would not bring about any real results.
Therefore, when this idea finally materialised many people were surprised 
at the appearance of a new formation. We should do justice to our foreign 
partners who regarded this process with understanding, recognised its 
conformance to global economic trends and acknowledged that it did not 
contradict in any manner to the standards and principles of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). I would like to specifically point out that Russia was 
admitted as a member of the WTO after it had become a member of the CU. 
It is obviously not only the evaluation of Russia’s efforts to harmonise its laws 
with the requirements of the WTO but also the recognition of the fact that 
the CU is a structure which meets the requirements of global economy. After 
joining the WTO, Russia’s tariff obligations will become mandatory for the 
whole territory of the CU. As a result of this, the states signed a special 
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international agreement and Russia’s obligations before the WTO will be 
carried out in a rigorous fashion.
Seventeen agreements were quickly signed on the basis of the CU to form the 
Single Economic Space. If you wish to draw an analogy with Europe, this is the 
“Eurasian version” of the EU single internal market. The agreements took effect 
on January 1, 2012.
The implementation of integration ideas and their transition from theoretical 
and bureaucratic concepts has driven interest to their conceptual basis. Where 
does integration begin? What are its stages? What are its laws and principles? 
What is being actually built in Eurasia?
These issues that in our countries were previously of interest to a narrow circle 
of experts have become topical for politicians, officials, business people and 
the general public. This is very encouraging because the SES project requires 
broad public support – even more so than the CU. The CU has been in 
development for fifteen years and in the end no one believed it was a serious 
project. When it was finally created it amazed those in the member states or 
abroad.
The SES and the Eurasian Economic Union are expected to produce another 
effect. This project will inevitably give rise to a host of myths. Some people will 
expect, with hope or horror, a revival of the Soviet Union. Russia’s neighbours 
will inadvertently become anxious about the reinstatement of Moscow’s 
“imperial ambitions”. The Russian will be concerned whether they would “again 
pay for everyone”. All this will happen against a very significant background of 
sympathy with integration trends among the general public.
However, the national egoism of our companies is equally, or I would say 
already, significant. They do not want greater competition, even from weaker 
competitors. There is no sense in ordering everyone to “parade” towards 
integration. Companies need to see its advantages as European companies 
saw them in the common market, although they faced a stiffer expansion of 
competition. For this reason, thorough work with the general public and the 
business community is needed.
On the other hand, we have thousands, possibly tens of thousands of research 
studies on integration in our countries. The majority of them begin to formulate 
its theory with the statement that the objective preconditions for the formation 
of integration tendencies formed in late 1950s.
Here’s an important quote: “One of the objective tendencies in the modern 
global economic relationships is the formation of regional integration unions 
inspired by technological progress, intensive centralisation and concentration of 
production and capital, which gives rise to the need to bridge the gap between 
internationalisation in all areas of global economic ties on the one hand and 
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the existence of separate, relatively isolated national economic complexes on 
the other”.
Overall, this statement does not raise any objections. I still agree with it on the 
whole; it opened my own Ph.D. thesis in 1995.
However, today, after fifteen years of participation in the practical building 
of integration, I have to admit that this statement explains only the economic 
component of integration. It is important, but it not the only factor.
It does not answer why integration is so successful in Europe and why it is so 
slow, compared to the EU, in other parts of the world. Indeed, the EU is, at 
present, the only regional union that went beyond a free trade area and a 
customs union and that created an economic and currency union and 
supranational mechanisms that have significantly restricted national 
sovereignty.
Surely, we can suppose that Europe, divided into national economies, has 
more clearly understood the conflict between the internationalisation of the 
global market and the existence of national borders. It is understandable why 
the US, at least because of the scale of their economy, did not have a need for 
a continental union for a long time and why the prototype for an integration 
union, the North American Free Trade Area, began to form at significantly later 
dates.
This is a logical explanation. However, what about Japan, which is characterised 
by economic openness, its dependence on foreign markets and, at the time, 
stable economic growth? Why didn’t it manage to pull together around itself an 
efficient Asian integration union? Why all numerous regional unions that exist 
today are still so far from the EU?
Is it possible that the reason is that, in addition to the economic component, 
there is an important political, mental or psychological component, without 
which integration cannot succeed?
The founders of the European Union were inspired with the “European idea”, 
– the idea of common spiritual and cultural values of the European civilisation. 
Integration for Europe is, in essence, a return to its roots. In different historical 
epochs, be it the Roman Empire, Charlemagne’s empire, the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation, or the Habsburg or Napoleon’s empires, Europe 
was united for long periods of time. The collapse of an empire caused lengthy 
fratricidal conflicts on the continent, which culminated in the twentieth century 
when the flame of old European conflicts burst out with new military power and 
plunged the world into two world wars.
In addition to interstate conflicts, Europe suffers from a host of in-country 
tensions. Who can intelligibly explain where the Basque, Irish, Corsican and 
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other forms of separatism originate from today? They all have their sources in 
Europe’s past. It is difficult to delineate a “correct” state border in Europe today 
because there will always be those who disagree.
The idea has risen that it would be easier to reinstate the former unity on a 
new basis, and the European community was invented for this very purpose. I 
hope economists will pardon me for my statement that the founders of the EU 
had thought not about growth and modernisation but rather how to create an 
integral European mechanism, in which former state borders would lose their 
importance and practically dissolve. They hoped this would eradicate causes 
for new European wars.
It is no accident that geographically the united Europe of 1957 reminds that 
of Charlemagne’s empire. Only the original European Six that could prepare, 
sign and ratify the Treaty of Rome, a document that remains even today an 
unrivalled example of revolutionary economic thinking.
It is difficult to believe that only ten years after the destructive war the winners 
and the defeated countries voluntarily agreed to create a supranational union, 
in the name of which they had sacrificed their national sovereignty (which they 
had been protecting only a short time ago with arms). I am convinced that the 
Treaty of Rome was made possible and signed because it had been prepared by 
the countries that were linked with very strong, although controversial historical 
ties.
Having consolidated, the Six began to involve other countries that at different 
times were parts of previous European communities. Europe restored the 
borders of Charlemagne’s empire and began to chase, in a gradual fashion, the 
ghosts of other former empires. It remembered about the empire of the Caesars 
and began its movement toward the Mediterranean and Great Britain. Then 
it remembered about the Habsburg heritage and opened its doors for Central 
Europe. It encompassed the Scandinavians, whose ancestors, the Normans, had 
at one time conquered half of Europe and settled there. For all these countries, 
the joining to the EU was the return to Europe, and the implementation in 
practice of the great European idea.
This idea was born in the Middle Ages when many intelligent scholars dreamt 
about the creation of a single European Christian republic, and it acquired its 
modern shape in the 19th century when Victor Hugo proclaimed the concept of 
the United States of Europe. Without paying attention to the criticism from his 
contemporaries who considered this idea absurd (France and Germany regarded 
each other at the time as eternal enemies), in August 1849 at the International 
Peace Congress, Hugo presented a speech that became one of the fundamental 
thoughts in the European philosophy: 
“A day will come when you France, you Russia, […] you England, you Germany, 
you all, nations of the continent, without losing your distinct qualities and your 
CUSTOMS UNION 
AND THE SINGLE ECONOMIC SPACE
tatyana Valovaya. “Eurasian Economic Integration:  
Origins, Patterns, and Outlooks”
48 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
glorious individuality, will be merged closely within a superior unit and you 
will form the European brotherhood […] A day will come when we shall see 
those two immense groups, the United States of America and the United States 
of Europe […]”
He prophetically called for the creation of a single “continental currency”, resting 
on European capitals and driven by the activity of 200 million Europeans.
In other words, in addition to the economic efficiency of integration, the 
Europeans have always had an ideological component. The EU could not have 
managed to do what it has done without it. This is precisely what many other 
regional unions lack – they cannot formulate clearly their overall objective. 
A federation? Or a confederation? They do not understand why they should 
sacrifice their national sovereignty and, therefore, resist the process, making 
integration efforts useless.
To put it differently, the development of integration would be difficult without 
an inspiring, be it even ambiguous, idea, even when all necessary economic 
components exist. In my opinion, an optimal integration zone is a region where, 
in addition to economic prerequisites, mental prerequisites exist that often stem 
from the common past.
Is the experience of the EU, therefore, absolutely unique? No. It is universal 
because there are other regions on the globe, in addition to Europe, which, in 
my opinion, are in an optimal integration area. Eurasia is one of these regions, 
but not in a purely geographic sense as a continent spreading from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific – I mean its median part, which is equally different from its 
European and Asian ends.
Was Eurasia united in the past? It certainly was. The Scythian union existed 
before Christ, which then gave place to the Turkic Khaganate, which existed 
in 6-7th centuries A.D. and stretched from the Yellow to the Black Sea. The 
Turks were replaced by the Mongols headed by Genghis Khan, who came 
from Siberia. Then, after a period of complete disintegration, Russia took the 
initiative in the 15th century with its movement eastward to the Pacific Ocean. 
The Russian Empire then yielded to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union to 
post-Soviet regional unions. Over ages of living together, the Eurasian peoples 
have obviously developed a common mental space as well as common traditions 
and behavioural patterns.
It was therefore no accident that the “Eurasian idea” was born in the 1920s. The 
October revolution seemed to bury the Russian Empire forever. Yet, even as 
early as 1922, the Soviet Union emerged in its place as a state with an absolutely 
different socio-political and economic structure, but with practically the same 
borders. There is no other such instance in history where a multinational empire 
collapsed and was instantly revived.
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What was it that tied the fragments of the former Russian Empire together? The 
new states with a similar social order that appeared in its area found themselves 
surrounded by enemies – and a common enemy always fosters unity. However, 
was it only the Bolshevik ideology and the military threat that made the peoples 
to want to unite? Russian emigrants who opposed Bolshevism could not 
believe it.
In “civilised” Western Europe, people with a European education and a brilliant 
knowledge of the world’s history, politics and philosophy felt that European 
strangers should have been closer and more relateable to them than the 
“barbarian Asian Russians”. Yet they did not deem themselves the Europeans. 
They understood all of a sudden that they were the Eurasians with their unique 
mental and social peculiarities.
For this reason they believed that the basis for the revival of the Russian Empire 
lay in Eurasia’s specific geographical, psychological or, as we put it today, mental 
and cultural factors. In their opinion, the Eurasian mentality meant the priority 
of collectivist ideology over individualism, the eternal ideals over instantaneous 
values, and the spiritual values over material ones.
The Eurasian idea obviously did not fit the communist ideology or the 
administrative and command system; there were other factors that cemented 
the Soviet Union, and their dissolution caused its breakdown. The interest to 
the seemingly forgotten Eurasian doctrine emerged in the wave of this collapse. 
This was the doctrine that, despite all its internal controversies, managed to 
offer a real uniting dominant idea.
So, Eurasia also has its idea of unity. However, why were these ideas born in 
Europe and Eurasia? Proceeding from the postulate that it is social being that 
determines consciousness, I would assert that uniting ideas are only born where 
they have a solid material base, not just an economic one.
Economic efficiency is a necessary precondition for integration, but it is not in 
itself sufficient. A sufficient precondition appears when not only economies, but 
also peoples as a whole are ready for integration.
In my opinion, the theory of ethnogenesis by Lev Gumilev, whose 100th 
anniversary we celebrate this year, explains the phenomenon of appearance of 
similar uniting ideas. As it is recorded, Gumilev described the historical process 
as interaction of developing ethnoses with landscapes they occupied and other 
ethnoses. He defined ethnos as a “stable group of people that opposes itself to 
all other similar groups, has its own, original internal structure, and a dynamic 
behavioural pattern”.
Ethnoses have limited periods of existence, of approximately 1,200-1,500 years, 
during which they pass a number of stages in their development, “from dawn till 
dusk”. Each of these stages has a pattern of behaviour of individuals, peoples, 
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ethnicities, nations and even civilisations, which is determined by their level of 
passionarity. This basic pattern changes objectively depending on the phase of 
ethnogenesis, each of them lasting for several centuries.
According to Gumilev, the highest level in the ethnic hierarchy is a superethnos, 
which consists of several ethnoses that emerged simultaneously in the same 
region and were connected by economic, ideological and political relationships, 
and which manifests itself in history as mosaic integrity.
Among the superethnoses, Gumilev specifically distinguished the European 
one, which was previously “the Christian world”, and the Eurasian one that 
populated the median part of the Eurasian continent.
I suppose it was no accident that the European and Eurasian ideas were born in 
the frameworks of these superethnoses. In other words, a uniting idea cannot 
appear without a solid material base formed by ethnic structures.
Soviet science never recognised Gumilev and Russian science doesn’t either, 
despite numerous republications of his works. Few people dare to declare him 
a charlatan, as he was a son of respected parents and a man who lived a hard 
life. However, mainstream science does not recognise this scholar.
Where does this inattention, if not to say ignorance, stem from? Gumilev’s 
theory seems to be in line with the ideas of cyclical development of civilisations, 
including those by universally acknowledged scholars such as Toynbee.
I believe there are two reasons. The first one is that Gumilev’s writings were very 
simple, maybe too simple. Humanitarian sciences do not tolerate simplicity, 
which is deemed to be worse than plagiarism.
Another reason is that Gumilev contradicted the proletarian internationalism. 
He dared to state that not all nations could co-exist comfortably with each 
other. He does not blend with Russian nationalism. He believed that Russia 
did not exist at all as an independent ethnic structure. The Russian (or, as he 
sometimes calls it, Eurasian) ethnos in his view was an ethnos that populated 
the former Russian Empire, in which the Slavic peoples blended firmly with 
the Finno-Ugrians, the Mongol Tartars and other descendants from Eurasian 
steppes. The common home to this ethnos was not Russia, but Eurasia.
In my opinion, however, it is Gumilev’s concepts that make it possible to explain 
why economics, or politics, are not the only determinant factors in integration 
and that explains why it includes the ideological and mental component.
I would make two fundamental conclusions. The first one is that integration is 
a form of the state organisation of a superethnos. I anticipate an objection that 
the idea of integration appeared only in the past decades while superethnoses 
existed for hundreds of years. However, superethnoses, as ethnoses, pass 
several stages in their development with evidently different forms of their state 
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organisation. At the “acmatic”/development stage superethnoses organise in an 
empire, in my opinion. In Europe this was Charlemagne’s empire, which the 
Europeans zealously attempted to revive until approximately the 17th century. 
At the climax stage, when, according to Gumilev, “they [ethnoses], governed 
by the dialectic law of the unity of opposites, find areas of activities while 
“maintaining” a stable balance in the continuous struggle with each other”, 
these are nation states, which are very similar and have many things in common, 
possibly including ethnic and religious components, and which quarrel or are 
at war at times and are united at other times. This was what Europe looked in 
the 17-20th centuries.
At the inertial stage it is integration. This is the European Union.
The history of the Eurasian superethnos confirms my hypothesis. During the 
“acmatic”/development stage, it existed in the form of the Russian Empire. 
During the climax stage, which occurred in the 19-20th centuries, this was in 
essence a unitary state. It was no accident that the tsarist Russia was called “the 
prison of nations”, and the USSR tried to breed a new community – the Soviet 
people with smoothed ethnic diversity. This attempt failed and the Eurasian 
ethnos divided into nation states. Now we witness the end of the climax 
stage and Eurasia is entering its inertial stage, which means that the Eurasian 
superethnos is ready for integration.
Since integration is a form of the state organisation of a superethnos, another 
important conclusion follows that integration has clear, objective borders - the 
borders of the superethnos.
This provides an explanation for many things, including the Europeans’ doubts 
about admitting Turkey to the European Union. The reason is not simply Islam. 
The reason is that Turkey belongs to an absolutely different superethnos.
On the other hand, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus consider themselves part of 
Europe and Europe agrees because their western areas belong to the European 
superethnos. These countries are situated on an ethnic “dividing line” of 
our continent, which can become geopolitical if the European and Eurasian 
superethnoses do not unite. We’ll discuss this further later. 
Therefore, the application of Gumilev’s concept onto the modern map of the 
world helps reveal the objective laws of many geopolitical processes.
The European superethnos is now in the inertial phase, “the golden autumn” 
of civilisation, and is integrating quickly. At that, some decisions, including 
the quick expansion of the European Union, cannot be explained by economic 
efficiency. Quite the contrary, as sometimes they are taken in defiance of 
economic priorities. The key is in the underlying desire to “unite and strengthen” 
the European superethnos which is eroding from inside because of the fast pace 
of immigration.
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The North American ethnos is rather young and it is at the “acmatic”/development 
stage. This stage is characterised by aggressive wars abroad. Indeed, we witness 
a change in the American ideological model. The country, which had been 
developing its territory before and had taken part in the world wars of the 20th 
century contrary to the will of its own nation, has engaged in one reckless 
military undertaking after another since the 1950s. However it comes as no 
surprise to admit that the North Americans are, according to our hypothesis, 
pervaded by the “imperial syndrome”.
As for the Chinese superethnos it is traditionally viewed as a very old one, at 
the stage of convolution. I cannot agree with this statement. In my opinion, it is 
in the very beginning of a new cycle. I also disagree that (in the way Gumilev’s 
followers traditionally state it) the Islamic superethnos, as a contemporary of the 
Eurasian one, is at its climax stage.
I believe that a new passionary impetus was given to China, India, Pakistan, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Near East in the 19th century. The incubation phase 
of new superethnoses is coming to its end or has probably ended already. We 
witness the birth of two new superethnoses, the “new Chinese” and “new 
Islamic” ones that are based on fundamentalism. The Arab spring was a vivid 
confirmation of this. We witness how the remnants of the old, “religiously 
tolerant” Islamic ethnos, which gravitated towards Europe, gradually become 
history with our own help.
Since integration is a form of organisation of a superethnos, it becomes evident 
why Russia and China, or Latin America and North America can integrate within 
themselves, but not with each other.
Latin America received a passionate impetus in the 15th century when the 
Europeans began to investigate the continent and is now at the inertial stage. 
It is indeed ready for integration and its integration unions are quite viable. 
The US and Canada, which form a single superethnos, are de facto a viable 
integration union. However, they will never integrate with Latin America.
The post-Soviet space can and should integrate. Otherwise the Eurasian 
superethnos will be pulled apart piece by piece by its neighbours. If they do 
not integrate, many Eurasian nations will possibly cease to exist as a part of 
the Eurasian superethnos and will become parts of other superethnoses: the 
European one in the west, the new Islamic one in Asia and, possibly, the new 
Chinese one in the east.
For this reason the significance of integration in the post-Soviet space goes 
beyond geopolitical objectives and is closely connected to the future of the 
Eurasian ethnos. Only true integration will make it possible for the Eurasian 
ethnos to preserve its identity and geographical location when it is surrounded 
by young and energetic Islamic and Chinese superethnoses.
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In addition, Eurasian integration does not contradict the more global project to 
integrate the space from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Quite possibly, the post-
Soviet space and Europe can integrate in the future and give birth to a new 
superethnos. All the necessary prerequisites exist. Europe, which is ageing 
ethnically, simply has no other choice. It needs fresh blood and new “passionate 
people” to help it revive.
Europe is ready for regeneration, for the birth of a new superethnos on the 
basis of the old one. What will it be? Possibly, the European and Muslim one 
if Europe merges with the remnants of the old Islamic ethnos, which has been 
forced out from its traditional borders.
Yet, there is another option, the European and Eurasian one, one that frightens 
Europe for the moment. Common Europeans associate Eurasia with the Huns, 
Mongols, Tatars, and communists. However, they also feel that this option is 
preferable. This is reflected, among other things, in Russia and the EU’s decision 
to form “four common spaces”, including the economic one. 
It is all the more possible because Eurasian integration is developing in 
accordance with universal laws whose existence is proved by the experience 
of the EU. 
The European Union is indisputably the primary source and pioneer whose 
experience was used to prepare the documents of the CU and the SES and 
will undoubtedly be used in the preparation of the legislative framework of 
the European Economic Union. The European Union has tried the integration 
concept in practice blindfolded (not always supported by theoretical research). 
Our task is to thoroughly study the experience of the EU and learn from the 
mistakes of the others, a host of which have already been made and will surely 
continue to be made by our European counterparts.
This experience helps us formulate the universal laws of an integration process: 
stage-by-stage development, supranationality, subsidiarity, and convergence.
The first law is stage-by-stage development meaning an inevitable rise from 
lower to higher stages of integration.
We all know what happens to a car if we start with the third or fourth gear. The 
engine will stop. A similar thing occurs with integration – its stages cannot be 
avoided.
Integration begins with the first gear, a free trade area. At this stage, member 
countries remove, in a gradual fashion and in agreed timeframes, mutual trade 
barriers while remaining absolutely free in economic relationships with third 
countries. For this reason, they preserve customs borders and customs posts 
between each other to control the origin of goods that cross their frontiers and 
exclude those goods that are imported from third countries using preferential 
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conditions of import into each other’s territories. The CIS is currently at this 
stage.
The second stage of integration is the customs union. At this stage, a single 
customs tariff and a uniform trade policy with respect to third countries is 
adopted. Customs bodies are gradually eliminated on the “internal” borders 
of the member states of such a union and transfer their functions to customs 
services on common external borders, which now become the common borders 
of a single customs space. Supranational bodies, which are vested with certain 
coordination and management functions, begin to function at this stage.
This is the stage Eurasia entered into on January 1, 2010.
The next stage of integration is the single economic space – meaning a single 
internal market, which provides the so-called “four freedoms” (free movement 
of goods, people, services and capital) and a uniform or coordinated policy in 
key economic sectors.
Key economic sectors vary depending on the stage of the SES, the specifics 
of economies, and their level of development, as well as that of global 
economy. Fifty years ago, coal and steel were the key sectors, which were 
regulated by the Europeans in the first place. Other sectors dominate today. 
Accordingly, the set of the SES elements will change in an ongoing fashion 
while competition (in a broad sense of the word) policy and technical regulation 
will obviously remain key elements. Without them even the customs union will 
be inefficient. The Single Economic Space is being built in stages from January 
1, 2012.
The next stage is the economic and currency union, marked with the 
introduction of a single currency. Here, the Europeans had to literally move 
blindfolded, running before they could walk, stumbling and then beginning 
from scratch.
The reason for that was simple, in my opinion. No one thought about currency 
integration when the Treaty of Rome was being prepared. There was simply 
no need for it. The Bretton Woods monetary system ensured a rather high 
degree of stability of the world’s currency system, fixed parities, and a common 
equivalent (gold).
The founders of the EU could not foresee that this system would collapse in some 
fifteen years, and that the unstable 1970s would come when the EU countries 
would clearly understand what it meant to live in a customs union without 
protective trade measures and with unstable currency rates. To improve their 
competitiveness, the EU countries began to extensively make use of currency 
dumping.
To avoid this they decided to speed up the process of currency integration. 
They were not ready for a comprehensive economic and currency union at 
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the time and did not need it for internal reasons; however, external instability 
forced them to begin what they were not prepared for.
The actual currency union and the single currency appeared only when they 
became necessary in the actively developing single economic space, when 
national currencies turned out to be a serious economic barrier.
Therefore, economic integration has its internal dynamics. Each stage leads 
to the next one. To continue the car analogy, it could be said that the next 
integration gear can be used when the integration engine has the necessary 
number of revolutions and achieves the necessary speed. Then the engine 
requires the use of a higher gear.
Indeed, as integration moves toward its higher stages and barriers are removed 
in the way of the single economic space, the remaining barriers become 
increasingly inefficient. The economic policy of one of the countries begins 
to impact other countries in an integration union to a stronger extent and 
can cause them to take preventive or protective measures. These measures 
begin to threaten integration achievements and a challenge arises whether to 
make another breakthrough or to accept the loss of the existing integration 
accomplishments. It is no accident that the integration process is sometimes 
compared to riding a bicycle: any stop can lead to a fall. So, integration is an 
objective, self-developing process with its internal logic.
The second key law is supranationality. It appears at the stage of the customs 
union and solidifies significantly at the stage of the formation of a SES.
National regulatory tools become inefficient when economies become closely 
tied and a common market begins to function in practice. Finally, countries 
strive to unite their efforts to find other, joint ways of implementing economic 
policies. This may be coordination on an interstate basis, with the preservation 
of sovereignty by nation states and the adoption of decisions in primarily a 
unanimous fashion or on a supranational basis when supranational institutes are 
created and vested with a part of state powers.
The post-war decades have demonstrated rather convincingly that the 
combination of interstate and supranational mechanisms of regulation, with a 
gradual solidification of the supranational component, is a universal element in 
the development of regional integration. This approach was utilised in the SES 
documents as well.
Again, the EU experience was used. When it made an attempt to analyse why 
thirty years after the “common market” had been proclaimed it still had barriers 
to the movement of goods, services, capital and labour in the mid-1980s, it 
arrived at a conclusion that one of the causes that prevented the necessary 
joint steps from being taken was an insufficient degree of supranationality. This 
resulted in the 1986 adoption of the Single European Act, which introduced 
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majority voting as a general rule and made the making of decisions by consensus 
an exception.
Therefore, a single economic space is sustainable only when supranational 
bodies are formed and vested with competency that can be gradually extended. 
At the same time a supranational law, which would prevail over national laws, 
and a majority voting system, where the right of veto is used in exceptional 
cases only, are needed.
Subsidiarity is the third law of an integration process. We do not use this term 
in our integration efforts at the moment and the Europeans only began to use it 
not so long ago, in early 1990s when their integration process began to glitch. 
This is another mistake made by Europe that we should avoid.
Subsidiarity means that decisions are taken at the levels of state management 
where they are most efficient. Everything that can be resolved at lower levels 
is done there and what cannot be resolved at lower levels is passed to a 
higher level. This helps avoid the excessive centralisation of decision-making 
at the higher levels of state. Friedrich August von Hayek wrote that, “with its 
centralism, inefficiency, an excessive devotion to legal issues, etc., federalism 
without subsidiarity is a step toward feudalism”.
With respect to the EU, the principle of subsidiarity means that the community 
is vested with those functions only, which cannot be fulfilled by its member 
countries in an efficient manner any more.
The fourth law is convergence. The development of integration processes leads 
to significant coordination of economic policies of member states. A single 
trade, customs and tariff policy appears at the stage of the customs union. 
Competition and subsidising policies are adopted and policies in certain sectors 
become coordinated at the stage of the SES. A single monetary policy appears 
at the stage of the currency union.
A single policy means common goals and regulatory instruments. However, 
common goals can only appear and be fulfilled when main economic indicators 
are aligned and the levels of economic development and economic structures 
are close. How can a common policy be implemented when basic conditions 
differ? Convergence, or the alignment of main economic indicators, is needed 
to make an integration system stable.
All these laws should be carefully taken into account in building the Eurasian 
Economic Union. This is the only way to make it successful. What is the outlook 
for Eurasian integration?
On January 1, 2012, we entered into the stage of the single economic space. 
It is currently based on seventeen international agreements. Obviously, it is 
premature to talk about the completion of its formation. 
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I remember a phrase, which I often heard from the Europeans in the 1990s when 
they built and then improved their internal market. They said that building a 
single internal market was like a repair. It could not have been completed and 
carried on without cessation. Indeed, new spheres that need to be regulated 
and new challenges that need to be faced emerge continuously. In fact, even 
Europe, which made the project of a single internal market effective since 
January 1, 1993, still continues to work in this sphere.
We are at the very beginning of this road. These seventeen agreements need to 
transform into another eighty documents, including international agreements. 
This work is planned for the period until 2017.
The work to form the single economic space is based on the main principles the 
European Union used.
The most important of them is national treatment. Our businesses are gradually 
provided with an opportunity to function on an equal basis in all the three 
countries without discrimination between “nationalities”. This means in fact 
that national administrative systems now face competition: businesses can work 
in the jurisdiction which is the most efficient and the least burdensome.
This form of competition is very useful and efficient for the modernisation of 
state structures.
Another key element of the single economic space is the principle of mutual 
recognition. Everything that has been legally produced in any of the SES states 
should have a legal opportunity to be sold or used throughout the whole 
space. This includes goods, services, certificates, passports, and graduation 
certificates.
Finally, there is the principle of integrity or what the Europeans call acquis 
communautaire; the achievement by the community. Our measures to form 
the SES are also interconnected and interrelated. The states cannot implement 
them in a random fashion, that is to say, “I’ll do this because I like it and I 
won’t do this because I don’t like it”. The SES is a “table d’hôte”, not a menu 
in a restaurant where you can choose what you like. It should be ordered 
and eaten in its entirety. This is very important to the process of potential 
expansion: a country can join Eurasian integration in a comprehensive fashion 
only.
A colossal market is being formed based on these principles, with 170 million 
consumers, unified legislation, and free movement of capital, services and 
labour.
It is of crucial importance that the SES is based on uniform standards and 
requirements for goods and services, the majority of which will be harmonised 
with the European ones, and on coordinated approaches to key areas such 
CUSTOMS UNION 
AND THE SINGLE ECONOMIC SPACE
tatyana Valovaya. “Eurasian Economic Integration:  
Origins, Patterns, and Outlooks”
58 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
as macroeconomics and competition, technical regulations and agricultural 
subsidies, transport, natural monopolies’ tariffs, and, as it can be expected in 
the near future, a single migration policy.
Eurasian integration has a clear institutional structure. The single regulatory 
body managing the customs union and the SES is the Eurasian Economic 
Commission. It includes a standing board composed of nine ministers.
The Eurasian Economic Commission is the first supranational integration 
body in the history of our three countries, and is envisaged to be neutral, 
with respect to the member states, and prevent dominance by any of them. 
One of its main functions is to prepare proposals on further integration in the 
framework of the CU and the SES.
One of the Board’s paramount tasks is the possibility and necessity to develop 
dialogue with the business community, with which we would like to cooperate, 
and form transparent and clear rules of doing business throughout the Single 
Economic Space.
Now, a look to the future. 
By January 1, 2015, all the legislative framework of the CU and the SES 
should be codified. Eurasian integration, as distinct from European one, still 
lacks a fundamental document. It does not have anything similar to the Treaty 
of Rome or its subsequent modifications. It has a legislative framework of 
more than 100 international agreements. These agreements were written in 
different periods and although the majority of them are new, made in 2007-
2010, this framework includes documents that were made in the second half 
of the 1990s.
However, even new documents are written by different teams of negotiators 
and they sometimes overlap or have identical provisions stated in different 
legal formulae, which can complicate their implementation, or have some 
gaps.
Therefore, there arises the need to form a single legislative framework. 
Legislation needs to be systematised, the current regulatory standards need 
to be thoroughly analysed, and disagreements and controversies in regulation 
need to be eliminated.
The presidents required that the codified document be prepared and take 
effect not later than on January 1, 2015. The Eurasian Economic Union 
should also start its work based on this document no later than January 1, 
2015.
The Eurasian Economic Union will be built on the basis of the comprehensive 
development of the SES, the improved coordination of economic policies, and 
stronger cooperation in the production, agricultural and other sectors.
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The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union will definitely change the 
appearance of the post-Soviet space and Eurasia on the whole.
A parallel with the EU is again useful. While its current problems stem from 
its quick (I would even say rampant) expansion and not always well-grounded 
inclusion of new countries in the eurozone, the problem of the post-Soviet 
space lies in its excessive fragmentation into those who really want integration 
and are ready for it, those who want it but cannot join for economic reasons, 
and those who could join but do not want and are not ready to be satisfied 
with just advanced economic ties and a free trade area.
The CIS has fallen into pieces of unions. For better or for worse, this is 
again fully in line with the EU’s experience. Let us remember that European 
federalists had also begun with the creation of an organisation which did 
not turn into an integration union, but became later the Council of Europe. 
The supporters of real integration had made numerous attempts before they 
prepared the Treaty of Rome, which still remains a revolutionary 
document. 
What will we achieve? We have four levels of integration today: the CIS, 
EurAsEC, the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space, and the Union 
State of Russia and Belarus. It is quite possible that with the expansion of 
the customs union with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who already express their 
interest in joining it, the CU and the SES will organisationally extend to 
EurAsEC. The Union State of Russia and Belarus will become a partner of this 
new union, more advanced in certain areas such as foreign politics and the 
military sector, but identical from the economic point of view. In the longer 
run, the Eurasian Economic Union will obviously acquire functions in the 
humanitarian and social sphere, and transform into a fully-fledged Eurasian 
Union.
Therefore, two levels of integration will co-exist in our space, the CIS and the 
European Union.
The CIS will operate as an interstate union, which economically won’t go beyond 
free trade and elements of the single economic space and which therefore does 
not envisage the creation of supranational institutes. This will be a common 
denominator of interaction that will be satisfactory for all post-Soviet states.
The Eurasian Union will become a supranational integration association, which 
will gradually move from the Single Economic Space toward the economic and, 
in the longer run, currency union.
This internal orderliness and balance in the Eurasian space will make it possible 
to better organise economic ties on our continent and I hope that no new 
barriers will emerge. If we remember the discussions that took place in the 
period when Europe was building its single internal market, many people 
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were cautious that the process would finally result in a so-called “fortress 
Europe”. However, very few of them remember this today because this did not 
happen.
Today’s discussions are concerned with whether Eurasia would become isolated 
from the rest of the world.
I’m absolutely convinced it won’t be. The Eurasian Union is being built as a 
regional association on the same principles that were used for the creation of 
the European Union. It is intended to partner with both the European Union and 
the dynamically developing Asia-Pacific.
The Russian Federation and the European Union have been discussing the 
formation of a single economic space since 2003. Now it becomes clear that 
this single economic space can be the space encompassing the European Union 
and the emerging Eurasian Economic Union.
In the process of forming this space, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are 
obviously interested in becoming harmonised with European counterparts in the 
use of the world’s best practices, including international standards and customs 
administration, among other things. Accordingly, what the three countries do 
for themselves cannot contradict in any way to the work they plan to do with 
the Europeans.
In 2012, Russia will chair Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in 
September it will host a summit in Vladivostok. The economic liberalisation 
processes that are underway in the Asia-Pacific region are in line with the 
tendencies of the modern post-crisis global architecture.
Russia intends to take a proactive part in these processes and harmonise with 
its Asian counterparts. At the same time we cannot use standards that would 
differ from those that form the basis of the European Union and of the single 
economic space. These very standards should be used in the work with the 
Asia-Pacific partners.
I believe this is an absolutely natural process, which can lead to the formation of 
a true global economy because today’s global economy has formed in a rather 
spontaneous fashion.
Countries and their economic policies simply could not keep up with 
globalisation processes at the micro level, which has resulted in the formation 
of a global economy with global interdependence and interrelationships but 
without global management.
Organisations that were in charge of the global management of various 
spheres of this economy discovered during the crisis that they lacked sufficient 
authority and capacity. Among them were the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Trade Organisation.
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Therefore, the process of regionalisation should not be deemed an alternative 
to globalisation.
Regionalisation means that two hundred participants in the global economy 
can hardly come to an agreement. However, if these two hundred participants 
unite into twenty teams with common interests and economic interconnection, 
and if these teams will together build global rules of the game in the world’s 
economic field, this process is expected to be more systemic, more intelligible 
and less stressful.
For this reason I believe there are no controversies between globalisation 
and regional integration. They are two sides of the same coin. The process of 
economic integration, of which Eurasian integration is a dynamic manifestation, 
is one of the tools to help the global economy recover from its currently 
challenging condition.
I also hope that this will change the world’s geography: Big Europe (from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific), that politicians have been talking about for a long time, 
will be born. Or perhaps it will be Wide Europe, from Vladivostok to Lisbon?
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This study was initiated by the Centre for Integration Studies of the Eurasian 
Development Bank (EDB) to assess the economic impact of the Kyrgyz 
Republic joining the contractual and legal base of the Customs Union between 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. The project concentrated on the applied matters 
of the potential Kyrgyz accession; this chapter represents a brief synopsis of the 
findings of this technical study1.
By various estimates, the 25-50% decline in Kyrgyzstan’s GDP in the 1990s 
can largely be explained by the disruption of cooperative ties during the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. For nearly 20 years, the global competitive 
advantages of post-Soviet countries were underutilised, and economic 
cooperation between them constantly decreased. In 2003-2004, an attempt 
was made to change the situation by creating a Single Economic Space. 
However, its formation encountered a number of significant obstacles. In 
1 http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/kyrgyzstan/
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recent years, the real prerequisites for the rapid development of integration 
within the Eurasian Economic Community emerged. In 2010, the CU of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia was established. In 2012, the treaties forming 
the SES on the territory of these three countries came into effect. 
Presumably, the accession of Kyrgyzstan to the CU would provide additional 
benefits to the CU and substantial economic benefits for the republic due to 
expansion of interstate cooperation and the related synergy. In order to promote 
this process, there is a need for a comprehensive assessment of long-term 
macroeconomic effects associated with the accession of Kyrgyzstan to the CU.
Currently, the economy of Kyrgyzstan is facing a number of significant 
disparities, which directly affect its competitiveness and efficiency. Formed 
during the Soviet period as part of the general Soviet economic system, the 
Kyrgyz Republic was faced with loss of capacity, even for reproduction on a 
simple scale, following the breakdown of economic ties.
Despite Kyrgyzstan’s high degree of openness to foreign investors and its entry 
into the World Trade Organisation on December 20, 1998, the predicted surge 
in investment activity has not actually occurred. The major obstacles are the 
lack of natural resources and competitive industry, and the low capacity of the 
domestic market. The hydropower sector of the economy may still possess a 
certain appeal, but its development depends on cooperation between Central 
Asian countries, which is lacking. 
Kyrgyzstan’s main purpose of joining the WTO was to increase the volume 
of the country’s foreign trade, and therefore enhance the level of economic 
development. However, the effects of such a step are hard to evaluate and much 
less predict. For example, the most significant achievement of foreign trade 
policy liberalisation is considered to be the openness of the economy, which, 
on the one hand, presupposes the development of joint ventures, the abolition 
of state monopoly of foreign trade, the effective use of comparative advantages 
in the international division of labour, greater specialisation and cooperation in 
production, rational allocation of resources, and increased competition between 
domestic producers. On the other hand, open economy requires reasonable 
access to the domestic market for foreign capital, goods, technology, media 
and labour. If these conditions are not met, then the spontaneous opening of the 
economy can have a negative impact on economic development, by creating 
an unsustainable structure of exports and imports, which pulls the economy into 
an unequal exchange in foreign trade.
Upon entry into the WTO, Kyrgyzstan made many concessions and commitments 
that were even not expressly required by the organisation. In particular, the 
country committed itself to adhere to virtually all non-binding agreements 
and sector initiatives of the WTO member countries (for example, agreements 
on tariff concessions with respect to chemical and pharmaceutical products, 
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textiles, steel, nonferrous metals, research, agricultural equipment, furniture, 
paper, and several other categories of product). This limited the possibility of 
protection for its agricultural sector and opened up almost all consumer services 
to non-residents. In addition, Kyrgyzstan has committed itself to joining the 
WTO agreement on government procurement, and some other optional WTO-
related arrangements.
As a result, Kyrgyzstan received preferential treatment for its goods in trade 
with more than 140 countries of the WTO, which theoretically expanded the 
market. However, such trade preferences are beneficial primarily for finished 
products. Creating equal conditions for domestic and imported goods in 
the domestic market actually had a negative impact on the development of 
industry in Kyrgyzstan. The openness of the country’s agricultural market to 
foreign producers has also adversely affected the insufficiently competitive 
local producers.
For more than half of commonly traded commodities, Kyrgyzstan has established 
rates of import customs duties lower than those that are expected to be agreed 
upon within the WTO-related agreements of the CU member states. The main 
objectives pursued by Kyrgyzstan when joining the WTO – developing export 
potential, enhancing the competitiveness of domestic producers, and improving 
the country’s structure of production and position in the international division 
of labour – have not been achieved so far. The country cannot effectively take 
advantage of the preferential conditions offered by WTO members, since most 
of its exports, especially in manufacturing, are not competitive.
When joining the WTO, Kyrgyzstan assumed that local businesses would 
evolve and integrate into global technological chains, but in practice this has 
not happened. Even the export of raw materials, primarily antimony, tin and 
rare earth elements, is not competitive because of the high cost when compared 
to neighbouring China, where these products are cheaper. 
It should be noted that contemporary multinational companies have sufficient 
capacity to provide the necessary industrial cooperation in certain areas, 
even without participation in the WTO. Even before Kyrgyzstan’s entry into 
the WTO, Kyrgyz enterprises that matched the requirements of multinational 
companies were acquired and incorporated into their structures, for example, 
the gold mining companies in the Kumtor region.
One reason for Kyrgyzstan’s entry to the WTO was belief in the inevitable 
increase in investment by creating a transparent economic environment, 
complying with global trade rules, and participating in the global trading 
system. However, the authorities did not take into account that developing 
countries have traditionally been perceived as places with limited opportunities 
for investment. Economic theory suggests that a country with a relatively 
unfavourable investment climate would receive foreign investment only insofar 
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as it is closed for the imports of foreign goods. The case of imports-open 
Kyrgyzstan confirms the economic theory assumption.
One possible domain for investment and cooperation is the country’s fuel and 
energy complex by way of utilising Kyrgyzstan’s transit potential. The extent of 
investment in Kyrgyzstan could substantially increase in the event of cooperation 
in the sphere of hydropower.
As a WTO member, Kyrgyzstan enjoys the most favoured nation regime with 
all the member states of the organisation. A free trade regime has also been 
established with the CU countries and some CIS countries. By joining the CU, 
Kyrgyzstan is expected to unify its trade regulations in accordance with those 
established by the CU member states for trade with third countries.
Currently, the united delegation of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia that is 
conducting negotiations on joining the WTO is also in talks on free trade 
agreements with a number of individual countries (New Zealand, Vietnam), 
and with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) that unites Liechtenstein, 
Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. The delegation has also completed 
negotiations with Serbia and has enacted an agreement with Montenegro. Upon 
Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU, it will have to sign the same agreements with 
those countries with similar exclusions, which may lead to the need to revise 
Kyrgyzstan’s WTO commitments. The CU member states, as well as Kyrgyzstan, 
have preferential treatment with many other countries. The unification of 
Kyrgyzstan’s regulations should take place through the adoption of the CU’s 
legal standards, which will affect its international obligations with regard to 
WTO member states.
The formation of regional unions is allowed within the WTO (Article 24 of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT). In addition, Kyrgyzstan has 
the right to initiate secondary negotiations on altering its commitments on tariffs 
(Article 28 of GATT). Negotiations with the WTO may pertain to compensation 
conditions or reduction of import duties on other goods. Every three years, 
Kyrgyzstan has the right to make changes in its list of commitments on tariffs for 
the next three-year period. The last period of exercise of this right covers up to 
December 31, 2011. Thus, Kyrgyzstan may make alterations in its WTO-related 
commitments in favour of the CU.
The CU’s legislation allows membership in the WTO. Analysis of the protocol 
on Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the WTO reveals that the republic’s international 
obligations and legislation differ from the legal framework of the CU and SES, 
providing much less protection for the Kyrgyz domestic market. In particular, 
this applies to the Customs Tariff of the Kyrgyz Republic (CT), which should be 
altered to be aligned with the CU Common Customs Tariff (CU CCT).
When the Customs Tariffs of Kyrgyzstan and the CU are compared, it can 
be seen that of 10,968 Kyrgyzstan’s duty rates 3,288 (30%) concur with and 
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another 2,284 (21%) can be realigned with the CU CCT without violating 
WTO commitments. However, 4,696 (46.6%) of Kyrgyzstan’s customs duties 
do not tally with the CU CCT, while 241 (2%) are incomparable because of 
differences in duty rates categorisations. 
The average rate of the CU CCT is about 10.5%, while the average rate of 
Kyrgyzstan’s CT is about 5%, and the average rate of the country’s potential 
CT, considering its obligations to the WTO, is 7.7%. Thus, in case of enacting 
the CU CCT, an average increase in Kyrgyzstan’s CT rates in excess of its WTO 
commitments will be about 3%.
If Kyrgyzstan initiates negotiations to modify its WTO commitments at present, 
it would have to make changes on a substantial number of rates (around 5,000). 
When all CU countries accede to the WTO, Kyrgyzstan would have far fewer 
duty rates to modify.
Based on the average 3% increase in import duties in excess of Kyrgyzstan’s 
WTO commitments, possible claims of WTO member states may result in 
worsening terms of trade, estimated in the range from $40 to $180 million 
annually. However, such claims may be settled due to certain concessions 
in respect of specific CU CCT sub-positions within the framework of the CU 
united negotiating delegation.
Foremost, the changes in import duty rates will affect the country’s trade with 
China, imports from which in 2009, according to Kyrgyzstan, totalled $0.6 billion 
(20% of total imports and 47% of Kyrgyzstan’s imports from non-CIS countries), 
and according to UN COMTRADE – $5.2 billion (71% of Kyrgyzstan’s total 
imports or 89% of imports from non-CIS countries). It should be noted that, 
according to some estimates, the main flow of goods from China to Kyrgyzstan 
figure 3.1.
Dynamics of 
Kyrgyzstan’s foreign 
trade in 2005-2009 
($ billion)
Exports to Kyrgyzstan by foreign countries (including reexports), according to 
UN COMTRADE 
Kyrgyzstan’s imports from foreign countries, according to UN COMTRADE 
Kyrgyzstan’s imports from foreign countries, according to CIS Statistical Committee 
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comprises goods that are delivered subsequently onto the CU territory, due to 
lack of appropriate control.
The data shown differs by two to three times, which may indicate the unreliability 
of Kyrgyzstan’s official statistics. The differences give rise to significant 
discrepancies in estimating Kyrgyzstan’s share in the CU imports.
It must be borne in mind that the data is obtained using “mirror statistics”, 
in which the volume of imports into a country is taken as the total exports 
to it from other countries. The results may not always be quite correct, since 
the foreign trade data provided to UN COMTRADE is based on the countries’ 
specific methodologies of foreign trade statistics.
Currently, Kyrgyzstan does not apply any special protective, antidumping 
or countervailing measures against third countries. If it joins the CU, the CU 
protective measures would be valid for it. In this case Kyrgyzstan will have to 
define which measures would be applied and which would not.
Market access policies of Kyrgyzstan and the three CU and SES member states 
differ significantly. For example, access to transportation via pipelines, road 
and railway transportation services, and other services is unrestricted for WTO 
member states in Kyrgyzstan.
Another difference from the established SES agreements is Kyrgyzstan’s 
commitments on WTO-related subsidies. Thus, in accordance with Article 6.4 
(a) of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Kyrgyzstan adopted a minimum rate 
of subsidy based on the average subsidy rate for particular products in 1994-
1996, which is less than 5% of production costs of each subsidised commodity, 
and an average level of subsidy for all commodities, which is less than 5% of 
the overall agricultural production. That is significantly lower than the level of 
subsidies defined by the SES agreement (10%), as well as the commitments 
agreed upon by Russia and Kazakhstan in their negotiations on the accession 
to the WTO.
The following should be noted with regard to predicted growth in Kyrgyzstan’s 
budget revenues from levy of customs duties. Kyrgyzstan currently uses a 
simplified procedure for customs clearance of goods from China and applies 
tariffs by weight for almost the entire FEACN range of products (up to 2011 – 
$0.15, from 2011 – $0.2 per kg of goods imported by land). The importer states 
the cost of goods arbitrarily, which in turn, can seriously distort the customs 
value of goods as the customs service does not have to determine the accurate 
value of imported goods to collect revenue. With Kyrgyzstan’s accession to 
the CU, this procedure will have to be cancelled and brought in line with the 
customs procedures and methodology of the CU.
Upon Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU, the national budget revenues from 
customs duties will be determined by the standard allocations of import duties 
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to be credited to the budget as a share of the total volume of the CU’s import 
duties. 
According to preliminary expert estimates, this share could vary from 0.62% 
to 0.73% with no significant exemptions from CU CCT. Based on the revenue 
import duties of the CU for the first quarter of 2011, which amounted to about 
$5.5 billion, Kyrgyzstan’s share (0.65%) for the first quarter of 2011 could reach 
$35.6 million, respectively, and for the year – $142.6 million.
In 2010, the actual budget revenues from customs duties in Kyrgyzstan amounted 
to $100.5 million. Thus, by this alone, the country could increase revenue by 
about 42%, or about 3% of its total revenue budget in 2010. As part of the 
national budget revenue from VAT, the impact of the country’s accession to the 
CU is assessed as neutral and would depend on the total amount of added value 
created in Kyrgyzstan.
table 3.2.  
the structure of 
Kyrgyzstan’s state 
budget revenues 
in 2010 
Note: The average 
exchange rate  
in 2010 was 42.96 
soms per 1$
The main risks of Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU relate primarily to a possible 
decrease in imports due to the cancellation of the simplified declaration 
procedure, which may result in the loss of Kyrgyzstan’s attractiveness for 
Chinese imports for subsequent reexport to other countries. This could cause an 
increase in unemployment among the population in the sector involved and so 
reduce income from taxation, but would not affect the distribution of the share 
of import duties of the CU, since normative distribution is calculated based on 
the imports in previous years.
Another problem is the inadequacy of the methodology used to calculate the 
normative distribution of import duties. The CU states’ methodology is based 
on actual import figure, which is close to the amount consumed. In the case 
of Kyrgyzstan, the value of consumed imports is lower than the total value of 
imports, since many goods are reexported to other CIS countries, including 
the territory of the CU. It is therefore important to clarify the methodology for 
calculating normative distribution of import duties for Kyrgyzstan.
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Kyrgyzstan’s budget revenues in 2010 million som $ million
Share in total 
income (%)
Tax revenues, including: 39,365 916.3 68.6
related to the import of goods, including: 14,685.6 341.8 25.6
VAT on goods imported into Kyrgyzstan 10,370 241.4 18.1
Customs duties from imported goods 4,315.6 100.5 7.5
Other tax revenues 24,679.4 574.5 43
Transfers from abroad 7,022 163.5 12.2
Non-tax revenues 10,997.3 256 19.2
total 57,384.5 1,335.8 100
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As far as tariff preferences on payment of customs duties are concerned, the 
principles of their provision in Kyrgyzstan differ from those set forth in the 
CU. For example, the legal framework of the CU, in contrast to Kyrgyzstan, 
defines the list of products from developing countries – a single-user system of 
the CU preferences on the import tariffs rates set at 75% of import tariff rates of 
the CU CCT. Upon accession to the CU, Kyrgyzstan should adopt regulations, 
operative under a unified system of tariff preferences of the CU, including 
rules concerning the goods originating from developing and least developed 
countries.
Entry to the CU involves Kyrgyzstan joining all agreements included on the list 
of international treaties that constitutes the CU legal framework. Moreover, all 
the relevant decisions of the EurAsEC Interstate Council and the Customs Union 
Commission shall be binding for Kyrgyzstan.
Increased tariffs, strengthened customs controls and cancellation of a simplified 
clearance procedure for imports may lead to an increase in Kyrgyzstan’s 
domestic market prices. Given that a one-off increase in tariffs is inevitable 
when the CU CCT is introduced, the consumer price index is projected to jump 
by about 2%.
It should be noted that collection of duties from Chinese imports at the rates set 
by the CU CCT will inevitably lead to a decrease in volume due to the partial 
redirection of imports to other countries in the CU, bypassing Kyrgyzstan. 
However, it will create additional incentives for investment in Kyrgyzstan in 
order to establish production of the relevant goods in the country itself.
If Kyrgyzstan does not join the CU in the immediate future, it would worsen 
the country’s current economic situation due to the increased control on the 
external borders of the CU, and deprive it of potential prospects for economic 
development, because the low capacity of Kyrgyzstan’s domestic market can 
hardly be seen as appealing for domestic-market-bound investment.
Joining the CU may have a positive impact on Kyrgyzstan’s production and 
export of agricultural products, textiles, and building materials, as these 
products will become more competitive than similar products from China due 
to higher import tariffs set in accordance with the CU CCT, and as a result will 
earn a bigger market share in the CU. This will mitigate the risk and increase 
the predictability of long-term investment in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the 
electricity and transport sectors, since economic relations in those sectors will 
be largely regulated at the level of the SES.
The negative consequences in the short term may include a loss of attractiveness 
of Kyrgyzstan as a base for reexport of Chinese goods into the CU and a 
decrease in the flow of goods through its territory, with the corresponding loss 
of jobs in that sector. The rise in prices of imported goods is expected due to 
the application of the CU CCT rates; however, it may result in the growing 
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trade deficits. The probability of such developments is very high, regardless of 
Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU.
This accession is not likely to significantly affect the overall macroeconomic 
indicators of the CU member states, given the low share of the Kyrgyz economy 
in the general economic indicators of the EurAsEC countries. However, a 
positive effect for the CU may be the improvement of customs administration 
on the Kyrgyz-Chinese border and the application of the CU CCT to imports 
from China. This will reduce the volume of cheap imports that flow through the 
republic onto the territory of the CU, and improve the overall quality of imports 
due to the need for adequate sanitary, veterinary, phytosanitary and technical 
control in order to comply with the legal and regulatory framework of the CU. 
This will improve the price competitiveness of the CU producers against the 
Chinese.
Joining the CU would have positive long-term economic effects for the economy 
of Kyrgyzstan. Integration into this large regional economic entity would lead 
to an expansion of markets for goods produced in Kyrgyzstan. It will increase 
the country’s investment appeal in a number of production sectors, leading to 
the growth of GDP and increased exports of domestically produced goods. In 
general, adherence to the CU may result (if appropriate measures are taken) in 
a 20-22% increase in Kyrgyzstan’s export potential.
It should be noted that a number of the potentially positive and negative effects 
of Kyrgyzstan joining the CU lie in the non-economic dimension, and are 
therefore outside the scope of this work.
According to the study, we can conclude that the accession of Kyrgyzstan to 
the CU could potentially have a positive economic effect, but its achievement 
depends not only upon trade but also on Kyrgyzstan’s general economic 
policies, as well as those of the CU and SES member states.
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Commentary on the article: 
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Nazik Beishenaly – Ph.D. in economics, French Republic; Director 
of the Institute of Development Initiatives and Research, Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan.
E-mail: nazik_beishenaly@yahoo.com
Nazik 
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In his article, the author analyses the foreign trade ties of Kyrgyzstan (based 
on the research conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences’ (RAS) 
National Development Institute for the EDB Centre for Integration Studies) 
which have formed due to the country’s membership of the World Trade 
Organisation, and the prospects for their advancement if Kyrgyzstan joins 
the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The author believes 
that Kyrgyzstan’s economic problems, such as underdeveloped competition 
and low economic efficiency, prevent the country from using the full 
potential of free trade in the framework of the WTO. The author believes that 
Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU, given the existing economic ties between 
its member states, would have a positive economic effect on Kyrgyzstan and 
the CU member states. The article provides a detailed analysis of the technical 
compatibility between the obligations Kyrgyzstan has undertaken in the 
framework of the WTO and its new obligations if it joins the CU, and identifies 
the issues that would require special attention in the course of negotiations 
between Kyrgyzstan and the WTO. In the author’s opinion, the effect of the 
CU on Kyrgyzstan’s economy will be bivalent, especially in the short term, as it 
could cause a rise in prices through increased customs duties, tougher customs 
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control and a reduction in Chinese imports and, possibly, employment in this 
segment. At the same time, it should have a positive effect on budget revenues. 
In the long term, membership in the CU could allow Kyrgyzstan to refocus its 
economy on production with the help of new investments, market expansion 
and other improved conditions.
In their 2011 study, Economic Effects of Kyrgyzstan’s Accession to the Customs 
Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia for the Kyrgyz National Institute of 
Strategic Studies, Faruk Ulgen and Haluk Levent came to the conclusion that 
Kyrgyzstan joining the CU would have a positive effect. The study analyses the 
effects of trade creation and trade diversion in Kyrgyzstan’s trade records with 
China and other countries from 2008 to 2010. A trade diversion will take place if 
the CU countries promote trade inside the union, even if their production is less 
efficient compared to proposals by other countries. In this instance, the volumes 
of trade can decrease because of protective measures against the rest of the 
world and this would affect the welfare of the member countries and the global 
trade as a whole. However, if external trade barriers are not too high and the CU 
increases trade through the expansion of markets and larger investments, this 
can lead to increased revenues, which in their turn will improve the demand for 
imports from non-member countries. 
The authors have also studied the interrelation between trade creation as a 
result of joining the CU and the growth in employment. An estimate of dynamic 
panel data used in this analysis has shown that, in a 95% confidence interval, 
a 1% increase in production will cause a 0.295% growth in employment in 
Kyrgyzstan’s economy. Despite the fact that the change in the CU tariffs for third 
countries such as China can reduce multilateral trade, Ulgen and Levent believe 
that the reduction in trade will not be significant and can result in increased 
domestic production. This can happen if a portion of the reduction in trade is 
compensated by broader trade with the CU and increased domestic production. 
The authors believe that production could grow by 8.8% and employment by 
about 2.5% after Kyrgyzstan joins the CU, as a result of net trade creation. 
The authors have also calculated the trade specialisation index (TSI) and the 
bilateral revealed comparative advantage index (BRCA) to find out how the 
Kyrgyz economy relates to its main trade partners: China, Kazakhstan and 
Russia. These calculations have shown that in 2008-2010, Kyrgyzstan traded 
significantly more product categories with Russia and Kazakhstan than with 
China, which is why its trade with the former two countries has a comparative 
advantage2.
2 In the period under consideration Kyrgyzstan had two product categories in which it traded with China, twelve with 
Kazakhstan and three with Russia, with a TSI of 1. In the same period Kyrgyzstan had nine, 30 and 22 product categories, with 
a TSI between 0 and 1, with China, Kazakhstan and Russia respectively. In addition, in the same period Kyrgyzstan had 26 
product categories above 84 with a BRCA of more than 1 in its trade with China, 49 with Kazakhstan, and 33 with Russia.
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Even in Soviet times, Kyrgyzstan was highly dependent on imports and 
subsidies from the central budget. Over twenty years of sovereignty, it has 
not succeeded a lot in improving structural imbalances, but the accession to 
the WTO has given impetus to the development of an economy orientated on 
trade and reexport. Today the Kyrgyz economy, with its poor diversification 
and no scale effect, can hardly surpass the threshold of $5 million, even at the 
generalised, two-digit level of trade classification; hence its strong dependence 
on partnering countries with a diversified structure of exports. In addition, 
high interest rates and economic and political risks explain the low level of 
investments in production and agriculture. Accordingly, the most developed 
sectors are the services and retailing sectors as they ensure quick profit, do 
not require large investments, and are flexible with respect to changes in the 
external environment.
The studies have shown that Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU should entail a 
number of positive changes. These will include the recovery of trade ties, easier 
access to main markets, possible increases in investment flows to the country, 
and the advancement of production and agriculture. The authors agree that 
hydropower, textiles and agriculture will be the priority sectors, in particular 
because Kyrgyzstan’s supply to global markets in recent years was primarily 
composed of textile and agricultural products.
The development of industrial production and agriculture is impeded by the 
economy’s poor ability to compete with Chinese imports. Because of the WTO 
membership (and beneficial tax treatment and customs duties that depend not 
on the customs cost of goods but on their weight) Kyrgyzstan has spotted a 
niche of a reexporting economy in the CIS. In 2010, the reexport of Chinese 
goods exceeded 13% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Large 
platforms of international trade have formed in the country, such as Dordoy 
and Kara-Suu where, according to the World Bank (2009), the aggregate annual 
sales approximate $3.5 billion and employment exceeds 70,000 people. 
Since 2010 (according to the administration of the Dordoy Bazaar), wholesale 
volumes have gone down but retailing has seemed to grow (in small batches of 
approximately up to 50 kg per person after the creation of the CU in 2010).
The administration of the Dordoy Bazaar and representatives of the association 
of bazaars are obviously concerned about how Kyrgyzstan’s possible accession 
to the CU will influence employment in the market. However, on the whole 
they understand that the creation of the CU and the Single Economic Space 
will result in a reduction in Kyrgyzstan’s reexporting activities irrespective 
of whether it joins the CU or not. In the former instance, access to the main 
directions of reexport will be complicated and in the latter one, the transition of 
goods through Kyrgyzstan will become meaningless. In addition, the continuous 
appreciation of the Chinese yuan against the US dollar and the currencies of the 
region makes Chinese goods increasingly expensive. This makes it clear that 
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the desire to preserve the existing reexporting scheme, which has become a 
source of income for many people in recent years, should not be an argument 
in refusing to join the CU. Therefore, representatives of the markets have 
agreed to gradually reorientate toward production with the active support from 
the Kyrgyz Government, which needs to smoothly reform the markets and 
preserve, at least for some time, beneficial conditions for importing goods such 
as textiles.
Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU will definitely change the existing economic 
context and this will require the adoption of correct key decisions to avoid 
weakening the economic situation further. The undertaken studies are the first 
step in this area, which requires additional research with respect to Kyrgyzstan 
joining the SES, including issues such as labour migration and the quality 
and focus of Kyrgyzstan’s educational system (since the development of new 
sectors requires qualified specialists). Another important issue that needs to 
be thoroughly studied is Kyrgyzstan’s shadow economy – primarily in the 
agricultural, trade and textile sectors. While the shadow economy accounts for 
20% (according to official data), international organisations and independent 
experts suppose it to exceed 60%. In this situation we lack information on 
the real size of Kyrgyzstan’s economy, which complicates economic analysis 
and decision making. For this reason it is deemed advisable to develop and 
introduce a methodology for determining the size of the shadow economy 
before calculating the economic effects of joining the CU.
The growing number of preferential trade agreements in the world suggests that, 
in spite of the platform offered by the WTO, regional trade agreements seem to 
take prevalence over multilateral relationships in the framework of the WTO. 
This is possibly caused by the fact that the CU offers wider opportunities for 
integration, which is specifically important to countries with close historical, 
political and economic ties.
CUSTOMS UNION 
AND THE SINGLE ECONOMIC SPACE
Nazik Beishenaly. “Commentary on the article: Assessing the 
Economic Effect of Kyrgyzstan’s Accession to the Customs Union”
80 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
THE ECONOMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET  
AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
Eurasia and Eurasian Integration: 
Beyond the post-Soviet Borders
Evgeny Vinokurov – Ph.D., Director of the EDB Centre for 
Integration Studies. He authored A Theory of Enclaves (2007), 
The CIS, the EU, and Russia: Challenges of Integration (2007, with 
K. Malfliet and L. Verpoest), Eurasian Integration: Challenges of 
Transcontinental Regionalism (2012, with A. Libman), Holding-
Together Regionalism: 20 Years of Post-Soviet Integration (2012, 
with A. Libman). Chief Editor of the Journal of Eurasian Economic 
Integration and the series of EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbooks, 
published by the EDB since 2008. He published in such journals 
as the Review of International Political Economy, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Post-Communist Economies, European 
Urban and Regional Studies, and Voprosy Ekonomiki. His current 
research focus is integration in Eurasia.
E-mail: vinokurov_ey@eabr.org
Alexander Libman – Assistant professor at the Frankfurt School of 
Finance & Management, senior research fellow at the Institute of 
Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) and associate 
of the Centre for Russian Studies of the East China Normal University. 
He holds a Doctor of Economic Science degree from the RAS and 
a Ph.D. degree in Economics from the University of Mannheim. 
His main scientific interests include empirical political economics 
and political economics of regional integration and federalism. 
He was awarded the Knut Wicksell Prize by the European Public 
Choice Society in 2010 and the Ovsievich Memorial Prize by the 
RAS in 2012. His most recent books include Holding Together 
Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration and Eurasian 
Integration: Challenges of Transcontinental Regionalism (both 
coauthored with Evgeny Vinokurov, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). 
His work has been published, among others, in Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Journal of Comparative Economics, Review of 
International Political Economy, Empirical Economics, Europe-
Asia Studies, Post-Communist Economies, Post-Soviet Affairs and 
Constitutional Political Economy.
E-mail: alibman@yandex.ru
Evgeny 
Vinokurov,  
Alexander 
Libman
5
81Eurasian Development Bank
Evgeny Vinokurov and Alexander Libman. 
“Eurasia and Eurasian Integration: Beyond the Post-Soviet Borders”
THE ECONOMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET 
AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
‘Eurasia’ seems to be a relatively clear concept in terms of physical geography, 
but much less so for social sciences. While the word ‘Eurasia’ is constantly used 
in various contexts (more today than twenty years ago), the specific notion 
of what it actually means is unclear. According to Laruele (2008), the term 
‘Eurasian’ was actually invented in the 19th century to refer to children of mixed 
European-Asian couples, and it was later used to highlight the geological unity 
of the continent. Throughout the last two decades, ‘Eurasia’ has been used more 
commonly by both scholars and practitioners, but the definition of the term 
remained unclear. It goes even to a greater extent for the concept of ‘Eurasian 
integration’ – which is, in fact, what this yearbook (and the companion Journal 
of Eurasian Economic Integration, which is published in Russian) is devoted 
to. This paper intends to elaborate on the concept of Eurasia and Eurasian 
integration, distinguishing between three notions of ‘Eurasia’ and corresponding 
views of Eurasian integration, considering their importance in the literature and 
possible research developments. The ideas presented in this paper heavily draw 
from the discussion in our book, published in English (Vinokurov and Libman, 
2012a) and in Russian (Vinokurov and Libman, 2012b).
tHREE CoNCEptS of EuRASIA 
post-Soviet Eurasia
The first and probably the most often cited concept of Eurasia is also the 
youngest one: it came into existence in December 1991, when the Soviet 
Union ceased to exist. While originally the former Soviet republics have been 
naturally described as ‘post-Soviet’ or ‘post-Communist’ (also terms like ‘new 
independent states’ or – in Russia – the ‘near abroad’ were used), over time 
using this term became less and less reasonable: defining a group of countries 
only through their common historical past, even if the latter is highly important, 
is a questionable approach. In fact, more and more voices (as early as Carothers 
2002) call for an abandonment of the transition paradigm in investigating the 
post-Soviet space. However, in spite of the changes within the two decades 
following the collapse of the USSR, there is still a lot of work focusing on these 
countries as a comparable group: Frye (2012) in his recent survey even suggests 
that these countries become more important for investigations of political and 
economic institutions. 
There are three reasons why the post-Soviet countries are considered as a 
unified entity in academia and outside it. First, they still constitute a natural 
group for comparison of different institutional, political and economic 
developments. While this view seemed to be obvious twenty years ago, today 
it requires justification: it is likely that, for some research questions, comparing 
post-Soviet countries is meaningful, while in other aspects they deviate a lot 
from each other (Stykow, 2012, offers an excellent discussion of the topic). 
Secondly, there exist intensive links between these countries, so they do 
influence each other strongly. Third, and finally, studying most of these 
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countries still requires a set of common skills: for example, knowledge of the 
Russian language still may suffice for a researcher dealing with these countries 
(although less so than twenty years ago). Since the skills of the researchers have 
a crucial influence on the chosen objects of investigation (Libman, 2007), this 
is an issue of extreme importance. Therefore, it is necessary to find a new name 
for the region under investigation: a natural solution chosen within academia 
and outside it seems to be ‘Eurasia’.
The examples of how Eurasia is used as synonym for the post-Soviet space are 
numerous; it pops out in multiple academic articles (e.g. Bruckbauer, 1994; 
Fish, 1999; Beissinger and Young, 2002; Rivera, 2003; Hale, 2005; and many 
others – sometimes the former Eastern Europe is included in the concept of 
Eurasia as well). Many scholarly journals dealing with the region were renamed 
in a way using ‘Eurasia’, and new journals in the field were named applying 
the same word: examples include Eurasian Geography and Economics, Europe-
Asia Studies, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Eurasian 
Review and Journal of Eurasian Studies outside the region and Russia and 
New States of Eurasia (published by the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences), Eurasian Economic 
Integration (published by the Eurasian Development Bank) and Eurasian 
Integration: Economy, Law, Politics (published by the Interparliamentary 
Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community). Numerous research centres 
were renamed in the same way in Harvard (Davis Centre for Russian and 
Eurasian Studies), Columbia (Harriman Institute: Russian, Eurasian and Eastern 
European Studies), Berkeley (Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian 
Studies), Stanford (Centre for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies), 
Illinois Champaign-Urbana (Russian, East European and Eurasian Centre), 
Toronto (Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies), Leuven (Russia 
and Eurasia Research Group), Oxford (Russian and Eurasian Centre), Uppsala 
(Department of Eurasian Studies) and Cambridge (Eurasia Centre at the business 
school). The name of the leading American scholarly society dealing with the 
region was changed to The Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian 
Studies, and the International Council of Central and East European Studies, 
although it did not change its name, devoted its world congress in 2010 to the 
topic of Eurasia. 
Outside academia, those regional organisations created by post-Soviet states 
from the early 2000s onwards also tend to use the word ‘Eurasia’ more and 
more often. Again, it is hardly surprising: the early titles like the ‘Commonwealth 
of Independent States’ did not provide any reference to a particular region or 
even any common feature of the member states (in fact, the titles stressed only 
the fact that they were ‘independent’ of each other). The most notable examples 
are the Eurasian Economic Community and the Eurasian Development Bank. 
However, the idea to use the word ‘Eurasian’ to describe these countries is 
older than the last decade – Andrei Sakharov’s project of the Soviet Union 
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new constitution intended to rename it into a ‘Union of Soviet Republics of 
Europe and Asia’; and Nursultan Nazarbayev’s initiative to create a more 
advanced regional organisation for the post-Soviet space in early 1990s called 
it the ‘Eurasian Union’. Outsiders also seem to ‘naturally’ call the 
region ‘Eurasia’: e.g. the ‘European and Eurasian’ bureau at the US State 
Department. The word ‘Eurasia’ (including post-Soviet states) found its way 
into definitions of regions used by many businesses (e.g. Nordic Investment 
Bank).
Strictly speaking, the ‘post-Soviet Eurasia’ is, unlike another concept of Eurasia, 
which we are going to present below, free from any ideological connotations. It 
is merely a designation of a particular region, chosen for the lack of better words 
to describe it. However, it still relies on a debatable assumption: it claims that 
the post-Soviet space is going to stay a relatively interconnected entity and that 
the countries comprising this region will be relatively comparable to each other. 
Whether this is indeed the case is debatable; while some researchers point out 
that the countries of the region still strongly depend on each other (Buzan and 
Waever, 2003), others, on the contrary, proclaim the ‘End of Eurasia’ (Trenin, 
2002; 2011; Tsygankov, 2012). Typically, in this case it is assumed that the 
pre-Soviet legacies of the individual parts of the post-Soviet world are going 
to dominate and eventually lead the countries on very different paths. As one 
could probably expect, the reality in the post-Soviet region is more complex 
than any of these views: while in some cases ‘Eurasia’ seems to dissipate, in 
other areas integration becomes stronger. 
Eurasianism
The second concept of Eurasia is much older than the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and can be traced back to the 1920s Russian emigrants, promoting the 
ideas of ‘Eurasianism’. Unlike the post-Soviet Eurasia, the concept of Eurasia 
in Eurasianism has a clear ideological connotation: it represents the ‘Eurasian’ 
world as a distinct reality from the European ‘Western’ civilisation, but also 
from the Asian cultures. While the last contradiction is typically not pointed 
out, the first one constitutes the main element of Eurasianism in many (though 
not all) of its varieties, which came into existence during the last hundred years. 
Somewhat simplified (and without attempting to provide a detailed analysis 
of Eurasianist ideology, which has been discussed e.g. by Laurelle, 2008), it 
is possible to distinguish among several variants of the ‘Eurasian space’ as 
defined by the ‘Eurasianists’. First, Eurasia can be perceived as a unity of the 
Russian-Slavic culture and the nomadic cultures of the Inner Asia (this would 
probably be primarily the Eurasia of Gumilev). Second, Eurasia can be viewed 
as a unity of Russian Orthodox and Islamic peoples. Third, the focus can be 
made on connections between Russian and Asian cultures. Fourth, Eurasia 
can be viewed as a unity of ‘continental’ countries as opposed to the Atlantist 
island nations (the list of which countries are ‘continental’ differs: for example, 
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while China is for many Eurasianists a natural continental empire, it is not the 
case for another famous Eurasianist, Dugin, who sees Japan and Germany as a 
continental nation). Fifth, Eurasia can be primarily linked to the Russia-centric 
Slavic-Orthodox civilisation. Sixth, it is very common among Russian scholars 
(especially in the International Relations) to use the word ‘Eurasia’ just to stress 
the ‘geopolitical importance’ of Russia (a hundred years ago, probably ‘greater 
Russia’ would be used, with this word being old-fashioned now), taking a 
special place of dominance among its neighboring countries. These varieties are 
very often combined and mixed with each other, consciously or unconsciously, 
and the list is certainly not exclusive.
The ideas of this ‘ideological Eurasianism’ are deeply rooted in the self-
perception of Russian peoples (Rose and Munro, 2008) and elites. According 
to a survey, conducted by Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VCIOM) 
in 2001, 71% of respondents said they believe Russia to be a one-of-a-kind 
civilisation – ‘Euro-Asian or Orthodox’, as it was formulated in the poll. Only 
13% believed that Russia belongs to Western civilisation. To some extent, they 
can be perceived as a continuation of the ideas of the Russian Sonderweg of the 
nineteenth century (although many Eurasianists would probably disagree with 
this assessment). To some extent, the following statement of Trubetskoi (2005) 
seems to be an accurate description of most varieties of Russian Eurasianism: 
“The territory of Russia […] constitutes a separate continent […] which in 
contrast to Europe and Asia can be called Eurasia […]. Eurasia represents an 
integral whole, both geographically and anthropologically […]. By its very 
nature, Eurasia is historically destined to comprise a single state entity. From the 
beginning, the political unification of Eurasia was a historical inevitability, and 
the geography of Eurasia indicated the means to achieve it”. In Russia and some 
other post-Soviet countries, some varieties of the Eurasianism enjoy the status 
of a recognised field in academia (e.g. the writings of Lev Gumilev) and they 
are present in the political arena (e.g. several ‘Eurasian’ parties and movements 
in Russia). However, Eurasianism of this sort has never been, even rhetorically, 
adapted as a guiding ideology of the Russian policy in the post-Soviet space or 
in Asia.
An interesting notion of the Eurasianists is that their picture of ‘anti-Western’ 
Eurasia seems to be accepted by some Western observers, of course, with the 
opposite ideological connotation: now Eurasia is treated (politically) as a zone 
of Russian influence and (culturally, socially and economically) as a domain of 
non-democratic regimes, oligarchic economies and archaic social orders. This 
is, for example, the picture offered in Bugajski (2008) and Ryabchuk (2001); the 
latter, for example, describes the modern Ukraine as a battleground between 
‘European’ and ‘Eurasian’ elements. From this point of view, Eurasia can expand 
or shrink at its borders. However, while the word ‘Eurasia’ is used, it is typically 
‘Russia’ which is in mind of the observers – as Russia has a long tradition of 
the Sonderweg thinking, Europe does have a long tradition as defining Russia 
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as ‘the Other’ outside of the European civilisation (e.g. Neumann, 1999). It 
is interesting to notice that for the people in Asia (e.g. China), Russia is 
unambiguously perceived as a ‘European’ country (both in positive and in 
negative sense; Russia also has its tradition of colonialism in Asia), different 
from what Eurasianists would expect.
Eurasia as a continent
The third concept of Eurasia focuses on interdependencies between the 
European and the Asian parts of the continent. To some extent, the very 
approach of dividing Europe and Asia as two continents is artificial. As for Asia, 
as Freeman (2011) notices, “for thousands of years after strategists in Greece 
came up with this Eurocentric notion [of Asia – E.V., A.L.], the many non-
European peoples who inhabited the Eurasian landmass were blissfully unaware 
that they were supposed to share an identity as ‘Asians’”. In the same way, 
Europe was constructed over millennia. However, during this period there was, 
as we will discuss in what follows, a vivid economic and political exchange 
spanning the entire Eurasian continent. The third notion of Eurasia perceives 
it exactly as this web of connections, which, after a period of decline over 
several centuries, start reviving now. As such, Eurasia naturally spans beyond 
the Soviet borders.
This perception of Eurasia faces serious difficulties while searching for its way in 
the academic literature, clouded by two previously defined concepts of Eurasia. 
Nevertheless, several papers describe the economic links between China and 
the EU (e.g. ASEM) as ‘Europe-Asian’ regionalism (see e.g. Stockhof et al., 
2004; Roessler, 2009; Dent, 2003). Among other studies, the work of Johannes 
Linn (Linn and Tiomkin, 2006, 2007) should be emphasised, as it explicitly 
concentrates its attention on the emerging economic ties in the Eurasian 
‘supercontinent’ (Linn, 2006). 
Recently, the idea of Eurasia in this context has been picked up by several 
Russian observers (Bykov, 2009; Chernyshev, 2010; Krotov, 2011; Spartak, 
2011), discussing the development of the post-Soviet integration. An area 
where the minority of Eurasia faces less difficulties is Central Asian, or 
(following the name of the leading scholarly association in this area in the 
US) Central Eurasian studies – indeed, it is difficult to study the history, the 
current economic development or the ethnography of the modern ‘post-Soviet’ 
Central Asia while simultaneously ignoring its links to Chinese Turkestan, 
Afghanistan and Iran (Gleason, 2003). Since the focus of this concept of Eurasia 
is on ties and exchange, it is less bound by ideological considerations than the 
Eurasianism described above – in fact, if there is a lesson to be learned from the 
last two millennia of Eurasian history it is that trade transcends all differences 
and crosses all barriers. As such, this Eurasianism can be styled as ‘pragmatic’ 
Eurasianism. 
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As such, the ‘pragmatic Eurasianism’ is entirely compatible with focus on 
institutional and technological transfer from the West; in the sense, it is related 
to what Trenin (2006) describes as the ‘new West’, that is, the modernisation and 
marketisation of non-Western societies following the blueprints of the West. Of 
course, it does not imply the unequivocal acceptance of particular institutions 
and practices (which also differ greatly within the group of the Western nations), 
yet it is very different from creating the rejection of the Western ideas and the 
explicit attempt to construct an alternative to them typical for many branches 
of the Russian ideological Eurasianism, or the view on the relations between 
‘Eurasia’ and ‘the West’ as inevitably hostile and competitive. 
It is likely that the country where the ideas of this pragmatic Eurasianism 
received the greatest recognition was Kazakhstan, where the Eurasian idea is, 
unlike Russia, very often recited and accepted on the level of political ideology. 
It is important to stress that we do not, under any conditions, claim that 
pragmatic Eurasianism is the ideology of Kazakhstan – what we see is rather 
a combination of Eurasian rhetoric (paying tribute to various branches of 
Eurasianism, e.g. to Lev Gumilev, and also to the idea of the ‘post-Soviet Eurasia’), 
nation-building effort and some elements of pragmatic Eurasianism, which are, 
however, stronger than in other parts of the post-Soviet space; it is rather a set 
of rhetorical statements and political goals than a philosophy or ideology of 
some kind. The Eurasian idea has a firm position in Kazakhstan, partly because 
table 5.1.
three concepts 
of Eurasia
Source: Vinokurov, 
Libman 2012
Eurasia as the post-Soviet 
area
Eurasianism as 
ideology
Pragmatic 
Eurasianism
Constituent factor 
for Eurasia
Shadow of the Soviet past Cultural, historical 
and geopolitical 
commonality
Emerging economic 
linkages
Perception  
of Europe
Excluded (with possible 
exception of post-
Communist countries)
Excluded (and 
treated as the Other 
constituting Eurasia)
Included
Perception of Asia Excluded (with possible 
exception of Mongolia  
and China)
Partly included 
(depending upon 
particular approach: 
China, Japan,  
Great Steppes)
Included
Perception of 
Westernisation and 
modernisation  
of Eurasia
Limited probability of 
the Former Soviet Union 
countries becoming an 
integral part of the Western 
world (therefore a long-
term special designation 
needed)
Rejection of 
modernisation 
through 
Westernisation and 
search for ‘another 
way’
Learning from the 
West as the strategy 
of modernisation; 
limited attention to 
ideology and focus 
on economic aspects
Nature of the 
concept
Geographical notion, 
definition of an area for 
research, policy and 
business purposes
Science or ideology Set of foreign policy 
or economic policy 
ideas without 
ideological pretence 
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of its focus on the links between Slavic and Turk cultures (e.g. the ideas of 
Olzhas Suleimenov), but it clearly assumes that “Eurasia is not synonymous 
with Russia” (quoting the famous 19th century Kazakh ethnographer Chokan 
Valikhanov, see Nysanbayev and Kurmanbayev, 1999). As such, Eurasianism 
does not serve as a Sonderweg ideology (in fact, of many alternatives available 
to Kazakhstan it is one of the least compatible with it) and instead concentrates 
on perceiving the country (as Nursultan Nazarbayev calls it) a “Eurasian bridge”. 
The effort of Kazakhstan to develop integration both within the post-Soviet 
world, with its Asian neighbors, as well as with Europe (e.g. OSCE presidency), 
and a widespread economic liberalisation fit under the umbrella of this notion 
of Eurasia.
Table 5.1 provides a brief summary of three concepts of Eurasia discussed in 
this paper. Again, it is crucial to stress that three notions we describe are rather 
brute generalisations than descriptions of precise and well-defined intellectual 
positions or camps. Furthermore, it is incomplete: the ‘Eurasianism’ has its own 
tradition, for example, in Ukraine and in Turkey, very different from what we 
have described above. Yet even this simplification could form a good basis for 
further discussion of what ‘Eurasian integration’ is, which we will address in the 
next section.
poSt-SoVIEt AND CoNtINENtAL EuRASIAN INtEGRAtIoN
Waves of exchange in Eurasia
Each of the concepts of Eurasia has its own distinct picture of what may be 
called ‘Eurasian integration’. For the post-Soviet Eurasia it is a clearly defined 
set of regional integration organisations created by the post-Soviet states 
(regionalism), as well as persistent and emerging ties between these countries 
(regionalisation). There exists a large amount of literature on these organisations 
in Russian academia, and a much smaller amount in the West (Libman, 2012), 
though the area as a whole remains generally under-researched (Wirminghaus, 
2012). For the Eurasianism regional integration in some form is also important, 
although in this case the focus is rather on the possible development of 
Eurasian integration than on the actual regional organisations. Laruelle (2008) 
even describes the attention to restoring economic and political ties between 
former Soviet republics as one of the most attractive features of Eurasianism. 
Yet typically perception of regional integration in Eurasianism shares several 
common features: (i) regional integration ought to be Russia-centric (this is 
indeed true for many post-Soviet regional organisations, although even in 
this case Russia has been often less active in their design than some other 
countries like Kazakhstan or Belarus); (ii) regional integration is perceived 
primarily as a tool in the general confrontation between ‘Eurasia’ and ‘Europe’ 
and (iii) the focus is either on military and political cooperation, or at least on 
intergovernmental cooperation, and much less so on spontaneous economic 
links between countries of the region.
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The third concept of Eurasia offers a distinct picture of Eurasian regional 
integration, which, unlike the ‘post-Soviet Eurasian integration’, could be 
called ‘continental Eurasian integration’. The focus is in this case on emerging 
economic linkages spanning the entire Eurasian continent, and, more 
specifically, on economic links between individual macroregions in Eurasia. 
It is, indeed, interesting to notice that contrary to the expectations of the 
ideological Eurasianists, in Eurasia in general and in the post-Soviet space 
in particular, bottom-up economic integration has been substantially more 
successful than the top-down regionalism. From this point of view, Eurasian 
continental integration is, however, not a recent phenomenon: it can be 
embedded into the framework of the so-called Eurasian exchanges, waves 
of developed exchange of goods and ideas across Eurasia, which have been 
observed over the last two and a half millennia (Bentely, 1998), or probably 
even earlier – Diamond (1997) points out that the vast Eurasian landmass 
spread from the East to the West supported the spread of domesticated 
animals and plants. 
It is possible to distinguish between three waves of Eurasian exchange (Gunn, 
2003; Abu-Lughod, 1989; Frank, 1992; Chaudhuri, 1985). The first wave 
has been observed in the first to third centuries A.D., and resulted from the 
emergence of a set of large stable empires spanning the Eurasian continent from 
the Roman Empire to the Han dynasty empire. The eastern commerce of the 
Roman Empire flourished after Augustus primarily through two routs: sea trade 
with Arabia, East Africa and India, with the centre in Alexandria, and caravan 
trade with China through Parthia and Central Asia (Thorley, 1969). These 
linkages collapsed after the end of the Roman Empire. The second wave of 
Eurasian exchange occurred a century later, in the 11-13 centuries A.D. Unlike 
the first wave, this time Europe remained at the margins of the existing trade 
network, which mostly spanned India, China, the Byzantine Empire and the Arab 
world. Again, three routs came into existence. The northern route, which is often 
referred to as the famous Silk Route (on various points of view on this concept 
see Christian, 2009; Rezakhani, 2010), connected the Arab world and China 
through Central Asia. The middle route connected the Mediterranean region 
with the Indian Ocean via Baghdad and Basra. The Southern route connected 
Egypt through the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Both Central Asian and Indian 
Ocean trade was implemented without great powers uniting the entire territory 
by merchant networks – the system of free harbours in the Indian Ocean from 
this point of view differed greatly from the Mediterranean experience (Hourani, 
1951/1995) and has had a positive impact on the contemporary development 
in India until the present day (Jha, 2008). The second wave culminated under 
the Mongol Empire, which for the first time united the Eurasian landmass and 
created unprecedented opportunities for exchange (Kotkin, 2007). The third 
wave came into existence in the 16-19 centuries and was associated with 
European discoveries and colonisation. 
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The picture of Eurasian exchanges brings conjectures that there existed an 
uneasy relationship between the economic exchange and political integration. 
In some cases, exchange was facilitated by political unity, while in others, 
barriers created by new empires have in fact brought the Eurasian exchange 
to a halt, as it happened, for example, with the continental exchange over 
Central Asia after the emergence of the Ottoman, the Qing and later the Russian 
Empires. It also demonstrates a complex interplay between the maritime and 
the continental routes, as well as the importance of exchange not only for purely 
commercial issues (although during most of the period of existence of the 
Eurasian exchange goods travelled farther than people, see Abu-Lughod, 1989), 
but also for the movement of ideas, ideologies, technologies and religions, and 
also diseases and pandemics; to some extent, the Black Plague, which was 
the most disastrous epidemiological event in the history of the Western world 
(but also one of the key factors pushing the essential changes in the European 
economy contributing to the Age of Geographic Discoveries (Findlay and 
O’Rourke, 2007)), was a product of facilitated exchange between the West and 
the East during the Mongol Empire.
Eurasian integration in the last decades
While economic connections across Eurasia played a vital role for the world 
economy during three waves of Eurasian exchange, the situation changed 
dramatically in the 20th century. During the post-World War II era, the global 
economic integration became mostly concentrated in the Transatlantic (the 
economic ties between the European countries and the US, as well as within 
Europe) and later Transpacific (with the growth of Japan and other Asian tigers) 
areas. The Central Eurasia and China areas were basically cut off from the global 
economy, with some exceptions (for example, the growing export of Russian 
oil and gas to Europe since the 1970s), and India also turned to protectionist 
trade policies and high regulation. Thus – although to a lesser extent than, say, 
Sub-Saharan Africa – Central Eurasia constituted a hole in the emerging web of 
globalisation. 
The situation changed dramatically in the last two decades due to two major 
trends. One is the collapse of the Soviet bloc, forcing the post-Communist 
countries to search for alternative paths of integration into the world economy. 
This, in turn, resulted in two contradicting outcomes. On the one hand, most 
countries of the former Soviet Union developed firm ties with extraregional 
partners – starting with Russia, which is in fact the post-Soviet country with 
the lowest level of intraregional integration (Vinokurov and Libman, 2010). In 
Central Asian states, for example, China became a crucial trade partner; however, 
at least for some of them the development of informal trade to China is rather 
linked to the use of these countries as gateways into the post-Soviet space. 
On the other hand, therefore, the post-Soviet trade ties turned out to be more 
resilient than expected originally (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 2003). In other areas 
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(like migration), the post-Soviet space actually became more integrated over 
the last few years (Libman and Vinokurov, 2012). There also persist issues of 
common infrastructure, which keep the region together; thus, the development 
of economic ties with extraregional partners coexists with persistence of 
intraregional integration at least in some areas. Second, a prominent change 
in Eurasia in the last two decades has been the growth of China, with trade 
between China and Europe becoming one of the key economic links in the 
modern world.
Thus, Eurasian continental integration is again on the move. It is particularly 
pronounced in the area of trade (both formal and informal), where interregional 
trade ties grow faster than intraregional trade linkages. It is also present in the 
area of foreign direct investments (FDI), where new generation of multinationals 
from China and Russia become important players influencing the economic 
development of Eurasia. It is, however, much less successful in the area of 
migration, where the Eurasian continent still consists of a number of isolated 
areas. Two key bottlenecks in the development of the Eurasian continental 
integration are the lack of intergovernmental cooperation and the problems 
of infrastructure. It is important to understand, however, that the land 
connections and sea connections (and hence transoceanic and 
transcontinental) integration are very different in terms of the infrastructure, 
policy and governance. An obvious issue is that transcontinental trade 
inevitably crosses borders of multiple jurisdictions, which are required to 
show at least some level of cooperation. Furthermore, it is very often much 
more costly in terms of infrastructure required (railroads or roads) than the 
maritime trade. This infrastructure should be, once again, jointly constructed 
and maintained by many countries (and the associated redistributional 
conflicts should be resolved – what is, as for example Central Asian 
experience shows, a very difficult task, see Granit et al., 2012). That is why the 
development of the global economy mostly went along the lines of transoceanic 
trade in the last few centuries. There are, however, some examples of trade 
where transoceanic linkages have been less developed than transcontinental: 
examples include oil and gas, to some extent, and also illicit drug trade, which 
is mostly land-based. Eurasian continental integration so far has been also 
very much based on maritime routes (e.g. trade between China and the EU); 
understanding the potential of the continental infrastructure in this respect 
is of vital importance.
To conclude, Eurasian continental integration is a vivid process shaping the 
economic development of the continent. Interestingly, again, contrary to what 
ideological Eurasianists would expect, it is mostly market-driven – much more 
than integration in the EU, for example, where top-down coordination played 
a crucial role. However, there is also a substantial ‘shadow’ side to the regional 
integration in Eurasia, which, in turn, is related to two aspects. On the one 
hand, partly because of the fast-track development of Eurasian continental 
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integration, many Eurasian countries experience strong economic growth 
and industrialisation, which in turn are associated with stronger ecological 
problems. Issues of environment protection in border regions or pollution call 
for cooperation across different countries of the continent. On the other hand, 
the increasing movement of goods, trade in services and somewhat larger 
migration are also used for illegal trade in drugs, human beings and firearms, 
which is strengthened by the presence of essentially lawless territories (like 
Afghanistan) in the direct vicinity of the borders of key Eurasian states and the 
inefficient corrupt bureaucracies in other countries. Finally, diseases also spread 
across Eurasia, much faster and with possibly more disastrous consequences 
then five hundred years ago. Hence, a certain form of top-down integration in 
Eurasia is also advisable. 
CoNCLuSIoN
It remains to summarise the main arguments of this paper. First, we have presented 
three concepts of Eurasia, as they are used by researchers and practitioners. 
Clearly, the most troublesome is the second type of ‘ideological’ Eurasianism, 
which is hardly compatible with both empirical realities of market integration in 
Eurasia, as well as normative goals of modernisation and development. For us, 
it is crucial to stress that there exists a need to conceptualise and to understand 
Eurasia and Eurasian integration beyond the ideological Eurasianism, and there 
is no reason why the latter should keep monopoly rights on the application of the 
concept of Eurasia. As for the post-Soviet Eurasia versus Eurasian continent (and 
also post-Soviet Eurasian versus continental Eurasian integration) contradiction, 
here the situation is more complex. The authors of this paper themselves seem 
to mix up these concepts sometimes, as they do also in their publications in 
the EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook. However, reserving the word ‘Eurasia’ 
merely for twelve post-Soviet states seems to rob this concept of the possible 
broad applications: it may be that referring to the region as ‘Northern and 
Central Eurasia’ (Vinokurov, Libman, 2012) is more applicable. 
For us, however, two issues are crucial in this respect. First, continental Eurasian 
integration remains an under-studied phenomenon, which requires further 
work, especially empirical (for several areas, like informal trade, emergence of 
cross-border networks or FDI, we simply lack reliable data for more elaborated 
analysis). It is also an issue that should be taken into account by policy-makers 
and which is often overlooked. Second, for the post-Soviet space the interaction 
of two Eurasian integrations: the continental and the post-Soviet one, remains 
a crucial challenge. As of now, the post-Soviet regional integration projects 
face substantial difficulties in terms of coping with Eurasian economic ties; 
and although the understanding of the importance of this issue is growing, it is 
still insufficient. Thus, redesigning post-Soviet regional organisations in a way 
that is compatible with both European integration in the West and multitude 
of regional projects in Asia, as well as with the developing intraregional and 
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interregional economic interests of the post-Soviet companies and households, 
remains an issue of crucial importance. 
REfERENCES
Abu-Lughod J.L. (1989) Before European Hegemony. The World System A.D. 
1250-1350. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beissinger M.R., Young C. (2002, eds) Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa 
and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press.
Bentley J.H. (1998) Hemispheric Integration, 500-1500 C.E. Journal of World 
History. 9(2): 237-254.
Bruckbauer R. (1994) Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet 
Union and post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account. Theory and Society. 
23: 47-78.
Bugajski J. (2008) Expanding Eurasia: Russia’s European Ambitions. Washington: 
CSIS.
Buzan B., Waever O. (2003) Regions and Powers: The Structure of International 
Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bykov A. (2009) Postsovetskoe Prostranstvo: Strategii Integracii I Novye Vyzovy 
Globalizatsii. Moscow: Aleteya.
Carothers Th. (2002) The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy. 
13(1): 5-21.
Chaudhuri K.N. (1985) Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic 
History from the Rise of Islam to 1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Chernyshev S. (2010) Na Puti k Edinoi Evrazii. Rossiya v Global’noi Politike. 
3: 36-48.
Christian D. (2000) Silk Roads or Steppe Roads? The Silk Roads in World 
History. Journal of World History. 11(1): 1-26.
Dent C.M. (2003) From Interregionalism to Trans-Regionalism? Future 
Challenges for ASEM. Asia Europe Journal. 1(2): 223-235.
Diamond J. (1997) Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. 
Norton.
Fidrmuc Jan, Jarko Fidrmuc (2003) Disintegration and Trade. Review of 
International Economics. 11(5): 811-826.
THE ECONOMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET  
AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
93Eurasian Development Bank
Findlay R., O’Rourke K.H. (2007) Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World 
Economy in the Second Millennium. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fish M. Steven (1999) Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and 
Democratisation in East Europe and Eurasia. Slavic Review. 58(4): 794-823.
Frank A.G. (1992) The Centrality of Central Asia. Studies in History. 8: 43-97.
Freeman C.W. (2011) The Challenges of Asia. The Washington Note. February, 
21.
Frye T. (2012) In from the Cold: Institutions and Causal Inference in 
Postcommunist Studies. Annual Review of Political Science. 15: 245-263.
Gleason A. (2010) Eurasia: What Is It? Is It? Journal of Eurasian Studies. 1(1): 
26-32.
Gleason G. (2003) The Centrality of Central Eurasia. Central Eurasian Studies 
Review. 2: 2-6.
Granit J., Jaegerskog A., Lindstroem A., Bjoerklund G., Bullock A., Loefgren R., 
de Gooijer G., and S. Pettigrew (2012) Regional Options for Addressing the 
Water, Energy and Food Nexus in Central Asia and the Aral Sea Basin. Water 
Resource Development. 28(3): 419-432.
Gunn G. (2003) First Globalisation. The Eurasian Exchange 1500-1800. Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield.
Hale Henry E. (2005) Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution 
in Post-Soviet Eurasia. World Politics. 58(1): 133-165.
Hourani G. F. (1951/1995) Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and 
Early Medieval Times. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jha S. (2008) Trade, Institutions, and Religious Tolerance: Evidence from India. 
Mimeo.
Kotkin S. (2007) Mongol Commonwealth? Exchange and Governance across 
the Post-Mongol Space. Kritika. 8: 487-531.
Krotov M. (2011) Evraziyskaya Ideya i Perspektivy SNG, in: Evraziyskaya Ideya 
v Novom Mire. Astana.
Laruelle M. (2008) Russian Eurasianism. An Ideology of Empire. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press.
Libman A. (2007) Sovremennaya Ekonomicheskaya Teoriya: Osnovnye 
Tendencii. Voprosy Ekonomiki. (3): 36-54.
Libman A. (2012) Studies of Regional Integration in the CIS and in Central Asia: 
A Literature Survey. EDB Centre for Integration Studies. Report. No.2.
Evgeny Vinokurov and Alexander Libman. 
“Eurasia and Eurasian Integration: Beyond the Post-Soviet Borders”
THE ECONOMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET 
AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
94 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
Libman A., Vinokurov E. (2012) Regional Integration and Economic Convergence 
in the Post-Soviet Space: Experience of the Decade of Growth. Journal of 
Common Market Studies. 50(1): 112-128.
Linn J. (2006) Liberal Eurasianism. Kommersant. November 24.
Linn J., Tiomkin D. (2006) The New Impetus towards Economic Integration 
between Europe and Asia. Asia Europe Journal. 4: 31-41.
Linn J., Tiomkin D. (2007) Economic Integration of Eurasia: Opportunities and 
Challenges of Global Significance. in Aslund, A. and Dabrowski, M. (eds.) 
Europe After Enlargement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Neumann I.B. (1999) Uses of The Other: “The East” in European Identity 
Formation. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Nysanbayev A., Kurmanbayev E. (1999) Evraziyskaya ideya Chokana 
Valikhanova. Evraziyskoye soobshestvo. 2: 26-31.
Rezakhani K. (2010) The Road That Never Was: The Silk Road and Trans-
Eurasian Exchange. Comparative Studies of South Asia. Africa and the Middle 
East. 30: 420-433.
Rivera D.W. (2003) Engagement, Containment, and the International Politics in 
Eurasia. Political Science Quarterly. 118(1): 81-106.
Roessler J. (2009) Eurasia: Reemergence of two World Regions – the Effects of 
Interregionalism on Regional Integration. Asia Europe Journal. 7(2): 313-326.
Rose Richard, Neil Munro (2008) Do Russians see Their Future in Europe or in 
the CIS? Europe-Asia Studies. 60(1): 49-66. 
Ryabchuk M. (2001) In Bed with an Elephant: Cultural Wars and Rival Identities 
in Contemporary Ukraine. Reuters Foundation Paper. 159.
Spartak A. (2011) Evraziyskaya Perspektiva Postsovetskoi Integracii. Zhurnal 
Novoi Ekonomicheskoi Assotsiacii. (11): 164-167.
Stockhof W., van der Velde P., Hwee Y.L. (2004, eds) The Eurasian Space: Far 
More than Two Continents. Leiden: International Institute for Asian Studies.
Stykow P. (2012) Postsozialismus: Ueberblick und Perspektiven der 
Forschung. Vortrag bei der 20. Tagung Junger Osteuropa-Experten Jenseits der 
Transformation, Tutzing. 1-3.06
Thorley J. (1969) The Development of Trade between the Roman Empire and 
the East under Augustus. Greece and Rome. Second Series. 16(2): 209-223.
Trenin D. (2002) The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics 
and Globalisation. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
THE ECONOMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET  
AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
95Eurasian Development Bank
Trenin D. (2006) Integraciya i Identichnost: Rossiya kak Novyi Zapad. Moscow: 
Evropa.
Trenin D. (2011) Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story. Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.
Trubeckoy N. (1925) My i Drugie. Evraziyskiy Vremennik. 4: 66-81.
Tsygankov A. (2012) The Heartland No More: Russia’s Weakness and Eurasia’s 
Meltdown. Journal of Eurasian Studies. 3(1): 1-9.
Vinokurov E., Libman A. (2010) Regional Integration Trends in the Post-Soviet 
Space: Results of Quantitative Analysis. Problems of Economic Transition. 53: 
43-58.
Vinokurov E., Libman A. (2012a) Eurasian Integration: Challenges of 
Transcontinental Regionalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Vinokurov E., Libman A. (2012b) Evraziyskaya Kontinental’naya Integraciya. 
St. Petersburg: EDB.
Wirminghaus N. (2012) Ephemeral Regionalism: The Proliferation of (Failed) 
Regional Integration Initiatives in Post-Soviet Eurasia, in Boerzel T., Goltermann 
L., Lohaus M., and Striebinger K. (eds): Roads to Regionalism: Genesis, Design, 
and Effects of Regional Organisations. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Evgeny Vinokurov and Alexander Libman. 
“Eurasia and Eurasian Integration: Beyond the Post-Soviet Borders”
THE ECONOMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET 
AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
96 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
6 Central Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?
Johannes Linn – Senior Resident Fellow at the Emerging Markets 
Forum and a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings 
Institution. He served as Vice President for Europe and Central 
Asia at the World Bank 1996-2003 and as Special Adviser to 
CAREC 2006-2010.
E-mail: jlinn@brookings.edu
Johannes f. 
Linn 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET  
AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
INtRoDuCtIoN
For centuries Central Asia1 was in the backwater of global political and 
economic attention, tales of “Great Games” and “Silk Roads” notwithstanding. 
However, interest in Central Asia from outside the region has been on the rise 
in recent years: Central Asia’s energy resources are of great importance to its 
neighbours in Europe and Asia. In addition, China wants a peaceful backyard, 
while Russia considers Central Asia part of its historical economic and regional 
interests and draws heavily on Central Asia migrants. Turkey is attracted by 
the common Turkic heritage of the region. Iran shares language and cultural 
ties with the Tajik people. The Central Asia’s Islamic tradition connects it with 
the Middle East and other Islamic countries. And now NATO countries rely on 
Central Asia for transit of their nonlethal military supplies in their engagement 
in Afghanistan. 
There is wide agreement that economic prosperity and political stability in 
Central Asia is critical not only for the 60-plus million inhabitants of the region, 
but also for Central Asia’s neighbours, since Central Asia serves as a strategically 
important land bridge between Europe and Asia. Since the five Central Asian 
countries are landlocked small economies, a critical prerequisite for long-term 
1 Central Asia is here defined as comprising the five former Central Asian Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
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economic growth and political stability is successful economic integration 
underpinned by effective regional cooperation2.
This paper therefore addresses the central question of what are the prospects 
for regional economic integration and regional cooperation in Central Asia. It 
starts by briefly reviewing the role of Central Asia in the context of the overall 
process of Eurasian continental economic integration. It then considers what 
are the benefits and obstacles of regional integration and cooperation in Central 
Asia against the backdrop of lessons of international experience with regional 
integration and cooperation, and looks at four of the most important recent 
regional cooperation initiatives. In closing, the paper provides an answer to the 
question whether regional integration and cooperation in Central Asia are for 
real or only a mirage.
CENtRAL ASIA At tHE CoRE of EuRASIAN ECoNoMIC INtEGRAtIoN
Central Asia lies in the heart of the Eurasian continental space, where Eurasia 
is defined to cover all of Europe and Asia, including the Middle East and Arab 
Peninsula. The opening up of China to the rest of the world in the early 1980s 
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, tore down the 
political barriers that had held back the continental economic integration 
process of Eurasia. This meant that Eurasia could now catch up with the 
economic globalisation process that had advanced rapidly in the rest of the 
world after the Second World War3. One indicator of the rapid integration 
process of Eurasia is that today the largest share of world trade takes place 
between Eurasian economies as shown in Figure 6.1. While much of the trade 
is carried on traditional maritime routes, the long-term potential for land routes 
to take on an increasing share of continental trade – from traditionally minimal 
levels – is significant, as other continental integration processes have shown, 
most notably in Europe and North America.
These developments are of great significance for Central Asia. During Soviet 
times, Central Asian economies were mostly oriented towards Moscow. Now 
they can increasingly look towards China, South Asia, Europe and the Middle 
East to gain access to markets, while maintaining strong links with Russia. Central 
Asia’s neighbours make up a large share of the global economy and count among 
them the most dynamic economies of the world. Where previously it might 
have been accurate to consider Central Asian countries as handicapped by their 
2 “Regional economic integration” refers to the economic links formed between economic agents in different countries 
of a particular geographic region through trade, transport and communications, financial flows, and migration. “Regional 
cooperation” refers to the coordination of efforts by governments to provide the necessary public infrastructure that supports 
regional economic integration and to remove barriers to regional integration that may arise from national policy regimes. 
(Linn, 2011)
3 See Linn and Tiomkin (2006) for a full exploration of the evidence on Eurasian economic integration, and Linn (2007) and 
Linn (2011) for a discussion of the significance of Eurasian integration for Central Asia.
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figure 6.1.
Global trade flows 
(2008, $ billion)
Source: Gill and 
Raiser (2011)
land-locked position, it is now more appropriate to think of them as facing 
great opportunities for being “land-linked” to the world’s great and dynamic 
economies4. Not only will they benefit from access to their neighbours’ goods, 
energy, capital and labour markets, but also from the potential transit trade 
which will develop across Central Asian territory in linking Europe and Asia 
from East to West and North to South. 
One way to look at this potential process is to compare Central Asia with 
the successful, small, land-locked countries of Europe: Austria, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland, and now Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. 
Rather than suffering from their land-locked location, these countries have long 
taken great advantage of the historic economic integration process of Europe 
and been able to create great prosperity for their citizens5.
CENtRAL ASIA’S REGIoNAL ECoNoMIC INtEGRAtIoN  
AND CoopERAtIoN: BENEfItS AND oBStACLES
For Central Asian countries to benefit from access to their big neighbouring 
economies they have to overcome the legacy of disintegration that haunted all of 
4 The idea of Central Asia benefiting from a “land-linked” status can be found in CAREC (2012)
5 Geographic distances to neighbouring economic centres are of course much greater for the Central Asian countries than for 
the land-locked countries of Western and Central Europe. But with the advances in transport and communications technology, 
economic distances have shrunk dramatically over the last 150 years, and especially over the last 50 years.
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the former Soviet republics. As the Soviet Union broke up, the long-established 
intensive economic links between the republics were dramatically ruptured. 
This contributed to the deep and protracted economic downturn throughout the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) (Linn, 2004). Central Asian countries, along with the 
rest of the FSU, recovered from the transitional economic recession beginning 
in the late 1990s, and indeed during the 2000s emerged as one of the most 
dynamic economic regions in the World (chalking up average growth rates of 
8-10%) (IMF, 2011). They re-established growing trade links with each other, 
with their big neighbours and with the rest of the world. Figure 6.2 shows that 
6 Figure 6.2 shows a broader country grouping for Central Asia than generally used in this paper by including countries that 
were members of the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation programme (CAREC) as of 2010.
figure 6.2.
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intraregional trade between Central Asian countries grew five-fold during 2000-
20086. However, despite this rapid growth, the share of intraregional trade in 
Central Asia relative to the region’s overall trade dropped dramatically after 
independence while it increased in other part of Asia (see Figure 6.3).
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This demonstrates that there remains much to be done to improve the 
interconnectedness of the five Central Asian countries with each other and with 
their neighbours. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and UNDP carried out a 
comprehensive assessment of trade opportunities and constraints in 2005 and 
found that average trade cost and time requirement for shipments to and from 
Western Europe from and to Central Asia, and within Central Asia were about 
twice those expected with normal transport conditions (ADB, 2006; UNDP, 
2005). The principal reasons for these elevated time and monetary costs were 
delays and costs (both legal and informal) of border crossings, behind-the-
border barriers (poor logistics, police barriers, illicit fees, etc.) and infrastructure 
structure bottlenecks. The ADB and UNDP reports projected significant potential 
increases in trade and resulting benefits from systematic improvements in 
these areas. Moreover, with a halving of the cost of transcontinental shipments 
through Central Asia, the region would become cost competitive with maritime 
shipping, while further enhancing its advantage in terms of much shorter time 
requirements7.
In addition, the UNDP report identified a number of other areas in which 
regional cooperation would generate significant benefits, including improved 
use of the regional energy and water resources, improved preparedness for 
natural disasters, and prevention of conflict. Very roughly, UNDP (2005) 
estimated that the potential benefits of effective regional cooperation for 
the countries of Central Asia could lead to a possible doubling of regional 
GDP over 10 years, over and above the level achievable without 
cooperation8.
In short, there is little doubt among economists that the benefits from regional 
economic integration and cooperation are significant for Central Asia. However, 
there are many obstacles to realising these gains in the political and governance 
realms. In the political arena, all the leaders of the newly created states of 
Central Asia prize their countries’ sovereignty, while some of them compete 
with each other for control of resources, especially water and energy (Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan), and for supremacy in regional leadership (Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan), or prefer to operate in strict neutrality to the point of isolation 
(Turkmenistan) (Olcott, 2011). In terms of governance, Central Asian countries 
7 See Pomfret (2011) for comparative cost and time data of maritime and overland routes in Eurasia. A further factor to consider 
is the newly elevated risk from piracy for shipping routes through the Indian Ocean. 
8 This is on the high side among available estimates of the benefits of cooperation. A recent review of benefits from regional 
cooperation around the world showed estimates of benefits from tariff reductions in Asia to be relatively minor; benefits from 
infrastructure investments and quality improvements in the range of 10–20% of GDP over 10 years; and for the Maghreb 
region in North Africa the benefits from entering a trading bloc with the European Union, the liberalisation of services, and 
investment climate reforms have been estimated at 40–60% of GDP over 10 years (Linn, 2011). For a skeptical view of 
estimates of benefits from regional trade integration see Prokop (2012).
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suffer from limited or poor accountability in public decision-making and 
policy, pervasive corruption, smuggling and drug trade, all of which serve the 
interests of the governing elites and undermine their willingness and ability 
to control security forces and border control agents effectively. Accordingly, 
governments find it difficult to implement their stated intentions to pursue the 
goals of improved border management, control of drug trafficking, and reduced 
behind-the-border harassment of private business and investors (de Tray, 2011; 
Shishkin, 2012).
This begs the question whether regional integration and cooperation in Central 
Asia have a chance to succeed. To answer this question it helps to consider the 
experience with regional integration and cooperation elsewhere in the world, a 
topic that we turn to next.
tHE INtERNAtIoNAL ExpERIENCE WItH REGIoNAL INtEGRAtIoN 
AND CoopERAtIoN
Along with the global economic integration process worldwide, regional 
integration (as reflected in the rising share of intraregional trade in total trade) 
has progressed rapidly in many parts of the world. Leading the pack is Europe, 
but it is closely followed by Asia (see Figure 6.4). However, regional integration 
figure 6.4.
Intraregional trade 
Shares
Source: ADB, 2010
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has not been matched by equal progress with regional cooperation in most 
regions. In fact, most efforts to create and sustain regional organisations have 
fallen woefully short of lofty political pronouncements. Even the European 
Union, long held out as the paragon of successful regional cooperation, has 
always had notable shortcomings in the way the regional institutions have 
functioned and Europe has recently run into dramatic problems as a result of the 
poorly designed common currency project of the Euro, combined with weak 
macroeconomic management and structural policies in individual EU countries 
(Soros, 2012).
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A recent review of the experience with regional cooperation initiatives 
worldwide and in Asia concluded with nine lessons that are highly relevant for 
Central Asia9:
1. Building effective regional institutions is difficult, takes a long time, and 
requires incremental, gradual, and flexible implementation with visible 
payoffs.
2. It is preferable to keep the number of members in sub-regional and regional 
organisations manageable. Membership should be based on shared 
geography and common regional interests.
3. Adequate funding mechanisms for regional investments are essential. 
4. Successful cooperation requires leadership at the country, institutional, and 
individual levels. 
5. External assistance can be helpful in setting up and sustaining sub-regional 
institutions, but it cannot substitute for ownership of the process from 
within the region.
6. Open regionalism – i.e., the creation of institutions that are open to 
extra-regional participation and do not discriminate against non-regional 
economies in the long term – is the most successful strategy as demonstrated 
in the case of East and South-East Asia.
7. Regional economic cooperation organisations that involve ministries of 
finance or economy and central banks tend to be more effective than those 
that rely on the leadership of line ministries or foreign affairs. 
8. Transparency and the engagement of the business community and civil 
society strengthen the mechanisms for regional cooperation. 
9. Monitoring and evaluating the performance of countries under regional 
agreements is important, as are incentives for better compliance.
RECENt REGIoNAL CoopERAtIoN INItIAtIVES IN CENtRAL ASIA
For Central Asia, as we have noted earlier, intraregional trade has expanded 
significantly in terms of volume, but its share in total trade dropped precipitously 
since the 1990s. In part this reflects three factors: (a) overall trade expanded 
very rapidly, more rapidly than GDP, as the ratio of trade to GDP rose from an 
already high level of 63% in 2000 to 76% in 2008 (ADB, 2010); (b) Central 
Asian economies have similar economic structures and all rely principally on 
natural resource based exports10, and hence one would expect relatively low 
9 This section is based on Linn and Pidufala (2008) and Linn (2011)
10 In Soviet days, Central Asian countries actually had a differentiated industrial base, but much of this was destroyed as a 
result of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Linn, 2004).
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intraregional trade shares; (c) where there were no external borders and hence 
no trade barriers within the Soviet Union, countries in Central Asia introduced 
significant barriers to economic exchange across their sovereign borders after 
independence11.
Despite – or maybe because of – this trend, there was no dearth of efforts to 
create regional organisations to foster regional cooperation in support of regional 
economic integration involving Central Asian countries. On the contrary, a large 
number of regional organisations and forums were set up in the years following 
the collapse of the FSU, with overlapping memberships and mandates creating 
a “spaghetti bowl” of regional institutions. Most of the regional organisations in 
Central Asia have been characterised by weak organisation and funding, with 
little or inconsistent engagement by key countries and national leaders, and 
none of them was able to affect decisively the way in which the countries of the 
region cooperated in the economic sphere (Linn, Pidufala, 2008). In fact, many 
of the obstacles that have prevented effective regional cooperation through 
regional organisations in the rest of the world have also been at work in Central 
Asia: lack of ownership and political commitment by leaders (despite public 
statements to the contrary), lack of funding mechanisms, lack of transparency, 
lack of engagement by the private sector and civil society, and lack of a clear 
results agenda and monitoring of progress.
There are some signs, however, that regional cooperation has been given a 
new impetus in the last few years, albeit coming from very different directions. 
In the remainder of this paper we will focus on four of the most prominent 
examples: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), led by China and 
Russia; the Eurasian Economic Community, led by Russia; recent initiatives 
focused on integrating Afghanistan with its neighbours, led by the United States 
and Europe; and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation programme 
(CAREC), led by the Asian Development Bank with the support of China. 
the Shanghai Cooperation organisation
The SCO was formally established in 2001 with six members: China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan12. They declared that the 
“Shanghai Spirit”, i.e., “mutual trust and benefit, equality and consultation, 
respect of diversified civilisations, and seeking common development”, 
represents the guiding principle of the organisation as members seek to 
cooperate in three areas: security, economics, and humanitarian concerns 
11 These barriers were not principally due to high tariffs, but due to non-tariff barriers, including quantitative restrictions, 
arbitrary, costly and time-consuming border crossing conditions, and poor logistical support. See, for example, UNDP 
(2005). 
12 Subsequently, India, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan and Afghanistan obtained observer status and Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey 
are “dialogue partners”. 
Johannes f. Linn. “Central Asian Regional Integration 
and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?”
THE ECONOMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET 
AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
104 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
(Yang, 2012). While principally focusing on Central Asian regional security 
concerns, including cross-border drug trafficking, terrorism and crime, the SCO 
since 2003 also has made regional economic development and cooperation 
one of its goals. However, to date SCO has not been able to deliver much that 
represents significant progress in terms of regional economic cooperation (Linn 
and Pidufala, 2008).
A number of factors explain this. First, the leading two member countries, 
China and Russia, do not necessarily see eye to eye on key regional economic 
development challenges, such as energy and trade development, with Russia 
concerned about China’s growing influence in the Region and its interest in 
maintaining control over regional oil and gas transit (Cooley, 2012a). Second, 
since the SCO operates on the principles of consensus decision-making and 
non-interference, it is not in a good position to resolve conflicts among 
members, such as border closures or regional water management conflicts. 
Third, while China supports the Central Asian members of SCO with significant 
financial resources13, notionally under the umbrella of SCO and in support of 
regional infrastructure, they are in fact bilateral financial flows; the Interbank 
Consortium which was established by SCO in 2009 does not appear to have 
developed into an effective financial coordination mechanism for funding 
regionally coordinated infrastructure investments. Fourth, SCO has not 
established close relationships with any of the other regional organisations, 
even where there could be complementarities, as for example in the case of 
CAREC (see below). Finally, the Secretariat of SCO, based in Beijing, has a 
limited mandate and limited technical capacity for developing, implementing 
and monitoring effective economic cooperation strategies for Central 
Asia.
A number of these constraints were highlighted in connection with official 
contributions to the 2012 SCO summit in Beijing, including by the Chinese 
President Hu Jintao who “called for the SCO to be built into an effective platform 
for increasing international exchange and influence”, and by Chinese Vice 
Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping, who referred to the need to “balance regional 
stability versus the principle of non-interference”, to balance “the ability to act 
versus adhering to the principle of consultation to reach consensus”, and the 
need “for the SCO to improve its process, rationalise the working mechanism, 
and improve its decision-making efficiency (China Weekly, 2012; Cheng, 
2012)”. And Sun Changhong, Deputy Director of the Eurasian Research Institute 
of the State Council Development Research Centre, commented that SCO is 
progressing with “setting up conferences and meetings, and reaching resolutions 
and agreements, but they lack specific targets and specific implementation” 
13 At the 2012 SCO summit in Beijing, China announced a $10 billion loan package for Central Asia. (Reuters, June 6, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/us-china-sco-loans-idUSBRE85602920120607; last accessed July 20, 2012)
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(Sun, 2012). Thus it appears that China in particular wishes to turn SCO into a 
more effective regional organisation for economic cooperation in Central Asia 
than it has been hitherto.
the Eurasian Economic Community
After a decade of limited effectiveness since its foundation in 2000, EurAsEC14 
has recently become much more active. Russia and Kazakhstan, together with 
Belarus, have with surprising speed and apparent success set up a customs 
union, effective July 2011, when the customs barriers came down between 
these three countries. The customs union may expand to include Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, but will likely not extend to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the 
foreseeable future. Fourth, and most recently, in October 2011, the then Prime 
Minister Putin announced plans for the establishment of a Eurasian Economic 
Union, which would push ahead with further market integration among its 
members (Halbach, 2012). 
These recent efforts followed two earlier, related initiatives: First, in 2006, 
Russia and Kazakhstan set up the Eurasian Development Bank, which now also 
has Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (in addition to Armenia and Belarus) among its 
members. While EDB is not formally affiliated with EurAsEC, it finances the 
development of national and regional resources and infrastructure in EDB’s 
member states, which are broadly similar to those of EurAsEC15. Second, Russia 
and Kazakhstan set up an “Anti-Crisis Fund” in 2008, managed by EDB, with 
$8.5 billion in resources to support the poorer member countries in dealing 
with the fall-out of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis16.
Looking ahead, the strength of EurAsEC is that it has a strong national champion 
in Russia, a focused mandate on economic integration, and partners with an 
effective financing instrument (EDB). A limitation of EurAsEC is that it does 
not include key Central Asian countries (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and 
does not fully conform to the principles of “open regionalism”. As its reach 
extends and its internal cooperative mechanisms get stronger it may well 
reinforce barriers against non-members in Central Asia17. Finally, it is not 
clear whether Russia’s ambition to create an economic union is serious 
and whether other current and prospective members of the customs union 
14 Current members are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan as members; Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine 
are observers (see EurAsEC, 2011).
15 The members of EDB are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
16 Russia contributed $7.5 billion, Kazakhstan $1 billion, Belarus $10 million, and Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan $1 
million each (EurAsEc, 2011).
17 Reportedly, the border controls between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic have been considerably tougher since the 
creation of the Customs Union (Smith, 2010). This has been one of the factors driving Kyrgyz Republic to seriously explore 
membership in the Union, even though it will also have significantly disruptive impacts on its trade with China, which had 
grown rapidly as Kyrgyzstan with its hitherto open borders had developed as an active transit trade route for imports from 
China into Central Asia.
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share it, considering their likely resistance to a tight embrace by a dominant 
Russia.
Regional Initiatives focused on Afghanistan
A second new regional initiative – or, more accurately, set of initiatives – is 
focused on the challenge of how to integrate Afghanistan into a regional 
integration process that will help it to strengthen its economic development and 
support its political stability, especially after 2014, when the current engagement 
of NATO forces in the country is expected to end. Based on a vision that sees 
Afghanistan as a “hub” or “roundabout” for Eurasian integration, and in particular 
for strengthening the North-South axis connecting South Asia with the rest of 
Eurasia (Starr and Kuchins, 2010), recent initiatives include the “New Silk Road 
Strategy” (NSRS) of the United States, the “Regional Economic Cooperation 
Conference on Afghanistan” (RECCA) and the “Northern Distribution Network” 
(NDN), which transfers nonlethal NATO supplies to Afghanistan. 
The NSRS represents a vision and call to action rather than a well-articulated and 
organised strategy, let alone a regional organisation18. It endorses the concept 
of integrating the economy of Afghanistan with its neighbours as a hub for 
Eurasian economic integration. It calls on Afghanistan’s international partners 
to support the development of regional transport and energy corridors. With no 
substantial new resources contributed by the US or the Europeans beyond their 
continuing large financial engagement in Afghanistan and their low levels of aid 
to Central Asian countries, it is not clear that this initiative on its own will add 
much substantially to help regional integration in Central Asia. 
Potentially of greater significance is RECCA, which represents a recurrent 
series of conferences involving Afghanistan, its neighbours, and international 
partners. The Fifth RECCA conference (RECCA V) convened in Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan, on March 26-27, 2012. It extended and deepened agreements 
among the participants in five areas: infrastructure (transport and energy), 
human resource development (including vocational training and labour market 
facilitation), investment and trade (including transit and border management), 
regional disaster risk management, and regional fiber optic connectivity. 
With commitments to support specific projects and institutional initiatives, 
and a well-articulated monitoring process of progress from one conference 
to the next, the RECCA process potentially can serve as a driver of regional 
cooperation initiatives. Among the major projects supported are improved 
rail and road links of Afghanistan with its neighbours, major regional energy 
transmission projects for and through Afghanistan19, and the development of 
18 See Hormats (2011) for an official statement on the New Silk Road Strategy.
19 Including the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and the Kyrgyz Republic-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan electricity transmission line (CASA 1000).
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regional institutions devoted to vocational training (in Tajikistan) and disaster 
management (in Kazakhstan) (RECCA, 2012).
Another development involving Afghanistan, and of regional significance for 
Central Asia, is the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). Set up in 2009 to 
facilitate transport of non-lethal supplies for NATO from the Baltics through 
Russia and Central Asia as an alternative to the increasingly unreliable supply 
lines through Pakistan, the use of this transit route intensified with the “surge” 
of NATO presence in Afghanistan in 2010 and was especially important as 
Pakistan closed its border to NATO transit in 2011 and into 2012. While facing 
many obstacles and continuing challenges in managing the extended and costly 
transport lines20, NDN has demonstrated that the transcontinental transport 
routes involving rail and roads from Europe to Central and South Asia are viable 
alternatives to the traditional sea routes (Kuchins and Sanderson, 2010)21. As the 
NATO military engagement in Central Asia winds down in the run-up to 2014, 
it is expected that NDN will also serve to support the removal of equipment 
from Afghanistan (Tynan, 2011).
In sum, the focus on Afghanistan as a key connecting hub in Eurasia and the 
need to stabilise its economic and political development has served to place a 
lot more attention on the broader neighbourhood in which it lies, and especially 
on Central Asia. Moreover, for Central Asia a stable, prosperous Afghanistan is 
critical, not only to avoid the disruptions that could once again emanate from 
a conflict-ridden neighbour (refugees, terrorism, drugs, etc.), but also to gain 
access to Central Asia, to the dynamic economies of South Asia and as the 
shortest and cheapest way to connect to sea ports and hence to world markets. 
Unfortunately, the prospects for turning around Afghanistan on a lasting basis 
are at this time at best uncertain, and so it is not clear if Afghanistan in future is 
a plus or minus for the longer term development and integration of Central Asia 
into the world economy.
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program22
In 2011 CAREC celebrated its 10th anniversary of existence as a regional forum 
for Central Asia. It emerged from a regional initiative for Central Asia started 
by the Asian Development Bank in the late 1990s. The first of the annual 
ministerial conferences of CAREC convened in 200223. It set in motion a 
20 Critics have charged that NDN has supported authoritarian regimes, reinforced local corruption at borders, and failed to 
encourage local private enterprise (Cooley, 2012b).
21 However, according to Pentagon data, the cost of shipping a container on NDN remains substantially higher than the 
alternative route through Pakistan ($17,500 compared to $7,200 per container) (Tynan, 2012).
22 The author served as Special Adviser to CAREC from 2006-2010. This section is informed by his observations gathered in 
that capacity. For official documentation on CAREC see http://www.carecprogram.org/ (last accessed on July 20, 2012).
23 The 2002 Ministerial Conference brought together five member countries (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan). Azerbaijan and Mongolia joined in 2003, Afghanistan in 2005, and Pakistan and Turkmenistan in 2010. In 
addition, six multilateral institutions are members of CAREC: ADB, EBRD, IsDB, UNDP, and WB.
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substantial effort to support the intraregional economic integration of Central 
Asia and its integration with its neighbours, modelled on the example of the 
Greater Mekong Subregion Programme (GMS), also initiated and supported by 
ADB beginning a few years earlier24.
Like GMS, CAREC is focused on a limited number of areas of regional 
cooperation, involving principally the development of regional trade, 
transport, and energy corridors. Like GMS, CAREC is not a formal treaty-based 
organisation, but an informal forum, supported by an organisational structure 
that comprises annual ministerial meetings, complemented by more frequent 
meetings of senior officials and of technical committees which prepare sectoral 
strategic plans and investment programs. Like GMS, CAREC enjoys the strong 
support of China, which participates actively in both. 
CAREC’s current membership consists of 10 countries and six multilateral 
institutions25. The participation of multiple multilateral agencies is a unique 
aspect of CAREC (not found in GMS or any other regional organisation). It 
allows the cooperation and coordination not only among the member countries 
but also among the key financial supporters of regional integration. ADB staffs 
and manages the CAREC Secretariat. Unlike GMS, CAREC has not yet seen 
the direct engagement of the member countries heads of state or heads of 
government.
CAREC’s principal goal is development through cooperation, based on the 
vision embodied in its motto: “Good neighbours, good partners, good 
prospects”. In the course of its existence, it has formulated a clear and persuasive 
vision of why regional integration and cooperation matters for Central Asia 
and for its neighbours, based on the notion that its location at the core of 
the dynamic Eurasian continental economic space allows it to transform its 
traditional handicap of land-locked location into an advantage of land-linked 
development (CAREC, 2012)26.
In its first 10 years of existence CAREC saw strong growth in regional investments 
and technical assistance activities, funded primarily by the multilateral agencies, 
with ADB as a principal source. Most investments were in the transport sector 
(see Table 6.1 and Figures 6.5 and 6.6).
Much of the investments took place after 2006, when CAREC ministers 
approved its Comprehensive Action Plan and developed sectoral strategies that 
provided roadmaps for agreed follow up. By 2011, CAREC member countries 
24 For a brief summary of GMS see Linn and Pidufala (2008)
25 See footnote 26. 
26 This theme was first introduced to CAREC ministers by the author in a presentation at the 2007 Ministerial Conference in 
Dushanbe, Tajikistan (Linn, 2007).
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table 6.1.
CAREC operations 
in 2001-2010
Source: Central Asia 
Regional Economic 
Cooperation 
Programme Project 
Portfolio
figure 6.6.
financing of CAREC 
programs (2011)
Source: CAREC, 
2011a
 
 
 
ADB:
$1,536 million
Total 2011:
$2.2 billion
CAREC Member 
Governments:
$452 million
WB:
$126 millionNon-CAREC 
Cofinanciers:
$33 million
IsDB:
$35 million
EBRD:
$27 million
figure 6.5.
CAREC Investment 
Loans and Grants, 
by Sector and Date 
(2001-2010)
Source: CAREC 
Project Portfolio, 
2010
Indicator 2001 2006 2010
Number of investment projects approved (loans and grants; 
cumulative since 2001)
6 43 96
Annual average volume of new approved investment projects 
(loans and grants; 3-year rolling average, $ million)
444.5 630.8 2,862.2
Volume of approved investment projects (loans and grants; 
cumulative since 2001, $ million)*
247.1 3,227.9 13,191
Number of technical assistance projects approved (cumulative 
since 2001)
3 77 153
Annual average volume of new approved technical assistance 
projects (3-year rolling average, $ thousand)
6,814 13,413.3 13,747.3
Volume of technical assistance projects (cumulative since 
2001, $ thousand)
2,476 60,682 136,334
Number of completed technical assistance projects (cumulative 
since 2001)
3 64 73
Note: Where rolling averages are used, 2001 reflects data for 2001-2003, 2006 reflects data for 2004-
2006, and 2010 reflects data for 2008-2010.
* Figures include only disbursed tranches of multifinancing facility investments.
2001-
2005
2006-
2010
2001-
2005
2001-
2005
2006-
2010 2006-
2010
TRANSPORT
ENERGY
TRADE 
FACILITATION
2001-2010, 65 projects 
$10.4 billion, 79%
2001-2010, 22 projects 
$2.5 billion, 19%
2001-2010, 10 projects 
$218 million, 2%
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and organisations had approved a total of $14 billion in funding for regional 
investments and advisory activities under the CAREC umbrella. 
CAREC’s strongest area of engagement has been in the area of transport and 
transit and trade facilitation. The CAREC Transport and Trade Facilitation 
Strategy (TTFS) identified six priority transport corridors traversing Central 
Asia east to west and north to south and connecting with Eurasian transport 
arteries. For each corridor, TTFS noted infrastructure bottlenecks as well 
as key border crossing points and their investment requirements, as well as 
complementary needs to improve border transit and logistics arrangements. 
A core component of TTFS was the establishment of a corridor monitoring 
programme under which the time and cost of transit was to be measured based 
on regular vehicle surveys, allowing CAREC to assess whether and where the 
investments and procedural improvements along the corridors actually led to 
progress in reducing transport and transit barriers and where further action was 
needed.
CAREC has a number of strengths, in line with many of the lessons from the 
international experience of regional cooperation identified above:
1. CAREC is an action-oriented, pragmatic alliance of countries and 
institutions, with a long-term vision and a clear focus on a few key priority 
sectors. 
2. It builds mutual understanding and consensus through work in its technical 
committees and senior officials meetings, leading to constructive discussions 
and agreements in the ministerial conferences.
3. Countries participate in CAREC through their technical ministries (Finance, 
Economy, Transport, etc.).
4. CAREC developed a good action plan and sectoral strategies with a clear 
results framework, against which progress is monitored and evaluated 
regularly27.
5. It mobilised the multilateral organisations’ financial resources for 
coordinated investment and capacity building.
6. It has supported the creation and dissemination of knowledge products 
and the development of training initiatives, through its affiliate, the CAREC 
Institute28.
27 In 2010 the CAREC secretariat carried out an assessment of progress achieved during CAREC’s first 10 years of existence 
(CAREC, 2010). Since 2009, it also prepares annual development effectiveness reviews which report progress against baseline 
indicators in key results areas. So far, no independent evaluation of CAREC’s performance has been carried out.
28 The CAREC Institute was set up in 2006 as a “virtual” entity, managed by ADB. 
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7. CAREC has developed a transparent approach to reporting on its work, 
with its public website (www.carecprogram.org) making available key 
documentation of CAREC sponsored meetings and events. 
CAREC also faces many challenges, not unlike those confronting other regional 
institutions29:
1. Some key regional players are missing, foremost among them Russia30. 
Russia was formally invited to join CAREC in 2006 and sent a delegation 
as an observer to the ministerial conference in 2006, but never formally 
responded to the invitation. Since then it appears that CAREC members 
have lost interest in getting Russia to join, even as the membership was 
expanded to include Turkmenistan and Pakistan in 201031.
2. While CAREC actively and overall successfully pursued the transport and 
trade facilitation agenda since its inception, it made significantly less 
progress in the energy and trade policy areas. Moreover, the critical area of 
water resource allocation and management was excluded from the CAREC 
agenda at the outset, at the behest of China and Uzbekistan, ostensibly 
because they feared that the topic was too sensitive and best dealt with on 
a bilateral basis.
3. Progress has been greater in regard to physical infrastructure investments, 
less so in the “soft” areas of improving the legal, regulatory, and 
administrative aspects of trade, transport, and energy sector management.
4. CAREC has not attracted the attention of the top leadership in Central 
Asia. Because of that, and because of limited efforts at building broader 
stakeholder awareness in the region, CAREC has not been able to gain a lot 
of visibility in Central Asia as an important regional forum.
5. Links between the regional sector strategies formulated in CAREC and 
national sector strategies have been weak or absent, and forward planning 
for specific investment projects under CAREC’s tutelage has been limited. 
These factors have constrained CAREC’s ability to follow through effectively 
on its sector strategies.
6. The intensity of cooperation among the multilateral agency members of 
CAREC has suffered in recent years, as the regular consultation meetings 
among them withered and inconsistent engagement by the individual 
agencies at senior levels left ADB with a near-exclusive responsibility for 
managing the CAREC processes. 
29 Many of the issues highlighted here were identified in CAREC’s 10-year retrospective (CAREC, 2010).
30 Other potentially important neighbours, who are currently not members of CAREC, are India, Iran and Turkey.
31 One complication is that Russia is not a member of ADB. Since ADB plays a central role in supporting the work of CAREC, 
this has been seen as an obstacle for Russia and current CAREC members.
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7. Links with non-member partners and other regional organisations have been 
at best sporadic. CAREC organised two development partner meetings (in 
2009 and 2011) for information purposes and has invited official partners 
to participate in some of its technical committee meetings. The CAREC 
Secretariat also engaged in some outreach to and meetings with other 
regional organisations in Central Asia. However, these efforts have at best 
helped a limited exchange of information, and have not yet resulted in 
effective coordination among partners and organisations32.
8. Participation of and interest from the private sector and civil society has 
been limited to date. CAREC organised two business forums and 
some outreach events to civil society organisations (CSOs) in member 
countries. However, this has not led yet to serious private sector and CSO 
engagement.
9. The work of the CAREC Institute has been, at best, of limited impact. Its 
training activities did not focus on specific sectoral and regional capacity 
building needs, its analytical work has to date not produced significant 
results, and its networking with knowledge institutions (universities, think 
tanks, etc.) in the region has been limited. 
10. The work of the CAREC secretariat, while of high technical quality, suffered 
from the fact that after 2007 ADB moved the secretariat, which previously 
had been located in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to ADB headquarters in Manila, 
Philippines. This substantially reduced the secretariat’s effectiveness 
in building greater understanding, consensus and capacity for regional 
cooperation needs among the stakeholders in Central Asia.
11. CAREC has been unwilling or unable to address, let alone resolve, a number 
of key issues and events that represent a direct challenge to progress in its 
core mandate of fostering integration through improved trade, transport, 
trade facilitation and energy cooperation. Among these are the following:
• The tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over Tajikistan’s 
intentions to build the hydro-dam at Rogun; this has led to actions by 
Uzbekistan that have severely affected Tajikistan, including selective 
border closures, interference with rail transit and blockage of Tajikistan’s 
access to electricity and gas imports33.
• During the food crisis of 2008-2009 Kazakhstan blocked exports 
of grain, including to its Central Asian neighbours, in the interest 
32 For a summary of the CAREC Development Partners’ Forum in Baku in November 2011 see CAREC (2011b). Participation 
at that Forum was limited, with statements by non-member representatives made only for the bilateral aid agencies of 
France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US. It should be noted that closer partnership with other organisations also requires 
receptivity on the prospective partner’s side, which has not always been forthcoming.
33 Uzbekistan has a long-standing practice of severely restricting border exchanges, including mining of some of its borders 
(UNDP, 2005).
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of protecting its domestic consumers. During the unrest in Kyrgyz 
Republic in 2010 Kazakhstan unilaterally closed the Kyrgyz-Kazakh 
border.
• The Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia customs union led to new barriers at 
the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border, which however the countries’ authorities 
are currently aiming to resolve.
• Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan abandoned the existing regional electric 
power dispatch mechanism that had existed in Central Asia since 
Soviet days, directly undermining the development of a regional energy 
market, one of the key objectives of CAREC’s energy sector strategic 
action plan.
• NATO planned and implemented its Northern Distribution Network 
without engagement of CAREC34.
In view of these many issues and constraints which CAREC has not been able 
to deal with, the ownership by its member countries of CAREC as a legitimate, 
relevant and effective instrument for fostering regional cooperation remains in 
doubt. 
The CAREC Strategic Framework 2011-2020, which was approved by ministers 
in November 2011, promises to address some of the issues identified above, 
including efforts to increase country ownership and outreach, better linkage 
between regional and national plans, improved planning and sequencing of 
the multi-year project pipeline, a stronger CAREC Institute, and renewed efforts 
to engage the multilateral institutions, other donor partners, as well as private 
sector and CSO stakeholders. Key issues where the Strategic Framework is 
silent include (a) how to engage the country leadership more directly35, (b) how 
CAREC can deal with hot-spots of regional tensions and relapses in key areas 
of sectoral policies, and (c) when and how CAREC’s Secretariat can become a 
truly regional entity that is located in Central Asia, and managed and staffed by 
Central Asians. As long as these three key issues are not effectively addressed 
and regional commitment to cooperation is in place, the effectiveness of CAREC 
will remain impaired and its sustainability uncertain. 
The reality is that multilateral institutions do not have the mandate or the clout 
to generate political consensus on fractious or disinterested regional partners. 
But this is not to argue that it was a mistake for the multilateral institutions, and 
34 It is notable, however, that the documentation for the US New Silk Road Strategy and the Regional Economic Cooperation 
Conference for Afghanistan refer explicitly to CAREC as a significant partner in implementing programs envisaged under 
these initiatives.
35 The Strategic Framework notes in passing the possibility of a summit of heads of state or government. However, for this to 
materialise and result in an effective meeting, it will be critical to engage leaders early by creating their awareness of CAREC 
and of CAREC’s potential contribution. In the case of GMS, heads of state were involved from early on, initially through direct 
consultations with ADB and the GMS secretariat and subsequently in recurring summits.
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especially the ADB, to take on a lead role in creating and supporting CAREC. 
On the contrary, the fact that CAREC has been able to support key investments 
in regional infrastructure and some improvements in regional policies and 
administrative practices can be attributed to a significant degree to the excellent 
technical and financial contributions made by ADB and its multilateral partners. 
But, for the longer term, more country leadership and ownership in CAREC (and 
in other regional organisations) will be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition 
for success.
CoNCLuSIoN
Based on the preceding analysis we can now address the question: Is regional 
economic integration and cooperation in Central Asia a reality or a mirage?
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the resultant dramatic 
economic depression on Central Asia in the 1990s, the region experienced in 
the 2000s a process of rapid economic growth and of internal and external 
integration. Within Central Asia, connectivity between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Tajikistan has increased36. There are growing links with 
Afghanistan. And there has been rapid growth in economic ties with some of 
the big neighbours, especially China and Russia. A key driver of this process of 
integration of Central Asia has been the larger process of continental integration 
of the Eurasian economic space. In this sense, economic integration of Central 
Asia has been a reality.
But there are serious gaps and major risks to this integration process. First, 
some of the countries in the region remain substantially closed to intraregional 
trade and also represent a hurdle to transit trade, especially Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. As noted, border closures, lack of cooperation in the energy and 
water areas, and weak governance interfere with intraregional and extra-regional 
integration. The regional organisations in Central Asia have been fragmented 
and weak, unable to tackle the sources of interstate tensions, and with at best 
limited resources and mandates to address key regional infrastructure needs. 
In this sense, effective regional cooperation among Central Asian states, as 
beneficial as it would be, remains a distant dream. 
This pattern of regional development – progressive economic integration, but 
hindered by weak institutional cooperation – is a phenomenon that can be 
found in all regions of the developing world. But four recent developments 
point to a possible intensification of the regional cooperation process in 
Central Asia: China’s apparent intentions to turn the SCO into a more effective 
instrument to support regional economic cooperation; the Russian-led EurAsEC 
process and its progress in creating a customs union; the European-US led effort 
to support Afghanistan’s regional integration process; and the ongoing efforts, 
36 Even here, however, serious obstacles remain, including limited progress on the critical CAREC Corridor 5 (CAREC, 
2012b).
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supported by China, to strengthen the CAREC programme. Some links have 
been established between the third and fourth initiatives (CAREC is seen as an 
important instrument to support the Afghanistan integration process), but so 
far there have been few, if any efforts made to connect the SCO, EurAsEC, and 
CAREC processes. 
Looking ahead, therefore, a key question will be whether SCO, EurAsEC and 
CAREC can develop effective coordination and even cooperation in key areas, 
taking advantage of complementarities and avoiding measures that could hurt 
non-member states or that would duplicate effort. As an influential player in all 
three organisations, Kazakhstan could play a major role in ensuring effective 
linkages between SCO, EurAsEC and CAREC. Russia and China, the most 
important players in SCO and respectively in EurAsEC and CAREC, should join 
with Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian countries to explore the potential 
for strengthening the synergies and minimising possible conflicts between these 
three regional bodies.  
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The period from 2007 to 2012 was a period of increased turbulence in the 
global economy. After the US mortgage crisis (accompanied by the bankruptcy 
of major financial companies such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers) caused 
1 EDB (2012a) The CIS Macromonitor. March. Eurasian Development Bank. EDB (2012b) Risks for Public Finance of the CIS 
Member Countries in Light of the Current Global Instability. Eurasian Development Bank.
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a drastic fall in economic activity and a slump in equity and commodity prices 
in 2008, economies and markets recovered considerably in 2009-2010 with the 
help of energetic fiscal and monetary incentives implemented by governments 
throughout the globe. The situation worsened in the second half of 2010 and, 
particularly, in late 2011 and early 2012, when the high government debt of 
some eurozone countries made investors doubt whether they could service it 
further. Over the past two years the European authorities have been looking for 
measures to mitigate the debt crisis by providing support to debtors through the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and newly created stabilisation mechanisms such 
as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM).
In the meantime, the debt crisis began to affect the economic situation 
in developed countries throughout 2011. In the fourth quarter of 2011, the 
eurozone economy had negative growth and international organisations 
predicted that it would remain in recession throughout 2012. The economic 
downturn in Europe has affected international trade: after an average increase of 
15% in 2010, the growth of the global trade dropped by 6% in 2011 and 2.7% 
in the first quarter of 2012 and the growth in exports by developed countries 
declined to 2.4% and of developing economies to 3%.
Today, several factors exist that could potentially worsen the world’s economic 
situation in 2012 and for the next several years.
a. Recurrences of the eurozone debt crisis 
Since the stability of European economies with a high level of debt does not 
seem certain, many observers still believe their default and withdrawal from the 
eurozone to be the most probable outcome of the crisis. Despite the noticeable 
figure 7.1. 
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positive effect the measures undertaken by the European authorities had on 
debt quotes of the largest economies affected by the crisis (Italy and Spain), 
government bonds quotes in more problematic countries remain low and debt 
servicing remains expensive for them. Therefore, it is possible that the debt crisis 
will periodically recur in Europe, requiring debt restructuring in a wide range 
of eurozone countries. The unfavourable consequences of this process for the 
financial sector and budgetary savings measures will have a negative effect on 
the global economic situation. Its extent will depend on what countries will be 
affected by recurrences of the debt crisis. If it does not go beyond small countries 
of the European periphery the related negative shocks can be rather moderate. 
If the debt situation in larger countries gets out of control, the consequences 
will be very significant. The breakdown of the eurozone (which is, however, 
seemingly unlikely) will have consequences that will be more serious than those 
of the 2008 US mortgage crisis.
b. fiscal consolidation in the uS
A reduction in the US government’s expenditures because of the need to 
regain control over the growing public debt is another source of risks for the 
CIS countries. Despite the positive effect of this measure in the long term, its 
immediate effect will be a slowdown or a fall in economic activity in the US 
and, possibly, a decrease in the world prices of raw materials that form the 
exports of CIS countries. The lack of extensive direct trade ties with the US 
is not too important in this case: the trade in oil, metals and grain is of global 
nature and a decrease in demand for them in any part of the world will affect 
the prices of raw materials exported by the CIS.
It should be noted that the effect the situation in the US will have on the rest 
of the world will be considerably lighter than it was in 2008. First, even a 
rather decisive reduction in government expenditures will have a very limited 
effect on the country’s economy. There are no grounds to expect that this will 
lead to a financial catastrophe as it was in the Lehman Brothers’ case. Second, 
the political struggle in the US in the run-up to the presidential and 
parliamentary elections prevents radical measures from being taken in the 
sphere of budgetary policy, despite the intensity of the respective debates. In 
fact, we will only be able to talk about the tightening of the fiscal policy in the 
US from around 2013. Third, the overall situation in the American economy is 
changing for good. If this trend continues, fiscal consolidation, which is needed 
to recover the stability of public finance, can turn to be less radical than it seems 
necessary today.
However, earlier consolidation can be provoked by a large-scale crisis in 
another part of the world, most probably Europe, if, affected by it, investors 
become less confident of the reliability of the American government’s debt 
obligations.
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c. Slowdown in economic growth and decrease in real property prices  
in China
The Chinese economy, whose renewed growth with the help of government 
incentives in 2009-2010 had significantly facilitated the recovery from the 
crisis for both China and the rest of the world, has again slowed down. This is 
partially due to a change in state policy in 2011: having faced overheating in 
the economy, which manifested itself in accelerating inflation and, in particular, 
a quick rise in real property prices, the authorities took measures to restrain 
the credit expansion, which have already brought results. As a result of this, 
inflation went down and the real property boom is fading out. In addition, 
the slowdown in China’s economic growth has been caused by a number 
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of longer-term factors: the demand for Chinese exports is falling because of 
difficulties in Western economies, while increasing prices and wages in the 
country make them less competitive. At present, China’s monetary policy is 
being weakened to a certain extent since the previous year’s tightening made 
it achieve its objectives at large. If the Chinese economy avoids disruptive 
developments, in particular in the financial sector (which was accumulating 
considerable volumes of bad debts during the previous credit expansion), China 
could even become a source of positive effects for the global economy. The 
fact that the authorities still possess very significant financial reserves makes 
this rather probable; however one should not rule out the possibility that the 
situation will change unfavourably. The financial crisis in China, as well as the 
hasty financial consolidation in the US, which we discussed above, can be 
caused by unfavourable events outside the country, for example in Europe. 
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If this happens, the crisis will have a considerable impact on the global 
economy.
d. Growing energy and food prices
We have described the factors that can lead to a decline in prices of the CIS 
exports or hinder access for banks and companies from these countries to global 
finance. There is another threat however: because of the recovery of the world’s 
leading economies, the soft monetary policies pursued by central banks, and 
the limited opportunities to boost production of the majority of energy and food 
commodities, energy and food prices could begin to grow in an unexpectedly 
quick fashion. In such an event, the situation will develop similarly to 2010, 
when energy and food prices also grew.
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figure 7.3.
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Financial Statistics
The CIS countries can very conventionally be divided into three groups that 
differ in terms of the condition of, and sources of finance for, their balances of 
payments and, accordingly, sources of tax revenues. These differences determine 
the channels for external negative effects on the economies in a certain group 
and, accordingly, the reaction of these economies to the development of the 
global situation and measures necessary to mitigate these effects. The following 
groups can be formed using these factors:
Group 1. Energy exporters (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan) 
have a significant export to GDP ratio, a positive balance of trade and a current 
account surplus. The share of raw materials exports in budget revenues is high. 
These countries have financial reserves which were accumulated during the 
favourable part of the 2000s, which however reduced considerably during 
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the 2008-2009 crisis. At present, these countries have a budget surplus, 
which is, however, considerably lower than in the pre-crisis period before 
2008.
Group 2. The economies of Armenia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are 
financed, to a considerable extent, by remittances from labour migrants and 
with the support of diasporas. Although the majority of these countries have 
certain (mineral and/or agricultural) resources, they are not large enough to 
make exports determine economic dynamics. These countries have considerable 
negative balances of foreign trade and current accounts. The tax base in these 
countries is primarily domestic economic activities. Because of the relatively 
difficult collection of taxes from this base (compared to taxes on raw materials 
exports), the budgets of the countries in the second group have chronic deficits 
and depend more or less on external finance.
Group 3. Belarus, Uzbekistan and Ukraine can be included in the third group. 
These countries have a diversified structure of exports and a considerable share 
of products with a relatively high level of processing, while they still have 
considerable raw materials exports. Their foreign balances are historically better 
than those in the second group. The budgetary policy in these countries is also 
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table 7.1.
Grouping indicators 
for the CIS countries 
(data for 2010)
Source: Trademap, 
national authorities
Share of 
mineral 
products in 
exports (%)
Commodities accounting for more than  
10% in exports 
Current 
transfers 
(% of 
GDP)
Money 
remittances 
from Russia 
(% of GDP)
Exporters 
of oil and 
gas
Azerbaijan 95% mineral products (95%) 1% 1.5%
Kazakhstan 76% mineral products (76%), metals (13%) -0.3% -0.3%
Russia 66% mineral products (66%), metals (10%) -0.2% -0.5%
Turkmenistan 71% mineral products (71%), textiles (20%) 0%
Exporters 
of labour
Armenia 31% foodstuffs (17%), mineral products (31%), stone, 
cement, precious metals (16%), metals (28%)
6% 10.1%
Kyrgyzstan 8% foodstuffs (13%), textiles (11%), stone, cement, 
precious metals (46%), other items (11%)
29.1% 21%
Moldova 1% foodstuffs (48%), textiles (19%), machinery, 
equipment (11%)
22.8% 13.4%
Tajikistan 4% foodstuffs (18%), textiles (16%), metals (57%) 26.8% 38%
Exporters 
with a 
diversified 
structure  
of trade
Belarus 29% foodstuffs (13%), mineral products (29%),  
chemical products (16%)
0.6% 0.3%
Uzbekistan 24% foodstuffs (10%), mineral products (24%), chemical 
products (14%), textiles (23%), metals (13%)
6.7%
Ukraine 13% foodstuffs (19%), mineral products (13%),  
metals (34%), machinery, equipment (11%)
-6.1% 1.4%
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historically stronger than in the majority of countries in the second group, but 
the stability of their public finance is fragile. Government budgets are balanced 
or have a moderate deficit, but all countries have a significant deficit in quasi-
fiscal transactions.
In 2011, the economic situation in the region was somewhat different from the 
global trend: despite the overall worsening of the economic situation in the 
world, the CIS economies managed to speed up their growth to a certain extent. 
The weighted average GDP growth in the region (in 2011) was 4.6% (compared 
to 4.2% in 2010). Three economies (Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova) had a 
slower growth than in 2010. The Russian economy, which accounts for 77% 
of the region’s economy, remained at the level of 2010. A noticeable result 
of 2011 was high growth in agriculture. In contrast, the growth in production 
slowed down in the majority of the CIS countries because of the increased 
prices of products and a lower demand for them.
The dynamics of the current accounts were determined, as before, by the 
effects the favourable situation in the global raw materials markets had on the 
balances of trade of the countries in the region and, primarily, the first group 
(exporters of oil and gas). At the same time, increased oil and food prices have 
worsened the balances of trade in the other two groups, which are primarily 
importers of oil products. However, in these countries the effect of increased 
prices of imports was compensated to a certain extent with high prices of their 
main exports, in particular gold, aluminium and cotton. The growth of the 
Russian and Kazakh economies had a positive effect on money remittances. 
The countries that are dependent on transfers to the most significant extent 
have received additional opportunities to finance their trade imbalances, which 
had worsened because of increased import prices. Despite the considerable 
outflow of capital from the economies in the first group, the balance of 
payments in the region has produced an overall net increase in the reserve 
assets of central banks.
On one hand, increased export revenues and the revival of economies 
in the region had a positive effect on budget revenues. On the other hand, 
these contributed to an insignificant growth in social spending and salaries of 
government officials, compared to state revenues. Kazakhstan’s traditionally 
well-balanced budgetary policy resulted in a considerable budget surplus in the 
consolidated budget. Russia’s fiscal results were also better than forecasts made 
in the beginning of the year. In those countries of the region that face chronic 
public finance deficits and rather high government debt, favourable conditions 
led to a certain improvement in economic situation.
A lower growth in the world prices of raw materials and food products and 
tightened (to a certain extent) monetary policies have restrained inflation in 
all countries of the region. At the same time, Belarus faced an acute crisis in 
its balance of payments caused by excessive stimulation of domestic demand. 
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After the devaluation of the Belarusian currency in spring and summer, the 
government’s measures and the urgent assistance from the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis 
Fund and other donors have significantly stabilised its economy and helped 
to stop the drastic weakening of the national currency and restrain growth in 
prices.
The scenario for the nearest years suggests that global imbalances will continue 
to be eliminated. The growth in developed markets will remain low until the 
population decreases its debts, which could require several years. In eliminating 
global imbalances, Western countries with high government or private debt will 
change the structure of their economies by strengthening export-oriented sectors 
and reducing consumption. At the same time, the dynamically developing Asian 
countries – China in particular – will increase their domestic consumption to 
the detriment of their export potential. This process won’t be painless for the 
West, or for the Asia-Pacific, as the economic correction it suggests is very 
significant.
However, there are grounds to believe that the global economy will retain 
insignificant, but stable growth, as a slowdown in the development of certain 
economic sectors or certain countries will be compensated by accelerated 
growth in other sectors and countries. The IMF and the World Bank suggest that 
the economic unevenness of developed and developing countries will gradually 
be eliminated. According to their recent forecasts2, the global economy will 
have a growth of 2.5-3.5% in 2012, with an insignificant acceleration to 3-4% 
in 2013-2014. The growth in developing economies will slow down slightly 
in 2012, and accelerate to 6% on average in 2013-2014, while, in developed 
countries, it will remain at a relatively low level of 1.4-2.5%. The most probable 
scenario is that the eurozone authorities will retain control over the situation 
around problematic countries through debt relief and support of debtors. 
However, the fear of recurrences of the debt crisis in Europe will continue to 
affect the world’s economic activity.
For the CIS countries this scenario is rather favourable, since Asian developing 
markets will still demand raw materials. In addition, raw materials prices will be 
supported by investment demand underpinned by soft monetary policies in the 
West and the weakness of main reserve currencies, primarily the US dollar, in 
the nearest years. EDB forecasts that if Brent oil prices remain high (at $115 per 
barrel), the region will grow by 4-5% on average in 2012-2013. However, the 
main risks, which we described above, threaten higher growth rates in the CIS 
economies. For this reason an alternative scenario has been prepared, which 
suggests that oil prices will fall to $90 per barrel on average in 2012 and 2013. 
This will slow down the growth of the CIS economies to 3.2-3.9%.
Elvira Kurmanalieva, Konstantin fedorov. “The Impact of Global 
Financial and Economic Instability on the CIS”
THE ECONOMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET 
AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
2 IMF (2012) World Economic Outlook, April. World Bank (2012) Global Economic Prospects, June.
126 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
We have grounds to believe that even in the event of dramatic developments 
in the world, prices of raw materials won’t go down in such a radical fashion 
and the lending activity of the global financial sector won’t stop as it happened 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. A comparison of the current situation 
in the world and the CIS countries with the situation which had place before 
the crisis of 2008 suggests that the changes that happened in the last three 
years did not impact unambiguously the scale of possible negative events and 
the resistance to them on the part of the countries in the region. The essential 
differences include the absence of overheating in both the global economy and 
the economies of the region. Another important factor, which seems to be the 
most important now, is that the possibilities to support economic growth in 
the eurozone, with monetary and fiscal policies (monetary policy in particular), 
have not been exhausted to date.
Therefore, the following realistic scenarios exist which demonstrate the 
effects of negative developments in the world on the CIS in the nearest 
years:
1. Debt crisis in the eurozone. The consequences of a default by one or two 
peripheral eurozone countries (Greece and possibly Portugal) will depend 
on the measures taken in this situation by European authorities, but we have 
grounds to believe that these consequences will be moderate. A significant 
portion of debts of these countries has been de facto already written off by 
their creditors. In addition, financial institutions that are holders of these 
debts had sufficient time to form adequate reserves in case of default. 
For these reasons we have grounds to hope that in a moderately negative 
scenario, financial markets will continue to function normally and the 
corporate sector of the CIS economies won’t face a sudden discontinuation 
of access to external funding. Nevertheless, economic damage in this case 
will be considerable: Europe will be in deep and lengthy recession, which 
will probably last throughout 2012 and a part of 2013. Prices of all raw 
materials can be expected to decrease to a certain extent. We can expect 
that Brent oil prices in this scenario will fall to approximately $90 per barrel 
and remain at this level for a year (the level of prices determined by the 
budgetary situation in Saudi Arabia and marginal oil production costs). The 
effect this crisis will have on the CIS countries will be significant but not 
catastrophic: growth rates in the region will remain positive.
2. Financial crisis in China. We can suppose with some certainty that Chinese 
authorities will manage to avoid the crisis development of the problematic 
situation in the country’s financial sector. We deem the possibility of 
a financial crisis in China as an additional negative factor in case other 
negative scenarios develop, primarily the scenario of a large-scale crisis 
in the eurozone which is described above. China is the world’s leading 
consumer of energy resources, and a slowdown in its economy will result 
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table 7.2.
Geographical 
distribution of trade 
in the CIS countries
Source: Trademap
 
Trade with 
European Union 
(share,%)
Trade with China 
(share,%)
Trade with the 
CIS (share,%)
Exporters  
of oil products
Azerbaijan 42% 3% 16%
Kazakhstan 47% 17% 26%
Russia 47% 9% 15%
Turkmenistan 20% 21%
Exporters  
of labour
Armenia 31% 9% 30%
Kyrgyzstan 8% 15% 52%
Moldova 45% 6% 36%
Tajikistan 6% 34%
Exporters with 
a diversified 
structure of trade
Belarus 25% 4% 55%
Uzbekistan 16% 16%
Ukraine 29% 5% 40%
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in reductions in oil prices. If its growth is slowed down to 4-5% a year, 
this will be a challenge to all the CIS economies, especially Central Asian 
economies which are more closely tied to China.
3. Fiscal consolidation in the US. As we suggested above, more or less serious 
measures to restore budgetary balance in the US will most probably be 
taken not earlier than in 2013. Earlier consolidation can be provoked by 
a large-scale crisis in another part of the world, most probably Europe, if 
because of it investors become less confident about the reliability of the 
American government’s debt obligations.
4. Unexpectedly quick growth in energy and food prices. There is a risk that 
relatively favourable developments in the world (the renewed growth in 
Europe and the US and still very soft policies by central banks) will cause 
an unexpectedly quick rise in raw materials prices instead of their decrease 
and this can be dangerous for the most vulnerable CIS economies. The CIS 
countries that are vulnerable to unexpectedly quick growth in food prices 
are the countries with the highest poverty level, such as Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. Both these countries were listed by the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) among the countries in danger of food crisis. The 
situation in this sphere could worsen, as agriculture in these countries 
depends on oil imports. A drastic increase in oil prices can also damage the 
CIS countries with high energy consumption which do not have their own 
significant oil and gas reserves and lack stability in external balance. This 
can affect Belarus and, although to a considerably lesser extent, Ukraine. In 
this case, the CIS countries above may need support from neighbours in the 
region.
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The channels, through which external economic events influence the situation 
in the region, did not change compared to 2008-2009. If oil prices drop, the 
CIS countries (where raw materials exports play a key role in economy) will 
suffer reductions in export revenues and narrower access to external funding, 
which is important to their private sector. Exporters of labour will be affected 
by lower financial remittances from their citizens who work abroad, primarily 
in neighbouring countries within the region. On the other hand, a drastic 
increase in energy prices will impact favourably on the trade surpluses of the 
net exporters of raw materials and bring additional revenues to state budgets 
and international reserves of these countries. At the same time, this increase will 
significantly worsen the balances of trade of oil and gas importers, which will be 
compensated by increased remittances by labour migrants.
Money remittances are the key mechanism, with the help of which benefits 
and losses of energy and food exporters, in the event of changes in prices of 
their exports, are distributed among all countries in the region. Despite all the 
difficulties, this risk sharing mechanism helps the majority of the CIS countries 
to mitigate the increasing risks to a certain extent and resist the slowdown in 
the global economy.
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This paper is based on the monitoring of mutual investments in CIS countries 
and Georgia (MMI CIS). This research project was conducted jointly by IMEMO 
and EDB Centre for Integration Studies in 2012. Institute of World Economy 
and International Relations (IMEMO) between December 2011 and May 2012. 
Efforts are currently under way to build the Single Economic Space on the basis 
of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This is, of course, 
not the first attempt at promoting economic integration between post-Soviet 
states; nevertheless, CIS countries have so far failed to achieve their desired 
level of regional integration. Scientific studies suggest that the success of “top-
to-bottom” integration can only be ensured if the strong prop of corporate 
integration is already in place (Libman, 2007; Heifetz, Libman, 2008). One of 
the critical elements of this corporate integration is foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Without the ongoing monitoring of investment ties it would be difficult to 
formulate an effective integration strategy for Russia and its CIS partners.
Investor companies in the post-Soviet states represent a very specific type of 
transnational corporation (TNC). Whilst they have much in common with most 
other TNCs, these companies have a number of distinct attributes linked to 
the relative lack of language and other non-economic barriers to investment 
within the CIS, and to the peculiarities of the post-Soviet business community 
itself. Moreover, the emerging TNCs in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and 
other countries in the region share some features with TNCs from developing 
countries. Therefore, an analysis of investor companies from the CIS and Georgia 
supported by a high-quality empirical and statistical database would allow 
the theoretical notion of TNCs to be widened. In recent years, any significant 
“geographic” expansion of the empirical base has inevitably prompted new 
theoretical studies of direct investment (Kuznetsov, 2012).
130 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
THE ECONOMICS OF THE POST-SOVIET  
AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
A clearer picture of cross-border investment ties within the region provided by 
the MMI CIS exercise will not only benefit consumers in public administration, 
scientific and expert analysis but also the business community. Companies 
active in CIS countries have an interest in the availability of proficient consulting 
services; such consultancy is not generally offered by leading western agencies 
due to the highly specific nature of FDI in the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, 
the combination of a quality information source (database) and professional 
summary analysis may raise the “eligibility criteria” for foreign competitors who 
are able to mobilise considerable resources to enhance their presence in CIS 
countries. This effect has already been observed in the scientific sphere, where 
professionals from the US and EU have begun cooperating with leading experts 
from Russia (Kuznetsov, 2010).
MMI CIS has several targets, and this is reflected in the structure of our paper. In 
Section 1 we discuss flaws in the existing MMI official statistics in CIS countries. 
Section 2 describes the algorithm of MMI applicable to the CIS. Section 3 
describes the geographic structure of accumulated FDI that has emerged from 
the MMI CIS. Section 4 gives a breakdown of FDI by industry and corporation. 
Finally, in Section 5, we suggest ways of applying MMI CIS on a wider scale.
1. fLAWS IN tHE offICIAL StAtIStICS oN MutuAL INVEStMENt  
IN CIS CouNtRIES
Despite many attempts by international organisations to standardise FDI 
statistics (e.g., the introduction of a 10% threshold to distinguishing between 
direct investment and portfolio investment), there are still features which are 
peculiar to the CIS countries and Georgia: 
• coverage of investment projects (especially small ones); 
• method of calculating accumulated FDI; 
• establishing the “nationality” of FDI;
• inclusion of reinvestments in existing foreign projects. 
The most comprehensive assessment of FDI flows can be obtained from balance 
of payment statistics which are normally published by national central banks. 
However, these central bank publications rarely provide sufficient detail on 
the industry or geographic structure of investment. In Russia, FDI statistics are 
available from the Central Bank (CB) and Rosstat (the national statistics agency); 
the latter relies on surveys completed by investor companies (Kuznetsov, 2009). 
However, not all companies readily supply the information requested on the 
Invest-1 form. 
There is no perfect method of calculating accumulated FDI. Due to high inflation 
rates (especially in CIS countries), calculations based on historic prices result in 
lower FDI figures for periods in the past compared with more recent years. Any 
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calculation based on market prices is complicated by the fact that CIS stock 
markets are less well developed (i.e., most companies’ securities are not traded 
on stock exchanges on a large scale). There are also problems linked with rapid 
fluctuations in asset values (especially during the last global crisis), subjective 
estimates of value, and a variety of other factors.
Another problem is the inclusion in FDI statistics of long-term loans provided 
by parent companies to their overseas subsidiaries (e.g., by a Russian TNC to 
its branch in Ukraine). The repayment of such loans, especially interest-bearing 
ones, in some instances results in negative accumulated FDI figures. Yet a 
project implemented using such loans may continue to function successfully 
under the control of the same foreign company.
Therefore, despite claims that cross-border investment statistics have been 
standardised between different countries, we should bear in mind that any 
quantitative assessment of accumulated FDI is merely an approximation. Even 
statistics from the UNCTAD, the leading international agency on FDI studies, 
can only partly illustrate the proportion of total FDI contributed by specific 
investor countries. In the region studied, the indisputable lead exporter of 
capital is Russia, and the other prominent players are Kazakhstan, Ukraine and 
Azerbaijan (see Table 8.1). FDI by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan is negligible by comparison.
International comparisons are complicated even further by differences in the 
time taken to calculate accumulated FDI in different countries. As a rule, the 
more investment companies from a particular country make, the more time 
it takes the central bank or other body in charge of FDI statistics to collect, 
process and verify the data. As a result, international statistics on such countries 
table 8.1.
Accumulated 
exported and 
imported direct 
investment in CIS 
countries and 
Georgia as at late 
2010
Source: UNCTAD, 
2011: 194
Country
Accumulated exported direct 
investment ($ million)
Accumulated imported direct 
investment ($ million)
Azerbaijan 5,790 9,593
Armenia 85 4,206
Belarus 205 9,940
Georgia 155 7,821
Kazakhstan 16,176 81,352
Kyrgyzstan 1 974
Moldova 68 2837
Russia 433,655 423,150
Tajikistan … 915
Turkmenistan … 8,186
Uzbekistan 0 4,460
Ukraine 7,966 57,985
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may be based on incorrect preliminary estimates. In Russia, for example, the 
UNCTAD relies exclusively on data supplied by the Russian Central Bank, but 
it receives this data from the CB for preparing its annual FDI reports in spring, 
whereas the CB publishes its final data only in summer.
As a result, at the end of 2010 UNCTAD’s figures showed $433.7 billion of 
accumulated Russian FDI, whereas the CB showed only $368.7 billion (in 
fact, the latter figure was used for international comparison by the IMF which 
prepared its report later than the UNCTAD). Both the IMF and the UNCTAD 
also show different data on Kazakhstan and Armenia (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2).
The official CIS statistics clearly reflect the “neighbourhood effect” in FDI 
geography, which is more pronounced in countries with insignificant capital 
export volumes (see Table 8.2). Whereas in Russia, according to official 
statistics, only 4.4% of all accumulated overseas direct investment was made in 
the CIS, the respective proportion is 10.9% in Kazakhstan, 46% in Azerbaijan, 
and as much as 90.7% in Belarus. 
The main recipients of FDI from Kazakhstan are Russia and Kyrgyzstan, and 
Georgia receives nearly the same amount of Kazakh capital as Ukraine. The 
table 8.2.
the geography 
of accumulated 
direct investment 
of CIS countries 
as at late 2010
Source: IMF, 2010
Recipient country
Accumulated direct investment ($ million)
Russia Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Belarus Armenia Kyrgyzstan
Total 368,737 15,682 5,790 205 83 2
Azerbaijan 17 8 – 0 0 0
Armenia 1,753 10 0 0 – 0
Belarus 5,702 39 0 – 0 0
Georgia 290 162 2,578 0 0 0
Kazakhstan 2,036 – 26 1 0 0
Kyrgyzstan 106 257 0 0 0 –
Moldova 387 1 0 0 0 0
Russia – 891 44 156 6 0
Tajikistan 264 44 0 0 0 1
Turkmenistan 173 1 0 0 0 0
Uzbekistan 991 127 0 0 0 0
Ukraine 4,333 166 13 29 0 0
Total, 12 post-Soviet countries 16,052 1,706 2,661 186 6 1
Cyprus 153,934 496 0 0 0 0
The Netherlands 39,668 9,228 68 0 0 0
British Virgin Islands 38,762 687 0 0 0 0
The UK 10,278 2,433 18 0 0 0
The US 9,825 599 15 1 0 0
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lion’s share of Azerbaijan’s FDI in the CIS flows into Georgia. The other main 
recipients of Azerbaijan’s FDI are Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. For Belarus, 
the main destination of export capital is Russia, and neighbouring Ukraine also 
receives significant volumes of FDI.
The above data confirms the theoretical conclusion that the overseas expansion 
of national businesses slowly moves beyond the familiar cultural and business 
environment of neighbouring countries (Kuznetsov, 2008a). The low percentage 
figure for Armenia partly fits this logic, since an “occasional” investment project 
implemented outside the neighbouring countries may be of great significance 
in the context of the country’s small FDI volumes. 
However, much more serious misrepresentations occur in connection with 
transshipping FDI via third countries such as Cyprus, the Netherlands, British 
Virgin Islands, etc. (in some cases such jurisdictions are used for round-tripping 
FDI, e.g., Russia – Cyprus – Russia). This issue has been addressed in other 
research papers (Pelto, Vahtra, Liuhto, 2003; Heifetz, 2009), and MMI CIS 
provides a wider empirical base for further studies. In particular, one of the large 
projects included in the MMI CIS database (with authorised capital of about 
$577 million) is the 100% control of Russian Alfa Bank over Alfa Bank Ukraine 
exercised via ABH Ukraine Ltd. of Cyprus. Another example from the series is 
Atomredmetzoloto (a structural branch of Rosatom) which controls uranium 
mining and enrichment assets in Kazakhstan with a value exceeding $1 billion 
via Uranium One Inc. of Canada. 
Other CIS countries also use third-country jurisdictions. This phenomenon 
can be seen most clearly in the official Ukrainian FDI statistics, which requires 
special arrangements for monitoring mutual investment in the CIS. Over 90% of 
Ukraine’s accumulated FDI is formally concentrated in Cyprus (see Table 8.3).
table 8.3.
the geography 
of ukrainian 
direct investment 
accumulated abroad 
(share capital)
Source: Ukrstat, 
2011
Recipient country
Accumulated direct investment 
as at late 2010
Accumulated direct investment 
as at late 2011
$ million % $ million %
Total 6,871.1 100 6,898 100
Cyprus 6,342.5 92.3 6,342.1 91.9
Russia 194.3 2.8 236.5 3.4
Latvia 87.9 1.3 80.4 1.2
Poland 49.1 0.7 48.2 0.7
Georgia 31.1 0.5 32.7 0.5
British Virgin Islands 25.8 0.4 25.8 0.4
Kazakhstan 25.2 0.4 24.5 0.4
Others 115.2 1.6 107.8 1.5
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In Kazakhstan, the situation is somewhat different: large volumes of Kazakh 
capital flow via the Netherlands and the UK (indeed, foreign investment from 
Russia and other CIS countries often reaches Kazakhstan via third countries). 
The proportion of investment transacted via Cyprus is not significant (see Table 
8.2).
In Section 2 we demonstrate that, once the “transshipment” of capital used for 
many projects is detected by means of MMI CIS, the geographic distribution of 
FDI differs dramatically from that officially recorded in post-Soviet states. It is 
unlikely that official bodies in the CIS countries and Georgia are prevented from 
recording FDI both at the location of initial investment and final destination by 
any legal or methodological barriers. To date, the Federal Bank of Germany 
(Deutsche Bundesbank) and other overseas agencies have separately published 
information on the geographic distribution of so-called unmediated and 
mediated direct investment. In this context, in the case of CIS countries, it 
becomes more relevant to discuss the increasing volumes of registered mutual 
FDI, including mediated investments, since CIS countries themselves rarely act 
as “transshipment bases” for investing outside the post-Soviet space.
Another material discrepancy between the official statistics and MMI CIS data 
arises due to the inclusion of investment in project expansion and modernisation. 
This raises an important methodological question: whether or not FDI should 
include the reinvesting of profit generated by overseas subsidiaries. Where a 
researcher is interested primarily in the financial aspects of direct investment, 
reinvested profit does not need to be included, since it has nothing to do with 
balance of payments statistics. But where research is focused on the general 
role FDI plays in an economy, regional integration, technology transfer or other 
positive cross-border process, it is necessary to record not only cross-border 
movement of capital but also total investment by a particular foreign company. 
After all, profit may have been transferred by a TNC to its home country without 
being reinvested, and then the TNC may have returned to invest the same 
sum. Or, for example, cross-border capital movement recorded in balance of 
payments statistics may represent merely a formal exchange of shares without 
any money actually being invested. 
In practice, the expansion of a foreign investor’s business presence rarely 
takes the form of classic FDI. A notable exception to this rule in the CIS was 
Gazprom’s acquisition of control over Beltransgaz in Belarus, which was 
concluded by transferring funds across the border each time it became necessary. 
But typically, especially in the CIS, initial investment in assets is much smaller 
than subsequent investments in modernisation and expansion. In the case of 
privatisation transactions in Central Asia, foreign investors are often brought in 
not as part of an attempt to raise funds by selling a state-owned company, but 
in order to make former Soviet assets competitive internationally, which is often 
impossible without the participation of a powerful TNC (Kuznetsov, 2008b).
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Some experts even maintain that the division of FDI transactions into greenfield 
and merger-and-acquisition (M&A) categories is largely notional. In many 
instances FDI has a transitional “brownfield” format, where a purchased asset 
is fundamentally modernised or expanded. Russian telecommunications 
companies, the majority of fuel and energy companies, and players from other 
industries, took this route in almost all CIS countries. Projects of this type also 
include certain banking investments, where a foreign subsidiary bank multiplies 
its authorised capital by diversifying and expanding its business in the country.
As with estimates of the number of ultimate recipients of FDI made via third 
countries, public statistics agencies in all CIS countries and Georgia would 
collect and publish FDI data both with and without reinvested profit. Figures 
for such international transactions are available. But to date, MMI CIS fills the 
gap in the post-Soviet space. 
2. tHE MMI ALGoRItHM 
Previously published research papers on Russian TNCs did of course include 
lists of projects in CIS countries. However, such publications were not regular. 
The only exceptions are internet publications by the Turku Pan-European 
Institute (e.g., Vahtra, 2005) and B.A.Heifetz from the Institute of Economics 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (beginning with the monograph by Libman 
and Heifetz, 2006). In addition, many publications focus principally on large 
projects (e.g., Kuznetsov, 2007). The exceptions are papers on Russian FDI 
in particular CIS countries (Chetverikova, 2009; Blyakha, 2009; Yeremeyeva, 
2009, and others). In many cases the value of a vast database provided in a paper 
is somewhat diminished, as these databases contain only project titles and start 
dates without any attempt to assess, even approximately, the amount of FDI 
(Heifetz, 2011b; Heifetz, 2001c). The number of quality publications covering 
FDI by companies from other CIS countries can be counted on the fingers of 
one hand, and they deal mostly with Ukrainian and Kazakh TNCs (Kononov, 
2010; Amagoh, Markus, 2010). Some useful information can be derived from 
research publications on particular industries (e.g., Vinokurov, 2009) and large 
businesses from selected countries (Yezhednevnik, 2012).
Since most companies do not publish their FDI statistics, MMI CIS has to rely on 
various indirect indicators to estimate FDI amounts. Typically, any missing data 
on FDI are substituted with cross-border M&A costs (Vahtra, 2009, Kalotay, 
Sulstarova, 2010). The main weakness of this method is that it results in a bias 
towards one form of FDI (M&A) without due attention to greenfield FDI or 
investment in expansion and modernisation of acquired companies (brownfield 
FDI). An approximate, but often the only substitute for data on accumulated FDI 
by industrial TNCs is data on capital (non-current) assets (Kuznetsov, 2009). For 
banks, the most accurate indicator is their authorised capital (which in principle 
is the key element of FDI). Since financial institutions are subject to stricter 
requirements, the increase of authorised capital generally reflects the extent 
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of overseas expansion of the relevant banking groups. In the case of transport 
companies, as a rule, it is very difficult to obtain FDI statistics even on long-
term assets, nevertheless the nature of the investors’ fleet of aircraft, rail cars or 
vessels is well known and its value can easily be estimated. Comparison with the 
published costs of similar projects may also be utilised in estimating investment 
in construction, provided that the projects in question are fairly standard.
The information search algorithm also has some distinctive features. To build 
an initial database, it was necessary to decide upon a list of target companies 
to be included in the MMI CIS exercise on a regular basis in order to detect 
new investment in the overseas expansion of relevant TNCs (be it additional 
FDI in existing assets or geographic expansion). In addition, we had to identify 
the most valuable sources of information, mainly on the internet, for identifying 
new acquisitions and greenfield projects.
On the whole, the MMI CIS algorithm can be divided into the following six 
steps:
• examining the websites of leading Russian companies, firstly those on the 
Expert-400 list (Expert, 2011), and the most prominent companies and 
business groups in other CIS countries;
• monitoring news of FDI issued by companies from CIS countries and 
Georgia;
• examining business and scientific publications (with varying levels of 
coverage, from Belarusian projects in Smolensk Oblast to corporate 
integration in the context of the CIS as a whole);
• verifying all collected data on FDI using the companies’ financial statements, 
reports and press releases;
• if no such data are available, calculating the above indirect indicators and/
or checking them against other data (particularly Rosstat data on direct 
investments from CIS countries in Russia’s regions and industries); and
• commissioning an independent expert to verify the data obtained.
One of the key decisions for monitoring was where to set the minimum size 
of project investment for inclusion in the database. Clearly, information on 
smaller investment projects often escapes the attention of the mass media. 
The relevant investing companies are themselves less likely to publicise 
their activities (due to their small size, among other things), and in the case 
of large TNCs such projects seem negligible in the context of their larger FDI 
transactions. Therefore, many foreign statistical agencies introduce minimum 
reporting thresholds for direct investors which, however, vary greatly between 
countries. For example, in the mid-2000s this threshold ranged across the EU 
from $3,000 in Estonia and $12,000 in Denmark to $10 million in Finland and 
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$13 million in the Netherlands. Some countries, particularly Germany, increase 
the minimum size of “eligible” FDI on a regular basis (Kuznetsov, 2008). The 
introduction of alternative forms of monitoring implicitly limits opportunities, 
since they do not always include companies that have a high response rate 
to their inquiries. Therefore, for example, the Russian magazine Mergers and 
Acquisitions set a minimum threshold of $5 million for its database of Russian 
company transactions (including cross-border ones).
When launching the MMI CIS exercise, we set an initial minimum interval of 
$1-$10 million. We then found empirically that changes in the reliability of 
collected data occur at a level of about $3 million, and this figure was selected 
as the minimum threshold. It should be stressed that in many cases FDI estimates 
can be accurate to within $10 million. 
However, one-third of projects in our database are smaller in scale. At later 
phases of MMI CIS, such projects will assist us in addressing the following three 
tasks:
• following up promising projects which were initially included in the 
database in their early stages. For example, Zarubezhneft and Itera intend to 
invest up to $6 billion in fossil fuel production in Block-21 in Turkmenistan, 
but so far only relatively low-cost geological exploration has been carried 
out;
• monitoring industries which are important to post-Soviet integration but in 
which large-scale investment is extremely rare. The sector which perhaps 
best illustrates this is higher education: there are 37 branches of Russian 
universities throughout the CIS, but the largest investment ever made in 
this industry was the $5 million received by the Sevastopol Branch of the 
Lomonosov Moscow State University; and
• collecting information on small projects, including those implemented by 
smaller investor countries or in border regions, to assess whether there is 
a need to lower the selected threshold in the future (at least for individual 
project categories).
The database on investment projects in CIS countries and Georgia built by the 
IMEMO research team principally contains information on accumulated FDI 
as at the end of 2011 or indirect statistical indicators which may indicate FDI 
volumes. It contains a total of 602 transactions or greenfield projects, but two 
transactions do not formally qualify as direct investments (large production 
projects with a stake of less than 10%). Six of these transactions were made in 
unrecognised or partially recognised republics (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh); these autonomous republics are economically isolated 
from the respective countries (i.e. Georgia and Azerbaijan). In addition, the 
database contains information on 56 relatively significant transactions or 
projects which had been terminated by 2012 (the companies were sold to 
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national investors or TNCs from third countries, and the greenfield projects 
were wound up). Another 12 transactions were embarked upon by independent 
Russian companies but then the investors themselves came under the control of 
TNCs from third countries (typically, from the EU).
In total, MMI CIS covered 526 mutual investment projects which were active 
at the end of 2011 (two of these with investors from two CIS countries). 
Of these, 96 projects had accumulated direct investment of $100 million 
or more (including one Russian-Kazakh project), and 185 transactions 
involved investments not exceeding $3 million. Official information or fairly 
reliable estimates of accumulated FDI are available for about half these 
projects.
3. tHE IDENtIfIED GEoGRApHY of MutuAL DIRECt INVEStMENt  
IN CIS CouNtRIES AND GEoRGIA
Although Russia accounted for only 74% of the projects in the MMI CIS which 
were active at the end of 2011, that country’s proportion of large projects was 
79%, and its share of total mutual FDI reached nearly 87% (see Table 8.4). By 
contrast, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan had no large projects, and Georgia had one project which was a 
very specific case. Georgia’s only known billionaire, B. Ivanishvili, gave up 
Russian citizenship and started to sell off his large assets in Russia (including 
Rossiysky Kredit Bank). However, by the end of 2011 he still had two companies 
to dispose of, Stoilenskaya Niva and Doktor Stoletov.
table 8.4.
projects involving 
direct investment 
in CIS countries 
and Georgia 
(as at late 2011)
Source: MMI CIS
Investor country Total number of projects
Number of projects with 
direct investment of 
$100 million or more
Number of projects with 
direct investment not 
exceeding $3 million
Total direct 
investment  
($ billions) 
Azerbaijan 9 2 0 1.38
Armenia 4 0 3 0.01
Belarus 42 0 36 0.18
Georgia 8 1 2 0.41
Kazakhstan 41 13 3 4.26
Kyrgyzstan 3 0 2 0.03
Moldova 3 0 3 0
Russia 391 76 127 47.94
Tajikistan 1 0 1 0
Turkmenistan 1 0 1 0
Uzbekistan 2 0 1 0.01
Ukraine 23 5 6 1.15
Total 12 countries 526 (2 – two countries) 96 (1 – two countries) 185 55.37
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Russia naturally dominates not only due to its economic and geopolitical weight 
in the post-Soviet space, but also due to its powerful TNCs. Russian TNCs are 
diverse and often owe their success to their strength in Soviet times or to other 
factors which are specifically  Russian (Kuznetsov, 2007). Some Russian TNCs 
(e.g., those in the telecommunications sector) rose to prominence by serving 
the domestic market on the “catching-up development” model. But many other 
TNCs were able to exploit rich natural resources or operated competitive Soviet 
production assets (in the first case Russia has much in common with Kazakhstan 
and Azerbaijan, and in the latter case with Ukraine).
In analysing the geography of Russian FDI in the region, Ukraine’s position 
as the leading recipient (see Figure 8.1) is notable. Due to their geographic 
and cultural proximity, the strong influence of inherited Soviet-era value-added 
chains and other factors, doing business in Ukraine remains the most attractive 
option for many Russian companies. In terms of accumulated Russian FDI, 
Ukraine is some way ahead of Russia’s partners in the Customs Union. Of the 
smaller countries, Armenia takes the lead for geopolitical reasons.
figure 8.1.
the geographic 
distribution of 
accumulated Russian 
direct investment in 
CIS countries and 
Georgia
Source: MMI CIS
Russia receives large amounts of FDI from other CIS countries. There are, 
however, serious discrepancies between Russian Central Bank and MMI CIS data 
(see Table 8.5). Firstly, the MMI CIS database understates the contributions of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Central Asian countries (except Kazakhstan) 
to FDI in Russia, as well as the total accumulated FDI figures. This may be 
explained by the omissions in the recording of small projects, especially those 
owned by ethnic communities in Russia. Technically, it is very difficult to 
identify Tajiks or Armenians, for example, among investors who may or may not 
hold Russian passports. For the same reason (i.e., a billionaire Georgian without 
a Russian passport) Georgia’s share of FDI in Russia was overstated.
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More interesting, in our opinion, is the data on the larger investor countries 
– Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus. In all cases, MMI CIS’ total FDI figures 
are much higher than those of the Russian Central Bank (four times higher in 
the case of Ukraine) (see Table 8.5). This confirms our hypothesis that, just 
as Russian companies invest in Ukraine via offshore jurisdictions, Ukrainian 
companies also invest in Russia via third countries. A similar situation is 
observed in Kazakhstan. In the case of Belarus, however, the main reason for the 
discrepancy is inadequate recording of investment projects by official bodies.
table 8.5.
Accumulated fDI 
in Russia, by country
Source: Direct 
Investment in the 
Russian Federation 
as at January 1, 2010 
and January 1, 2011 
(http://www.cbr.ru); 
MMI CIS
Investor country
Accumulated FDI in early 2011, 
according to the Russian Central 
Bank
Accumulated FDI in 2011,  
according to MMI CIS
$ billion % $ billion %
Azerbaijan 0.32 15.3 0.04 0.9
Armenia 0.18 8.6 0 0
Belarus 0.08 3.8 0.16 3.7
Georgia 0.01 0.5 0.33 7.7
Kazakhstan 1.12 53.6 2.84 66
Kyrgyzstan 0.08 3.8 0 0
Moldova 0.01 0.5 0 0
Tajikistan 0.01 0.5 0 0
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0
Uzbekistan 0.03 1.4 0.01 0.2
Ukraine 0.25 12 0.92 21.4
Total 2.09 100 4.3 100
Generally, since investment by other CIS countries in Russia is no match for 
Russian investments in those countries, mutual direct investment is less significant 
for Russia than for other countries. Russia is the key investor in all CIS countries 
except Georgia, where Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan clearly dominate (see Figure 
8.2). However, many experts maintain that the successful development of any 
integration group is determined principally by economic interaction between 
smaller member countries circumventing the leader (we would draw an analogy 
here with the NAFTA, in which Mexican-Canadian contacts traditionally act as 
benchmarks).
In some cases the largest investor pairs without Russian participation illustrate 
the neighbourhood or territorial closeness effect in a wider context (see Table 
8.6). There are, however, other pairings which are not so geographically 
proximate, e.g., Kazakhstan – Ukraine or Georgia – Belarus. Importantly, 
there are no politically motivated alliances (as with the GUAM initiative). For 
example, PrivatBank of Ukraine made considerable investment in Georgia 
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(the authorised capital of its subsidiary is $13 million); in parallel with this, 
PrivatBank founded Moskomprivatbank whose authorised capital has already 
reached $50 million. A further example is the Bank of Georgia, which attempted 
to augment its presence not only in Belarus but also in Ukraine. However, it 
eventually had to sell off a large proportion of shares in its Ukrainian subsidiary 
due to its poor profitability.
The size of the circles is directly proportional to the volume of accumulated direct investment of the countries
Russia
Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan
Ukraine
Belarus
Georgia
Direct investments:
figure 8.2.
the map of direct 
mutual investment 
in CIS countries and 
Georgia
Source: MMI CIS
table 8.6.
the largest fDI pairs 
in the post-Soviet 
space not involving 
Russia
Source: MMI CIS
Investor country Recipient country Accumulated FDI ($ billions)
Company with the largest 
FDI volume
Azerbaijan Georgia 1.25 SOCAR
Kazakhstan Georgia 0.61 Kaztransgaz
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan 0.37 Kazakhmys 
Kazakhstan Ukraine 0.32 BTA Bank
Ukraine Georgia 0.16 Privat
Azerbaijan Ukraine 0.09 SOCAR
Ukraine Moldova 0.06 Kviza Trade
Georgia Ukraine 0.05 Borjomi
Georgia Belarus 0.03 Bank of Georgia
Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 0.03 No accurate data available
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In our opinion, therefore, there are no grounds for claiming that there is an 
economic basis for political integration that does not include Russia. Even 
the projects of the SOCAR (State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic) 
which principally are in Georgia and Ukraine, are driven by ordinary economic 
logic: in Central Asia or Russia the leading Azeri oil and gas producer would 
have faced far more aggressive competition from Russian, Kazakh and leading 
international TNCs.
4. KEY INDuStRIES AND INVEStoR CoMpANIES
The MMI CIS database facilitated a much greater understanding of the structure 
of mutual direct investment by industry, since official statistics, for reasons of 
confidentiality, do not provide details of individual investor companies. The 
largest investment projects were implemented by companies from Russia 
which belong to the group leading Russian non-financial TNCs in terms 
of overseas assets (Kuznetsov, 2011). Of the 25 largest projects, only three 
were implemented by investors from other CIS countries (see Table 8.7). In 
Azerbaijan, there was a joint project involving Azerbaijan Railways and the 
State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFA), which, among other things, exemplifies 
a particular type of FDI, i.e., a privileged loan for 25 years to a subsidiary joint 
venture. In Kazakhstan, the investors were development companies rather than 
classic TNCs.
table 8.7.
the largest 
investment projects 
in the MMI CIS 
database
Source: MMI CIS
Note: Mechel, 
RUSAL, VEB and VS 
Energy implemented 
projects which do 
not correspond to 
their core business
Investor
Home country and 
industry
Recipient country 
and project
Approximate FDI 
($ million)
Inception 
year
Project type
Gazprom Russia, gas transportation 
and sale
Belarus, Beltransgaz 5,000 2007 Phased 
purchase
MTS Russia, 
telecommunications
Ukraine, MTS 
Ukraine
3,000 2003 Purchase, 
expansion
VympelCom Russia, 
telecommunications
Ukraine, Ukrainskiye 
radiosistemy
3,000 2005 Purchase, 
expansion
LUKOIL Russia, oil and natural gas 
production
Kazakhstan, 
participation in 
several PSAs
2,639 1995 Series of 
purchases, 
expansion
Evraz Russia, steel production Ukraine, Petrovsky 
Evraz DMZ and other 
facilities
2,111 2008 Purchase
LUKOIL Russia, oil and natural gas 
production
Uzbekistan, several 
PSAs 
1,710 2004 Greenfield, 
purchase, 
expansion
VympelCom Russia, 
telecommunications
Kazakhstan, Kar-Tel 1,500 2004 Purchase, 
expansion
Mechel Russia, non-ferrous metals 
production
Kazakhstan, 
Voskhod-Khrom
1,300 2008 Purchase
RUSAL Russia, coal production Kazakhstan, Bogatyr-
Komir
1,000 2007 Merger
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Investor
Home country and 
industry
Recipient country 
and project
Approximate FDI 
($ million)
Inception 
year
Project type
VEB Russia, production of cast 
iron, ferroalloys, steel, 
rolled metal and coke
Ukraine, Industrialny 
Soyuz Donbassa
1,000 2010 Purchase
Atomredmetzoloto 
(Rosatom)
Russia, uranium 
production and 
enrichment
Kazakhstan, Betpak 
Dala
928 2009 Purchase
Gazprom Russia, gas processing 
and sale
Kazakhstan, 
KazRosGaz
887 1990-е Greenfield
Azerbaijan 
Railways, SOFA
Azerbaijan, railways Georgia, Kartsakhi-
Marabda
775 2007 Construction, 
reconstruction
VS Energy Russia, steel production Ukraine, 
Dneprospetsstal
750 2007 Purchase
MTS Russia, 
telecommunications
Belarus, Mobilnyie 
Telesistemy
725 2002 Greenfield
Atomredmetzoloto 
(Rosatom)
Russia, uranium 
production and 
enrichment
Kazakhstan, Karatau 720 2009 Purchase
Capital Partners Kazakhstan, construction Russia, Metropolis 700 2006 Greenfield
Bulat Utemuratov Kazakhstan, hotel 
business
Russia, Ritz-Carlton 
hotel
700 2011 Purchase
VTB Russia, banking VTB Bank (Ukraine) 674 2006 Purchase, 
expansion
TNC-BP Russia, oil refining Ukraine, LINIK 650 2000 Purchase, 
modernisation
VEB Russia, banking Ukraine, 
Prominvestbank
643 2009 Purchase
VympelCom Russia, 
telecommunications
Armenia, Armentel 600 2006 Purchase, 
expansion
Alfa Bank Russia, banking Alfa Bank (Ukraine) 577 2001 Purchase, 
expansion
LUKOIL Russia, oil and natural gas 
production
Azerbaijan, Shakh-
Deniz project
574 1996 Greenfield, 
PSA
INTER RAO EES Russia, power Tajikistan, Sangtuda-
1 Hydropower Plant
550 2005 Greenfield
Our study confirms foreign experts’ view that TNCs from CIS countries other 
than Russia are immature (Kononov, 2010; Amagoh, Markus, 2010). However, 
there are several companies which have portfolio production assets in more than 
one country in the region, i.e., the Minsk Tractor Works (which has assembly 
plants in Russia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, and a facility which it 
licences in Kazakhstan), and a number of Kazakh banks. 
The general structure of FDI by industry is largely shaped by the parameters 
of Russian FDI, which have been well documented to date (Heifetz, 2011a; 
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Kuznetsov, 2011). Accordingly, the results of MMI CIS are most interesting 
from the perspective of FDI in industry by other CIS countries and Georgia (see 
Table 8.8).
table 8.8.
the key recipients 
of direct investment
Source: MMI CIS
Industries 
Direct investment 
by Russia  
($ billion)
Direct investment from 
other CIS countries 
and Georgia ($ billion)
Total direct 
investment  
($ billion)
Telecommunications 10.79 0.1 10.89
Production of oil and natural gas 6.19 – 6.19
Transportation and sale of gas 5.62 0.34 5.96
Production of cast iron, ferroalloys, 
steel, rolled metal and charred coal
4.15 0.12 4.27
Banking 3.29 0.87 4.16
Power 3.17 – 3.17
Production of non-ferrous metals 
including gold
2.54 0.05 2.59
Production and enrichment  
of uranium
2.34 – 2.34
Oil refining 1.65 – 1.65
Petrol stations 1.49 0.16 1.65
Coal production 1 0.4 1.4
Railways 0.28 1.1 1.38
Hotel business 0.6 0.76 1.36
Production of chemicals including 
polymeric pipes
0.62 0.28 0.9
Processing and sales of gas 0.89 – 0.89
Retail trade 0.82 0.06 0.88
Some industries which are important to Russian TNCs, for example, oil and 
natural gas, power, etc., are not as attractive to other countries in the region, 
even when they are highly developed in these countries themselves. Ferrous 
and non-ferrous metallurgy also receive small amounts of FDI. By contrast, 
nearly 21% of all the region’s mutual investment in banking was made by 
non-Russian banks, which rather indicates the weak competitive position of 
Russia’s banks compared to its industrial TNCs. The same is true of the Russian 
hotel industry, which has so far failed to attain the high standards set by its 
overseas counterparts. Data on railways and chemical production are not worth 
comparing, since there is only one large project in each of the industries and 
the figures are high.
There are over 50 incomplete projects in the MMI CIS database; these can be 
divided into the following categories:
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• projects representing failed attempts at overseas expansion (e.g., branches 
of private Russian universities);
• assets which were sold off as a result of business restructuring in particular 
countries (e.g., large blocks of shares in Ukrainian power companies owned 
by K. Grigorishin, a Russian citizen);
• projects aimed initially at establishing a long-term presence in a country 
but which were terminated for economic or political reasons (e.g., MTS in 
Turkmenistan or Vimm-Bill-Dann in Uzbekistan);
• parent investor companies which have been sold off because of financial 
problems (bankruptcy) (e.g., the conglomerate owned by the Kazakh 
businessman M. Ablyazov, Soyuz-Viktan of Ukraine, which produces 
alcoholic drinks, and the Russian scrap-processing company MAIR).
One additional category which should be mentioned involves Russian 
companies which were bought by investors from third countries as a foothold 
in the CIS from which to launch further expansion. 
5. poSSIBLE SCIENtIfIC AND pRACtICAL AppLICAtIoN  
of MoNItoRING
The interesting results achieved by the MMI CIS to date appear to merit 
expansion of this project beyond the post-Soviet space. This would involve the 
identification and resolution of new scientific tasks and the widening of the FDI 
monitoring system itself. 
FDI has been playing a prominent role in most developed economies for 
decades, and now there are numerous databases of various types on cross-border 
investment projects. At the national level, the initial basis for many databases is 
provided by statutory registration procedures, including registration of companies 
with foreign capital (Adelkhanyan, 2012). Companies thus registered are subject 
to frequent surveys, one-off inquires and other information-gathering exercises 
on which official FDI statistics rely. Such information is very rarely published 
“project by project” for confidentiality reasons, yet there are precedents for 
this. In Poland, for example, until the mid-2000s the State Agency on Foreign 
Investment published information on all projects with FDI exceeding $1 million 
(according to poll data) and estimates of smaller projects twice a year. Although 
this data was not official (since it was collected by other bodies), it was greatly 
valued by experts for its quality and prompt availability (IIEPS, 2006).
Commercial databases on cross-border projects are much more diverse. The 
most internationally renowned databases are Thomson Reuters and Thomson 
ONE Banker (for mergers and acquisitions) and FDI Intelligence (Financial 
Times Ltd.) (for greenfield projects). The analytical department of the British 
newspaper the Financial Times uses unverified news from the mass media. 
However, the prompt supply of data coupled with a clever PR campaign which 
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created the idea of this being a valuable resource (its website carries examples 
of well-structured and colourfully presented information on FDI by country, 
industry and company) enabled it to sell this relatively poor quality product to 
consumers (detailed examples on Russian TNCs: Kuznetsov, 2010).
There are several highly specialised monitoring projects, mainly on FDI relating 
to mergers and acquisitions. Examples include databases on all significant FDI 
for a particular country both as a recipient and source of investment (e.g., the 
Russian database of the Mergers and Acquisitions magazine) to databases on 
FDI by one country in another (Thilo Hanemann, for example, monitors Chinese 
M&A in the US on a weekly basis at rhgroup.net).
There is a separate category for projects which monitor FDI in integration 
groups. Arguably the most prominent is Ernst & Young’s European Investment 
Monitoring, launched in 1997. This database already contains information on 
over 40,000 projects and was compiled by Oxford Intelligence. The project 
monitors news stories and the information obtained is checked against 
reports from relevant companies. Because it employs multilingual experts, the 
project can efficiently monitor cross-border investments throughout the EU. 
Such monitoring yields, among other things, regular and highly authoritative 
analytical publications (Ernst & Young, 2011). In other regions of the world 
this type of monitoring is not used – possibly because integration processes 
are not as intense in those regions. However, the potential for such projects 
does exist. For example, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada monitors, on 
a monthly basis, mutual investments by Canada, Australia and Southeast Asia, 
and its findings, unlike many others, are all publicly available at http://www.
asiapacific.ca. 
MMI CIS can find its niche in this market. It was originally tailored to fulfil 
a wide range of tasks, including analytical support for regional integration in 
the post-Soviet space and to improve the scientific understanding of TNCs. 
This makes MMI CIS different from many other products created to provide 
consulting services primarily to large businesses or to formally register foreign 
investment.
The need to process information on TNCs from Russia and other CIS countries 
via a single project raised several important questions. Firstly, what types 
of investor companies tend to emerge in former socialist countries, what 
transformation processes do they undergo, and can the increasing presence of 
classic TNCs be viewed as a universal trend? Secondly, as the empirical base 
grows (this time due to other CIS countries, not Russia), it is necessary to clarify 
once again the factors that shape the scope and industrial structure of exported 
direct investment. Thirdly, the growing integration of the Customs Union 
countries calls for renewed scrutiny of interaction between formal integration 
and corporate integration. The presumption is that even more questions will 
arise in the course of MMI CIS.
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Even now it is clear that FDI in the region corresponds to the key theoretical 
notion that foreign economic relations tend to be secondary to the processes 
taking place in national economies. This relates both to the proportions of CIS 
countries’ capital export and its structural parameters. Russia’s domination 
of mutual FDI is apparently unavoidable due to its economic weight and 
proliferation of true TNCs. It is remarkable that other important investor country 
pairs in the region are motivated by the “neighbourhood effect” which is 
more traditional in the geography of FDI than it is in other political initiatives 
(GUAM, etc.). The industry structure is dominated by traditional specialisations 
(primarily fuel and energy, and metallurgy). However, mutual investment 
in medium- and high-tech industries is also being made. Not only do such 
investments promote the development of new sectors in smaller CIS countries 
(e.g., telecommunications), they also help to enhance the export structure of 
bigger countries (e.g., in mechanical engineering).
The territorial widening of MMI CIS’s “area of responsibility” has been dictated 
by the multi-directional nature of most CIS investment links i.e., those of Russia 
(Kuznetsov, 2006), Ukraine (to an even greater extent) and others. In the light 
of plans to promote integration with the EU – under the aegis of the Eurasian 
Economic Union rather than of Russia alone – the monitoring should be extended 
to cover the mutual investment of EU countries and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan. And, in the longer term, bearing in mind the growing role 
of China, South Korea and other Asian countries, similar monitoring exercises 
would be informative for Russia, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries 
vis-a-vis the Asia-Pacific region. Unfortunately, to date most FDI data are based 
on estimates only and are given little coverage in official CIS publications; this 
highlights the need to redouble our efforts in building databases to support the 
integration of the EurAsEC countries.
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1 The full version of the EDB Integration Barometer analytical report available at: http://www.eabr.org/r/research/analytics/
centre/projects/integration_barometer/
In April-May 2012, the Eurasian Monitor conducted its latest study on public 
opinion in the post-Soviet space, devoted to the theme of people’s attitude 
towards integration between countries. This study was conducted jointly with 
the Centre for Integration Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) 
and with its support. The project, EDB Integration Barometer1, consisted of 
nationwide polls in 10 CIS countries as well as in Georgia, questioning over 
13,000 people (between 950 and 2,000 in each country). The sample universe 
in each country represented the adult population by gender, age and type of 
settlement. 
The post-Soviet space is an arena of close economic, technological, political 
and cultural interaction. Integration between countries of the former Soviet 
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Union results from intrinsic objective and economic factors such as geographic 
proximity, trade and agricultural relations, infrastructure and a common historic 
background. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, cooperation on Eurasian 
integration has become an essential element in the formation of economic 
relations in the region, promoting social and economic stability, and has turned 
into an effective mechanism of comprehensive regional interaction.
Government bodies, business structures and the expert community therefore 
need accurate and methodical sociological information describing the nature 
of integration processes, including analysis of how citizens of the former Soviet 
countries relate to integration and institutions of integration. The deepening 
of economic integration within the framework of the Customs Union and the 
Single Economic Space of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus intensifies the need 
for systematic, highly-professional work of this kind. 
At the same time, foreign policy activities in the post-Soviet states are 
interwoven with public opinion, and integration or disintegration efforts have to 
take account of the mass consciousness and factors affecting prevailing moods. 
The average person’s opinion on foreign policy is therefore an essential factor 
in forming internal policy. 
There are now many government and private research companies that carry out 
studies and polls of the population on a variety of topics operating in almost all 
countries of the former Soviet Union. However, until recently, there have been 
no institutes devoted to conducting regular evaluation of the foreign policy, 
foreign economic and other integration preferences of citizens of the region. 
The EDB Integration Barometer project was designed to fill this significant 
knowledge gap by developing the necessary methodology and conducting 
annual social studies on this range of issues. 
A terminological problem arises in the study of integration, related to the 
need to differentiate between cooperation (high-level collaboration between 
states, directed towards the achievement of common goals) and integration 
(interdependent economies, common “rules of the game” for transactions, 
shared culture). However, it is impossible to design tools for mass polls based 
on the nuances of these terms: studies involving the populace require simple 
and unambiguous formulations. Therefore, for the convenience of the study, 
we have equated the terms “integration preferences” and “attraction between 
the countries evident in the views of the population of these countries”. 
The “attraction” construct combines both possible cooperation and possible 
integration, and even a general positive disposition to people in the other 
country. The decision to define the subject in this way allowed us to avoid any 
artificial limitations imposed by terminology. 
Taking into account this reason, the goal of the study may be formulated as 
follows: to evaluate the degree of economic and humanitarian affinity of the CIS 
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countries (and Georgia), expressed through the attitudes of the populations of 
these countries towards other countries of the former Soviet Union (except for 
the Baltic States) and a range of other countries round the world. Respondents’ 
attitudes toward other countries are categorised in a range of indicators displayed 
in questions on a survey form. 
Each question on the survey form is designed to reflect the degree of the 
respondent’s social and cultural affinity with different countries, on the 
corresponding indicator. The respondent expresses both his/her personal 
disposition to the countries out of the prescribed list, and also the disposition 
desirable for his/her country. 
The questions forming the main part of the survey are all of the same basic 
type: respondents are asked to match countries from the prescribed list 
with qualities such as friendly/non-friendly, familiar/unfamiliar, interesting/
uninteresting, and so on. In other words, the survey form consists of dichotomous 
pairs. 
The list of answers that respondents can choose from gives rise to three groups 
of conclusions for each question: a desire for integration with other post-Soviet 
states, a desire for integration with countries outside this region, and a desire for 
Integration preferences  
of population
Economic attraction
Socio-cultural attraction
Political attraction
Which countries’ 
goods do you buy?
Where would you 
want to work?
Where would you 
want to live?
Where should we 
import labour from?
Where should we 
import capital from?
What countries should 
we run a scientific  
exchange with?
What countries have you been in?
What countries do you want to know 
more about?
What countries have permanent 
correspondents?
Where would you want to go on 
holiday?
Where would you want to study  
(or send your children to study)?
Where should we import art from?
Where should we attract tourists 
from?
Who is our friend?
Who is our enemy?
Which countries would 
we provide military 
aid to?
Which countries would 
provide military aid 
to us?
Categories of people’s integration preferences
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Answer options
Indicator  
to be calculated
Azerbaijan
Attraction to the  
post-Soviet space as a 
whole and to separate 
countries in it 
Armenia
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Ukraine
Great Britain
Attraction to the 
European Union
Germany
France
Other countries of the European Union
India
Attraction to the rest  
of the world 
China
USA
Turkey
Japan
Countries of Arabic-Islamic World (Middle East and Northern Africa)
Other countries
No countries
Autonomy 
Cannot say
the list of answers that respondents can choose
autonomy (evident from a high proportion of refusals to mention any countries 
as “attractive”). Possible choices are shown in table above.
An additional basis on which to classify conclusions about people’s integration 
preferences is the functional direction of this integration, the sphere in which 
integration could take place. Regional integration is a multilevel process, which, 
along with economic cooperation, includes issues of politics, security and socio-
cultural interaction. We therefore divided our questions to the population into 
three categories: economic, political and socio-cultural. The composition of the 
indicators in each of these groups is illustrated in next figure (brief versions of 
the questions).
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It is worth noting that not all the questions out of the sets were asked in each 
country. This is connected mainly with differences in labour rates and the volume 
of work involved in conducting nation-wide polls in different post-Soviet states. 
Using the complete version of the survey form in each country would result in 
an unjustified budget increase. Instead, an obligatory minimum was defined for 
all countries, and 9 indicators out of the initial set were measured in each of 
the 11 countries. 
Two different approaches were used when interpreting the collected data:
• Study of individual common factors revealed in the distribution of 
respondents’ answers to each separate question. 
• Study of general tendencies revealed in composite indexes. 
Now let us take a closer look at the method of calculating consolidated 
indexes. 
When constructing the indexes, only the questions which were asked in all 11 
countries were taken into account. These questions are marked by ticks in figure 
below.
Integration preferences  
of population
Economic attraction
Socio-cultural attraction
Political attraction
Which countries’ 
goods do you buy?
Where would you 
want to work?
Where would you 
want to live?
Where should we 
import labour from?
Where should we 
import capital from?
What countries should 
we run a scientific  
exchange with?
What countries have you been in?
What countries do you want to  
know more about?
What countries have permanent 
correspondents?
Where would you want to go on 
holiday?
Where would you want to study  
(or send your children to study)?
Where should we import art from?
Where should we attract tourists 
from?
Who is our friend?
Who is our enemy?
Which countries would 
we provide military 
aid to?
Which countries would 
provide military aid 
to us?









the questions which were asked in all 11 countries (marked by ticks)
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Based on the questions listed, two types of indexes were calculated:
• Indexes of attraction to a geopolitical cluster – to the former Soviet Union, 
European Union or other countries. These were calculated as the number 
of answers that mentioned at least one country of the cluster, taken as an 
average across all questions and expressed as a ratio to the total remaining 
answers (including the answer “None”). The index could range between 0 
and 1 (theoretically); in fact, the actual range of the values was [0.3; 0.7].
• Indexes of mutual attraction – these are the indexes of mutual attraction 
between each dyad of countries, evident in reciprocal choice of answers. 
For example: if Ukrainians mentioned Belarus in 12% of their answers, and 
Belarusians mentioned Ukraine in 34% of the answers, then the proportion 
of reciprocal choice in this case is 12%. Thus, this indicator is cleared of the 
inevitable asymmetry in terms of attraction of non-equilibrium countries.
Since the base for calculating the indexes contains at least two questions from 
each category (economy, politics, socio-cultural links), it is possible to calculate 
not only general indexes from the data as a whole, but from individual data 
too, to determine the degree of the countries’ affinity in the separate spheres of 
economy, politics and socio-culture. Both the individual indexes of affinity with 
a cluster of countries and the dyad indexes of mutual attraction were calculated 
for each sphere. 
The basic regularities found out following the results of analysis of consolidated 
indexes of attraction to the geopolitical clusters are given below. 
• In the political sphere, for almost all countries participating in the EDB 
Integration Barometer project, the highest-priority integration area is the 
post-Soviet space. The only exception is Georgia, which is oriented towards 
the US (“Other countries” cluster).
• In the economic sphere, an orientation towards the European Union is 
typical for six countries – Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are attracted to the post-
Soviet space instead, and the “Other countries” cluster is the priority for the 
population of Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. 
• Almost the same patterns as for the economic sphere are typical for 
the sphere of socio-cultural links. The only difference is the position of 
Tajikistan, which in this case has the higher-priority attraction not to the 
post-Soviet space but to the rest of the world. However, the population 
of Tajikistan seems to be more oriented towards the post-Soviet space (in 
particular, Russia) than the population of other countries with regard to all 
questions on the survey form (including those not used in calculating the 
summarising indexes). 
• For the aggregate of the three factors – economy, politics and culture 
– most countries participating in the project place the highest priority on 
integration within the post-Soviet space.
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Legend:
Index with the 
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Economy
“Former USSR countries” 
Cluster 
0.22 0.29 0.26 0.18 0.34 0.42 0.35 0.12 0.42 0.31 0.21 0.28
“European Union Countries” 
Cluster
0.23 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.22 0.18 0.36 0.36 0.13 0.21 0.35 0.27
“Other countries” Cluster 0.41 0.23 0.30 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.21 0.32 0.41 0.37 0.27 0.32
Politics
“Former USSR countries” 
Cluster
0.48 0.63 0.67 0.33 0.69 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.66 0.63 0.52 0.56
“European Union Countries” 
Cluster
0.05 0.20 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.26 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.12
“Other countries” Cluster 0.38 0.07 0.19 0.38 0.16 0.18 0.08 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.20
Culture
“Former USSR countries” 
Cluster
0.19 0.25 0.25 0.11 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.09 0.37 0.20 0.17 0.24
“European Union Countries” 
Cluster
0.23 0.35 0.31 0.48 0.20 0.21 0.40 0.31 0.18 0.23 0.33 0.29
“Other countries” Cluster 0.38 0.15 0.20 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.18 0.22 0.39 0.35 0.18 0.27
General indexes of attraction
“Former USSR countries” 
Cluster 
0.27 0.36 0.35 0.20 0.42 0.43 0.37 0.20 0.46 0.36 0.27 0.34
“European Union Countries” 
Cluster
0.19 0.29 0.26 0.33 0.19 0.15 0.34 0.31 0.13 0.18 0.30 0.24
“Other countries” Cluster 0.39 0.18 0.25 0.36 0.28 0.31 0.18 0.27 0.36 0.33 0.23 0.29
%
%
%
• Two countries, Azerbaijan and Georgia, feel an affinity primarily with the 
rest of the world, on the aggregate factors. 
• Within the post-Soviet space, Ukraine and Russia are the two countries 
of highest interest for the citizens of other countries of the former Soviet 
Union. In contrast, in Ukraine and Russia the population appeared to be 
oriented not towards the post-Soviet space, but primarily to the European 
Union. 
The data evidencing the conclusions mentioned above are given in below 
(average values of indexes). An illustrative scheme of the countries’ distribution 
on geopolitical vectors based on the table data is given in next figure 9.1.
Average values of indexes
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Economy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Armenia
Belarus
Georgia
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Uzbekistan
Politics
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Ukraine
All spheres
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Uzbekistan
Armenia
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
TajikistanRussia
Ukraine
Culture
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Ukraine
Azerbaijan Moldova
Georgia
Belarus
Armenia
“Former USSR countries” vector
“EU countries” vector
“Other countries” vector
figure 9.1.
Illustrative scheme 
of the countries’ 
distribution on 
geopolitical vectors
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Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Georgia
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Moldova
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Tajikistan 1%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
3%
3%
3%
3%
7%
27%
of which countries listed below could you say that you are interested in their history,  
culture and geography (nature)? (Average percentages for 11 countries)
Let us return to the fact that two different approaches were used in interpretation 
of the collected data – study of individual common factors using the distribution 
of answers, and analysis of general tendencies using the consolidated indexes. 
We have already specified some data about general tendencies, and so now it 
is worth giving some details relating to individual common factors. 
Almost all questions revealed an extremely low incidence of affinity with post-
Soviet states other than Russia. In other words, Russia is the main attractor and 
other states are only of low or peripheral significance to each other. Both the 
practical and the cognitive interests of the population of the post-Soviet states, 
when they are focused within this region at all, are as a rule oriented toward 
Russia. 
Within the post-Soviet space, Russia and Ukraine occupy the first two places in the 
rating of the objects of cultural, cognitive or practical interest. Correspondingly, 
most respondents who name no country of the post-Soviet space as being of 
interest for them are located in Russia or Ukraine. The imbalance is obvious: 
Russia and Ukraine are of the most interest to citizens of other countries, while 
the citizens of Russia and Ukraine are the least interested in any other post-
Soviet country. This is illustrated in the following two diagrams. On average, 
Russia and Ukraine are mentioned more often than other countries in the post-
Soviet space, yet simultaneously they give the highest percentage of answers 
professing no interest in other countries.
On the economic theme, the proportions of answers for each country falling 
to each of the three largest geopolitical clusters – “Former USSR countries”, 
“European Union”, “Other countries” – are on the whole very similar. This means 
that none of the three clusters takes priority over the others, but deviations are 
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35%
40%
31% 30%
26%
32%
19%
13%
7% 10% 8%
23%
18% 9%
11%
8%
9%
3%
11%
9%
14% 9%
9%
3%
U
kr
ai
ne
R
us
si
a
A
rm
en
ia
U
zb
ek
is
ta
n
B
el
ar
us
A
ze
rb
ai
ja
n
K
az
ak
hs
ta
n
K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n
G
eo
rg
ia
M
ol
do
va
Ta
jik
is
ta
n
A
ve
ra
ge
of which countries listed below could you say that you are interested in their history,  
culture and geography (nature)? (Autonomy indexes)
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67% 62% 50% 50% 49% 43% 41% 26% 25% 17% 9%
40%
21% 27%
51%
30% 36% 38% 42% 48% 40% 26%
48% 37%
49%42%54%37%
59%46%35%
58%43%40%48%
75%
from which countries would an inflow of capital, investments, companies, entrepreneurs  
and businessmen be desirable for our country? (Answers grouped in three categories) 
always evident in the details. Thus, variation towards the post-Soviet space is 
typical for the countries of the Central Asian region and Moldova; toward the 
European Union for Russia, Georgia and Moldova (which is attracted to Russia 
and Romania simultaneously); and toward the rest of the world for Azerbaijan 
and Tajikistan. Turkey is a priority for Azerbaijan, and the priorities for Tajikistan 
vary depending on the question (China, the US and Turkey). The diagram below 
illustrates this data (percentage indexes should be read as follows: “At least 
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56% 48% 43% 42% 41% 35% 26% 25% 21% 18% 17%
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4
24% 23% 29% 19% 21% 23% 27%
53%
28%
46%
32% 22%
36%
25% 14%
40%
18%
44%
27%
42% 32%
of which countries listed below could you say that you are interested in their history,  
culture and geography (nature)? (Answers grouped in three categories)
one country out of the group of countries was named”. For example, 67% 
of respondents in Tajikistan named at least one country of the former Soviet 
Union).
In the political questions, the average proportions of answers by country are 
visibly shifted towards the post-Soviet space, both in a positive sense – for 
example, in the question about friendly countries – and in a negative sense, as 
in the question about unfriendly countries). The only country whose population 
is oriented towards military and political support beyond the limits of the post-
Soviet space is Georgia. 
The patterns of socio-cultural interest are similar to those of economic 
interaction: Central Asian countries are oriented towards the post-Soviet 
space and, to a lesser extent, towards China and Muslim countries; Moldova 
is oriented simultaneously towards Russia and Romania; Georgia towards the 
European Union and USA; Azerbaijan towards Turkey; and Russia and Ukraine 
have a less-than-average orientation towards the post-Soviet space, while their 
level of attraction to the European Union and the rest of the world corresponds 
to the country averages.
A range of additional indicators was used in the study besides the central block 
of dichotomous questions. The main results are given below. 
Attitudes held by the post-Soviet states towards establishment of the Customs 
Union and the Single Economic Space appeared to be rather positive: over half 
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of the respondents gave positive answers. It is particularly remarkable that these 
integration efforts are perceived positively not only in those countries affected 
by incorporation. A high proportion of positive answers was characteristic for 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova: countries whose inhabitants 
are relatively more oriented towards economic cooperation with other countries 
of the former Soviet Union, and, most of all, with Russia.
Positively
No matter
Negatively
Cannot say
Kazakhstan
Tajikistan
Russia
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Armenia
Average
Belarus
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Member
Member
Member
80%
76%
72%
67%
67%
65%
61%
61%
60%
57%
38%
30%
10%
17%
17%
14%
15%
20%
26%
24%
28%
31%
46%
39%
8%
7%
11%
What do you think about Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia uniting into the Customs union  
(which abolished duties on trade between the three countries)?
Both official integration mechanisms also receive an above-average level of 
support in Moldova and Armenia, which do not have common borders with 
the Customs Union or the Single Economic Space, and, accordingly, could not 
take full advantage of hypothetic incorporation. This high level of attraction 
is partially connected with the history of migrant labour from these countries 
– the intensity of this flow may be illustrated by the fact that three-quarters 
of Armenian citizens and every second citizen of Moldova currently have 
permanent communications with relatives and friends in Russia. 
High support for the Customs Union appeared to be typical for two countries 
which are potential members of the Customs Union – Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. 
It is also interesting that the official integration mechanisms receive high 
support in Uzbekistan, in spite of the noticeable isolationist tendencies of the 
population evident from the answers to other questions. 
Out of the three members of both the Customs Union and the Single Economic 
Space, membership is least supported in Belarus and most highly supported 
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in Kazakhstan, although, in all three of these countries, over half of the adult 
population supports these integration associations. 
There are only two countries on the total list of countries where the share of 
positive opinions on the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space is less 
than half, and those two countries are Azerbaijan and Georgia. The complex 
relations, or rather breakdown of relations between Russia and Georgia (refer 
to the war of 2008) make it rather hard to anticipate positive evaluations of 
the integration associations with Russian participation from the population of 
Georgia, and the integration preferences of Azeris are directed beyond the 
territory of the former USSR, in particular, towards Turkey.
Positively
No matter
Negatively
Cannot say
Kazakhstan
Tajikistan
Russia
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Belarus
Armenia
Average
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Member
Member
Member
8%
8%
12%
76%
72%
70%
67%
63%
62%
62%
61%
59%
56%
38%
27%
10%
20%
17%
13%
16%
20%
27%
27%
24%
31%
45%
39%
What do you think about the fact that, in addition to the Customs union, Belarus,  
Kazakhstan and Russia have created the Single Economic Space  
(essentially a single market composed of three countries)? 
The absolute majority of the population in each country believes that in the next 
five years the post-Soviet states will at least not distance themselves from each 
other – the percentage of responses “The countries will drift apart” does not 
rank first in any country. In Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, the rate of respondents 
who believe that in the next five years the post-Soviet states will become closer 
exceeds 50%.
Integration preferences depend significantly on age, and this dependence takes 
two forms. The first is typical for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan and, 
to a somewhat lesser extent for Kazakhstan, where among the older age group, 
attraction to the “Former Soviet countries” cluster is significantly higher and 
attraction to the “European Union countries” and “Other countries” clusters is 
significantly lower throughout the entire sample. 
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The countries will become 
closer
Nothing will change in this 
regard
The countries will distance 
themselves from 
Cannot say
Kazakhstan
Tajikistan
Russia
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Belarus
Armenia
Average
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Georgia
62%
26%
53%
46%
46%
41%
41%
40%
38%
34%
28%
27%
26%
33%
32%
41%
30%
30%
33%
34%
20%
33%
28%
23% 5%
5%
9%
7%
7%
11%
12%
18%
8%
17%
29%
15%
Do you think the countries of the former uSSR will become closer or distance themselves  
from each other in the next five years?
Another type of integration preferences depending on age is typical for Georgia, 
Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia – the younger the age, the 
more often EU countries and the rest of the world are mentioned, while the 
percentage of references to post-Soviet states stays virtually unchanged. The 
key difference between the listed countries and the Central Asian countries and 
Azerbaijan is that their older respondents do not differ greatly in their integration 
preferences from the representatives of the middle and younger age category. 
Therefore, the older generation of the Central Asian countries is experiencing 
greater attraction to the post-Soviet states.
This was the first time a large-scale survey of public opinion on the issues of 
post-Soviet integration, covering establishment of economic and cooperation 
links, social and business contacts and cultural interaction, has been held in the 
CIS countries. The result was a detailed view of the preferences of citizens of 
the CIS countries with regard to a variety of aspects of integration and regional 
cooperation. It is assumed that the EDB Integration Barometer survey will be 
held annually as a monitoring survey, which will make it possible to evaluate 
long-term trends in public opinion in the CIS countries.
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The purpose of this article is to describe the current state of EurAsEC’s civil 
aviation and analyse its prospects, paying special attention to airfreight 
transportation. We will discuss opportunities for further cooperation in civil 
aviation within EurAsEC, taking into account the establishment of the Common 
Transport Space, the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space. We 
will also examine air traffic between Asia and Europe and possible ways of 
maximising the potential of Eurasian transit links. The article is based on the 
EDB sector report No.13, Developing EurAsEC’s Air Transport Potential.
INtRoDuCtIoN
Civil aviation is a vital component of the transport systems of EurAsEC member 
states, contributing to their sustainable economic growth, foreign trade, tourism, 
and population mobility. 
EurAsEC’s undisputed achievement in the area of civil aviation is the use of 
harmonised standards, aviation rules and procedures (in particular with respect 
to airworthiness, operational suitability of airports, airport equipment, air 
routes and air accident investigations) as a result of their common adherence 
to the Agreement on Civil Aviation and Use of Airspace, signed by all EurAsEC 
member states in 1991. However, integration processes in EurAsEC have not 
yet had an effect on many aspects of civil aviation, including the development 
of freight traffic and exploitation of transit potential.
Globally, integration in air transport and the establishment of common 
markets in air transport services are important processes. This practice also 
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shows that mutually beneficial cooperation between governments, air carriers 
and other suppliers of air transport services develops in a gradual fashion, in 
full compliance with the policies, standards and recommended practices of 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Freight traffic is a key 
component of integration processes.
tHE IMpoRtANCE of DEVELopING AIR tRANSpoRt potENtIAL
In 2010, foreign trade turnover in EurAsEC exceeded $780 billion (4.6 times 
greater than in 2000). Exports grew 4 times and imports 6.2 times over the 
same ten-year period. Mutual trade between EurAsEC member states made up 
$47 billion in 2010, accounting for approximately 10% of their total exports 
and 16% of imports (EDB, 2011b). Freight traffic between EurAsEC countries 
by all transport modes, except waterways transport and pipeline, is shown in 
Table 10.1.
table 10.1.
Cargo transported 
between EurAsEC 
member states by 
road, rail and air in 
2010 (million tonnes)
Source: EDB, 2011b
Country Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia Tajikistan
Total 
export
Belarus 0.2 0.1 6 0.1 6.4
Kazakhstan 0.7 2.4 29.4 1 33.5
Kyrgyzstan 0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.6
Russia 7.9 6 1.4 1.4 16.7
Tajikistan 0 0.06 0.04 0.2 0.3
Total 
import
8.6 6.6 3.9 35.8 2.6 57.5
In addition, 500 million tonnes of freight are transported by pipeline or rail and 
road transport to seaports for transit to third countries.
Third countries’ net transit through EurAsEC in 2010 (by all transport modes, 
except waterways and pipeline) was estimated at 5 million tonnes. The main 
routes were between East and Southeast Asia (including China) and Europe, 
Central Asia (Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and Europe, and the Black 
Sea countries (Ukraine, Turkey and others) and the Baltic States and Northern 
Europe (see Table 10.2).
table 10.2.
forecasted cargo 
transportation in 
EurAsEC by road and 
rail for 2015-2020
(million tonnes)
Source: EDB, 2011b
2000 2005 2010
2015 (forecast) 2020 (forecast)
conservative optimistic conservative optimistic
Within EurAsEC 23.4 45.9 57.6 70 90 80 120
Third countries’ transit through 
EurAsEC
1 2 5 7 10 10 15 
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The share of civil aviation in total freight transportation between EurAsEC 
countries is insignificant (see Table 10.3). In 2010, air cargo transported between 
the member states stood at 15,000 tonnes, or 0.03% of the total (excluding 
goods transported by pipeline).
table 10.3.
Scheduled 
and non-scheduled 
cargo and mail 
traffic between 
EurAsEC member 
states (tonnes)
Source: Interstate 
Aviation Committee 
Note: N/A – data not 
available
Country Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia Tajikistan
Total 
export
Belarus N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Kazakhstan N/A 13 1,458 5 N/A
Kyrgyzstan N/A N/A 746 11 N/A
Russia 53 5,388 2,386 653 N/A
Tajikistan N/A 79 8 1,274 N/A
Total 
import
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
At the same time, cargo transit through EurAsEC (i.e., with a transit stop in its 
international airports) by national and foreign airlines totalled approximately 
400,000 tonnes per year.
According to the Boeing Corporation (Boeing Corporation, 2010), an additional 
three million tonnes of transit cargoes are transported between Asia and Europe 
through EurAsEC by traditional passenger airlines (in baggage holds of passenger 
aircraft), cargo carriers and airmail companies. 
Air transportation accounts for approximately 3% of tonnage and up to 15% 
of the value of all cargo traffic between Europe and Asia. For the past 20 
years, these figures have been growing and increases in air cargo traffic have 
been significantly higher than increases in passenger traffic. The undisputable 
advantages of transporting freight by air between Europe and Asia are its speed 
(several hours), point-to-point delivery and high quality (accuracy and safety). 
Significant efforts are being made to shorten on-ground processing, which often 
accounts for around 90% of delivery time.
As well as being affected by general economic factors, the air freight 
transportation market is influenced by the widespread use of safe and fuel-
efficient aircraft, as well as changes in international trade patterns (in particular, 
an increase in the proportion of highly processed products).
Attracting Europe-Asia transit flows to EurAsEC air routes is important for three 
main reasons:
1. Levying additional air navigation charges for transit flights will help improve 
air traffic services (ATS) and air traffic management (ATM) infrastructure in 
EurAsEC member states;
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2. Increasing the number of technical stops at EurAsEC airports will foster the 
improvement of aerodrome and airport infrastructure, create new jobs and 
have a multiplier effect on other sectors e.g., fuel supplies and maintenance; 
and
3. Increasing the number of commercial stops will help advance logistics 
in Eurasia, improve delivery speed and enhance exporters’ access to the 
largest global markets. The development of air cargo traffic between Europe 
and Asia with commercial stops in EurAsEC airports will have a significant 
multiplier effect on transport systems and other sectors.
In the context of globalisation, civil aviation plays an increasingly important role 
and assures expanding EurAsEC member states’ access to global markets. Air 
transport is particularly important to the resolution of socioeconomic problems 
and the improvement in people’s quality of life, especially in regions without 
ground transportation systems.
In recent decades, civil aviation’s role in the global economy has been increasing 
steadily. A total of 2.5 billion passengers (approximately 40% of the world’s 
population) and 46 million tonnes of freight and mail are transported by air 
every year. Commercial flights are serviced by 25,000 aircraft, with a maximum 
takeoff weight (MTOW) of more than 9,000 tonnes. There are approximately 
40,000 civil airports on the globe, including 1,000 international airports.
The aviation industry accounts for approximately 8% (about $3 trillion) of the 
global gross domestic product (GDP). It also has multiplier effect on other 
sectors such as tourism, oil processing, maintenance and construction.
Over the past 20 years, international cargo traffic has increased 2.5 times to 167 
billion revenue tonne kilometres (RTK), 90% of which is provided by scheduled 
airlines (Boeing Corporation, 2010). According to Boeing forecasts, this figure 
will triple by 2029, averaging 5.9% annual growth.
Despite the 1997 and 2001 economic recessions and the 2008-2009 global 
economic crisis, cargo air traffic between Europe and Asia averaged 9.8% 
growth a year, totalling 3.2 million tonnes in 2009. In 2010, Europe-Asia traffic 
was estimated at 3.7 million tonnes (see Figure 10.1).
Europe-Asia flows now account for 19.3% of the world’s cargo traffic by 
commercial civil aviation and 9.2% of transported tonnage.
The Europe-Asia market is deemed to be one of the most attractive sectors for 
the air transportation business. It is also interesting to see how air cargo traffic 
is structured. The main items transported from Asia westbound are automobile 
parts and accessories (26.3% of the total) and from Europe eastbound are 
machinery and equipment (35.5%). The percentage of express mail is also high. 
Documents and express small packages account for 15% of Asia-to-Europe 
cargo flows and 9% of Europe-to-Asia traffic (Boeing Corporation, 2010). 
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figure 10.1.
Europe-Asia air 
cargo traffic in 
1991-2010 
(million tonnes)
Source: The Boeing 
Corporation, 2010
Boeing estimates that, over the next twenty years, Europe-Asia traffic will 
average 6.6% growth a year, reaching 11-12 million tonnes per year by 2029 
(Boeing Corporation, 2010). 
The optimal correlation of three factors (price, quality and delivery time) enables 
air transport to attract a significant amount of freight traffic from maritime 
transport, the main transportation mode for cargo moving between Europe and 
Asia.
AIR tRANSpoRt MARKEt: CuRRENt StAtuS AND futuRE tRENDS 
During the first ten years of the 21st century, passenger and cargo traffic in 
EurAsEC grew steadily, underpinned by growth in real incomes and increased 
demand for air cargo transportation both within the Community and between 
the leading global markets (Europe and Asia).
Despite the decline in air traffic in 2008-2009 as a result of the global economic 
crisis, since 2010 all EurAsEC member states have been regaining their former 
positions in the air cargo market.
The development of EurAsEC’s civil aviation strongly depends on general trends 
in world aviation and on global socioeconomic, political and other factors. 
In 2010, world passenger traffic on ICAO member states’ scheduled airlines 
exceeded 4.5 trillion pkm, up 7.3% on 2009, and adjusted payload distance 
totalled 523.3 billion tkm (up 3.8%). This traffic grew even more rapidly in 
EurAsEC in 2010.
In 2010, EurAsEC’s civil aviation accounted for 3.6% of the world’s tonne 
kilometres; over the last five years its share of this market has grown by over 
150% (see Table 10.4).
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figure 10.2.
Annual growth 
in EurAsEC’s civil 
aviation traffic in 
2005-2010 (%)
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
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table 10.4.
EurAsEC and ICAo’s 
adjusted payload 
distance  
in 2005-2010  
(billion adjusted tkm)
Source: ICAO, 
International Aviation 
Committee
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2010/2005 
(%)
ICAO member states 487.9 516.7 546.7 549.7 504.1 523.3 107.3
EurAsEC member states 11.2 12 14.2 15.6 14.6 19 169.6
EurAsEC’s share (%) 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.6 +1.5%
Over the last five years, EurAsEC’s adjusted payload, passenger and payload 
distances have grown at a faster pace than total world civil aviation as 
represented by the 189 ICAO member states (see Figure 10.3).
figure 10.3.
Annual growth of 
adjusted payload 
distance in world 
and EurAsEC civil 
aviation in  
2005-2010 (%)
Source: ICAO, 
International Aviation 
Committee
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Economic development and population mobility in EurAsEC member states 
facilitated growth of almost 280% in scheduled and non-scheduled passenger 
traffic in 2000-2010, from 56.9 billion pkm in 2000 to 157.7 billion pkm in 
2010 (see Table 10.5).
table 10.5.
EurAsEC’s domestic 
and international 
passenger traffic 
in 2000-2010 
(billion pkm)
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2010/2000 
(%)
Belarus 0.5 0.7 0.8 1 1.3 1.3 1.6 320
Kazakhstan 1.6 3 3.1 4.9 5.5 5.4 6.3 393.8
Kyrgyzstan 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 140
Russia 54 85.8 93.7 111 122.6 112.5 147.1 272.4
Tajikistan 0.3 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.6 2 666.7
Total EurAsEC 56.9 90.9 98.8 118.6 131.5 121.3 157.7 277.2
The most significant increases in passenger distance between 2000 and 2010 
have been registered in Tajikistan (6.7 times), Kazakhstan (4 times) and Belarus 
(3.2 times).
Passenger numbers have shown a similar trend. According to the Interstate 
Aviation Committee, EurAsEC’s passenger traffic grew 2.5 times to 62.4 million 
people in 2010 (see Table 10.6). The highest increases in 2000-2010 were in 
Kazakhstan (4.1 times), Tajikistan (4 times), and Belarus (3.3 times).
table 10.6.
EurAsEC’s domestic 
and international 
passenger turnover 
in 2000-2010 
(million people)
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008  2009 2010
2010/2000 
(%)
Belarus 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 1 333.3
Kazakhstan 0.8 1.6 1.9 2.7 2.8 2.7 3.3 412.5
Kyrgyzstan 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 100
Russia 23 35.1 38 46.6 49.8 45.1 57 247.8
Tajikistan 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 400
Total EurAsEC 24.9 37.9 41 51 54.4 49.6 62.4 253.7
Russian airlines account for over 90% of total passenger, cargo and mail traffic. 
Kazakhstan is the second largest passenger transportation market in EurAsEC 
(5.3% of the total in 2010).
In 2010, 49% of passengers within EurAsEC travelled on international flights. 
In the last ten years, international passenger traffic has grown faster than traffic 
on domestic flights. Belarus has almost no domestic flights (see Figure 10.4). 
The share of international flights in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is high (74% and 
84%, respectively).
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figure 10.4.
EurAsEC’s 
international and 
domestic passenger 
traffic in 2010 (%)
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
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Although leading foreign airlines provide international flights in EurAsEC and 
aim to expand their destination network as well as passenger and cargo traffic, 
domestic airlines account for approximately 66% of international passenger 
traffic (see Figure 10.5).
figure 10.5.
International 
passenger traffic 
through EurAsEC by 
domestic and foreign 
airlines in 2010 (%)
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
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In 2010, 23.3 million passengers departed from EurAsEC airports to international 
destinations, of which 7.97 million people travelled by foreign airlines and 
15.3 million people by domestic airlines. However, the country-to-country 
distribution of foreign companies’ shares in international passenger traffic varies 
significantly. Their share is high in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and relatively low 
in Kazakhstan and Russia.
In 2010, EurAsEC’s civil aviation companies transported over 964,000 tonnes 
of freight and mail, a 69% increase over the last ten years. Belarus showed 
the highest approximately fourfold increase in freight traffic. At the same time, 
cargo traffic in Kyrgyzstan declined almost threefold in 2010, compared to 
2000. Russia accounts for more than 96% of all cargo traffic (see Table 10.7).
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table 10.7.
EurAsEC’s domestic 
and international 
cargo and mail 
turnover in 
2000-2010 
(thousands tonnes)
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2010/2000 
(%)
Belarus 4.4 14.5 25.7 20.8 17.8 22 17.48 397.3
Kazakhstan 13.8 20.7 16.5 25.7 17.6 15.8 17.2 124.6
Kyrgyzstan 2.9 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 1 34.5
Russia 546.6 628.9 640.3 732.2 779.4 712.2 926.4 169.5
Tajikistan 2 3.7 2.4 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.2 110
Total EurAsEC 569.7 669.2 685.6 781.4 818.2 753.0 964.3 169.3
International freight and mail traffic in EurAsEC in 2010 totalled 693,000 tonnes 
(71.9% of the total) and domestic traffic 271,000 tonnes (28.1%). In Belarus, 
cargo and mail are transported by air to international destinations only (see 
Figure 10.6). Russia and Kazakhstan boasted the highest domestic traffic (28.4% 
and 42.6% of the total, respectively).
figure 10.6.
EurAsEC’s 
international and 
domestic cargo and 
mail traffic in 2010 
(%)
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
100
international destinations domestic destinations
0
57.4
42.6
91.6
8.4
71.6
28.4
84.5
15.5
71.9
28.1
Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia Tajikistan Total EurAsEC
In 2010, foreign carriers accounted for 32.7% of cargo and mail traffic through 
EurAsEC’s international airports. Russia is the only country where foreign airlines 
transport less than 25% of all freight. In other EurAsEC member states, their 
share is significantly higher: 63.3% in Belarus, 68.7% in Kazakhstan, 61.5% in 
Kyrgyzstan and 45.4% in Tajikistan (see Figure 10.7).
In terms of payload distance, EurAsEC’s cargo traffic increased by 76.1%, 
compared to 2000. Belarus demonstrated the most significant increase 
(3.3 times), while in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan this figure declined (Table 
10.8). 
As shown in Figure 10.8, in 2010 the utilisation of aircraft capacity in EurAsEC 
countries was significantly lower than the world average seat occupancy of 
77%.
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figure 10.7.
International cargo 
and mail traffic via 
EurAsEC airports by 
domestic and foreign 
airlines in 2010 (%)
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
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2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2010/2000 
(%)
Belarus 18 58.8 91.5 66.3 53.8 48 59.4 330
Kazakhstan 117.5 81 77.9 42.3 46.5 30 56.3 47.9
Kyrgyzstan 8.8 4.5 1.4 1.3 2.5 1.8 3.4 38.6
Russia 2600 2830.3 2932.2 3424.3 3691.6 3557.7 4715.4 181.4
Tajikistan 4.3 7.6 9.4 4.8 5.2 5.1 5.4 125.6
Total EurAsEC 2748.6 2982.2 3112.4 3539 3799.6 3642.6 4839.9 176.1
table 10.8.
EurAsEC’s domestic 
and international 
cargo and mail 
traffic in 2000-2010 
(million tkm)
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
figure 10.8.
utilisation of 
EurAsEC’s aircraft 
capacity in 2010
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
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The utilisation of aircraft capacity varies significantly across EurAsEC. Kyrgyzstan 
and Russia have the highest rates (84.3% for passenger traffic and 78.9% for 
cargo traffic in Kyrgyzstan; and 78.2% and 66.4% in Russia, respectively).
International commercial flights in EurAsEC are operated by more than 200 
domestic air carriers and 100 foreign companies. Table 10.9 shows the 
performance of the main domestic players in terms of passenger and cargo 
traffic. 
table 10.9.
Scheduled passenger 
traffic by EurAsEC’s 
largest airlines in 
2005-2010
(million pkm)
Source: ATW (2010)
Note: N/A – data not 
available
Airline 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2010 
(estimate)
Belarus
Belavia 660 N/A 952 1,252 1,262 N/A
Kazakhstan
Air Astana 2,511 2,417 4,452 4,795 4,525 5,082
SCAT 157 258 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrghystan 183 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Russia
Aeroflot 20,751 22,407 24,675 27,248 25,986 34,777
Transaero 5285 7793 11,759 17,549 18,733 26,294
Sibiria/S7 10,942 12,498 13,900 14,351 13,155 10,279
Utair 2,977 3,666 4,510 5,063 5,828 7,982
OrenAir 988 1,656 3,031 4,940 7,159
Rossia (GTK Rossia)/Pulkovo 5,717 6,118 6,792 7,454 6,150 6,242
Nord Wind N/A N/A N/A 71 2,898 5,086
Ural Airliny 2,348 2,609 2,998 3,948 4,035 4,841
Vladivostok Avia 1,852 2,105 2,447 2,943 3,875 4,756
VIM-Avia 3,650 5,294 4,455 3,214 3,978
Moskva Airlines/AtlantSoyuz 3,109 4,355 3,653 2,612 3,303
Yakutia N/A N/A 1,135 1,600 2,244 3,028
Globus N/A N/A N/A 1,518 2,696 2,714
Red Wings N/A N/A N/A 1,094 2,021 2,437
DonAvia (Aeroflot-Don) 911 875 1,665 2,540 2,392 2,423
NordAvia (Aeroflot-Nord) 886 1,044 1,539 1,375 1,528 1,972
tajikistan
Tajikistan 1,030 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Somon Air N/A N/A N/A N/A 729 N/A
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EurAsEC’s largest cargo carrier is AirBridgeCargo, a member of the Volga-Dnepr 
Group. The company uses Boeing 747F aircraft on Europe-Asia and other routes 
(see Table 10.10). Polet is another emerging air carrier. This company became 
the first operator of the IL-96-400 freighter. Five airlines, AirBridgeCargo, 
Aeroflot, Volga-Dnepr, Polet and Transaero, account for about 84% of all cargo 
traffic in EurAsEC.
table 10.10.
Scheduled cargo 
traffic by EurAsEC’s 
largest airlines in 
2005-2010
(million tkm)
Source: ATW (2010)
Note: N/A – data not 
available
Airline 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2010 
(estimate)
Belarus
Belavia 1,181 1,810 2,000 2,000 N/A
Kazakhstan
Air Astana 15,857 20,420 38,000 48,000 38,000 N/A
Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrghystan 2,707 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Russia
AirBridgeCargo N/A N/A N/A 1,101,798 1,317,708 2,057,883
Aeroflot 866,800 885,000 457,000 390,996 399,867 952,172
Aeroflot Cargo N/A N/A N/A 436,650 426,000 -
Volga-Dnepr 748,369 995,000 661,779 618,826 526,108 499,292
Polet N/A N/A 179,138 161,660 105,895 246,402
Transaero 73,338 78,000 93,048 130,032 170,803 234,421
Aviacon 
Citotrans
N/A N/A N/A 55,459 61,336 101,400
Sibiria/S7 67,107 82,000 92,310 120,168 98,523 91,413
Vladivostok Avia 28,765 33,000 25,830 32,496 40,907 70,479
Aerostars N/A N/A 20,617 25,300 25,954 36,302
Utair 14,401 17,000 21,450 23,206 23,071 31,969
Ural Airlines 14,969 14,000 13,800 15,000 20,112 32,748
Alrosa N/A N/A 56,783 56,247 34,912 30,100
tajikistan
Tajikistan 7031 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Somon Air N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,830 N/A
The specific features of EurAsEC’s air cargo market are that its domestic carriers 
are market leaders in non-scheduled flights by ramp aircraft and that foreign 
companies are now expanding their presence in the express cargo and mail 
delivery markets.
The express delivery market in EurAsEC is dominated by the “Big Four” (DHL, 
TNT Express, United Parcel Service and Federal Express) and accounts for more 
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than 50% of all mail transported by air. The market leader is DHL. Experts 
estimate that 60%-75% of express mail is flown to international destinations.
The ramp aviation1 segment handles transportation of outsize and heavy 
cargoes, machinery or other freights that cannot be transported in standard air-
freight containers for whatever reason. The leaders in this segment are Volga-
Dnepr and Polet, whose fleets include ramp aircraft such as the IL-76 and the 
AN-124 Ruslan.
As at the beginning of 2011, EurAsEC had 99 functioning international airports, 
49 of which (49.5%) were assigned ICAO categories (see Table 10.11).
1 Ramp aviation is an airlift system using ramp aircraft. A ramp aircraft has a special front or rear ramp so that the transported 
or loading machines can drive on board. Ramp aircrafts are widely used in military aviation and are irreplaceable in civil 
aviation where outsize and heavy items need to be transported.
table 10.11.
EurAsEC’s 
international 
airports, including 
ICAo category 
aerodromes
Source: CIS (2007) 
Note: *Airports with 
runways having 
ICAO categories
Country Total international airports
Categorised aerodromes *
Total
Category
I II IIIA 
Belarus 7 1 - 1 -
Kazakhstan 16 7 4 1 2
Kyrgyzstan 2 1 1 - -
Russia 72 39 26 10 3
Tajikistan 2 1 1 - -
Total EurAsEC 99 49 32 12 5
Less than one third of EurAsEC’s international airports are suitable for long-
range cargo aircraft with heavy takeoff weights such as the McDonnell-Douglas 
MD-11 and the Boeing-747 (various versions). The technical characteristics, 
including lighting and radio facilities, of Almaty, Astana, Domodedovo 
(Moscow), Yemelyanovo (Krasnoyarsk), Kazan, Koltsovo (Yekaterinburg), 
Knevichi (Vladivostok), Tolmachevo (Novosibirsk), Sheremetyevo (Moscow) 
and Novy (Khabarovsk) airports make it possible for them to become Europe-
Asia cargo hubs. The majority of these airports have undergone extensive 
upgrading and construction work in 2005-2011.
As mentioned above, EurAsEC’s airlines compete very successfully with foreign 
air carriers. However, foreign companies continue to expand their operations 
in the region. The largest foreign airline handling EurAsEC’s international cargo 
is Lufthansa. Lufthansa Cargo carries 1.8 million tonnes of freight a year, up 
to 25% of which is transported from Germany to Asia Pacific destinations. 
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Lufthansa’s main transit hub in EurAsEC is Domodedovo. Its aircraft also make 
transit stops at Yemelyanovo.
Over the last few years, cargo transited through Sheremetyevo by Chinese air 
carriers Air China, China Southern Airlines and China Eastern Airlines, and 
through Domodedovo by Hong Kong’s Cathay Pacific, has been on the rise. 
Air China Cargo also uses Tolmachevo as a transit airport. Over 30 foreign 
companies are executing cargo deliveries between Europe and Asia Pacific via 
EurAsEC and their number continues to grow. 
The promising areas for the development of international traffic across Eurasia 
include transit by new types of aircraft such as the Airbus-380 and, in the longer 
term, the Boeing-747-800. However, EurAsEC’s airports must undergo further 
reconstruction so that they can handle such types of aircraft and serve as transit 
or backup aerodromes.
EurAsEC’s ATM bodies service a total airspace of 30.9 million km2 (see Figure 
10.9). All its member states belong to the Eastern Part of the ICAO European 
Region and, as members of the ICAO, they must endeavour to implement its 
national ATM harmonisation strategy.
figure 10.9.
Airspace serviced 
by EurAsEC’s AtM 
bodies (thousands 
km2)
Source: International 
Aviation Committee
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EurAsEC airspace includes international and domestic routes. International 
routes allow transit through EurAsEC, linking Europe with Asia and Asia with 
North America.
The six air routes that pass through EurAsEC, and which are potential transit 
routes for foreign air carriers, are:
• Asian routes (Northern Europe-Near East/Central Asia);
• Trans-Siberian routes (Europe-Southeast Asia);
• Transpolar routes (Europe-Japan/Korea);
• Trans-Asian routes (Europe-Southeast Asia/India/Pakistan);
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• Trans-eastern routes (US/Canada-Southeast Asia); and
• Cross-polar routes (US/Canada-Southeast Asia).
Only two of the six groups cross two or more EurAsEC member states. These are 
the Trans-Siberian route through Russia and Belarus and the Trans-Asian route 
through Russia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asian countries. The other routes cross 
Russia only.
The main advantages of international air routes crossing EurAsEC are as 
follows:
• significant time savings for foreign air carriers;
• reduced transportation costs and, consequently, tariffs, which in turn 
generate higher demand for the Europe-Asia flights by foreign air carriers;
• increased frequency of transit flights provides additional benefits to EurAsEC 
member states such as ATS income and investment in airport infrastructure 
and ATS and ATM systems; and
• the development of international routes provides air carriers in the member 
states with access to Asian, European and American markets (in both 
passenger and cargo transportation).
EurAsEC member states’ policy to expand their trade and economic cooperation 
and to remove obstacles to mutual trade has provided solid foundations to 
expand air cargo traffic, including transit. However, the region’s existing 
potential and the opportunities it offers for international transit through its 
territory are not fully exploited.
The World Trade Organisation forecasts that Asia Pacific will remain the main 
generator of trade flows and that the amount of cargo traffic to Europe will grow 
dynamically. In these conditions, the countries that benefit most are those able 
to persuade operators to use their transport systems, including air routes, for 
Eurasian cargo operations.
oBStACLES to tHE DEVELopMENt of CARGo tRAffIC 
EurAsEC member states have similar histories and therefore face similar 
obstacles to the development of civil aviation. The problems that prevent, to 
a lesser or greater extent, the full utilisation of the Community’s cargo transit 
potential can be grouped as follows:
1. Significant depreciation of capital assets (aerodrome and airport 
infrastructure, aircraft);
2. Underdeveloped logistics in the countries that could integrate cargo 
traffic;
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3. Lack of cargo carriers in EurAsEC that could compete in the Eurasian cargo 
transportation sector. Over the last 20 years, this sector has fallen behind 
technologically and fuel costs have been proportionally higher than in other 
countries;
4. The need to harmonise ATM systems; and
5. Regulatory and legal issues (mainly affecting access to market and 
commercial rights), which can become an obstacle to the development of 
EurAsEC’s air transport potential.
The main problem is that ground-based technology is not sufficient to meet 
current and future demand for cargo flights. Only a few airports and aerodromes 
are able to function as modern and competitive air hubs. The majority of airports 
face the following key problems (CIS, 2007):
• long operating life of existing airports, averaging about 50 years;
• lack of technology;
• mismatch of ground-based services with current and future volume of 
operations and with new types of aircraft;
• poor passenger and cargo processing services (less regular flights, lower 
levels of comfort and other indicators); and
• lack of aerodromes with ICAO classification for weather minimums2.
In order to integrate with the international cargo transportation system and 
develop their transit capacities, EurAsEC member states need to ensure greater 
flight regularity irrespective of weather conditions. Only aerodromes and 
equipment meeting the requirements of ICAO CAT I, II or III can offer all-
weather operation. Currently, less than half of EurAsEC aerodromes have ICAO 
categories and only five aerodromes have CAT III A. There are no aerodromes 
in EurAsEC with CAT III B.
EurAsEC aerodromes are currently facing the following issues:
• they lack precision approach-and-landing and visual instruments, which 
would allow them to operate in poor weather conditions;
• the majority of runways need overhauling or rebuilding;
• lighting and power equipment is ageing or obsolete;
• the majority of radio navigation aids are ageing or obsolete;
2 Weather minimum is the minimum cloud ceiling allowing takeoff, landing and flying. Weather minimums are filed separately 
for an aerodrome, aircraft and pilots. At an aerodrome, weather minimums are filed separately for different runways and 
landing schemes.
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• safety measures need to be improved, particularly with regard to the 
following:
– geometric dimensions of aerodrome components and daytime 
marking;
– light signalling equipment and power supply;
– strength of pavement;
– emergency and rescue equipment;
– radio facilities;
– meteorological equipment (CIS, 2007).
The development of new jumbo jets including the Airbus 380 and the Boeing-
747-800 require strengthened airport pavements. There are an insufficient 
number of EurAsEC aerodromes that can receive such planes or serve as backup 
aerordromes for their transit flights. The underdeveloped logistics network 
undermines the competitiveness of EurAsEC airports in terms of cargo deliveries, 
because the time saved by air transportation is outweighted by the time of ground 
delivery between the airport and the freight owner. At present, only Moscow’s 
Sheremetyevo and Domodedovo airports are integrated, to a greater or lesser 
extent, with Eurasian logistics chains. The development of logistics centres at 
airports would attract additional trade flows between EurAsEC member states 
and foreign countries.
Currently, AirBridgeCargo is the only Russian registered company offering 
scheduled commercial cargo transportation between Europe and Asia, which 
can stand comparison in terms of quality and quantity of services with other 
world leaders in the airfreight sector. AirBridgeCargo’s fleet comprises and 
continues to be expanded with various versions of the Boeing-747 freight 
aircrafts. Its parent company, Volga Dnepr, and some other carriers, operate 
non-scheduled flights with ramp aircraft such as the AN-124.
EurAsEC’s scheduled airfreight market has to be classified as undeveloped, or 
emerging, given the scale of operations in other regions. In 2010, for example, 
Cathay Pacific, one of Hong Kong’s carriers, transported twice as many cargoes 
as all EurAsEC’s air companies put together (ATW, 2010; Airline Business, 
2010). The competitiveness of EurAsEC cargo carriers is undermined by the lack 
of modern, cost-efficient cargo aircraft such as the IL-96-400 or Boeing-747 
MD-11, that meet international standards for ground noise, engine emissions 
and navigation precision. In EurAsEC in particular, there is a lack of aerodromes 
that can service such planes, which also hampers the development of cargo 
traffic. This continues to make air transportation in EurAsEC unattractive for 
potential shippers, and hence the vicious circle ensues where the lack of 
competition undermines the development of the air cargo business. So, the 
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problem lies, to a significant extent, in the lack of investments in developing 
aerodrome networks.
As for ATM, EurAsEC member states need to complete the planned enlargement 
of ATM centres and introduction of reduced vertical separation minimums 
(RVSM). Satellite communication equipment also needs to be installed to link 
ATM centres in EurAsEC member states with their European, American and 
Asian counterparts.
The easing of administrative (non-physical) barriers is also critical to the 
development of scheduled international airfreight transportation in and through 
EurAsEC. These barriers can be classified as follows:
• business barriers, primarily high customs duties and taxes on aircraft 
purchased (including new aircraft);
• cross-border barriers for cargo traffic: lengthy customs clearance procedures 
for air cargo and other formalities at the member states’ airports cancel out 
any benefits from faster delivery. Experience shows that the time taken to 
complete formalities is often significantly longer than the flying time; and
• regulatory barriers to market access: EurAsEC lacks an efficient market in 
delivering freight to third countries because of the provisions of bilateral 
intergovernmental air traffic agreements between EurAsEC member states.
The majority of the problems identified above can be resolved by member 
state governments if there is a political will to do so. The development of 
infrastructure requires investment, not only from governments but also from 
public-private partnerships. Aerodrome infrastructure must be brought in line 
with the latest requirements for handling large aircraft and with the ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices. This will significantly encourage the 
development of domestic and international traffic (including transit operations). 
The air transport sector is keen to simplify aircraft purchase and replacement 
procedures, to streamline cross-border procedures and enhance access to 
foreign markets, including markets in transportation between third countries.
pRoSpECtS foR CoopERAtIoN BEtWEEN EuRASEC MEMBER StAtES 
IN tHE AVIAtIoN SECtoR
The experience of integration associations globally suggests that to achieve 
macroeconomic, trade and political goals, common transport potential must be 
an integral component of the single economic space and common market.
Transport (including civil aviation) is a key element of regional economic 
cooperation, without which the free trade area, the customs and economic 
unions and the common market cannot be fully developed.
The development of integration associations increases passenger and cargo 
traffic between member countries. By the beginning of the 21st century, 
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economic integration in different parts of the world has gathered pace. Civil 
aviation is no exception, as indicated by the development of the ICAO as an 
international regulator of this sector.
Multilateral cooperation in the development of international air traffic, 
harmonisation of commercial practices based on ICAO model agreements 
relating to international air traffic, and the expansion of access to the market 
should all be speeded up. In addition, the ICAO supports multilateral regional 
air traffic agreements that work to harmonise and simplify airline ownership, 
companies’ control over their activities, non-discriminatory access to the market 
and other important issues.
Along with improving access to market for airlines, the removal of restrictions 
on investment is another important area of cooperation between countries in the 
civil aviation sector. Transport companies can invest more freely in businesses 
in other member states, buy shares in air carriers, acquire other carriers or 
create new integrated structures. Such practices are relatively common in the 
European Union, as demonstrated by Lufthansa, Air France-KLM and British 
Airways-Iberia.
Another important issue for regional integration is the free movement of 
specialists (pilots) which will enable them to find jobs in other member states of 
an integration association. Currently, air transport regulations in the majority of 
EurAsEC member states prohibit the employment of foreign pilots. This policy 
affects aircrews and key airline personnel (managers, chief accountants, etc.).
In this context, it is important to understand the paramaters of the Common 
Transport Space EurAsEC is creating and to assess the role of civil aviation 
within it.
The Community’s Interstate Council (heads of governments) approved the 
Blueprint for the Formation of EurAsEC Common Transport Space on January 
25, 2008 (Resolution 374). The Blueprint defines the Common Transport Space 
as a combination of the transport systems of EurAsEC member states ensuring 
free movement of passengers, baggage, freight and vehicles, as well as technical 
and technological compatibility of transport processes, harmonised transport 
laws and common competition rules. The Common Transport Space covers 
all modes of transport, the suppliers of transport and supplementary carrier 
services, and all forms of ownership irrespective of the country of incorporation 
(EurAsEC, 2008).
In other words, the Common Transport Space includes civil aviation and EurAsEC 
considers international passenger and cargo traffic integral to the creation of the 
Common Transport Space.
Section 3.1 of the Blueprint discusses the creation of a common market in 
transportation services. It includes the following measures (EurAsEC, 2008):
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• ensuring suppliers of transport services are operating in conditions no less 
favourable than those applicable to similar domestic companies;
• ensuring free transit of international passenger and cargo flows;
• harmonising the terms of passenger and cargo transportation between 
EurAsEC member states and third countries;
• adopting uniform approaches to commercial competition and preventing 
abuses of competition; and
• promoting mutual recognition of certificates, diplomas and other documents 
regulating access to transport operations.
The first step towards the formation of the Common Transport Space, the 
Customs Union, and the Single Economic Space is the creation of mechanisms 
to enhance cooperation in international cargo transportation within EurAsEC, 
upgrade infrastructure and take full advantage of transit potential.
If EurAsEC’s air transport potential is fully utilised, this will do more than resolve 
its transport problems. Besides the positive effect it will have on the region’s 
transport systems, it will also have a multiplier effect on macroeconomic 
indicators. Ultimately, it will help foster economic integration in EurAsEC and 
advance the Customs Union.
The development of air cargo traffic in EurAsEC must comply with ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices and should take into account the best 
practices of many foreign countries that successfully utilise their air transport 
potential (the European Union, the US and China, among others). In accordance 
with the priorities for the development of civil aviation and flight safety measures 
in the CIS approved by the CIS Council of Heads of States on November 22, 
2007, the key elements of the strategy for the advancement of national air 
transport systems and cargo traffic in EurAsEC should be:
a) the creation of favourable conditions for the development of air traffic;
b) the development of airport and aerodrome infrastructure and equipment;
c) the development of the use of airspace and ATM;
d) the upgrading of aircraft fleets and improvement of aircraft  
maintenance;
e) the improvement of flight safety and protection of civil aviation from 
criminal acts;
f) the improvement of training and professional development of civil 
aviation personnel; and
g) the improvement of the civil aviation legal framework.
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The most important task of EurAsEC member states is to exploit to the fullest 
possible extent the region’s geographical position as the only transit bridge 
between Europe and Asia and the potential of its transport infrastructure, 
including airports and air routes.
CoNCLuSIoN
The main objectives of this report were to analyse the current status of civil 
aviation in EurAsEC member states, focusing on international air cargo traffic, 
and to identify the main obstacles which stand in the way of developing air 
transport links within EurAsEC and the utilisation of its transit potential.
Research showed that EurAsEC member states are in the process of creating 
the Common Transport Space. Civil aviation accounts for only a very small 
part of EurAsEC’s total cargo traffic. In 2010, airfreight traffic between the 
countries in the region accounted for 0.03% of all cargo transported (excluding 
by pipeline).
EurAsEC has significant transit potential. Eurasia is the shortest “transport bridge” 
between Europe and Asia. However, the region does not exploit its competitive 
advantages in this regard.
The issues identified in this report are presented only as synopses and additional 
research is required before recommendations can be made regarding potential 
socioeconomic, political and other efforts to address the range of problems 
affecting cooperation between EurAsEC member states.
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The objective of this article is to study integration processes in the electric power 
sectors of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. The 
article analyses the power sectors of the EDB member states and, in particular, 
changes that have occurred in recent years, key trends in the development of 
generating capacities and power grids, and electricity exports and imports. In 
addition, the article analyses joint interstate initiatives, including the future 
establishment of a common electric power market. Recommendations are 
provided on how to deepen integration in the region and foster the creation 
of the common electric power space, with an emphasis on the EDB’s role in 
this process. The article is based on the EDB sector report No.15, Integration 
Processes in the Electric Power Sectors of the EDB Member States.
INtRoDuCtIoN
Being one of the primary industries, the electric power sector plays a vital role 
in social and economic development of any country. Therefore, it is identified 
as one of the priority economic sectors of all the EDB member states and of the 
Bank’s investment and lending activities. The sector’s sustainable development 
and robust functioning contribute, to a considerable extent, to the energy 
security of countries and their successful economic development.
The power sectors of the EDB member states are fairly well developed with 
different types of power plants, including thermal power plants (condensation 
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and cogeneration plants), hydropower (HPP) and pumped-storage hydropower 
(PSH) plants, nuclear plants (NPP), renewable energy plants and electric 
networks (transmission lines and substations) of various voltage classes of up 
to 750 kV.
The analysis has outlined a number of trends in the power sectors of the EDB 
member states. Some of them have already been formed, while others are just 
beginning to emerge. On the whole, the region has demonstrated growth in 
electricity consumption and production. A moderate decline was registered 
in the crisis year of 2009, however in 2010 electricity consumption restored 
and exceeded the pre-crisis level of 2008. Russia and Kazakhstan saw the 
largest growth, while consumption and generation declined in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan.
The countries under review can be divided into two groups in terms of 
electricity consumption: (i) those with growing gross and steadily high specific 
consumption (Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus), and (ii) those with declining 
gross and low specific consumption (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia). 
In general, during the period under review, the industry demonstrated 
stable growth in generating capacity, even in the crisis year, accelerating 
by the end of the period. At the same time, the expansion of Kazakhstan’s 
generating capacity was not sufficient to meet increasing electricity 
demand.
The structure of capacities and their contribution to total electricity generation 
differs between countries depending on the availability, or lack, of certain 
energy resources in a given country. Fossil-fuelled thermal power plants (TPPs) 
dominate in the region and this situation remained practically unchanged 
throughout the period. Hydropower dominates in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
The generation pattern varies from year to year due to stochastic HPP reservoir 
inflows.
The EDB member states are constructing their electrical grids and improving 
national infrastructures so that they are able to supply electricity to all 
regions, including remote ones. Despite the commissioning of new facilities, 
reconstruction and modernisation of existing plants, the proportion of obsolete 
power-generating and network equipment in the region is still high. The 
modernisation process needs to be speeded up. Over the period studied, 
exports and imports of electricity between the EDB member states were 
declining steadily. 
In fact, the development of electricity generating facilities and power grid 
infrastructure in energy-deficient regions that depend on electricity imports, as 
well as the decline in electric power exports and imports, and outages of the 
interstate electrical grids reinforce electrical independence of the EDB member 
states and weaken integration of their power sectors.
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Russia’s Unified Energy System (UES) works in conjunction with the UES of 
Kazakhstan. The power grids of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and the southern part of 
Kazakhstan’s UES form the Central Asian integrated power system (IPS). During 
the period under review, the Central Asian IPS faced numerous outages of the 
adjoining interstate electrical grids. As a result Tajikistan was disconnected from 
the Central Asian IPS and, consequently, from the unified power systems of 
the EDB member states. Armenia cooperates with the Iranian power system 
due to its geographical isolation from the post-Soviet IPS, which impedes 
mutually beneficial export and import of electricity and integration benefits of 
cooperation between the national power systems.
ELECtRICItY ExpoRtS AND IMpoRtS IN tHE REGIoN
Electricity exports and imports between the EDB member states were diminishing 
steadily in the period under consideration; exports decreased almost 30% 
between 2006 and 2010 and imports decreased by more than 50%. This is due 
to a number of factors: disagreements over gas and electricity supplies from 
Russia to Belarus, problems with the Central Asian IPS, fuel and energy crisis 
in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as increase in domestic consumption in 
Kazakhstan with subsequent decline in the country’s export potential leading to 
Kazakhstan’s transformation to a net importer of electricity.
Over the 2006-2010, Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan were net exporters of 
electric power and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan net importers. Kazakhstan 
managed to meet domestic electricity demand and become a net exporter only 
in the crisis year of 2009. In late 2005 and early 2006 Kazakhstan suffered an 
acute shortage of electricity and imported power from neighbouring countries 
(Podkovalnikov et al., 2010).
Belarus and Tajikistan rely on electricity imports for several reasons. For Belarus, 
imports are an economic necessity. It is more profitable for the country to buy 
electricity abroad than to produce it at its own power plants. The fuel used to 
generate electricity in Belarus makes its own product very expensive (Volkova 
et al., 2011).
In Tajikistan, hydropower plants produce the majority of the country’s electricity, 
which is why generation varies seasonally and annually. In years when water 
supplies are lower, HPPs do not produce enough energy and the country has to 
import electricity to make up the shortfall. However, even in years of average 
and plentiful water supply, electricity has to be imported to meet the peak 
autumn and winter demand, because hydropower production is still limited and 
output cannot be distributed to meet varying demand over a year.
Kyrgyzstan, where generation is consistently higher than annual consumption, 
faces the same problems as Tajikistan during peak seasons and has to import 
electricity to maintain the power balance.
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Armenia
The commercial operations of the Armenian power system are limited to 
electricity trading with Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Iran (see Table 11.1). 
table 11.1.
Electricity exports 
and imports  
by Armenia  
in 2008–2010 
Source: ESI SB 
RAS, based on data 
from the National 
Statistical Service 
of the Republic 
of Armenia; the 
Electricity System 
Commercial 
Operator of Georgia 
(ESCO)
Note: N/A – data not 
available; *estimates 
by the authors
Country
2008 2009 2010 January-October 2011
Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import
Nagorno-Karabakh N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Georgia 0 0 0 19.8 0 89.4 0 117.5
Iran 359.6 337.8 335.96* 271.2* 1,061.2* 156.6* N/A N/A
Total 359.6 343.4 336 291 1,061.2 246 1,400 N/A
Balance 16.2  45 815.2
The electricity exports and imports balance was more than twenty times higher 
in 2010 than the year earlier, increasing from 0.045 TWh to 0.815 TWh and the 
share of export in electricity consumption grew from 0.8% to 14.36%. In 2010 
total electricity exports stood at 1,061 TWh and imports 0.246 TWh. Before 
2010 the balance of Armenian electricity trade with Iran was almost at zero, 
as Armenia exported the power to Iran in April-September and imported in 
October-March. In 2010 Armenia’s trade in electricity with Iran had a positive 
balance of 904.6 million kWh.
On May 14, 2009 Iran began supplying gas to Armenia via the Iran-Armenia gas 
pipeline. Under the «gas for electricity» programme, Armenia pays for Iranian 
gas supplies with electricity at a rate of 3 kWh per 1 m3 of gas. A new unit at 
the Yerevan TPP, which was commissioned in 2010, is the main source of 
electricity exports under this programme (NIRA Aksakal News, 2011). 
Belarus
Belarus is a net importer of electricity and one of the biggest importers of Russian 
electric power, together with Finland and Kazakhstan. In 2008-2010 Belarus 
imported electricity from Russia, Ukraine, Latvia and Lithuania and exported to 
Poland and Lithuania (see Table 11.2).
Imported electricity accounted for 6.5% of the Belarusian power balance in 
2008, 12.8% in 2009, and 7.9% in 2010. The main suppliers of electricity were 
Russia in 2008 and 2009 (2.2 and 2.9 billion kWh respectively) and Ukraine in 
2010 (2.9 billion kWh). In 2010 Russian electricity imports fell by almost one 
hundred times from 2.9 to 0.032 billion kWh.
In early 2011 Belarus significantly increased imports from Russia compared 
to 2008 and 2009. In January-June 2011, Russian imports totalled around 
1.59 billion kWh (Me-press.kiev.ua, 2011). Electric power was supplied under 
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2008 2009 2010 January-October 2011
Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import
Russia 0 2,168.4 0 2,908 0 30.3 N/A N/A
Ukraine 0 0.7 0 1,213.6 0 2,940.6 N/A 1926.5
Latvia 0 70.3 0 58.1 0 0 N/A N/A
Lithuania 0 157.6 7.3 298.3 269.8 0 N/A N/A
Poland 557.8 - 0 - 0 - N/A N/A
Total 557.8 2397 7.3 4478 269.8 2970 N/A N/A
Balance -1,839.2 -4,470.7 -2,700.2 N/A
table 11.2.
Electricity exports 
and imports 
between Belarus 
and neighbouring 
countries 
(million kWh)
Source: official 
website of the 
National Statistical 
Committee of the 
Republic of Belarus.
Note: N/A – data not 
available
agreements on parallel operation and other contracts. The interruptions in 
supply in 2008, 2010 and 2011 were caused by different factors, including 
non-compliance with these agreements. 
Along with importing power from Russia, Belarus transits Russian electricity to 
Kaliningrad exclave and Lithuania. The volume of electricity transit depends 
on commercial contracts negotiated by each of the parallel power systems 
(FGC, 2011). Belarus imported 4,602 million kWh from Russia (including for 
subsequent transit) in 2008, 4,184.7 million kWh in 2009, and 2,510.6 million 
kWh in 2010. Electricity transit to Kaliningrad Region from Russia through 
Belarus and Lithuania totalled 1.143 TWh in 2008, 1.260 TWh in 2009, and 
0.915 TWh in 2010 (Government of Kaliningrad Region, 2010; Belarusian 
Reporter, 2010; Regional Forum, 2011). Russian electricity is transited under 
the Single Economic Space (SES) agreements guaranteeing access to the services 
of natural monopolies in the power sector, including pricing and tariff policies.
Kazakhstan
As shown in Table 11.3, Kazakhstan was mostly a net importer of electricity 
in 2006-2010. Only in the crisis year of 2009 Kazakhstan was a net exporter, 
possibly because of decreased domestic consumption caused by the economic 
slowdown. In the first nine months of 2011, net electricity imports exceeded the 
2010 figure. Electricity exports went down during the period under review. 
Kazakhstan’s main partner in Central Asia is Kyrgyzstan. Imports from this 
country are growing steadily and even outpaced Russian imports in 2010. In 
the first nine months of 2011, Kazakhstan imported 2.125 TWh of electricity 
from Kyrgyzstan (KABAR, 2011). 
Before 2010 Tajikistan was a member of the Central Asian IPS and exchanged 
small volumes of electricity with Kazakhstan, which was transited through 
Kyrgyzstan. When Tajikistan was disconnected from the IPS, this exchange 
stopped.
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table 11.3.
Electricity imports 
and exports by 
Kazakhstan  
(million kWh) 
Source: ESI SB RAS, 
data from KOREM; 
KEGOC
Note: N/A – data not 
available
Kazakhstan is Russia’s main electricity trading partner and the main exporter 
of electricity to Russia in the context of cooperation between the EDB and 
CIS member states. In 2009 and 2010 Kazakhstan accounted for 70% and 
52% of Russia’s electricity imports respectively. There were several reasons 
for the decrease in Russian imports, including an improvement in Kazakhstan’s 
domestic electricity’s links. In 2008 a new interregional high-voltage line was 
commissioned: the 500 kV 500 km Northern Kazakhstan–Aktobe Region line 
connected the Aktobe Region with electricity generation facilities in Northern 
Kazakhstan.
Indicator 2008 2009 2010 January-September 2011
Imports 2,780.1 1,771.7 3,009.5 2,299.6
from Russia 2,205.1 584.6 1,375.6 N/A
from Kyrgyzstan 553.9 967.9 1,633.9 N/A
from Tajikistan 21.1 219.2 0 N/A
Exports 2,234.7 2,245.8 1,538 704.7
to Russia 2,213.6 2,157.4 1,538 N/A
to Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 N/A
to Tajikistan 21.1 88.4 0 N/A
Balance, overall -545.4 474.1 1,471.5 -1,594.9
including:     
with Russia -8.5 -1,572.8 -162.4 -704.7
Central Asia 553.9 1,098.7 1,633.9 2,299.6
with Kyrgyzstan 553.9 967.9 1633.9 2,125
with Tajikistan 0 130.8 0 N/A
Note:
In November 2008 the EDB signed a $30.5 million seven-year loan agreement with the Batys Transit concession 
company to construct the Northern Kazakhstan–Aktobe Region power line. The Samruk Kazyna National 
Welfare Fund and KEGOC (Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company) also participated in the project.
The increase in net power flow between Kazakhstan and Russia in 2009 was 
caused, to a significant extent, by the accident on the Sayano-Shushensk HPP. 
The emergency shutdown of the plant necessitated transmission of reserve 
power from the Siberian IPS and the increased use of power from the Urals 
and mid-Volga systems transmitted to Siberia through Kazakhstan (Energy 
Forecasting Agency, 2010).
Because of the limited transit capacity of the Urals-Kazakhstan-Siberia system, 
Kazakhstan’s maintenance of the agreed power balance is vital in preventing 
overload on the lines by non-scheduled flows.
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Table 11.4 shows the estimated transit from the Urals IPS to the Siberian IPS 
through Kazakhstan. Although these are estimates, they illustrate Kazakhstan’s 
role in ensuring sustainable power supplies to Siberia and the European part of 
Russia.table 11.4.
Electricity 
transmission by 
Russia through 
Kazakhstan’s power 
system (million kWh)
Source: ESI SB RAS, 
based on data from 
KOREM; KEGOC; 
System Operator 
– Central Dispatch 
Department
Indicator 2008 2009 2010
Received by Russia from Kazakhstan 4,090 5,737 5,985
Siberian IPS 4,088 5,737 5,985
South IPS 2
Kazakhstan’s electricity exports to Russia 2,213.6 2,157.4 1,538
Total electricity transit 1,876.4 3,579.6 4,447
Kyrgyzstan
In 2010 the balance of electricity exports and imports was 1.559 TWh (see 
Table 11.5). Kazakhstan was Kyrgyzstan’s largest export customer. Kyrgyz 
exports and the net power flow were growing steadily over the period. The 
country also transits electricity.
table 11.5.
Electricity exports 
and imports 
between Kyrgyzstan 
and neighbouring 
countries 
(million kWh) 
Source: ESI SB 
RAS, based on data 
from the National 
Statistical Committee 
of the Kyrgyz 
Republic; Statistics 
Agency under the 
President of the 
Kyrgyz Republic; 
KEGOC
Note: N/A – data not 
available
Indicator 2008 2009 2010
January-
September 
2011
January-
September 2010  
(for reference)
Import 6.9 0 76.3 N/A N/A
Uzbekistan 6.9 insignificant 76.3 N/A N/A
Export 578.9 1,033.8 1,635.4 N/A N/A
Kazakhstan 555.3 968.5 1,634.6 2,125 1,100
Tajikistan 23.6 7.7 0 N/A N/A
China N/A N/A N/A 0.864 0.799
Uzbekistan N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Balance 572 1,033.8 1,559.1 N/A N/A
Transit from Tajikistan  
to Kazakhstan
21.1 219.2 0 N/A N/A
Transit from Kazakhstan  
to Tajikistan
21.1 88.4 0 N/A N/A
The electricity exchange between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (before it was 
disconnected from the Central Asian IPS) took place primarily in winter when 
Kyrgyzstan’s supplies were used to compensate for power deficit in the north 
of Tajikistan. Small amounts of electricity were exported to Uzbekistan under 
intergovernmental irrigation agreements covering water and power exchange 
(Inogate, 2011).
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Since December 2009, partly because of Tajikistan’s disconnection from the 
system, Kyrgyzstan has been supplying electricity primarily to Kazakhstan and 
China. The imports have been insignificant. The Kyrgyz power system, despite 
domestic shortages, remains a net exporter of electricity.
Russia
Table 11.6 shows Russia’s exports and imports of electricity. The decline in 
Russia’s trade with neighbouring countries in 2009, compared to 2008, resulted 
table 11.6.
Russian electricity 
exports and imports 
(million kWh)
Source: ESI SB RAS, 
based on data from 
Belenergo, CIS 
Interstate Statistical 
Committee, Russia’s 
Federal State 
Statistics Service, 
INTER RAO UES; 
KOREM, KEGOC, 
System Operator 
– Central Dispatch 
Department, 
Electricity System 
Commercial 
Operator (ESCO) 
of Georgia, 
European Network 
of Transmission 
System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSOE).
Note: N/A – data not 
available
Indicator 2008 2009 2010
January-
September 
2011
January-September 
2010  
(for reference)
Neighbouring countries
Export (total) 9,334.7 5,074.6 6,898.8 N/A N/A
including:    Ukraine 1,110.9 22 32
Belarus 2,168.4 2,908 30.3   
Latvia 1,617.9 656 7   
Lithuania 1561 410 5,106   
Kazakhstan 2,205.1 584.6 1,375.6   
Georgia 560.1 348 211.9 205.2 38.6
Azerbaijan 111.3 21 18   
South Ossetia  125 118   
Import (total) 3,079.3 3,002.3 2,902.1 N/A N/A
including:    Kazakhstan 2,213.6 2,119 1,498   
Ukraine  0.5 81   
Lithuania 97.5 199 3   
Georgia 432.7 525.8 1,117.1 574.5 1,051.8
Azerbaijan 335.5 158 203   
Balance 6,255.4 2,072.3 3,996.7   
other countries
Export (total) 11,254.9 12,962 13,047 9,611.3 N/A
including:    Finland 10,883 11,708 11,639 8,480 8,496
Norway 176.5 227 211  131  155
Mongolia 195.4 182 214 206  
China 0 845 983 925.3  
Import, total 21 21 21 N/A N/A
Mongolia 21 21 21   
Balance 11,233.9 12,941 13,026 N/A N/A
total
Export 20,589.6 18,036.6 19,945.8 16,576 13,523
Import 3,100.3 3,023.3 2,923.1 995.5 1,390.7
Balance 17,638.1 15,013.3 17,022.7 15,580 12,132.5
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from an overall reduction in consumption in other countries because of the 
global financial crisis. In 2010 Russia’s net power flow increased by more 
than 10% year-on-year to 17.02 billion kWh. The main importers of Russian 
electricity in 2010 were Finland (58.4%), Lithuania (25.6%), and Kazakhstan 
(6.9%). Small volumes were transmitted to Norway, Belarus, Latvia, Ukraine, 
South Ossetia and Mongolia. The exchanges with Georgia and Azerbaijan 
were seasonal. The redistribution of supplies between the countries was 
caused by two main factors: the decommissioning in 2010 of the Ignalina NPP 
(Lithuania) and the repair, during that year, of the 750 kV power line between 
Smolensk NPP and the Belorusskaya substation in Belarus (INTER RAO UES, 
2011).
In addition to exports and imports shown in the table, Russia supplied electricity 
(without importing it) from its own generating facilities located in other 
countries: it supplied Iran from the Hrazdan TPP in Armenia and Romania from 
the Moldavskaya GRES in Moldova. In 2010 Russia began supplying Turkey 
with electricity transited via Georgia (Еnergo-news.ru, 2010; INTER RAO UES, 
2011).
Exports grew and imports declined in 2011, creating a record high net power 
flow for the period 2008-2011. In the first nine months of 2011, the balance 
of exports and imports reached 15.6 TWh, up almost 3.5 TWh year-on-year. 
The increase in exports was due in particular to the restoration of supplies to 
Belarus, increased exports to China and Mongolia, and the launch of the second 
unit at the Kaliningrad TPP in 2010 (which made it possible to export its excess 
production to Lithuania and Belarus).
Belarus is Russia’s traditional partner, yet cooperation between the two in 
2008-2010 was far from stable. Exports and imports between Russia and 
Kazakhstan did not change drastically over the same period, but the trend was 
downward. Belarus and Kazakhstan accounted for around 50% of Russian 
exports to neighbouring countries in 2008. This increased to almost 70% in 
2009, but dropped to 20% in 2010 (because of the decrease in imports by 
Belarus). Kazakhstan supplied almost 70% of Russian imports from neighbouring 
countries in 2008-2009, falling to 50% in 2010.
tajikistan
As shown in Table 11.7 below, in 2008-2009 Tajikistan’s most significant 
electricity exchanges were with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, while its 
exchange with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was lower.
Before it was disconnected from the Central Asian IPS, Tajikistan supplied 
electricity each year to the Surxondaryo Province in southern Uzbekistan, 
and received the same amount of electricity in its northern Sughd Province 
from Uzbekistan’s Syrdarya GRES. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also exchanged 
electricity as allowed by their joint responsibility to regulate water discharge 
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table 11.7.
Electricity exports 
and imports by 
tajikistan  
(million kWh) 
Source: Petrov 
(2010); Abdul 
Razique Samadi 
(2011); official 
website of the 
Agency on Statistics 
under the President 
the Republic of 
Tajikistan (http://
www.stat.tj).
Note: N/A – data not 
available
 2008 2009 2010
January-
October 2011
January-October 
2010 (for reference)
Import 5,229.6 4,168.7 321.4 65 310.5 
Uzbekistan 3,984.2 3,404.6 321.4 N/A N/A
Turkmenistan 1,200.7 668 0 N/A N/A
Kazakhstan 21.1 88.4 0 N/A N/A
Kyrgyzstan 23.6 7.7 0 N/A N/A
Export 4,346.1 4,227.3 179.8 136.6 153.4 
Uzbekistan 4,279.1 3,933.8 0 N/A N/A
Kazakhstan 21.1 219.2  N/A N/A
Kyrgyzstan 0 0  N/A N/A
Afghanistan 45.9 74.3 179.8 N/A N/A
Balance -883.5 58.6 -141.6 71.6 -157.1 
from the Kairakkum reservoir. During the crop-cultivation season Tajikistan 
supplied water and surplus electricity to Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan returned 
the same amount of electricity to Tajikistan in winter when Tajikistan suffered 
power shortages (TopTJ.com, 2009). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan exchanged 
electricity primarily in winter.
Turkmenistan was an important electricity supplier. Until the end of April 2009, 
under a five-year intergovernmental agreement signed in 2007, Tajikistan 
imported Turkmen electricity from September to May of each year, transiting it 
through Uzbekistan. In 2009 Tajikistan failed to reach a transit agreement with 
Uzbekenergo. 
In 2010 Tajikistan imported small volumes of electricity from Uzbekistan 
only. Uzbekistan continued to supply 360 GWh a year to Tajikistan’s remote 
northern regions, via 220 kV and 110 kV transmission lines. The supplies were 
prepaid every ten days. Tajikistan exports electricity to Afghanistan only. At 
present, its daily exports stand at 15 MW and cost $0.035 per kWh. According 
to forecasts, exports may exceed 1 billion kWh in spring and summer (Аvesta.
tj, 2011).
MutuAL INVEStMENtS IN 2008-2011
The Agreement on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments signed 
by EurAsEC member states in December 2008 has had a positive effect on 
mutual investment.
Establishing long-term relationships can depend on mutual investment and the 
purchase of power facilities in the EDB member states, and on mutual supplies of 
power and electrical equipment at sites under construction (including life-time 
maintenance of equipment by suppliers). It should be noted that investors and 
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suppliers from third countries, including the US and China who are important 
competitors, play significant role in developing the energy markets of the EDB 
member states.
Facility Company Ownership Capacity
Investment, 
timeframes
Note
Armenia
Armenian NPP INTER RAO 
UES
trust 
management
815 (407.5*) 
MW
In November 2011 Inter RAO 
began negotiations on the 
termination of management
Hrazdan TPP INTER RAO 
UES
100% owner 1,110 MW Until 2011 the plant was 
owned by Rosneftegas (100% 
minus one share owned by 
Rosimuschestvo)
Hrazdan TPP 
(Unit 5)
ArmRosgasprom 100% owner 480 MW ArmRosgasprom’s 
investment 
programme in 
Armenia for  
2009-2011 
($169.6 million) 
Construction reaching 
completion. ArmRosgasprom 
is an Armenian-Russian joint 
venture 80% owned by 
Gazprom
Sevan-Hrazdan 
cascade of 
HPPs
RusHydro 90% owner 561.4 MW Investment 
programme for 
2008-2010  
($30 million)
International Energy 
Corporation, until 2011 owned 
by Inter RAO UES
Electrical 
Networks  
of Armenia
INTER RAO 
UES
100% owner 29,600 km Investment 
programme 
for 2009-2011 
($180.3 million)
In March 2009 INTER RAO UES 
consolidated 100% of shares; 
before that INTER RAO UES 
owned 67%
Kazakhstan
Ekibastuz 
GRES-2 
(Kazakhstan)
INTER RAO 
UES
50% owner 1,000 MW Construction of a 
500 MW Unit 3 
($770 million)
Financed by Vnesheconombank, 
EDB and Halyk bank of 
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Kambarata-1 
HPP
INTER RAO 
UES
Kyrgyz-
Russian JV 
(50%/50%)
1,900 (0*) 
MW
A $1.7 billion 
loan from Russia, 
starting 2011
Kambarata-2 
HPP
360 (110*) 
MW
A $300 million 
loan from Russia, 
2009
tajikistan
Sangtuda-1 
HPP
Rosatom 
(60.13%); 
INTER RAO 
UES (14.87%)
Russian-
Tajik JV 
(75%/25%)
670 MW 16 billion roubles 
invested by Russia 
in construction in 
2005-2009
Russia owns 75% of shares of 
Sangtuda-1 HPP
table 11.8.
Russia’s foreign electric power assets and investments (as of November 2011)
Source: ESI SB RAS
Note: * – operating
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Russia and Armenia
Russia’s INTER RAO UES owns 100% of the Electrical Networks of Armenia, 
an Armenian monopoly distributor of electric power. INTER RAO’S investment 
programme for 2009-2010 included $180.3 million for special programmes and 
enhancement of its services (Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian 
Federation, 2011). In 2010 Electrical Networks of Armenia reconstructed sixteen 
substations with a voltage of 6/35/110 kV.
INTER RAO UES investment programme for 2008-2010 included spending 
of $30 million to upgrade the Yerevan, Argel and Arzni HPPs and overhaul 
the Sevan and Kanaker HPPs. The overhaul of Sevan and Kanaker has been 
completed and the modernisation of the other facilities is under way. In the 
summer of 2010, the dam height at Lake Sevan was elevated and this was 
expected to increase electricity generation by the Sevan-Hrazdan cascade. The 
company is expected to invest around $40 million by 2013, including $20 
million to modernise the HPPs (INTER RAO UES, 2011b).
Rosneftegas owns four units at the Hrazdan Energy Company (Hrazdan TPP), 
with a total installed capacity of 1,100 MW. In 2002 ownership of the Hrazdan 
plant was transferred to Russia as payment of the Armenian government’s $31 
million debt (Oilcapital.ru, 2009). The Russian government transferred 100% of 
shares in the company to INTER RAO UES (except Unit 5) (News.am, 2011b).
The construction of Unit 5 is under way at the Hrazdan plant. It is owned 
by ArmRosgasprom, an Armenian-Russian JV with 80% of stock owned by 
Gazprom. ArmRosgasprom’s investment programme in Armenia for 2009-2011 
totalled $169.6 million (Ministry of Economic Development, 2011).
Russian-Armenian cooperation in nuclear power generation is executed under 
the Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear 
Energy dated September 25, 2000. Rosatom is responsible for coordinating 
the participation of Russian organisations in the execution of four technical 
cooperation projects being carried out by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) to improve safety at the plant. These projects are financed by 
Russia’s contribution to the IAEA’s extra-budgetary fund. In 2008, to finance 
safety improvements at the plant, Russia transferred 2.04 billion roubles to 
Armenia from the IAEA fund to support projects implemented under the IAEA’s 
Technical Cooperation Programme for 2009-2011 (Atomenergoprom, 2011).
On August 20, 2010 the governments of Russia and Armenia signed the 
Agreement on Cooperation in Constructing New Units at the Nuclear Power 
Plant in Armenia (Atomenergoprom, 2011). The first facility to be constructed 
is a 1,000 MW generating unit. According to the Armenian Ministry of Energy, 
the project’s estimated cost amounted to $5-$6 billion (BigpowerNews.ru, 
2011). In 2006, the Armenian parliament abolished the state’s monopoly right 
to own new nuclear power units in order to attract foreign capital to the project. 
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Construction was scheduled to begin in 2011 and the new unit is due to be 
commissioned by 2017 (BigpowerNews. ru, 2011).
Russia and Belarus
The investment cooperation between Russia and Belarus in 2008-2011 focused 
on different areas, including the supply of power equipment. Since 2005, Power 
Machines1 has been involved in the upgrade of Belarus’ largest TPP, the Lukoml 
GRES. In 2010 Power Machines OJSC and Vitebskenergo Republican Unitary 
Enterprise signed a contract for the manufacture and supply of equipment to 
upgrade Unit 3 of the Lukoml GRES, with a contract value estimated at $7 
million (Power Machines, 2011; Energyland.info, 2010).
Under the agreement signed in August 2010 with Vitebskenergo, the Kaluga 
Turbine Works (part of the Power Machines group) manufactured and supplied 
equipment for the Vitebsk TPP. The group also provided installation, start-up 
and training (Bigpowernews.ru, 2011).
Vitebskenergo is implementing construction of the 21.6 MW Polotsk HPP 
on the Western Dvina, due to be commissioned in 2016. This project is 
implemented under the State Programme for Innovative Development of the 
Republic of Belarus for 2011-2015, and has an estimated cost of 450.3 billion 
Belarusian roubles (Bigpowernews.ru, 2011). After the purchase of the main 
equipment a contract was concluded with Technopromexport (part of the 
Russian Technologies State Corporation) for the construction of a hydro unit at 
the Polotsk plant. Technopromexport is to provide design, construction, supply 
and installation of equipment, start-up and commissioning.
EDB and Vitebskenergo signed a ten-year loan agreement to finance the project in November 2010. The power 
plant will generate 112 million kWh a year. The project cost is $1.427 billion, including $99.8 million provided 
by the EDB.
1 Russia’s leading producer of power equipment, uniting large electrical engineering enterprises, including the Leningrad 
Metal Works, Energosila, the Kaluga Turbine Works, and the Turbine Blades Plant, among others.
Note:
On March 15, 2011, at a Council of Ministers session in Minsk, the governments 
of Russia and Belarus signed an agreement to construct a nuclear power plant in 
Belarus. The state enterprise «Directorate for Nuclear Power Plant Construction» 
(Belarus) and Atomstroyexport JSC (Russia) also signed a contract in 2011. The 
parties agreed that construction costs would be based on the same pricing 
formula as those used for nuclear plants built in Russia (Energy Strategy, 2011). 
Loan financing for construction will be extended once the parties have signed 
an agreement on a Russian government loan. The estimated total investment 
(and loan amount respectively) for the Belarusian NPP will make up $6-6.5 
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billion. Social, transport and production infrastructure will cost an additional 
$2.5-3 billion (Atominfo.ru, 2011).
Russia and Kazakhstan
The construction of Unit 3 at Ekibastuz GRES-2, which is jointly owned by 
Samruk Energo (50%) and INTER RAO UES (50%), will raise the plant’s capacity 
by 50% to 1,500 MW.
Note:
The governments of Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the construction and operation of Unit 3 at 
Ekibastuz GRES-2 on September 11, 2009. The project cost is estimated at $800 million. Financing terms were 
agreed in the summer of 2010 in Kazakhstan. The document was signed by EDB, Vnesheconombank, Ekibastuz 
GRES-2 JSC, Samruk Energo and INTER RAO UES. In accordance with the agreement, EDB and Vnesheconom-
bank will provide a multi-currency 15-year loan for a total of $770 million, on a parity basis. Halyk Bank of 
Kazakhstan also became party to the agreement in June 2011 as the third lender.
In addition, Bogatyr Komir, a Kazakh-Russian JV, is developing the Bogatyr coal 
deposit which supplies coal to Ekibastuz GRES-2. This company is owned by 
Samruk Kazyna and RUSAL.
Note:
EDB agreed to finance Kazakhstan’s largest coal producer, Bogatyr Komir. EDB’s seven-year loan for a total 
of up to $50 million will be used to purchase up-to-date equipment and machinery. The increase in coal 
supplies is expected to boost mutual trade between Russia and Kazakhstan by $30 million a year. In addition, 
about 80% of the required equipment (worth around $40 million) will be supplied to the project by Russian 
enterprises.
In June 2010 Karaganda Energotsentr (Kazakhstan) contracted Power Machines 
to manufacture and supply equipment for a 150 MW fifth unit (currently under 
construction) at Karaganda TPP-3. In March 2011 the turbine generator was 
commissioned (Bigpowernews.ru, 2011). Power Machines also provided 
supervision, start-up and training.
In June 2011 a long-term programme for the re-equipment and reconstruction of 
the Bukhtarma HPP, which is being implemented since 2001, was completed. 
The ninth power unit (Unit 7 at the plant) and a turbine upgraded by Power 
Machines were commissioned. As a result the plant’s capacity rose from 75 
MW to 82 MW (Power Machines, 2011b).
Kazakhstan and Russia are keen to develop and integrate their nuclear sectors. 
EDB’s Sector Report No.11, Russian and Kazakh Nuclear Energy: Trends in 
Economic Cooperation, provides more information on this issue.
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Russia and Kyrgyzstan
Russian investment in the Kyrgyz economy consists mainly of the setting up 
the subsidiary companies and joint ventures in strategic sectors. In April 2009, 
INTER RAO UES and Kyrgyzstan’s Electric Power Plants JSC agreed to build 
the 1,900 MW Kambarata-1 HPP as a 50/50 joint venture (Alemar, 2009). The 
construction cost was estimated at $3 billion (Dw-world.de, 2010). Russia was 
expected to provide a $2 billion loan from the federal budget and INTER RAO 
UES’ funds.
In May 2011 a Kyrgyz-Russian working group was set up to control the 
implementation of the project. In October 2011 Russia confirmed its intention 
to provide a $2.1 billion loan for building the Kambarata-1 HPP and the upper 
Naryn cascade of HPPs (four hydropower plants with a capacity of up to 300 
MW) for a term of 20 years, including the 8-year grace period and the annual 
interest rate of 3% (24.kg, 2011). The majority of the loan ($1.7 billion) is likely 
to be spent on the construction of Kambarata-1 HPP.
Russia is also partnering with Kyrgyzstan in the completion of Kambarata-
2 HPP. Construction of the 360 MW plant (three 120 MW units) began in 
1986 but was suspended in the early 1990s when funds ran out. Leningrad 
Metal Works (Power Machines Group) supplied the first unit. Funds injected 
by the Kyrgyz government and loaned by Russia in 2009 were invested into 
the project. Now the plant’s capacity is 120 MW, and full generating capacity 
should be reached in 2015. A total of $195.164 million were allocated for 
research, design, construction and equipment for Kambarata-2 HPP, including 
$77 million from the Kyrgyz budget, over $8.505 million from Kyrgyzstan’s 
Electric Power Plants JSC (general originator of the project) own funds, and a 
loan of $109.65 million (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2011).
RusHydro and INTER RAO UES, together with Kyrgyzstan’s Electric Power 
Plants JSC, are studying the possibilities for the development of the Naryn River 
hydro potential particularly along its upper reach, and conducting feasibility 
studies for both large and small hydro projects (Сleandex.ru, 2011).
Russia and tajikistan
In February 2005 Sangtuda-1 HPP, a Russian-Tajik JV, was created with a 
view to the plant’s construction and its subsequent operation. Russia invested 
over 16 billion roubles in the HPP construction (Sangtuda-1 HPP, 2011). In 
2010 the plant generated 1.633 billion kWh of electricity. As at June 1, 2011, 
Rosatomprom owned a 60.13% stake in Sangtuda-1 HPP, the Tajik government 
had 25% plus one share, and INTER RAO UES owned 14.87% (Sangtuda-1 
HPP, 2011).
The construction of the Rogun HPP, with an installed capacity of 3.6 GW 
and long-term average production of 13.1 TWh a year, was suspended after 
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the collapse of the Soviet Union. Located on the Vakhsh River, the plant 
was expected to become the largest hydropower plant in Central Asia. The 
commissioning of all six units will require approximately $4 billion. INTER RAO 
UES and RUSAL considered a possibility of taking part in the completion of the 
Rogun HPP, however it was not implemented. Russian-Tajik cooperation in 
this project is currently limited to the drafting of engineering documents for the 
hydro unit (Hydroproject, 2011).
Russia, Kyrgyzstan and tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan are the four countries 
cooperating in the CASA-1000 project involving the construction of two high-
voltage interstate power transmission lines and three substations in Kabul, 
Peshawar and Sangtuda to export electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
to Afghanistan and Pakistan. INTER RAO UES also plans to take part in this 
project. The project was assessed positively by the World Bank. Its preliminary 
value is estimated at $1.5-$2 billion. Russia intends to invest at least $500 
million in CASA-1000 (Bigpowernews.ru, 2011).
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
In June 2011 the countries signed a protocol to set up a Kyrgyz-Kazakh investment 
fund and a number of other documents on cooperation (Fergananews.com, 
2011). The $100 million investment fund will be used to finance industrial 
projects in Kyrgyzstan, including those in the power sector. Kazakhstan intends 
to invest up to $12 million to help Kyrgyzstan meet its high demand for power 
and heat next autumn and winter.
The National Electrical Grid of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan’s KEGOC have also 
signed an agreement on cooperation in the power sector.
***
The above analysis illustrates that mutual investments in the power sectors of 
EDB member states over the 2006-2010 period were primarily unilateral and 
mostly Russian. This was also one of the conclusions of the EDB’s study in 
2008 (Vinokurov, 2008) and the situation has not changed since. Investment 
in power facilities are backed by supplies of electrical and power-generating 
equipment, the majority of which is also produced in Russia.
Clearly, integration between the EDB member states is gathering pace.
IMpLEMENtED SYStEM EffECtS
Electricity exchanges do have an effect on the integrated national power systems 
of the EDB member states. These effects illustrate, to a certain extent, the level 
of integration of their power systems. At present, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan are contributing to the evolution of power system’s integration 
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while Armenia and Tajikistan (following its isolation from the Central Asian IPS 
in late 2009) operate independently of the integrated system.
Armenia works in tandem with the Iranian power system to cover seasonal high 
demand (NARUC, 2011). Armenia’s peak season is in the winter while Iran’s 
in the summer. The countries exchange seasonal flows of electricity by loading 
their plants during low-demand periods and assisting each other in covering 
peak loads.
Belarus is reducing expenditure on the fuel necessary to generate electricity 
by increasing its imports from Russia. This helps minimise electricity prices for 
Belarusian consumers, thus, achieving a regime effect (Volkova et al., 2011a). 
Russia generates an economic effect through its electricity exports.
Cooperation between Russia and Belarus will have a more substantial regime 
effect in the future. With the commissioning of the Belarusian NPP, a base load 
power plant, Belarus will face a greater challenge of covering the variations 
in demand through the day. At night Belarus will need to transmit surplus 
electricity to neighbouring countries, including Russia, which should help to 
reduce cycle capacity problems (Volkova et al., 2011a).
Central Asian countries and Russia (partly through Kazakhstan’s grids) used 
Kyrgyz and, until 2009, Tajik hydropower resources (KOREM, 2011). This 
helped improve the operating rates at several power plants in these countries 
and reduced generating costs generally. Consumer prices for electricity were 
lowered to a minimum level to achieve a regime effect, which, due to political 
tensions between the Central Asian states, was not fully implemented and is 
currently not realised in practice.
In recent years Tajikistan has not had an opportunity to supply its seasonal 
surpluses of electricity to the Central Asian IPS, but did attempt to supply to 
Afghanistan, thereby achieving regime effects outside the post-Soviet space 
(Ministry of Energy and Industry, 2011a).
Electricity exchanges between the Siberian IPS and the Urals IPS via KEGOC’s 
(Kazakhstan) grids have usually been carried out from Siberia to the Urals 
(European part of Russia) during evening-time peak hours and from the Urals to 
Siberia during night off-peak hours in the European part of Russia. This helped 
to implement a regime effect of regulating daily demand in the European part of 
Russia through the exchange of electricity between these two regions also using 
Kazakhstan’s northern grids.
The cooperation between the national power systems of the EDB member states 
has helped to improve the reliability of power supplies to consumers (e.g., using 
Kazakhstan’s northern electrical grids to transmit electricity from the European 
part of Russia and the Urals to the Siberian IPS to cover its shortages caused by 
the Sayano-Shushensk HPP accident in 2009) (Volkova et al., 2011a).
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In 2008, in order to mitigate power shortages resulting from an accident at 
Belarus’ Lukoml GRES, the lacking amount of electricity was supplied by Russia, 
Lithuania and Latvia (Lenta.ru, 2008) via the power plants in the north-western 
IPS and the Baltic States that were loaded following the instructions of the 
System Operator of the Unified Energy System (UES System Operator, 2008).
The power systems of the EDB member states cover four time zones and 
daily peak hours in different systems do not coincide. It is expected that, 
given socioeconomic development, the winter peak loads in Kyrgyzstan and 
South Kazakhstan will be replaced by summer peak demand (Belyayev et al., 
2008). There will be a similar effect in Tajikistan. The unification of systems 
with winter and summer peak loads will have significant integration effects, 
saving generating capacity and lowering the cost of construction and operation 
of generating facilities. Given the daily differences in peak demand and the 
variation in generating capacities between the national power systems, closer 
cooperation between Central Asian EDB member states, primarily with Russia, 
where peak demand is in winter, is expected to produce the greatest capacity-
saving and regime integration effects for all countries.
INtERStAtE INItIAtIVES oN EStABLISHING A CoMMoN CIS 
ELECtRICItY MARKEt 
The power systems of the CIS countries emerged after the collapse of the 
USSR when the Soviet power complex was divided between them. Integration 
processes in the CIS power sectors began on February 14, 1992 when the 
Agreement on the Coordination of Interstate Relations in the Field of Electric 
Power in the CIS (CIS, 1992) was signed by the Heads of States. In accordance 
with the agreement, the countries formed the CIS Electric Energy Council 
(Mishuk, 2008).
To ensure the reliable operation of the power systems and to create a basis for 
mutually beneficial cooperation, the CIS Electric Energy Council approved the 
Agreement on Parallel Operation of the CIS Power Grids, which defined the 
common principles of parallel operation (Mishuk, 2008).
On November 26, 1998, the Agreement on Ensuring Parallel Operation of the 
Electric Power Systems of the CIS Member States was signed (CIS, 1998). This 
was the very first legal instrument (Mishuk, 2011) governing interaction between 
countries and enterprises regarding the parallel operation of the power grids on 
commercial terms. The agreement was signed by Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine 
(the latter with a modest proviso). Within the framework of the Agreement 
the parties reached corresponding bilateral and multilateral agreements (CIS, 
1998).
So, on November 22, 1999, Belarus and Russia signed an agreement to create 
an integrated power system (Agreement, 1999); on June 15, 2000 the parallel 
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operation of the Kazakh and Russian UES was reinstated; and in September 
2000 the power grids of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
that were parties to the Central Asian IPS together with Kazakhstan’s electricity 
system launched their first time ever parallel operation. By 2001 the Agreement 
on Ensuring Parallel Operation of the Electric Power Systems of the CIS Member 
States had made it possible to establish an integrated power system between 
the CIS member states, which subsequently enabled the power grids of the CIS 
countries (except Armenia) to work in parallel mode (Mishuk, 2011).
On January 25, 2000 twelve countries signed the Agreement on the Transit 
of Electric Power among the CIS Member States (CIS, 2000). Pursuant to the 
agreement (CIS, 1998), the Council of Heads of States approved the Concept 
for the Formation of the Common Electric Power Market of the CIS Member 
States (CIS, 2005a).
The Concept encompasses shared approaches to the common electric power 
market in the CIS. It takes into account the key principles of the unification 
and liberalisation of the European power markets as embodied in European 
Parliament and European Council directives and provides the basis for further 
regulation in this area.
The main objective of the Concept is to create a common electric power market 
in the CIS based on the power systems that work in parallel and on the principles 
of national equality, fair competition, and mutual benefit.
The Concept defines a functional structure of a future common electric power 
market based on the following relationships between participants:
• wholesale purchases and sales of electricity with independent pricing 
agreed between buyers and sellers;
• a centralised electricity market;
• a balancing market; and
• a market for system and auxiliary services, including a mechanism for using 
power reserves, regulating capacity and maintaining the energy balance.
On May 30, 2008 the EurAsEC Energy Policy Council approved the draft 
Concept, which was ratified by heads of governments on December 12, 2008.
On May 25, 2007 six CIS countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Armenia) drafted the Agreement on the Formation of the Common 
CIS Electric Power Market. However, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Georgia and Moldova refused to sign up to the new document and 
the parties made a decision to continue operations within the framework of the 
previously signed agreement. In order to establish a common electric power 
market, the member countries must undertake to maintain the energy balance 
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and ensure mutual reserves of capacity. This will improve the reliability of power 
supplies and ensure optimal use of fuel, energy and hydropower resources. 
In addition, the countries will need to provide electricity transit through their 
territories.
By creating the common electric power market, the CIS countries plan to 
gradually open up their domestic markets to each other. This will make it possible 
for suppliers or buyers of electricity in one country to access the transmission 
system, select counterparties, and enter into contracts in another country.
The 32nd CIS Electric Energy Council decided that the common electric power 
market would be formed in three stages.
The first stage will create trade in electricity between the CIS member states 
using international transmission lines and transit via the power systems of third 
countries. It will increase the number of participants on national markets; boost 
the development of a day-ahead market; and ensure free electricity pricing on 
national markets.
The second stage involves the emergence of competing national power 
markets in CIS countries, liberalisation of electricity exports and imports, and 
coordination of national grids and commercial operators.
The third stage implies the full launch of the common electric power market, 
based on uniform rules for all participants.
On November 22, 2007 twelve countries, including Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, signed the Agreement on 
Harmonisation of Customs Procedures for the Transmission of Electric Power 
across the Customs Borders of the CIS Member States (CIS, 2007a). This 
agreement aims to harmonise and simplify customs procedures for transmitting 
electricity between national power grids. The standard procedure for power 
transfer is specified in a customs declaration once the base period expires and 
there are special rules for the customs clearance and control of power flows 
through borders.
The approval in 2008 of the CIS Economic Development Strategy for a period to 
2020 became an important milestone in the coordination of the power sectors 
of the CIS member countries.
On November 20, 2009 the CIS member states signed an agreement on 
cooperation in operating interstate power transmission lines, which set forth the 
requirements for reliable and efficient grid operation to coordinate electricity 
transit.
The agreements signed have defined the prospects for electricity cooperation 
between the CIS countries, including:
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• the sustainable and predictable development of international trade in 
electricity for a relatively long term; and
• economic efficiency for all participants.
Each country’s energy policy is largely shaped by an energy strategy which 
prioritises long-term international cooperation. This shared priority recognises 
the desire to ensure the most efficient use of the energy potential of each 
country so that they can be integrated into the global power market and 
consolidate its position, and derive the greatest possible benefit for the national 
economy.
Achieving the strategic objectives of CIS member states depends on the 
following:
• the countries’ national interests should be taken into account in shaping the 
common electric power market to ensure predictable development of their 
electrical grids;
• the common electric power market should reliably meet demand and 
ensure, inter alia, the reasonable pricing of exports;
• mutual penetration of national power markets by electricity companies 
should be guaranteed; and
• effective international cooperation should be developed in the sector.
The development of the CIS power sector can be efficiently coordinated only 
by harmonising the main objectives of the long-term energy policies by the CIS 
member states (Shmatko, 2009).
On March 18-19, 2010 the Coordination Council for the Implementation of the 
Strategy of the CIS Member States for Interaction and Cooperation in the Field of 
Electric Energy approved new organisational, legal, technological and economic 
principles of the parallel operation of the CIS power grids. Moreover, in 2010 
the CIS Electric Energy Council adopted a master plan for the establishment 
of the common electric power market of the CIS member states (Mishuk, 
2011).
At present, eleven out of twelve CIS power grids operate in parallel mode with 
the Baltic States. Efforts are being made to prepare the CIS and Baltic States’ IPS 
to operate in parallel with the Trans-European Synchronously Interconnected 
Electric Power System (TESIS).
To date, the CIS has adopted over twenty basic interstate agreements and 
regulations governing joint interstate initiatives formulated by the CIS Electric 
Energy Council with regard to the following:
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• electricity transit;
• mutual assistance in case of accidents or other emergencies at power 
facilities;
• energy efficiency and conservation;
• creation and efficient use of reserve resources;
• formation of the common electric power market;
• setting of a common time for reading electricity meters on interstate power 
transmission lines; and
• harmonisation of customs procedures for the cross-border transmission 
of electricity and operation of interstate power transmission lines within 
national grids.
BARRIERS to CREAtING tHE CoMMoN ELECtRIC poWER MARKEt
Many agreements on parallel operation of the power systems of different 
countries were signed, including the October 2011 agreement on the CIS free 
trade area which concerns, among other things, the power sector. However, 
such initiatives have faced difficulties in recent years (Vinokurov, 2008), which 
prevent them achieving their goal quickly.
One of the challenges is historical: the power sectors of these countries vary 
in their level of development and structure. This is a result of the centralised 
approach to locating generating facilities and developing electricity grids under 
the Soviet common power system. Power stations were built to facilitate the 
centralised supply of power to large areas, regardless of the administrative 
borders between the Soviet republics. Generating capacity was determined 
according to the demand in each of these areas. Transmission lines were 
designed and built to distribute the electricity produced by these power plants 
to different power centres, also regardless of borders. After the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, many transmission lines became trans-border lines. Instead 
of system-forming role, they are used to export and import electricity at agreed 
prices.
There is still a need to coordinate the development of generating facilities and 
electrical grids in certain CIS countries. Although historical differences in their 
available energy resources was a driver for cooperation and the formation of 
trade ties between them in the power sector, it complicates the coordination of 
investment policies because of the energy security requirements which arise in 
the context of liberalisation of national economies and power sectors.
The problems associated with creating a common CIS electricity market are 
also linked to the power sector’s status as an important facet of economic 
management. The power sectors are natural monopolies, which create difficulties 
Aigul Absametova. “Integration Processes in the Electric Power 
Sectors of the EDB Member States”
ADVANCED ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
IN SECTORS AND INDUSTRIES
210 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
in short-term and long-term pricing, restrict competition, and complicate, to a 
significant extent, their balanced and efficient development. Therefore, state 
management and regulation need to be maintained to improve the efficiency and 
reliability of power supplies. Efforts to create and operate wholesale electricity 
markets in Russia and other countries (Podkovalnikov, 2011) have shown that 
assumptions regarding the market’s role as a regulator were misplaced. Many of 
these countries are now reconsidering their attitude towards liberalisation. This 
is why Russia, as expected, is continuing its market reforms, which are aimed at 
giving the power market a more efficient structure.
Difficulties also arise in creating a common market because the countries are 
employing different market models and vary in the level of liberalisation and 
reform they have achieved.
Although more than twenty years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the countries that emerged from former Soviet republics still face some 
intractable problems. These are mainly connected with their interaction in the 
use of natural energy resources and pricing, in particular the use of Caspian 
energy resources and the pricing of Russian gas and its transportation to 
European countries.
One of the problems associated with the common power market, and which is 
peculiar to Central Asia, is the need to resolve disagreements over the use of the 
power and water resources of trans-border rivers such as the Naryn and Vakhsh, 
among others. These disagreements have been caused by (a) the construction of 
cascades of HPPs in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, (b) the requirement to provide 
an optimal water use schedule to all countries located downstream of the trans-
border rivers in use, and (c) significant differences in seasonal water demand 
and energy efficiency of hydropower plants.
To overcome these disagreements, generating facilities, transmission lines 
(including interstate lines) and reservoirs need to be developed further and 
mechanisms of regional cooperation need to be created (Vinokurov et al., 
2007). The EurAsEC Integration Committee is involved in efforts to resolve this 
problem.
There are several organisational, legal and methodological challenges which 
also obstruct the creation and development of the common electric power 
market in the CIS.
Global experience (Belyayev et al., 2008), of creating common electric power 
markets shows that it is a lengthy and complex process. First, countries enter 
into bilateral agreements on parallel operation of their national power grids. 
In the CIS, such agreements were made between Russia, on the one hand, 
and Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan on the other. They govern 
relationships but do not provide a basis for free trade.
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The next stage is the signing of multilateral agreements and creation of regional 
integrated power systems. However, in order to use these as a network 
infrastructure for regional power markets, the countries that are party to these 
agreements need to enter into special agreements to provide access to the 
services of their natural monopolies in the power sector and to define pricing 
and tariff policies. In this case this becomes possible only after the formation of 
the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space of Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus. An additional requirement is the creation of a single management body 
to oversee long-term operation, a common market operator, and an agreed 
regulatory framework.
The integrated power system of the former Soviet republics actually exists, 
indeed the global power market recognises the Unified/Integrated Power 
System. However, in order to establish the common electric power market on 
the basis of this entity, a common regulatory framework needs to be created and 
approved and all the above problems resolved. This is a challenging task if the 
different economic interests of CIS countries and their different understanding 
of energy security are to be taken into account.
RECoMMENDAtIoNS foR DEEpENING INtEGRAtIoN pRoCESSES  
IN tHE REGIoN
This analysis allows certain recommendations to be drawn up as to how 
integration can be deepened and the creation of the common electric power 
market and interstate IPS be speeded up in the region, with the EDB’s role 
emphasised.
1. A comprehensive approach to integration initiatives would be effective, 
provided that such initiatives cover not only national power sectors and 
systems, but also related sectors, including production of energy resources, 
electrical engineering, electronics, and professional education.
2. Agreements between the EDB member states as parties to cooperation 
in the electrical energy sector are needed and they should be primarily 
multilateral, including as many participants as possible.
3. National standards in the electric power sector, electrical engineering and 
related sectors should be developed on the basis of a single regulatory 
framework, in particular the one used by the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO).
4. Interstate electricity trading relationships should be forged based on 
the modified principles proposed by previous agreements regarding the 
formation and organisation of the common electric power market, taking 
into account Russia’s experience of organising a competitive market.
5. The irrigation and energy disputes in Central Asia should be settled, parallel 
operation of the Central Asian IPS should be restored, and all its participants 
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should comply with dispatch requirements. The lack of understanding and 
cooperation in this area causes significant damage to energy and economic 
integration, without which further integration in Central Asia and the post-
Soviet space as a whole is impossible.
6. Efforts to jointly develop the CIS power systems should give way to 
coordinated development of national energy sectors. Mechanisms are 
needed to ensure their functions are coordinated.
7. National power sectors and the interstate grid infrastructure need to be 
upgraded and renewed to improve the reliability of electricity supplies 
to consumers and electricity exchange. This would provide a solid basis 
for deepening energy integration between the EDB member states. EDB’s 
participation as a source of necessary funding could be extended.
To foster integration in the electric power sectors of the EurAsEC member 
states and advance the creation of a common power system in the region, the 
following measures are essential:
• uniform methods for calculating electricity transit tariffs should be 
developed;
• national laws of the EurAsEC countries should be unified to support mutually 
beneficial cooperation in the power sector;
• regulations are needed to ensure electricity producers from the EurAsEC 
member states have equal access to its electricity market;
• tariff policies should be adjusted so that the majority of Central Asian power 
projects can go ahead even without the involvement of foreign investors;
• obsolete equipment in electrical grids and at power plants should be 
replaced;
• legislation is needed to make projects in the power sector more attractive 
to investors;
• the improvement of fuel and energy transportation infrastructure in the 
region should be continued;
• national power systems should apply market principles;
• key features of a unified energy policy need to be determined taking into 
account global trends and the need to ensure the best possible use of energy 
resources;
• cooperation with foreign investors should be extended in order to improve 
the efficiency of conventional and new energy sources;
• EurAsEC member states should adopt a professional development 
programme for the power sector.
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CoNCLuSIoN
Overall, during the period under review, the electric power sectors of the EDB 
member states have demonstrated stable growth in generating capacity, which 
was maintained even in the crisis year.
Fossil-fuelled TPPs dominate the structure of generating capacity and this 
remained practically unchanged during the period studied. Hydropower is the 
main generator in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Electricity generation in these 
countries varies year by year because of stochastic flow of water into the plants’ 
reservoirs.
Electricity exports and imports between the EDB member states decreased 
significantly and consistently over the period analysed.
The electric power sector is a driver of integration processes in related industries 
and sectors. Given its extensive infrastructural role for production industries and 
society it remains a leading sector in the EDB economies and the post-Soviet 
space as a whole.
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Central Asia emerged as a geopolitical space encompassing Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan after the breakdown of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. The region occupies a vast internal drainage area 
in the closed Aral and Caspian basin. This explains the peculiar behaviour of 
rivers, which are very sensitive to the impacts of economic activities and climate 
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changes. The location of the region and the landlocked position of its countries 
require the expansion of trade and other economic ties and the deepening of 
integration processes. For Central Asian countries, the interstate water use and 
economic development of each of them depend on the specifics of regional 
cooperation.
The issues of water use in the basins of transboundary rivers are similar for 
Central Asian countries and this makes it possible to develop uniform 
approaches to the joint use of hydropower resources. A host of water reservoirs 
and irrigation, collecting and drainage canals were built in the basins of 
transboundary rivers. The degree of flow control in the Syrdarya basin is 1.17, 
meaning that the volume of water reservoirs exceeds the dependable flow, and 
in the Amudarya basin this ratio is 0.78.
table 12.1.
Degree of flow 
control in the 
Amudarya and 
Syrdarya river basins
Source: Scientific and 
Information Centre 
of the Interstate 
Coordination Water 
Commission of 
Central Asia 
(SIC ICWC)
Country 
Amudarya basin Syrdarya basin
Number of 
reservoirs
Storage capacity 
(million m3)
Degree 
of flow 
control
Number of 
reservoirs
Storage capacity 
(million m3)
Degree 
of flow 
controlGross Active Gross Active
Kazakhstan - - - 21 10,075 8,867
Kyrgyzstan - - - 8 20,519 14,450
Tajikistan 12 25,287 13,970 4 4,413 2,813
Turkmenistan 19 7,960 7,006 - - -
Uzbekistan 32 15,364 11,588 26 6,352 5,511
Total 63 48,611 32,564 0.78 59 41,359 3,1641 1.17
Supporting coordinated and safe operation of reservoirs, long distance canals 
and large pump stations is fundamental to ensuring sustainable water use in 
the region. However, the situation surrounding the countries’ compliance with 
the design and operational conditions of reservoir cascades in the basins of 
transboundary rivers is rather tense. The insufficient level of integration, trade 
and other economic relationships in the region, the lack of agreements with 
respect to water and energy issues, and a drastic increase in prices of fuel and 
foodstuffs imported from neighbouring countries are the main reasons why 
Central Asian countries expand their use of water resources for energy and 
irrigation purposes.
However, the construction of new hydropower reservoirs, flow control 
structures, long-distance canals and irrigation systems often violates the 
principles and environmental limits for the use of basins and transboundary 
flows, disregards the interrelationship of available water resources with their 
use in the short to long term and gives no importance to notifying the 
neighbouring states about building facilities on a transboundary river. Thus, 
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the change of the role of water reservoirs and other flow control structures on 
the transboundary rivers makes it difficult to find solutions to the problems of 
energy, water, food and environmental security not only for the neighbouring 
countries but for the region as a whole.
New hydropower and water facilities in the region are being built increasingly 
on a bilateral basis. As a rule, in addition to providing financing and 
coordination of operations at these facilities, a country that takes part in the 
project is provided with the right to jointly operate them upon completion for 
a specified period of time.
The Turkmen-Iranian Dostluk (Friendship) Dam on the transboundary Tejen 
River was one of the first joint projects in Central Asia. Its construction began in 
2000, on parity with Iran, and was completed in 2004. The dam had a project 
value of $168 million and includes a multipurpose reservoir (irrigation, electric 
power generation, flood control). The dam is 78 m high and its storage capacity 
is 1,250 million m3; the installed capacity of the hydropower plant (HPP) is 14 
MW (four 3.5 MW units). The reservoir supplies irrigation water to 50,000 ha of 
land (25,000 ha in each of the countries). The agreement between Turkmenistan 
and Iran on the joint use of water resources of the Tejen (Hari Rud) River and 
the Dostluk (Friendship) reservoir, with each state having a share of 410 million 
m3 of water, was signed in 2004 (www.turkmenistan.ru). In accordance with 
Article 8 of the Agreement, the Dostluk Dam and its facilities are jointly owned 
by Turkmenistan and Iran and may not be waived by any of the parties or 
transferred to legal entities, individuals or other countries.
tajikistan has significant hydropower potential ranking eighth in the world after 
China, Russia, the US, Brazil, Congo, India and Canada (527 billion kWh a 
year, including 88 billion kWh a year ready for development). The hydropower 
potential of the Vakhsh and Panj Rivers accounts for 48% and 23.2% 
respectively, or 71.2% of Tajikistan’s total hydropower resources. The bulk of 
the country’s hydropower potential (93%) is concentrated in the basins of the 
Kofarnihon, Zeravshan, Bartang and Gunt Rivers, which account for 21.76% of 
Tajikistan’s total hydropower resources. The state authorities plan to construct 
new HPPs in this area.
The development of Tajikistan’s hydropower resources was linked primarily to 
the Vakhsh River, where in the 1950s the authorities commenced the construction 
of a cascade of hydropower plants (HPPs), including the Rogun, Nurek, Baipaza, 
Sangtuda-1, Sangtuda-2, and the Vakhsh Golovnaya, Perepadnaya and Central 
power plants.
The construction of the largest 3,000 MW Nurek HPP with nine units and a 
total annual generation of 11.4 billion kWh began in 1961 and was finally 
completed in 1979. The dam is 300 m high and the reservoir has a surface area 
of 98 km2. The gross and active storage capacity of the reservoir is 10.5 km3 and 
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4.5 km3 respectively. The Nurek HPP with its reservoir is a backbone facility 
in the Vakhsh Cascade and the Tajik power system as a whole, and plays a key 
role in the interstate regulation of the use of the Amudarya water resources.
All Tajikistan’s large hydropower facilities were built during the Soviet era and 
the development of hydropower in the country has frozen since the breakdown 
of the USSR. Given the obsolete and worn-out equipment and grid infrastructure 
and decreased financing of their overhaul and upgrade, electricity generation 
has reduced with technical losses exceeding 2-2.7 billion kWh a year. These 
factors, coupled with unstable parallel operation with the electric power grids 
of the region, can cause shortages in electricity supplies, particularly in winter. 
With an increase in population, these shortages will become more acute and it is 
planned to commission new generating facilities to meet the growing demand.
Tajikistan’s hydropower system began to revive in 2004 when agreements 
were signed between Russia and Tajikistan and between Iran and Tajikistan to 
construct Sangtuda-1 and Sangtuda-2 HPPs.
The design of Sangtuda-1 and the construction of preparatory facilities (the 
road and the transmission line, among others) took place simultaneously. Due 
to collapse of the Soviet Union, construction was halted (about 13% of work 
had been completed at the time). In October 2004, the governments of Russia 
and Tajikistan signed an agreement on the procedure and terms of Russia’s 
participation in the construction of Sangtuda-1 and the project was restarted. 
In February 2005, the parties have set up a joint stock company Sangtuda-1 
HPP with Russia holding an 84.03% stake in the company’s charter capital and 
Tajikistan 15.97%. Investments by Russia and its energy companies, primarily 
INTER RAO UES, exceeded 16 billion roubles. The plant was commissioned on 
July 31, 2009.
Sangtuda-1 HPP is the largest investment project and the first hydropower 
facility in joint use and operation to have been implemented by Russia in the 
CIS. This form of cooperation in the hydropower sector is of significant interest 
and this experience can be used in the construction of other hydropower and 
water facilities by two or more countries. In this regard, it seems appropriate to 
discuss the construction and operation of Sangtuda-1 HPP in more detail.
The power plant is located on the Vakhsh River in Danghara District, Khatlon 
Province, 110 km south of Dushanbe. The fifth plant in the Vakhsh Cascade, 
Sangtuda-1 HPP is one of Tajikistan’s largest hydropower plants, along with 
Nurek (3,000 MW) and Baipaza (600 MW). The plant’s installed capacity 
makes up 670 MW (four 167.5 MW units with a service life of 25-40 years 
without reconstruction). It generates 2.733 TWh a year on average, including 
1.64 TWh in the summer period (April-September) and 1.1 TWh in the winter 
period (October-March). The gross and active storage capacity of the reservoir 
is 258 million m3 and 12 million m3 respectively. Its surface area is 9.75 km2, 
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the flood-control storage elevation is 571.5 m, and the dead-storage elevation 
is 569.9 m. The rock-fill dam with clay core is 75 m high and 517 m long.
Improving the use of the economic potential of Tajikistan’s hydropower 
resources by 3%, Sangtuda-1 HPP accounts for about 15% of overall electricity 
generation in the country and reduces its seasonal shortages by 30%, thereby 
increasing opportunities for electricity exports in the summer period. The 
plant was designed by the “Hydroproject Institute” named after S.Y. Zhuk and 
constructed by Russian and Tajik companies.
The main area of activity of the plant’s operator, the Sangtuda-1 HPP company, 
is the generation of electricity. The structure and authority of its managing 
bodies are determined by the Tajik Law “On Joint Stock Companies” and the 
company’s charter. The company’s supreme managing body is the general 
meeting of shareholders. The procedure for preparing and holding general 
meetings is set forth by a respective resolution. The overall management of the 
company, except the issues included in the authority of the general meeting of 
shareholders, is vested with the board of directors. The sole executive body, 
which manages its day-to-day activities, is the general director. The audit 
committee exercises the internal control of financial and economic activities.
The price of electricity is set in accordance with the Agreement between the 
Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on 
Cooperation in Operating Sangtuda-1 HPP dated July 30, 2009. In particular, 
Article 2 of the agreement states that from August 1, 2009 the Tajik party 
guarantees the purchase of electricity generated by Sangtuda-1 HPP for its 
domestic market at a price of $0.0169 per kWh excluding VAT, for a period of 
20 years. From January 1, 2010, the price for the domestic market shall increase 
figure 12.1.
Sangtuda-1 Hpp
Source: INTER RAO 
UES’ archives
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annually by at least 4% of the price in the previous year. In accordance with 
Article 3 of the agreement, in case the Tajik laws are amended so that the 
payback period for investments in the construction of Sangtuda-1 HPP exceeds 
twenty years, the Tajik party will buy electricity produced by the plant at an 
increased price, which is to be agreed between the company and the Tajik party 
and which would make it possible to have the investment paid back within 
twenty years of commissioning.
Electricity produced by the plant is transmitted, distributed and sold to end 
consumers (the population and enterprises) by Barki Tojik. Prices differ by 
categories of consumers. From January 1, 2010, the price of 1 kWh of electricity 
is $0.0206 for the population, $0.0487 for industrial and non-industrial 
consumers, and $0.0195 for budget-funded organisations and the utilities 
sector.
Sangtuda-2 HPP is also a joint hydropower facility. In accordance with the 
Tajik-Iranian agreement on the construction of Sangtuda-2 HPP on the Vakhsh 
River (June 2005), Iran invested $180 million and Tajikistan $40 million. Iran 
will receive revenues from Sangtuda-2 HPP for 12.5 years from the date of the 
plant’s commissioning. After that the ownership of the plant will be transferred 
to Tajikistan. The contractor for the project was Iran’s Farob. Construction began 
in early 2006 and was completed in late 2011. The plant’s installed capacity 
is 220 MW and generation capacity 1 billion kWh a year. It is the lowest plant 
in the Sangtuda power system and operates in parallel with Sangtuda-1 HPP 
on water released from the Nurek reservoir. The joint operation of the plants 
makes it possible to control the flow on a daily basis and to cover heavy winter 
loads.
The cooperation between Tajikistan and Iran in the sphere of hydropower is 
being expanded. Iran intends to take part in the construction of the 130 MW 
Aini HPP and is considering investing in the construction of Nurabad-1 and 
Nurabad-2 HPPs with a capacity of 350 MW each. The Aini, Nurabad-1 and 
Nurabad-2 HPPs will form a cascade on the Zeravshan River. China expressed 
readiness to construct Nurabad-1 HPP, but in 2009 abandoned its plans due 
to Uzbekistan’s official position – Uzbekistan opposes the construction of 
hydropower plants on transboundary rivers because they could have a negative 
effect on the conditions of the country’s water use (Troitsky, 2010).
The Rogun HPP, which is currently under construction, has the potential to 
become another largest hydropower facility not only for Tajikistan, but also 
for the region as a whole. The plant was designed by the Sredahydroproject 
Institute (Tashkent) and approved by the State Construction Committee of 
the USSR in 1974. The plant’s facilities include a rock-fill dam, construction 
and operational tunnels, and an underground building for the power plant, 
which includes the turbine and transformer halls. If finished, it would be the 
world’s tallest dam with a height of 335 m. The plant had a design capacity of 
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3,600 MW and an average generation of 13.1 billion kWh a year. Six 
600 MW radial-flow hydropower units are to be installed in the plant. The dam 
is designed to form a reservoir with a gross storage capacity of 13.3 km3 and 
an active capacity of 10.3 km3 to be used for the purposes of power generation, 
irrigation and flow management over many years.
Preparation for construction began in 1976 and the construction of the dam 
(its upstream cofferdam) started in 1987. The Vakhsh River was dammed on 
December 27, 1987. By 1993, the level of the upstream cofferdam had reached 
40 m, 21 km of tunnels had been built and the turbine and transformer rooms 
had been excavated to 70% and 80% respectively.
The HPP construction was suspended after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and was resumed only in 2004 after Tajikistan and RUSAL (Russia) signed an 
agreement to continue construction. The “Hydroproject Institute” (Moscow) 
prepared a feasibility study and the Tajik party undertook some operations 
at site. However, the parties did not reach an agreement on the type and 
characteristics of the dam and the agreement was terminated unilaterally in 
2007. Since then, Tajikistan has been constructing the Rogun HPP on its own. 
The damming of the Vakhsh River was planned for December 2009 but was 
postponed for technical and political reasons. In December 2010, operations 
were completed on the first construction tunnel. In 2010, Tajikistan and the 
World Bank formed an agreement to conduct international assessment studies 
for the Rogun HPP and in February 2011 Switzerland’s Poyry Energy Ltd. was 
selected to do this work.
The plant is scheduled to be built in several stages. The first-phase facilities 
are expected to have a capacity of 400 MW and an average generation of 5 
billion kWh a year. The total construction cost is estimated at $2.2 billion and 
the cost of the first phase at $590 million. The first phase of construction (two 
hydropower units with an aggregate capacity of 400 MW) is expected to be 
completed in late 2012. Some hydropower equipment, including two RO310-
V-483.5 turbines made by Kharkov’s Turboatom, was supplied in the early 
1990s.
In accordance with the Blueprint for the Development of the Fuel and Energy 
Sector in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2003-2015, the main objective in this 
area is to ensure a balanced use of fuel, energy and water resources and stable 
in-country energy and fuel supplies. It is planned to develop the fuel and energy 
sector in stages. Its priorities in 2003-2015, which are aimed at ensuring the 
country’s energy security, include the construction and commissioning of a 
number of small hydropower plants. To this end, the state-owned Centre for the 
Management of Projects in the Electric Power Sector was set up to coordinate 
projects irrespective of the sources of finance and the Long-term Programme 
for the Construction of Small Hydropower Plants for 2007-2020 was approved. 
This programme was reviewed in view of new challenges and the Long-term 
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Programme for the Construction of Small Hydropower Plants for 2009-2020 
was prepared on its basis.
The Programme includes three stages:
• a short-term stage (2009-2011): 66 plants with a total installed capacity of 
43.53 MW and an estimated cost of $51.593 million;
• a medium-term stage (2012-2015): 70 plants with a total installed capacity 
of 32.85 MW and an estimated cost of $39.38 million; and
• a long-term stage (2016-2020): 53 plants with a total installed capacity of 
26.801 MW and an estimated cost of $32.161 million.
The Programme is expected to be financed by local and foreign investors. 
Industrial enterprises are provided with certain preferences if they build their 
own small hydropower plants. Electricity produced by these plants will be 
cheaper than that purchased from the power system. The price of electricity 
produced by a small power plant, which is owned by an enterprise, will not 
exceed its prime cost. The experience of constructing small plants in Tajikistan 
has shown that the cost of construction does not exceed $1,100-$1,200 
per kW.
The investment needed for all three stages of the programme exceeds $123 
million and is being sought from international financial institutions. The Islamic 
Development Bank (IsDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), UNDP, and Iran are financing the construction of 23 
small hydropower plants in Tajikistan.
Kyrgyzstan has also developed and is implementing a programme to 
construct new large and small hydropower plants, which lists Kambarata-1 and 
Kambarata-2 HPPs as priorities.
The prospective trade in electricity envisioned by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
targets primarily South Asian countries. In 2006 the CASAREM (Central 
Asia/South Asia Regional Electricity Market) programme was launched with 
assistance from the ADB to develop the sub-regional electricity market. The 
CASA-1000 (Central Asia/South Asia) project was launched in the framework of 
the programme, providing for the export to South Asia of electricity produced 
in summer by Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s active hydropower plants. CASA-
1000 creates a system to transmit electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
to Afghanistan and Pakistan, which will make it possible to export up to 
1,000 MW during the first phase with subsequent increase in supplies. The 
participants in the CASA-1000 project and the CASAREM programme are 
Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Tajikistan. The total expenditures, 
including contingencies and interest for the period of construction, reach $953 
million. They include the improvement of domestic transmission grids for the 
CASA project and preliminary environmental and social costs.
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Each country is expected to provide financing for the facilities that are located 
in its territory and involved in the project. Thus, Afghanistan will provide $309 
million, Kyrgyzstan $196 million, Pakistan $197 million and Tajikistan $251 
million. 
CASA-1000’s main objective is to build transmission line interconnections. The 
proposed facilities include a 477 km 500 kV Datka-Khujand transmission line 
to connect the power grids of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; a 350 km 500 kV 
Khujand-Rogun-Sangtuda line to connect Kyrgyzstan and Northern Tajikistan 
with Tajikistan’s central regions; a 750 km 500 kV Sangtuda-Kunduz-Puli 
Khumri-Kabul-Peshawar line from Tajikistan through Pakistan to Afghanistan; 
and substations in Datka, Khujand, Sangtuda, Kabul and Peshawar.
Within the framework of the CASAREM programme the 500 kV South-North 
transmission line was commissioned in Tajikistan, the 220 kV Tajikistan-
Afghanistan line is currently under construction and a 500 kV Datka-Kemin-
Almaty line is being planned to link Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
The regional project to construct the 220 kV Sangtuda-Puli Khumri transmission 
line interconnection (Tajikistan-Afghanistan) includes the construction of a 
118 km Tajik section from Sangtuda-1 HPP to the state border and a 156 km 
Afghan section. Construction has been completed in Tajikistan and is on-going 
in Afghanistan.
The 410 km 500 kV Datka-Kemin transmission line is scheduled for completion 
in 2012-2013. Kazakhstan plans to build a 500 kV Almaty-Kemin line 
(Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan).
uzbekistan also plans to build a number of small and medium hydropower 
plants with an overall capacity of 937.6 MW in the medium term in order to 
increase the share of hydropower resources in its fuel and energy balance.
The Uzbek Ministry of Agriculture and Water Management is implementing 
a programme to build hydropower plants at the existing water reservoirs. The 
Akhangara HPP (42 MW) was commissioned in Tashkent Province, the Gissarak 
HPP (45 MW) in Qashqadarya Province, the Shakhimardan HPP (2.2 MW) on 
the Koksu River in Ferghana Province, and the Gulba HPP (6 MW) in Samarkand 
Province. When the second phase of the Tupolang HPP construction on the 
Surxondaryo River is completed, its total capacity will reach 175 MW. The 
aggregate capacity of hydropower plants controlled by the ministry exceeds 
439 MW.
Four new plants are scheduled to be commissioned in Tashkent Province before 
2015: the Lower Chatkal HPP on the Chatkal River (with a capacity of 100 MW 
and a cost of $105.5 million), the Akbulak HPP on the Akbulak River (60 MW 
and $62.8 million), the Kamchik HPP on the Akhangaran River (30 MW and 
$34.5 million), and the Irgailik-Sai HPP on the Ugam River (13.6 MW and $25 
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million). It is also planned to construct the Pskem HPP and the Mullalak HPP 
on the Pskem River with a capacity of 404 MW and 240 MW respectively. In 
Surchondarya Province, the construction of the Nilo-2 HPP (30 MW and $33.3 
million) on the Sangardakdarya River and the Zar-Chob HPP (90 MW) on the 
Tupalangdarya River is planned.
Overall, 44 investment projects for a total of $5.27 billion are planned to be 
implemented in the power sector of Uzbekistan in 2011-2015 (RU, 2011b). 
In addition, Uzbekistan is building new large water reservoirs (Kenkul-Sai, 
Zhiidali and Rezaksai). In 2008, the Chartak water reservoir was completed in 
Namangan Province. A loan from China was raised for the construction of the 
Rezaksai reservoir with the estimated cost of $46 million.
The energy sectors of Central Asian countries are connected with water 
management and, ultimately, agriculture and this should be taken into 
account in ensuring their operation. A strive for independent energy and water 
policies in Central Asia results in reduced interstate power flows in the region 
and poorer coordination of the power systems. The power systems become 
isolated in a gradual fashion, hence their worsened coordination and reduced 
efficiency of the Central Asian integrated power system, which cannot ensure 
their reliable operation. The countries’ power grids need an urgent overhaul 
and modernisation of active plants, as well as technological reconstruction of 
the existing infrastructure. The diversion of funds solely to projects that are 
expected to pay back in the long term does not foster economic growth in 
the countries concerned. In addition, the lack of synchronisation in the use of 
water reservoirs between power generation and irrigation does not promote 
energy and water security in the region, interstate cooperation, and integration 
processes.
Experts believe that this scenario will have significant negative consequences 
for all countries in the region. When the operation of hydropower plants is not 
balanced by irrigation and environmental needs, carry-over storage reservoirs 
lose their compensatory capacity during periods of draught and low water, 
hence a threat to food and energy security in the region. The supplies of 
electricity outside the region should be synchronised with the interstate water 
use. Otherwise, electricity exports to external markets, i.e., outside the closed 
water basin (region) with limited water resources, may have a negative effect 
on interstate relationships and energy, water, food and environmental security 
in Central Asia.
Mark Lvovich, a known Soviet hydrologist, wrote that the efficient control of 
water resources and cooperation in this area are necessary for the resolution of 
regional water and energy problems. He said that, “[…] different water levels in 
different years affect the economy in an unfavourable manner. For this reason, 
one should not underestimate the significance of the long-term control of river 
flows, especially in Central Asia whose primary agricultural sector, irrigated 
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farming, is seriously damaged by dry periods. The key to improving the efficiency 
of the use of water resources in Central Asia is the long-term control of river 
flows with the help of a system of water reservoirs, which should be built in the 
mountains where water resources form. The existing water reservoirs and those 
under construction have significant storage capacities but it should be borne in 
mind that they operate to HPPs’ schedules and do not fully meet the needs of 
irrigated farming and water supply; moreover, their work often contradicts these 
objectives. The issue of priorities in the use of water resources is of regional 
importance. In ensuring water supplies, the quality of water is a significantly 
more acute challenge, especially downstream where considerable volumes of 
river flows consist of mineralised, irrigation return water. In the case of electricity 
generation, this area of water management at irrigation water reservoirs can be 
concurrent and rather efficient during approximately half of the time of their 
operation. However, the damage caused to hydropower generation can be 
compensated by thermal power plants or by the construction of hydropower 
plants in other regions, primarily where significant volumes of water are not 
needed for irrigation. Hydrological forecasts also play an increasingly important 
role given the need to plan the operation of carry-over storage reservoirs. 
Reliable long-term forecasts result in cubic kilometres of additional water for 
irrigated farming as they allow the allocation of the greatest possible volumes 
of water for irrigation from water reservoirs with minimal storage capacity” 
(Lvovich, Tsigelnaya, 1979: 124-135). 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan boast significant raw material 
resources (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are more limited in this regard), including 
oil, gas, gold and other minerals. All of these countries have a rather developed 
infrastructure and labour resources and each has potential to fulfil its planned 
social projects. Global prices of minerals and energy resources in particular also 
contribute to the economic development of the countries and their economic 
integration in the power sector. International practice shows that regional power 
sectors are more sustainable when power systems work in parallel. This mode 
of operation makes it possible to optimise generating capacities and improve 
the efficiency of heat generation.
Another advantage of parallel operation in the Central Asian integrated power 
system is the possibility to redistribute demand and optimise it by regional 
time zones. In the longer term, this will make it possible to ensure a wider 
use of renewable sources of energy for additional generation. The renewal 
of synchronised operation of Central Asian power grids is needed to ensure 
their economic and technological efficiency. The overall economic effect from 
renewed parallel operation in the region, compared to the isolated mode, could 
reach $1.6-$2.1 billion in the first three years. On the whole, the advantages of 
the integrated power system are far more significant than its possible drawbacks. 
The integrated power system will be of benefit to all its participants, both 
technologically and economically (WB, 2010).
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Despite all the gloomy predictions, the CIS integration associations are gaining 
strength thanks to the efforts of its members. Eight CIS countries signed the Free 
Trade Area Agreement, paving the way for more advanced forms of integration 
based on CIS foundations. Moreover, the CIS countries are negotiating 
agreements on regulating mutual access to national currency markets for the 
CIS resident banks and on key principles of currency regulation and control 
in the CIS member states. Observers have commented on Ukraine’s increased 
participation in the CIS integration processes in 2011. Regional cooperation in 
transport is progressing, and all eleven CIS countries have introduced unified 
technical standards, rules for exchanging rail cars, and a common tariff policy.
On July 1, 2011 the Customs Union became fully operational and customs 
controls were duly transferred from the borders between participating countries 
to the CU’s external border. Since July, there has been a significant reduction in 
the number of preferential duty rates for certain goods applicable in Kazakhstan. 
These preferential arrangements had been implemented to protect Kazakhstan’s 
markets from competing goods, and therefore their existence had hindered the 
full-scale launch of the CU. Discussions are now under way on unifying passport 
and visa controls in the CU member states. The CU Commission has approved 
a draft agreement on transporting goods by pipelines and power lines across 
13
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the customs border. The ratios for redistributing import duties between the CU 
states may be adjusted in favour of Belarus and Kazakhstan. Problems with 
VAT calculations (because the rates of this tax differ), the absence of unified 
technical regulations and different customs requirements specified in CU 
member-state legislation, are all added burdens for entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
concerns have been raised over the rate at which Russian businesses are moving 
into Kazakhstan to take advantage of lower taxes.
In April 2011 the government of Kyrgyzstan approved the country’s accession 
to the CU and the Single Economic Space of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. 
Tajikistan also intends to join the CU. Discussions are continuing in Ukraine 
about the potential benefits for the country of joining the CU.
The Single Economic Space has become an economic reality. The Presidents of 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed the Declaration on Eurasian Economic 
Integration, the Agreement establishing the Eurasian Economic Commission 
(EEC, the Customs Union’s supreme body) and its procedural rules, and the 
Agreement on the Single Economic Space. Thanks to this preparatory work in 
2011, on January 1, 2012, the SES between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus 
will start functioning, replacing the CU. The systematisation of its legal 
framework is now a priority, with the codification of documents being the 
first step towards this goal. To date, there are 104 documents, which together 
constitute the unified regulations of the CU and the SES; some of these were 
signed in the mid-1990s. The parties have decided to amalgamate them into 
a single document similar to the Treaty of Rome. Should Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan succeed in harmonising their legislation by 2015, the countries 
will unite in the Eurasian Economic Union.
Russia’s accession to the WTO has been a matter of extreme importance, not 
only in the last year. Russia now faces a large-scale revision of its protectionist 
foreign trade practices and a struggle against barriers to Russian exports. In 
addition, around one-third of the tariff rates introduced under the Russian 
Federation’s WTO commitments are higher than those applied within the CU, 
so Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus will have to decide what rates should be 
applied.
Last year Belarus faced the official devaluation of its national currency. The one-
off devaluation of the Belarusian rouble on May 24, 2011 reduced the value of 
the currency by 53%, or by over 70% compared to its quoted value in January 
2011. The sharp devaluation of the currency led to an economic recession in 
the country, accompanied by, inter alia, a temporary suspension of electricity 
supplies to Belarus from Russia and Ukraine. A loan agreement with the EurAsEC 
Anti-Crisis Fund (ACF) has mitigated tension in the Belarusian foreign exchange 
market. In mid-June, the Eurasian Development Bank transferred to Belarus 
the first $800 million tranche of the $3 billion loan from the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis 
Fund.
231Eurasian Development Bank
Natalia Maqsimchook. “Chronicle of Eurasian 
Regional Integration 2011” 2011: DATA AND REVIEWS
There was also some integration in the oil and gas sector in 2011. Kazakhstan’s 
KazMunayGas National Oil Company (KMG) expressed an interest in joint 
projects in Russia with OJSC Gazprom Neft. Ukraine’s Naftogaz discussed 
possible joint ventures with TNK-BP and LUKOIL on the Black and Azov Sea 
shelves.
Nevertheless, 2011 did not see an end to conflict over the terms of Russian 
energy supplies. The latest in a series of interruptions in Russian oil supplies to 
Belarus took place in early 2011 and was only resolved by the signing of new 
contracts with Russian oil companies.
Despite the early success of integration in the context of the CU, bilateral 
relations between some of the former Soviet countries deteriorated 
considerably during the year, most notably affecting relations between Russia 
and Ukraine. Last year saw the signing of a landmark agreement between 
Moscow and Kyiv, but in the middle of 2011 the President of Ukraine, Viktor 
Yanukovych, asked for Russian gas prices to be revised, effectively bringing Kyiv 
into open conflict with Moscow. The dispute is yet to be resolved: Gazprom 
says it has no intention of lowering its prices, while Kyiv is refusing to negotiate 
on Ukraine entering the CU and placing its gas transportation system under 
Russian control. Because of the price advantage of imported oil products over 
the output from Ukraine’s own refineries, Russia’s LUKOIL and TNK-BP have 
idled their refining capacity in Ukraine. Russia has also faced problems in trying 
to develop cooperation in nuclear energy with Belarus and Ukraine.
Integration initiatives in other sectors included the establishment of a joint 
venture between Russia and Kazakhstan in grain transportation and Russia’s 
entry into Kazakhstan’s terminal operations and freight-handling market, which 
may eventually lead to a unified freight railway infrastructure. Kazakhstan and 
Russia’s RUSAL agreed to create a joint venture to manufacture railcars, while 
another joint venture plans to produce UAZ automobiles in the Kazakh city of 
Kostanay. Kazakhstan and Russia ratified an agreement to build a third power 
unit at the Ekibastuz GRES-2, the other two units of which currently account for 
12% of all electricity generated in Kazakhstan. As for the financial and banking 
sector, VTB Kazakhstan, a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned VTB Bank, became 
a member of Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE) currency market, paving way 
for further financial integration.
The year ended with the adoption of measures to facilitate the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation’s (CSTO) transition to a fully-fledged military and political 
bloc, whose members must take each other’s, as well as their own, interests 
into account. From now on, no foreign military facilities can be deployed in any 
of the CSTO countries without the sanction of all CSTO member states. These 
changes have also affected the function of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force 
(CRRF), which may now be deployed to protect the constitution in any of the 
CSTO member states.
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Ukraine has participated actively in military and political cooperation. The 
Russian Defence Ministry announced plans to purchase Russian-Ukrainian 
AN-70 aircraft, Ukraine stated its intention to join in with Russian-Belarusian 
Union Shield-2011 large-scale drills, and Russia and Ukraine negotiated the 
controversial issue of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Crimea.
REGIoNAL oRGANISAtIoNS
CIS
CIS Economic Court to settle Customs union disputes
January 18, 2011
Disputes within the Customs Union of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan are to be 
settled by the Economic Court of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The 
protocol amending the agreement between the CIS and the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC), which transfers the functions of the EurAsEC Court to 
the CIS Economic Court, was signed in Moscow on January 17, 2011.
Under this agreement, the Court will oversee compliance of CU documents with 
the international agreements governing the CU, and will interpret international 
agreements and official Customs Union documents. The CIS Economic Court 
will settle disputes between the Customs Union Commission and its member 
states.
The agreement also states that other disputes, which must be resolved according 
to international agreements applicable to EurAsEC and the CU, will also come 
into the remit of the CIS Economic Court.
The document was signed by the Chairman of the CIS Economic Court Fayzullo 
Abdullayev and EurAsEC Secretary General Tair Mansurov.
CIS Executive Committee Press Service, 
IA Novosti-Kazakhstan
CIS Economic Council Approves free trade Area Draft Agreement
April 15, 2011
The CIS Economic Council approved a draft Agreement on a Free Trade Area 
that would bring the goal of liberalised trade a step closer for most of the 
former Soviet republics. CIS heads of government are meeting to discuss the 
document in May 2011 in Minsk. 
The Free Trade Area Agreement is due to replace the current system that exists 
between CIS member states and is expected to decrease the number of goods 
that are subject to import duties.
2011: DATA AND REVIEWS
233Eurasian Development Bank
Note:
May 19, 2011
The CIS Heads of Governments Council requested a revision of the draft 
Free Trade Area Agreement because a number of its provisions needed to be 
harmonised.
The Free Trade Area Agreement was originally drafted by the Ministry of Economic Development of Russian 
Federation in 2008. The CIS member states’ amendments to the agreement were drafted by the special working 
group and completed by February 2011. The Economic Commission of the CIS Economic Council approved 
the amended draft of the agreement in March.
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Konstantin Gryshchenko, stated in April that Ukraine had been active in improving 
the document and would sign the agreement on the CIS Free Trade Area in the near future. 
RIA Novosti
Marchenko: creation of CIS supranational currency is possible  
within 8-10 years
October 18, 2011 
The chairman of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Grigory 
Marchenko, believes that it may be possible to establish a single supranational 
currency in the CIS within the next 8-10 years, if there is concerted action on 
this from all countries in the region.
Marchenko believes that the world should have multiple reserve currencies, 
but that it will take time for the predominance of the dollar as the currency 
of choice for international transactions to wane. For the rouble to attain the 
status of reserve currency, Russian companies should use the Russian rouble for 
their own settlements. Marchenko said one of the impediments in positioning 
the rouble as a reserve currency was Gazprom’s reluctance to accept rouble 
payments from Moldova and Ukraine for 15 years. Marchenko noted the 
situation had changed, but not sufficiently.
The creation of a supranational currency within the Single Economic Space 
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus) is still in the planning phase. According to 
Marchenko, following the EU example was the best way forward; participants 
should agree on the macroeconomic parameters that should be observed, 
without exception, and harmonise fiscal policy, as had been achieved in 
Europe.
The lack of a unified fiscal policy was reflected in the volatility of the rouble 
against the dollar in recent years, with fluctuations of up to 20% in Russia and 
2% in Kazakhstan.
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It was also necessary, he said, to learn from the EU’s mistakes, and try to do 
better. 
Finam.ru
CIS Heads of Government sign free trade Area Agreement
October 18, 2011
Eight CIS Prime Ministers signed the Free Trade Area Agreement in St. Petersburg. 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have declined for the time being. 
They will consider joining the treaty by the end of 2011. 
In 1994, the CIS countries had signed a similar free trade area agreement; 
however it was never implemented because the parties were unable to secure 
unanimous ratification due to discrepancies that have mostly been eliminated 
this time around. The agreement may reconfigure trade and economic ties in 
the post-soviet space.
According to Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, the free trade agreement 
is another step towards the successful integration of neighbouring states, which 
is essential to boosting trade and economic growth.
Putin noted that trade turnover between the CIS countries increased by around 
50% in January-June 2011, exceeding $134 billion and almost reaching the 
pre-crisis level.
The agreement will abolish export and import duties on several groups of 
commodities; however, the restrictions on free trade in gas, oil and sugar will 
remain.
In addition, the CIS heads of governments signed a further 28 documents, 
including an agreement on currency regulation and control in the CIS member 
states, and a draft plan for rail transport in the CIS to 2020.
Expert 
EurAsEC, CSto and CIS coordinate their activities to regulate migration, 
strengthen international security and improve response to emergencies
November 22, 2011
Moscow hosted a meeting of top EurAsEC, CSTO and CIS officials to improve 
how the three organisations’ Secretariats operate with regard to strengthening 
integration between the member states.
The organisations’ executive agencies discussed the implementation of migration 
policy, and the legal basis for international cooperation to regulate the migration 
process. Delegates at the meeting were briefed on the most important issues 
identified in the field of migration, and heard proposals to boost the efficiency 
of the EurAsEC, CSTO and CIS agencies working together on projects.
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In addition, participants reviewed approaches to international security and 
stability, and new challenges and threats emerging in 2012-2013. Interaction 
in the wake of natural disasters or man-made emergencies was also high on the 
agenda for discussion. 
CIS Executive Committee
EurAsEC
Customs union
Distribution of customs duties within Customs union may benefit  
Belarus and Kazakhstan
February 25, 2011
According to the head of the Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS), Andrei 
Belyaninov, the redistribution of import customs duties between the CU states 
may favour Belarus and Kazakhstan. Belyaninov drew attention to errors of 
calculation, and said “the numbers speak in favour of Belarus and Kazakhstan”. 
From a practical point of view, the receipt and redistribution of customs payments 
did not cause concern. According to Belyaninov, the adjusted coefficients have 
been defined; however the Ministry of Finance of Russia still needs to make a 
decision.
Note:
The procedure for receiving and redistributing customs duties came into effect on September 1, 2010. According 
to the trilateral agreements between the CU member states, import duties are transferred to a shared account 
and then distributed on a pro-rata basis between the CU member states with 87.97% of the total import duties 
going to Russia, 7.33% to Kazakhstan and 4.7% to Belarus.
RIA Novosti, IA Novosti-Kazakhstan
Customs union and ukraine discuss accession
March 16, 2011
Summarising the meeting of the EurAsEC Interstate Council, Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin noted that Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union or 
the Single Economic Space would “enrich the integration processes”. According 
to Putin, Ukraine’s participation in the CU would “increase the country’s 
benefits” in international negotiations.
Russia is somewhat concerned by Ukraine’s plans to establish a free trade area 
with the EU. As Putin noted, “Russia will be forced to close the customs border 
with Ukraine if the country creates a free trade area with the EU, and sensitive 
items will be delivered to the Russian market bypassing the established level of 
tariff protection”. The tariff levels set by Ukraine during negotiations with the 
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EU are less than half the existing customs tariff in Russia. Russia also plans to 
establish a free trade area with the EU in future. Ukraine has not yet announced 
any restrictions on trade with Russia it may consider if this comes to fruition.
On June 6, 2011 Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych established a special 
working group on boosting cooperation with the Customs Union of Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Within two months the working group will draft a 
strategy of interaction between the CU and Ukraine on a 3+1 basis. Ukraine 
plans to sign a free trade area agreement with the EU by the end of 2011. Russia 
invited Ukraine to join the CU, and Kyiv expressed its readiness to cooperate 
with the CU, but only on a 3+1 basis.
Kommersant-Online, Kursiv.kz
Belarus streamlines border controls with Russia
April 1, 2011
Transport checks on the Belarusian-Russian border ceased from April 1, 
allowing cars to cross the border without stopping and without the need for 
special documents. From now on transport control will be performed only 
at the external border of the Union State. More than half of the 11 transport 
checkpoints have been shut down and the five remaining points are equipped 
only with weighing systems.
Russia and Belarus have agreed that Belarusian specialists will check carriers’ 
special permits for entry into Russia, for transportation of dangerous goods and 
for heavy-duty and large vehicles, in accordance with Russian standards.
The decision to eliminate transport controls between the two countries was taken 
during a meeting of the Customs Union Commission on March 14, 2011. 
Kazakhstan and Russia have also agreed to transfer all transport checks to the 
external border of the CU by July 1, 2011.
Expert Online, top.rbc.ru
Kyrgyz Government welcomes country’s accession to Customs union
April 11, 2011
The government of Kyrgyzstan decided to launch the process of accession to the 
CU and the SES of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. On April 11, the government 
set up a commission to negotiate the accession process taking into account 
Kyrgyzstan’s sensitive products and economic sectors. Meeting delegates 
noted that integration with countries of the Eurasian Economic Community was 
a priority for Kyrgyzstan. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia reportedly account 
for 44.9% of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign trade. The Kyrgyz government is to file a 
membership application with the EurAsEC Interstate Council.
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October 17, 2011 
According to the acting Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan, Omurbek Babanov, his 
country would not be ready to join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan by early 2012. The government filed a membership application and 
established a working group to discuss the details of Kyrgyzstan’s accession 
with “the working group that should have been established for this purpose by 
the CU”, Babanov said. The working groups have many issues to discuss as a 
priority, including any grace period granted to Kyrgyzstan’s certain economic 
sectors as it enters the CU.
November 23, 2011
The Executive Secretary of the Customs Union Commission, Sergei Glazyev, 
noted that all the necessary technical work on the Kyrgyzstan’s accession 
to the CU could be completed within the next year. According to Glazyev, 
the legal systems of Kyrgyzstan and the CU were similar enough to ensure 
the process would not be prolonged. Technical equipment at Kyrgyzstan’s 
border checkpoints and information exchange are currently two of the major 
problems.
Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU will boost the development of the country’s 
agribusiness and energy system, which could become part of the common 
energy market, allowing for the construction of new hydropower plants and the 
development of associated industries, Glazyev said, adding that Kyrgyzstan’s 
accession to the CU would encourage growth of the republic’s economic 
potential by at least 20-25%, and boost its attractiveness to investors.
www.tsouz.ru, Expert Online 
Customs control between Customs union member states to be eliminated 
from July 1
May 20, 2011 
Kazakhstan assured Russia and Belarus that it will protect both states from goods 
being imported cheaply into Kazakhstan. Therefore, customs control between 
the three states will be abolished from July 1, 2011.
Russia’s Federal Customs Service drafted a presidential decree on the transfer 
of controls on the Russian-Belarusian and Russian-Kazakh borders to the 
external border of the CU starting July 1, and on the dissolution of 16 customs 
organisations.
Border transfer will eliminate customs controls between Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus, as foreseen in the Customs Union founding documents. Customs 
clearance within the CU was abolished in July 2010, though the countries 
agreed several temporary exclusions from the common customs territory, the 
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majority of which will be valid until 2015. Kazakhstan may lower customs 
duty rates on over 400 goods, including cars, sugar, medicines, plastics, paper, 
aluminium goods and electronics. Belarus too will pay reduced car import 
duties. However, an additional fee is applied to these goods as they cross the 
Russian border to balance the total payment to the common tariff.
Vedomosti
Customs union states unify rail tariffs
May 23, 2011
In mid May Kazakhstan’s Majilis (the Lower Chamber of Kazakhstan’s 
Parliament) ratified the agreement on regulating access to rail transport services, 
including pricing policies. The agreement had been signed by Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan in December 2010. It foresees the use of one unified tariff 
instead of three – export, import and intrastate – from January 1, 2013. The 
tariffs will be determined in accordance with the national legislation of each 
country with potential differentials based on the nature of freight, type of cars, 
distance and railcar loading level.
The essence of unification is that the parties voluntarily waive protectionist 
practices in the field of rail transport; however, each country defines its own 
unified tariff to protect national interests and reduce the tariff burden on domestic 
consignors. For instance, if a Kazakh entrepreneur plans to work with OJSC 
Russian Railways (RZD), he will be offered the same conditions that are offered 
to Russian businessmen, from provision of rolling stock to the tariff level. 
Tariff unification would reduce the cost of freight transport for many but not all 
businesses. Thus, for example, Russian mineral fertilizer producers, Silvinit and 
Uralkali, may find their transport costs increase under the unified tariff, because 
rebates for certain export routes will be abolished, affecting return journeys of 
empty railcars. According to experts, tariff unification bears potential risk for 
Kazakhstan, since the main flow of commodities is from Russia to Kazakhstan 
but not vice versa.
Nevertheless, tariff unification brings great potential benefits. Among other 
things, it will guarantee equal access to infrastructure as a step towards securing 
equal conditions for all carriers from January 1, 2015. Regulations on equal 
access to infrastructure will be drafted by January 1, 2013.
Expert Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan in the Customs union
May 23, 2011
From January 1, 2010 Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus have operated a unified 
customs policy regulated by eight international agreements, a unified customs 
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tariff and a shared list of goods subject to the same non-tariff rates. The CU 
member states turned their attention to harmonising trade regimes with CIS 
countries and special protective and antidumping measures in the CU. A 
protocol on exemptions came into force along with the Customs Code. The 
protocol retains customs clearance procedures for “transition period” goods and 
commodities that are not subject to unified terms of trade, and protective and 
antidumping measures. In particular, Kazakhstan has negotiated a preferential 
tariff for cars imported by private individuals, valid till July 1, 2010. Special terms 
for other imported items remain valid for longer. For instance, Kazakhstan’s 
sugar refineries have been granted the right to import raw cane sugar duty-free 
for 10 years, and Belarusian and Kazakh airlines are exempt from import duties 
on aircraft till July 1, 2014. The duty-free import of aircraft spare parts has no 
time limit. In addition, Kazakhstan has negotiated a preferential tariff for imports 
of medicines, medical equipment, railcars, greenhouses, and raw materials for 
the light industry, chemical, and woodworking industries until 2014.
According to Zhanar Aitzhanova, Minister of Economic Integration of 
Kazakhstan, since the introduction of the CU in 2010 Kazakhstan’s foreign 
trade has increased by 26% due to price increases for Kazakhstan’s exported oil 
and metals. The structure of exports and imports has not changed in qualitative 
terms. The CU member states, the EU and China remain Kazakhstan’s major 
trading partners.
Russian direct investment in Kazakhstan’s economy has increased by 0.5% 
since the introduction of the CU and 400 Russian enterprises are now registered 
in Kazakhstan, Aitzhanova said.
Expert Kazakhstan 
Customs union abolishes border control
July 1, 2011 
From July 1, the CU begins to operate fully with customs controls being entirely 
transferred to the external borders of the Union. Russian customs officers will 
have observer status on the Belarusian-Russian and Kazakh-Russian borders. 
Border guards will remain at the Kazakh border while migration and other types 
of legislation are harmonised. 
Control over certain types of goods imported from Kazakhstan will be retained 
on a temporary basis: from July 1 Kazakhstan introduces import duties on the 
majority of goods in line with the common customs tariff, with exemptions on 
88 items (mostly medicines and medical equipment). 
In future the CU member states will enter into shared trade regimes with 
other countries. The CU has begun negotiating free trade agreements with the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and New Zealand, and has established 
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working groups to study the feasibility of similar agreements with Syria, 
Vietnam, Mongolia and Egypt. The establishment of a Single Economic Space 
from January 1, 2012 will be the next step towards integration. It is expected 
that the Customs Union Commission will be granted more authority to enable 
it to be more effective. From January 1, 2012 the Customs Union Commission 
is invested with 90 new powers relating to tariffs, subsidies, foreign trade and 
competition policy.
RBK Daily
No work permits for migrant workers from Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
July 4, 2011
Russia’s State Duma ratified an agreement on the legal status of migrant workers 
from the CU member states, which streamlines the bureaucracy involved in 
staying and working in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Under the new 
agreement, migrant workers do not need work permits to work legally within 
the CU member states. Moreover, migrant workers from Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan and their family members have 30 days after entering the country 
to register with the competent authorities there. The length of their stay will 
depend on the duration of the work contract. Should the employment contract 
be terminated migrant workers will have 15 days to find another job. However, 
migrant workers are prohibited from working in strategically important economic 
sectors, public order and healthcare services.
These agreements represent the CU member states’ efforts to ease the movement 
of manufacturing resources, including labour.
Expert Kazakhstan
Bar code tracking introduced in grain market 
July 6, 2011 
Experts drafting technical legislation “On Safety of Grain” in the CU have 
proposed a system for monitoring grain as it moves from the field to end 
consumer. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development reports that 
a system of assigning a bar code to every grain market participant is being 
considered. Starting July 5, the Ministry began negotiations on this proposal, 
with Kazakhstan being responsible for the relevant draft technical regulations. 
The draft will be based on similar technical regulations adopted by the EurAsEC, 
with a new section on ensuring grain traceability. The added section stipulates 
that unsafe grain should be withdrawn from circulation immediately and its 
origins traced, which would be possible as long as all participants in the grain 
market (at every stage of the supply chain) have registered with their relevant 
CU authority and received from them a special identification number (bar code). 
The bar code will carry information, such as where the grain was produced, the 
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field number, crop code, the address of the transport company that moved it, 
and the grain depot or store. Individual numbers have to be assigned to every 
producer, transporter, warehouseman and individual or legal entity engaged in 
grain transactions. Together with the bar code each grain market participant will 
receive a document confirming the name and address of the participant, their 
type of activity and coordinates of the local supervisory authority. The draft 
technical regulation is scheduled to be enacted on July 1, 2012, according to 
an explanatory note.
Kommersant
Customs union member states to create special ministry
September 16, 2011
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan intend to establish a special CU ministry 
responsible for ratifying ordinary and strategic decisions and approving draft 
international agreements. Viktor Khrystenko will be appointed head of the 
ministry. The draft agreement on the Customs Union Commission will be 
reviewed during the Commission’s regular meeting on September 22-23 in 
Almaty. If the agreement is ratified, the current management structure – via 
the supervising Deputy Prime Ministers – will be superseded by a two-tier 
management structure consisting of the Commission Council (a ten-member 
strategic body) and the Commission Board, which would become a separate 
supranational government operating on a professional, rather than a national 
level.
A chairman will be appointed from among the ministers or commissioners on 
the Board. It is assumed that the Deputy Prime Ministers of Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia will become members of the Commission Council (currently 
these are Sergey Rumas in Belarus, Umirzak Shukeev in Kazakhstan and Igor 
Shuvalov in Russia). Russia will receive 57% of votes in the Council, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan – 21.5% each. The countries will take turns in presiding over 
the Council. The Commission’s decisions will become legislation, which, 
along with international agreements, will constitute the contractual and legal 
framework of the Single Economic Space. The Commission’s operations will 
be financed by contributions from the parties proportional to their number of 
votes. According to preliminary estimates, the budget may amount to $50-$60 
million. The Commission will be based in Moscow.
Vedomosti, Kursiv.kz 
Controversies over Customs union technical regulations
October 3, 2011
The CU has been functioning for almost two years since January 1, 2010. 
Borders are open and goods move freely between Kazakhstan, Russia and 
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Belarus according to unified rules. However, while a de jure customs union is 
in place, de facto there are still several issues to be resolved. The CU agreement 
on technical regulation was signed in November 2010, yet Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Belarus have not yet established unified technical regulation and control, 
and have not adopted common technical regulations.
The members speeded up their work drafting common technical regulations, 
and granted 46 drafts top-priority status for 2011. Of these 46, eight were 
drafted by Belarus, 13 by Kazakhstan and 25 by Russia. 
A unified quality mark will be introduced for goods entering the markets in 
the three member countries. During the transition period, manufacturers will 
have the right to choose from a list of goods which are subject to mandatory 
conformity evaluation confirmed by documentation recognised in all three 
countries. “Transit” certificates, or declarations of conformity that are recognised 
in all the CU member states, are already available for products that are not 
included in the list (over 200 items). The list of goods is constantly growing.
Consensus is vital for the ratification of CU technical regulations. However, 
disagreements do arise in the negotiations between the CU member states. For 
instance, Kazakhstan refused to discuss the draft technical regulations on tobacco 
products agreed by Russia and Belarus. The decision to ban the collection and 
recycling of glass containers that have contained alcohol and infant food from 
July 2012 has also led to disputes. In some instances, European norms are used 
as the benchmark, to help the parties to reach consensus. The majority of CU 
technical regulations are based on the national technical regulations of Russia 
that were harmonised with EU directives.
Expert Kazakhstan
Businessmen assess first results of Customs union
October 17, 2011
Businessmen have given their initial assessment of the effects of the Customs 
Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Research carried out jointly by RBK Daily and Kelly Services recruitment agency 
suggests that businesses are facing longer queues at the customs, excessive 
bureaucracy, and a backlog of tax legislation. According to a  survey carried out 
among Russian transport and logistics companies, 69% of respondents believe 
that the CU has simplified their dealings with Belarus and Kazakhstan, and 
54% of respondents claim that the law “On Customs Regulation” that replaced 
the Customs Code in November last year has had a positive impact on their 
operations.
Problems with VAT calculations (the difference in tax rates), the failure to 
unify technical regulations thus far and different customs requirements are 
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problems for entrepreneurs. Currently each state may establish different rules 
and regulations on such matters. Nevertheless, a complex legal system is the 
root of all problems because at present the CU legislation has not been codified 
– simultaneously there exist the Customs Code and numerous decisions by the 
Customs Union Commission. In expert opinion, the correlation between them 
is complicated.  
RBK Daily
Customs union comes under the jurisdiction of the Single  
Economic Space
October 31, 2011
The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) will replace the Customs Union 
Commission from July 1, 2012, according to a Eurasian Economic Union draft 
agreement. The EEC is modelled on the European Commission. The EEC’s 
authority will expand and its staff increase from 150 to 1,200.
According to the draft agreement, the EEC will also be responsible for negotiating 
and establishing trade partnerships with third countries; it will draft currency, 
macroeconomic, energy and competition policies; regulate state monopolies and 
industrial and agricultural subsidies; and be responsible for public procurement, 
transport, migration, financial markets and other areas.
It is assumed that the EEC decisions will be based on the votes of the Council or 
Board members (every Board or Council member has one vote). Each country 
will delegate one Deputy Prime Minister to the Council and three representatives 
to the Board.
The Prime Ministers of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus approved the draft 
agreement on the EEC on October 19, 2011. The Customs Union Commission 
declined to comment on the agreement and noted that the CU is now being 
transferred to the jurisdiction of the SES.
Expert Online
EStABLISHMENt of tHE SINGLE ECoNoMIC SpACE
International agreements on the Single Economic Space enter into force
April 7, 2011
Moscow hosted the 26th session of the Customs Union Commission. The 
Commission members discussed the common customs territory and the 
contractual and legal foundations of the Single Economic Space within the 
framework of the EurAsEC.
The Commission discussed uniform export monitoring procedure for CU 
member states and approved Customs Union Commission legislation, including 
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a revised version of the list of goods that are subject to mandatory conformity 
evaluation confirmed by documentation recognised in all three countries; 
and a draft provision on standardised checking of conformity to CU technical 
regulations.
The Commission reviewed customs administration and customs tariff and 
non-tariff regulations. Members decided to amend the unified commodity 
nomenclature and the CU’s Common Customs Tariff on cast iron and cast steel 
components for hydraulic turbines; and to adjust import duties on monofilament 
yarn used in producing filters. 
Note:
During the Almaty informal summit in December 2009, the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia 
adopted the 2010-2011 Action Plan for the SES. The Plan foresaw the signing of a package of international 
agreements by January 1, 2012. However, by as early as December 9, 2010 the sides had signed 17 agreements 
on establishing the SES. The governments were instructed to ratify all the documents by July 1, 2011 and to 
ensure they entered into force by January 1, 2012.
Belarus ratified the whole package of documents on the SES on December 28, 2010. Kazakhstan and Russia 
completed all procedures necessary to ratify the documents before the deadline.
The EurAsEC Interstate Council (the CU supreme body) approved the Action Plan for the implementation of 
agreements on the SES on March 15, 2011 (decision No.77). The Plan comprises 111 elements, 75 of which 
must be implemented by the governments and authorised agencies of the three states. The remaining 36 
items relating to eight agreements come under the remit of the Customs Union Commission. To realise the 
Action Plan, a schedule for the preparation of documents implementing Agreements on the SES foresees the 
development of 13 international agreements and 42 other documents (protocols, procedures, methodologies, 
criteria, schemes, action plans). The Customs Union Commission approved the schedule on April 7, 2011.
www.evrazes.com, www.tsouz.ru
SES principles extended to agriculture
June 9, 2011 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus plan to adopt similar approaches to agricultural 
subsidies within the framework of the Single Economic Space. Kazakhstan’s 
Majilis ratified and referred this decision to the Senate.
According to the Executive Secretary of the Kazakh Ministry of Agriculture, the 
agreement on state support to agriculture was drafted by Belarus and signed 
by the heads of the CU member states on December 9, 2010 in Moscow. 
The agreement establishes the maximum level of state support that can 
be granted at 10% of the gross value of agricultural production. Currently, 
subsidies amount to around 18% of the gross value of agricultural production 
in Belarus, up to 6% in Russia, and about 4% in Kazakhstan, putting 
Russian and Kazakh producers at a disadvantage compared to Belarus
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State support for agriculture in Kazakhstan will not be limited since an 
additional 6% would be allowed before it hits the maximum level. Additional 
state support may be used to encourage local production and increase its 
competitiveness. Moreover, Kazakhstan will benefit from an additional 
mechanism for preventing unfair competition and protecting its domestic 
markets from its main trading partners. The agreement will cease to be 
effective as soon as the parties join the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).
Kursiv.kz
Kazakhstan, Russia sign up to coordinated exchange policy within  
the SES
July 21, 2011
So far, only Kazakhstan and Russia have ratified an agreement on coordinated 
principles of foreign exchange within the Single Economic Space. According 
to experts, the agreement allows for the creation of a common, gradually 
unified area to streamline cooperation in capital markets, labour migration 
and mutual trade. A single currency space may be established in the long 
term. 
The agreement defines how the SES member states will implement foreign 
exchange policy. It foresees a gradual harmonisation of foreign policy, creation 
of the legal and organisational foundations for currency integration, and an 
economic policy focused on boosting confidence in the national currencies of 
the member states.
The SES countries should pursue economic policies aimed at increasing 
confidence in the national currencies of its member countries, both on their 
domestic and on international currency markets. The parties pledge not to 
intervene in the currency sphere in a way that may adversely affect integration 
processes, but where forced to act the member states must seek to minimise the 
consequences of such actions.
The tasks listed in the agreement fall into two categories. Firstly, the 
approximation of legislation and coordination of foreign exchange policy are 
necessary to provide equal opportunities for economic entities, including 
financial institutions, which do not discriminate between residents and non-
resident entities. Secondly, the agreement calls for coordinated measures to 
improve the competitiveness and stability of all three economies within the 
global economy and global financial markets through the convergence of SES 
currency markets, national foreign exchange markets, and foreign exchange 
transactions. 
www.tsouz.ru 
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New integration milestone reached and Eurasian Economic union  
moves ahead
November 18, 2011
The Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed the Declaration on 
Eurasian Economic Integration, and the Agreement on a Eurasian Economic 
Commission and its functions. These documents should result in the 
establishment of Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Simplified regulation of 
the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour that will be in force 
within the Eurasian Economic Union is expected to increase trade flows and 
lead to a coherent currency and macroeconomic policy.
The Declaration states that the transition to the next stage of integration – the 
Single Economic Space – will begin on January 1, 2012. The Union will be 
established by 2015, when the existing legal base of the CU and SES will be 
fully codified, the Declaration says. The EEC, which will operate from January 1, 
2012, will be responsible for the codification process. All the executive bodies 
will be headquartered in Moscow for the first four years; Russian Industry Minister 
Viktor Khrystenko will head the EEC Board. The location of the executive 
bodies will be reviewed once the Eurasian Economic Union is established. The 
EEC will take over from the Customs Union Commission on July 1, 2012. The 
EEC will become the supranational authority managing integration within the 
CU and SES. It will have a two-tier structure with the Council (the upper tier), 
comprised of the three countries’ Deputy Prime Ministers, being responsible 
for resolving disagreements between members of the Board (the lower tier). 
The Board will become the EEC’s key executive power, responsible for setting 
duties, establishing sanitary, veterinary and migration controls and monitoring 
the distribution of industrial and agricultural subsidies.
Some businesses have not waited for the establishment of the Eurasian Economic 
Union to execute their integration plans. For example, Russia’s EuroChem is 
actively working towards the full-scale implementation of a $2 billion project 
in Kazakhstan. LUKOIL plans to commission a large gas-processing complex in 
Aktobe in Kazakhstan.
Vedomosti, RBK Daily, Expert Online
EurAsEC ANtI-CRISIS fuND
EurAsEC ACf considers loan to Armenia
June 16, 2011
The EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund is studying the prospects for restructuring 
Armenia’s gas and chemical industries. The Armenian government is pursuing 
a strategy to restore these industries’ positions in world markets, and hopes 
to attract financing from the ACF to implement the programme. Recently 
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the Chairman of the ACF Council, Russian Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, 
announced that the ACF was considering providing credit to Yerevan.
A number of independent consultants are working on the issue together with the 
Eurasian Development Bank. The ACF Council may take a decision on lending 
to Armenia during its next meeting.
Note:
Kudrin first mentioned extending ACF credit of about $400 million to Armenia at the ACF Council meeting on 
June 4, 2011 in Kyiv.
www.eabr.org
Belarus receives first tranche of EurAsEC ACf loan
June 21, 2011
Belarus received the first $800 million tranche of a loan provided by the 
EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund. The next five tranches each totalling $440 million 
will be disbursed to Belarus in 2012-2013, while the government programme 
for stabilising the Belarusian balance of payments and improving its economic 
competitiveness is being implemented. The programme foresees measures to 
curb the credit financing of the country’s economy, strengthen fiscal discipline, 
and replenish international reserves to an economically secure level.
Note:
On June 4, 2011 the ACF Council approved a $3 billion loan to the Republic of Belarus. The Eurasian 
Development Bank, the manager of the ACF resources, and the government of Belarus signed a loan agreement 
on June 9. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko ratified the agreement and put it into effect on June 
15.
The credit is extended for 10 years, including a three-year grace period, during which only the interest is being 
paid. Capital repayments will begin in the second half of 2014.
The terms of the loan meet the standard terms and conditions approved by the ACF Council for middle-income 
member countries. The floating interest rate is tied to the price of Russian funding in international markets 
(currently around 4.3% per annum) and will be reviewed every three months.
www.eabr.org
Belarus to receive second tranche of EurAsEC ACf loan 
November 28, 2011
The Council of the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund approved a second $440 million 
tranche of the loan to Belarus pending clarification of components of the 
country’s anti-crisis programme.
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The agreement to extend a $3 billion loan to Belarus from the EurAsEC ACF 
resources foresees the allocation of several tranches over three years: $1.24 
billion in 2011; around $800 million in 2012; and $1 billion in 2013. The ACF 
funding is expected to help Belarus overcome the foreign exchange crisis that 
hit the country in spring 2011, and the overall economic crisis triggered by an 
upsurge in prices and depreciation of currency.
Expert Online 
EDB
ukraine may join EDB
August 19, 2011 
Ukraine may accede to the EDB Foundation Agreement. The Ukrainian 
government approved the relevant presidential resolution at a meeting on August 
17. The government has authorised first Deputy Prime Minister and Economic 
Minister Andrei Klyuev to address the EDB. Ukraine’s contribution to the EDB 
charter capital may amount to around $15 million with Kyiv estimating the 
need for EDB investment at $2.5 billion. Ukraine’s joining the bank will bring 
economic benefits to the country, help attract additional financial resources for 
investment projects and enhance cooperation with EDB member states.
Note:
The Eurasian Development Bank is an international financial organisation established by Russia and Kazakhstan 
in 2006 to promote the economic growth of its member states, the expansion of trade and economic ties 
between its members and the development of integration in Eurasia. The Bank’s charter capital exceeds 
$1.5 billion and its member states are Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Tajikistan and Belarus.
Kursiv.kz
Kyrgyzstan pays its contribution to EDB charter capital
August 26, 2011
Kyrgyzstan has paid its $100,000 contribution to the charter capital of the EDB, 
thus completing the procedures required for joining the EDB. It has become 
the sixth full member of the Bank along with Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, 
Tajikistan and Belarus. 
Kursiv.kz
CSto
CSto limits Western influence on post-soviet space
December 21, 2011
Moscow hosted the summits of two major post-soviet integration structures 
– the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the CIS.
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The CSTO summit adopted measures to limit Western influence on the territory 
of the former USSR. Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan agreed new rules for foreign military forces deployed at military 
bases on the territory of CSTO member states. From now on, no foreign military 
facilities can be deployed in any of the CSTO countries without the sanction of 
all CSTO member states. This measure will facilitate the CSTO’s transition to a 
fully-fledged military and political bloc, whose participants are focused on the 
interests of their partners as well as their own financial benefits.
The CSTO countries’ leaders approved measures for managing information 
security in the CSTO member states. 
The purpose of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) has been changed 
to focus on preventing destabilisation of CSTO countries. Initially, the CRRF 
responded to military aggression from the exterior, and counteracted international 
terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking and the effects of disasters. From 
now on, the CRRF may also be engaged in protecting the constitutional position 
of CSTO member states. The summit agreed that the CSTO’s role will be to 
counteract real and virtual threats from the West and from the South – the 
Presidents discussed a plan of action in case the security situation in Afghanistan 
deteriorates after the withdrawal of NATO troops in 2014.
Kommersant
SCo
Vital SCo development issues 
June 16, 2011
Over the ten-year history of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), 
the organisation’s balance of authority has shifted towards Beijing. China has 
demonstrated its commitment to large-scale penetration of SCO member country 
economies. As a result, Russia finds itself bound up with China’s strategy, being 
able only to observe the process but not significantly to influence it. One way 
to stabilise Russia’s position in the SCO, according to analysts, is to create a 
free trade area in the post-soviet space and gradually expand into the SCO. 
This idea was voiced by the Russian delegation during 2011 Astana summit. 
Moreover, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed that the SCO should 
draw up a “road map” for multilateral trade and industrial cooperation by the 
end of 2011.
Opening doors to new members may become a turning point in the integration 
processes within the SCO. The SCO is on the cusp of expected expansion. In 
recent years, many powerful states have expressed their intention of becoming 
full members of the organisation. Some of these countries are, however, 
burdened with complex problems. Discussion of Iran’s potential membership of 
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the SCO was suspended in late 2009, when Russia stated that countries placed 
under UN sanctions on security grounds could not be admitted to the SCO. 
Meanwhile, Moscow welcomes India’s declared intention of joining the SCO, 
since the latter can act as a counterweight to the influence of Beijing. However, 
because of the serious competition between India and China – the two major 
powers of Eurasia – this step is quite difficult to realise. The summit showed that 
Afghanistan appears to be another preoccupation of those wishing to further 
SCO expansion. As the US withdrawal from Afghanistan becomes inevitable, 
and Hamid Karzai’s administration is actively taking over control, the SCO is 
obliged to take into consideration the future of the Afghan state.
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev put forward a number of initiatives 
during the anniversary summit of the SCO in Astana, including a proposal to 
establish a common energy space in SCO member states.
The delegates also returned to the question of establishing an SCO Special 
Account, the resources of which could be used for the technical and economic 
evaluation of large-scale projects. The SCO Special Account should become a 
“liquidity cushion” for projects that have great integration potential. However, 
creating such a fund is part of a broader plan to establish a joint fund to finance 
projects within the SCO, and its authorised body. So far the SCO member states 
have failed to reach consensus on the structure of this body. Beijing insists on 
creating a separate structure, while Moscow has suggested it should be based 
on the Eurasian Development Bank, the majority of which is owned by Russia 
and Kazakhstan.
China has taken the lead in granting loans to SCO member states. Chinese 
President Hu Jintao reminded the summit that in 2009 China pledged to provide 
$10 billion in concessional loans to SCO member states. However, the country 
has significantly exceeded its obligations. Kazakhstan has received $15 billion 
in credits from China in the last two years. At the peak of the economic crisis, 
Russian companies Rosneft and Transneft borrowed $25 billion from China 
Development Bank.
Russia does not view these developments as a threat to Russian interests in 
Central Asia, claiming rather that China’s greater flexibility in the SCO and 
proposed financial instruments merit comprehension and support.
www.sco.org, Kommersant, Kursiv.kz
tRADE AND INVEStMENtS
Russian enterprises move to Kazakhstan
April 4, 2011 
Boris Titov, head of the Business Russia organisation, claims production 
costs in Russia are too high, especially in industries bearing the cost of 
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growing tariffs of natural monopolies. Over the last five years production 
costs have increased threefold owing to rising tariffs and inflation rates, he 
says.
In 2010, industrial growth recovered, but slumped again after the uniform 
social tax increase in 2011 and another round of tariff increases. Loans are 
exceedingly expensive while long-term credit facilities do not exist at all, Titov 
claims. Manufacturers with a long production cycle have a slower turnover 
rate. As a result, only 22% of manufacturers are financed by borrowing, while 
the rest invest from their own resources.
In contrast, Kazakhstan’s producers have a lighter tax burden and tariff 
increases are limited by the authorities. The interest rate is lower and long-term 
credit facilities are more widely available.
Therefore, Russian industrial enterprises began relocating to Kazakhstan after 
the establishment of the CU and the introduction of agreements regulating 
industrial activity. A plant cannot be moved within a couple of days, of course, 
so this is a slow process taking place over several years. The CU makes it 
more profitable to produce in Kazakhstan and sell in Russia because customs 
duties have been abolished and Russian demand and prices are higher. If the 
situation remains unchanged, the relocation of production to Kazakhstan will 
accelerate.
Kommersant
Customs union protective measures
June 6, 2011 
The policy of the CU is becoming more protectionist. The CU’s most recent 
measures have been directed against Ukraine. The Customs Union Commission 
has decided to apply antidumping and special protective measures in Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan against Ukrainian steel pipes, fibreglass, and engineering 
fasteners and fittings. 
Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Economy of 
Ukraine signed an agreement regulating the supply of certain types of steel 
pipes. Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade proposed extending the validity 
of duties on over-quota imports of steel pipes from Ukraine for five years from 
January 31, 2011, and increasing the current duty rate.
Previously, on December 30, 2010, Ukraine and Russia had signed an agreement 
to increase quotas for duty-free imports of Ukrainian pipes to Russia to 300,000 
tonnes in 2011. If CU member states sign relevant agreements with Ukraine, 
this measure will be valid throughout the Union. 
Expert Online
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Belarus introduces export restrictions
June 13, 2011
Belarus has introduced restrictions on the export of food products and banned 
the export of some other commodities. The government introduced these trade 
measures to protect domestic market.
Special charges equivalent to double their average price have been imposed on 
exports of pork and poultry meat; sugar; flour; rennet cheese; butter; tobacco 
products manufactured in Belarus; canned meat and dairy products. 
A temporary ban has also been imposed on individual exports of household 
refrigerators and freezers manufactured by JSC Atlant; gas cookers 
(manufactured by the Belarusian-Russian joint venture Brestgazoapparat), 
cement (produced by JSC Krasnoselskstroymaterialy, RUE Belarusian Cement 
Plant, Krichevcementnoshifer Ltd.), detergents (JSC Barhim), cereals (various) 
and all pasta, regardless of manufacturer.
From June 11 Belarus is also restricting exports of motor fuel. Exporting such 
fuel more than once every five days requires the exporter to submit a customs 
declaration and pay customs duties. Restrictions and bans are valid only when 
goods are exported outside the CU – trade terms with Russia and Kazakhstan 
remain unchanged.
Kursiv.kz
Bottlenecks remain on Russian-Kazakh border
June 16, 2011
So far there has been no resolution of the problem of goods entering Kazakhstan 
under preferential customs duty rates, then being taken into Russia. Russia is 
very concerned about this emerging “window” through which imports of cheap 
cars, gasoline, medicines, cigarettes and alcohol from Kazakhstan could be 
channelled.
The abolition of customs checks at the Russian-Kazakh border from July 1, 
2011 was announced a year ago when the common customs territory between 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan came into effect. A year-long transition period 
was allowed because of the perceived permeability of Kazakhstan’s borders 
with other countries, primarily China.
Kazakhstan imports 70% of the goods its economy requires. Kazakhstan 
negotiated special conditions when it joined the CU, including lower duty on 
cars imported by individuals (until July 1, 2011), a zero rate on raw cane sugar 
(until 2020), a zero rate on aircraft (until July 1, 2014) and aircraft spare parts 
(unlimited).
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The EurAsEC Interstate Council also approved Kazakhstan’s list of lower-duty 
imports (compared to the common customs tariff) on 409 goods, including 
medicines, medical equipment, cars, raw materials for chemical, light and 
woodworking industries, aluminium, paper, etc. The validity period of these 
rates vary, none going beyond the year 2015.
The Russian authorities granted these concessions in 2009 to ensure Kazakhstan 
signed certain key CU documents; however, Russia is now concerned that 
goods imported into Kazakhstan from other countries at lowered duty rates will 
appear on the Russian market once the customs barrier is removed. 
During a meeting of the EurAsEC Interstate Council in Minsk on May 19, 2011, 
Kazakhstan pledged to introduce state control over the “privileged” products 
by July 1, 2011 and made assurances that such goods would not be brought to 
Russia.
Kommersant 
Russia’s accession to Wto: perspective from tbilisi
November 7, 2011
As part of negotiations on WTO accession, Russia and Georgia have solved the 
problem of monitoring cargo on the Russian border with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Georgia refused to agree to Russia’s accession to the WTO unless 
Russia submitted information on products coming in to the two republics. On 
November 3, 2011 the head of the Russian Delegation at the WTO accession 
negotiations Maxim Medvedkov announced that Russia has approved a 
compromise agreement with Georgia, proposed by Switzerland. Georgia 
approved the compromise on October 27.
The issue of observers was a problematic one during the Swiss-mediated 
negotiations. The parties agreed to select a special company that will be 
responsible for acquisition of data on cargoes at the checkpoints and transferring 
the data to Georgia in electronic form. The mechanism and criteria for selecting 
an operator were not disclosed, but a company is shortly to be selected by 
Switzerland. Under the agreement, Georgia will receive information on goods 
transported via three trade corridors. The first corridor will run from the river 
Psou on the border with Abkhazia to Zugdidi in the west of Georgia. The second 
will lie on the border with South Ossetia from the north side of the Roki Tunnel 
to Gori in Georgia. The third will be at the Kazbegi-Upper Lars checkpoint, the 
only official crossing on the land border between Georgia and Russia.
This transfer of border controls to a private company is unique. The US Congress 
is considering transferring the authority to control the US border with Mexico 
to a private operator.
Vedomosti
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Russia accedes to the Wto
November 10, 2011
The WTO Working Party has approved Russia’s accession to the WTO. A 
formal decision on Russia’s WTO membership will be adopted at the WTO 
Ministerial Conference on December 15-17. According to Maxim Medvedkov, 
head of the Russian Delegation at the WTO accession negotiations, Russia will 
have six months to ratify the WTO membership agreement, which comes into 
force one month after the ratification date, so Russia will become a full WTO 
member in summer 2012.
According to information on the WTO website, the average import duty in 
Russia will decline from 10% to 7.8% by 2020: from 13.2% to 10.8% for 
agricultural products, from 9.5% to 7.3% for industrial goods, from 19.8% to 
14.9% for dairy products, and from 15.1% to 10% for cereal crops. Duties on 
cars will be reduced from 15.5% to 12%, on electric vehicles – from 8.4% to 
6.2%, and on wooden and paper products – from 13.4% to 8%. 
Duties will be reduced gradually. First of all Russia will have to bring down its 
anti-recessionary duties (e.g., on chemicals and metals), and as soon as Russia 
becomes a WTO member, duties on new motor cars will be reduced from 30% 
currently to 25%, and further to 15% within the next seven years.
Officials believe Russia is joining the WTO on advantageous terms. Lower 
duties on foodstuffs are unlikely to seriously affect the domestic market, while 
higher duties on motor vehicles will be in place until the year 2018. Moreover, 
Russia has undertaken to reduce federal subsidies to the agricultural sector from 
$9 billion in 2012 to $4.4 billion in 2018.
Contrary to expectations, there will be no reform of the gas market. 
Under WTO terms and conditions, the government is allowed to regulate 
domestic gas prices as long as they bring profits to the national gas utility, 
Gazprom. Moreover, the gas giant will remain a monopoly in terms of gas 
exports.
With regard to the banking sector, Russia’s WTO membership terms state that 
foreign banks are allowed to operate via their subsidiaries but may not open 
branch offices and foreign capital in the Russian banking sector may not exceed 
50%. Foreign insurers will be allowed to open branch offices nine years after 
Russia’s accession to the WTO.
Russia has promised to lift all restrictions on foreign capital investment 
in its telecommunications sector by 2015. This industry is listed as 
strategic and companies taking a controlling stakes in telecommunications 
companies in Russia must have their investments approved by the 
government.
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December 16, 2011 
WTO trade ministers accepted Russia’s bid to join the WTO. The accession 
protocol was signed by Russian Economic Development Minister Elvira 
Nabiullina and WTO Director General Pascal Lamy.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, President of the Swiss 
Confederation Micheline Calmy-Rey, and WTO ministers attended the 
accession signing ceremony.
Earlier the WTO ministerial conference had approved all documents relating to 
Russia’s accession to the organisation including commitments on market access 
for goods and services. Russia has been working towards joining the WTO since 
1993.
Russia’s membership in the WTO marks an important milestone in its history, 
but there is hard work still to be done.
First of all Russia will have to determine the rules of its international trade, 
including the trade regime with the US. The Jackson-Vanik amendment, which 
limits trade with Russia and which is an obstacle to the application of WTO 
rules between the two countries, would have to be revoked. Failure to do so 
would allow Russia to deny the United States preferential access to its markets, 
and WTO rules will not apply to trade between Russia and the US before it is 
repealed.
Moreover, during the next six months the Russian government must decide 
terms of access to Russian markets for goods and services, which give the 
country room for manoeuvre. Russia needs to define its strategy in many areas, 
particularly in the services sector and with regard to systemic issues. According 
to the Ministry of Economy, the government and the Central Bank must first 
decide whether or not to introduce a 50% quota for foreign bank control of the 
aggregate capital of Russian’s banking system.
In addition, around one-third of tariff rates under the Russian Federation’s WTO 
commitments are higher than those applied within the framework of the CU, so 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus will have to decide what rates to apply.
Meanwhile, Russian businessmen will have to explore a new instrument – the 
WTO dispute settlement system, a mediation mechanism aimed at reducing 
barriers to trade which was unavailable to Russia before the official accession. 
Maxim Medvedkov, director of the Trade Negotiations at the Ministry for 
Economic Development, who has led the negotiations on Russia’s WTO 
accession for the last 11 years, believes that Russia should raise grievances 
over at least 120 trade barriers imposed by its trade partners. He cites the EU’s 
reluctance to accept Russian energy prices, especially on gas, when estimating 
the cost of Russian products. Moreover, WTO membership gives Russia an 
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opportunity to use the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms in trade with 
China. Prior to this, Russia had no formal grounds for asking China to reduce 
barriers to Russian goods.
The government will also have to learn to offer state support in ways that 
conform to WTO rules prohibiting direct subsidies that affect the pricing of 
goods. However, the Ministry of Economy is confident that the existing 
structure of state support demonstrates a 99% compliance with WTO 
rules.
Vedomosti, Expert Online, RIA Novosti, Kommersant, Finam.ru
BILAtERAL RELAtIoNS
transport, space and other aspects of Russian-ukrainian cooperation
April 13, 2011 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Kyiv and met with his Ukrainian 
counterpart Nikolay Azarov to discuss a new gas contract and Ukraine’s 
accession to the CU. 
Talks on Ukraine’s possible entry into the CU began about a year ago. The scope 
of economic cooperation between Russia and Ukraine is larger than between 
Russia and the other two member states of the CU. Businesses in Ukraine and 
Russia want to simplify customs procedures. In addition, if Ukraine joins the 
CU it could benefit from a significant discount on Russian gas prices. In early 
April, the Ukrainian authorities announced that the country may accede to the 
Protocol establishing the CU as early as June 2011. According to the President 
of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, the country is ready to cooperate with the CU on 
a 3+1 basis, meaning Ukraine’s accession to selected CU agreements only. 
Putin also noted that Ukraine’s accession to the CU would make it easier for 
the country to negotiate a free trade area with the EU. In recent years Ukraine’s 
policy makers have been in search of a formula that will allow them to cooperate 
both with the EU and the alliance of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Nikolay Azarov reminded his Russian counterpart that if Ukraine joins the CU, 
Moscow would have to cut the cost of its energy resources significantly. Ukraine’s 
Prime Minister also noted that Kyiv needs firm guarantees from Moscow on 
the volumes of gas flowing to Europe, and hoped Russian companies would 
participate in the reconstruction of the Ukrainian gas transit system.
Azarov stated that Russia and Ukraine should, in the short term, finalise 
preparations for a feasibility study on a transport crossing over the Kerch Strait. 
He also noted that Ukraine would be ready to sign up to the provision of a high-
speed rail link between Kyiv and Moscow in the near future and invited Russia 
to simplify customs controls as soon as possible. 
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In addition, Ukraine’s Prime Minister said that the Russian-Ukrainian joint 
venture between Ukraine’s state aircraft manufacturer and Russia’s United 
Aircraft Corporation (UAC) needed to be finalised. In March, UAC and 
ANTONOV signed an agreement to purchase and sell a 50% stake in the UAC-
Civil Aircraft Management Company, on which the joint Russian-Ukrainian 
company UAC-ANTONOV would be based. The joint venture will be engaged 
in mass production of AN-140, AN-148 and AN-158 passenger aircraft, as well 
as AN-70 and AN-124 transport aircraft. The two countries may also launch 
joint production of aircraft engines.
Potential cooperation between Ukraine and Russia in other aerospace projects 
was also discussed. Vladimir Putin invited Ukraine to participate in the 
construction of the new Vostochny spaceport, which is being built in Russia’s 
Far East. The spaceport will give Russia its own independent launch pad into 
space. At present, all manned flights are launched from the Baikonur spaceport 
in Kazakhstan, which Russia leases. Construction of the Vostochny spaceport 
is due to begin in summer 2011; the first rocket launch will take place in 2015, 
and construction of the whole complex is due to be completed in 2016. The 
launch of manned spaceflights from Vostochny is expected in 2018.
RIA Novosti, Expert Online
Russian and tajik presidents discuss labour migration
September 2, 2011 
During an official visit to Tajikistan, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev met 
with his Tajik counterpart Emomali Rahmon to discuss the problems migrant 
workers are facing in Russia. Both heads of states underlined the importance of 
creating decent conditions for Tajik labour migrants in Russia, including their 
pre-migration vocational training, and of reinforcing these conditions in law. In 
their joint statement the Tajik President acknowledges that Tajik migrants must 
abide by the laws of the host country. Both countries condemned manifestations 
of nationalism and xenophobia, including incitement to hatred and violence 
against citizens of another ethnicity. They also noted the importance of adopting 
laws to prevent such manifestations. Cooperation between law enforcement 
and immigration authorities in the two countries must be improved to that end, 
they said.
Expert Online 
Armenian president visits Russia
October 25, 2011
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan made a three-day state visit to Moscow 
on October 23-25. Currently Armenia is Russia’s sole ally in the South 
Caucasian region. Yerevan is building relations with Moscow, Tehran, 
Natalia Maqsimchook. “Chronicle of Eurasian 
Regional Integration 2011” 2011: DATA AND REVIEWS
258 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
Washington, Brussels and Tbilisi. Armenian policymakers are cooperating 
with all these states and complying with international commitments. Russia is 
playing an important role in ensuring the security of the Armenian state, which 
is sandwiched between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
During the visit various documents were signed, including an agreement on 
cooperation in humanitarian work; leasing of real estate in Armenia and Russia 
in order to set up diplomatic missions; a memorandum of cooperation on 
combating infectious diseases; and a memorandum of cooperation between the 
Foreign Ministries of Armenia and Russia. Armenia and Russia also signed an 
agreement on removing double taxation on income and property, which both 
parties agree will boost cooperation between the two countries.
Fostering trade and economic cooperation with Russia is an important task 
for Armenia. Today Russia is a major investor in the Armenian economy. 
Russian companies provide Armenia with consistent natural gas supplies, and 
are active in the electricity industry. A fifth unit at the Hrazdan thermal power 
plant is soon to be commissioned. According to Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev, Russian investment in Armenia’s economy already exceeds $2.8 
billion.
Expert Online
Somersault in Russian-tajik relations
November 22, 2011
November 8, 2011 – A Tajik court has sentenced Russian pilot Vladimir 
Sadovnichy and his Estonian colleague Alexei Rudenko, who were working 
for the Rolkan Investments Airline, to eight and a half years in prison each for 
border violations and smuggling. The two ANTONOV AN-72 transport aircraft 
they had been flying were confiscated.
November 11, 2011 – The case of the two convicted Russian airline pilots was 
discussed at interparliamentary level. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon assured 
the Russian Ambassador to Tajikistan of his readiness to help Moscow resolve 
the situation. The pilots’ lawyers, in turn, filed a cassation appeal.
November 12, 2011 – Tajik President Emomali Rahmon took the case under 
his personal control.
November 14, 2011 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev urged Tajik 
authorities to reconsider the case against the Russian and Estonian pilots.
November 15, 2011 – The head of Rospotrebnadzor, Russia’s chief medical 
officer Gennady Onishchenko, stated that HIV and tuberculosis infection 
rates are high among migrants from Tajikistan, and suggested that Russia 
should consider a ban on migrant workers from Tajikistan until the country 
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can establish satisfactory public health standards. The Federal Migration 
Service began authorising the detention of illegal migrant workers from 
Tajikistan. As at November 14, Russian law enforcement agencies have 
detained 297 migrants.
November 15, 2011 – The Prosecutor’s Office in Tajikistan’s Khatlon region has 
made an official protest against the conviction of pilots Vladimir Sadovinichy 
and Alexei Rudenko, sentenced to 8.5 years each in a maximum security 
penitentiary.
November 22, 2011 – The Cassation Committee of the Khatlon Regional 
Court overturned the verdict handed down on November 8 and both pilots 
were released by the court. The Prosecutor’s Office in Khatlon, Tajikistan, 
stated that a criminal case against the chief executive of the company Rolkan 
Investmens Ltd., Sergei Poluyanov, has been suspended and will be transferred 
to Tajikistan’s law enforcement agencies, Afghanistan’s special services and 
Russia’s Federal Security Service. 
RIA Novosti, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Vedomosti 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan address reservoir problem 
November 28, 2011
The dangers posed by aging dams have prompted greater cooperation between 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as they seek to ensure uninterrupted water supplies 
and prevent catastrophic flooding.
Relevant authorities in both countries are negotiating the allocation of funding 
by Kazakhstan to repair Kyrgyz reservoirs vital to both countries. Experts have 
stressed the need for the two countries to resume relations that were ended by 
the Soviet Union’s collapse. 
The South Kazakhstan and Zhambyl oblasts in Kazakhstan suffer from irregular 
water supplies; they are also at risk of flooding because of the dilapidation 
of reservoirs and canals along the border with Kyrgyzstan. Officials of both 
countries are striving to improve the situation.
In October 2011 Kazakhstan offered Kyrgyzstan $500,000 (73.9 million tenge 
or 23.4 million Kyrgyz som) to fix reservoirs that, according to Bishkek officials, 
are vital in providing uninterrupted drinking and irrigation water supplies to 
Kazakhstan.
Most of the reservoirs’ infrastructure was built in the 1970s to increase 
substantially the amount of water available to irrigate farmland in the Zhambyl 
and South Kazakhstan oblasts. The infrastructure has an estimated life span of 
100 years.
centralasiaonline.com
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ECoNoMIC SECtoRS
oIL AND GAS
Belarus
Belarus raises tariffs for transit of Russian oil
January 11, 2011
Belarus will increase tariffs for the transit of Russian oil to Europe by 12.5% 
from February 1, the Belarus Ministry of Economy said. The decision was taken 
under an agreement between Belarus and Russia on setting tariffs on oil-product 
transportation via the trunk pipelines of Belarus. 
From February 1, tariffs on oil transported through the Gomeltransneft Druzhba 
and Polotsktransneft Druzhba pipelines in Belarus will also increase by 12.5% 
compared to 2010.
According to the Belarusian Ministry of Economy, the tariff increase was 
necessitated by a change in economic conditions surrounding oil supplied by 
Russia and transported through oil pipelines in Belarus.
Finam.ru, RBK daily
problems with Russian oil supplies to Belarus
January 21, 2011 
In December 2010 the Presidents of Russia and Belarus, Dmitry Medvedev and 
Alexander Lukashenko, agreed that all export duties on Russian oil processed 
in Belarus would be transferred in full to the Russian budget. In turn, Moscow 
would supply oil to Belarus duty-free (the amount planned for 2011 was set at 
21.7 million tonnes). These arrangements are valid under the Single Economic 
Space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
However, Russian oil companies cut off oil supplies to Belarus on January 1, 
2011 citing an absence of contracts for the year. To protect the profitability 
of oil deliveries to Belarus and other countries, the Russian oil companies 
intended to increase the price of oil supplied to Belarus by $45 per tonne. 
Belarus’ protest over this increase has led to nearly a month of negotiations 
while both sides tried to reach a solution. Crude reserves at Belarusian refineries 
have been gradually decreasing, their operations were threatened, and Russia 
has been redirecting oil meant for Belarus to the Russian ports of Primorsk and 
Novorossiysk, Gdansk in Poland, and to Russian and Ukrainian oil refineries. 
The largest deliveries of oil were due to be supplied to Belarus during the first 
quarter of 2011 by LUKOIL (1 million tonnes), Surgutneftegaz (1 million tonnes) 
and Rosneft (0.9 million tonnes).
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January 25, 2011
Transneft resumed oil deliveries to Belarusian refineries after Minsk agreed to 
pay $46 per tonne of crude oil. 21.7 million tonnes of oil may be supplied to 
Belarus this year, including 18 million tonnes delivered by pipelines.
RBK daily, Vedomosti
Agreement on paying customs duties on oil exported from Belarus beyond 
the Customs union territory submitted to State Duma 
July 8, 2011 
The President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev submitted the Agreement on Customs 
Duties (and Other Similar Duties, Taxes, and Levies) Payment and Deposit 
Procedures for Crude Oil and Certain Petroleum Products Exported from Belarus 
beyond the Customs Union Territory to the State Duma for ratification. The 
agreement was drafted under a resolution of the Customs Union Commission 
dated October 14, 2010, and was signed in Moscow on December 9, 2010. 
The agreement sets out procedures for the collection and reimbursement of 
export duties (and other similar duties, taxes and levies) on oil and certain oil 
products exported from Belarus beyond the CU. It also regulates the collection 
and reimbursement of penalties for non-payment or partial payment of export 
duties in cases specified in CU law, the legislation of Belarus and the agreement. 
The agreement does not apply to the collection and reimbursement of export 
duties (and other similar duties, taxes and levies) on oil produced in Belarus and 
then exported beyond the CU.
According to the agreement, liability to pay export duties (and other similar 
duties, taxes and levies) is regulated by the Customs Code of the CU. Where 
goods are exported from Belarus beyond the CU, export duties shall be the 
same as those effective in the Russian Federation on the day the Belarusian 
customs authorities register the export declaration.
Article 5 of the Agreement stipulates that, given the technological and transport 
advantages of the republic’s oil refining industry, and the quality of oil, Belarus 
has the right to set an additional mandatory fee payable to the state budget 
over and above the export duties paid to the Russian government. Procedures 
for paying the additional duty and for transferring it to the state budget will be 
defined by Belarusian laws. Article 6 of the Agreement stipulates that export 
duties and penalties on goods Belarus exports outside the CU must be paid to 
Russia in US dollars. The agreement establishes rules additional to the Russian 
Federation’s laws, and therefore is subject to ratification pursuant to the Federal 
Law “On International Treaties of the Russian Federation”.
Finam.ru
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Belarusian gas debt increases
November 15, 2011
Gazprom claims that in the third quarter of 2011 Belarus paid 12% less than 
the contract price for its gas deliveries. In February-April, and in July 2011, 
Beltransgaz “violated the terms of its contract” in paying for Russian gas, 
Gazprom claims. Beltransgaz asked Gazprom if it could defer payment for gas 
delivered in the third quarter of 2011 and pay $245 per 1,000 m3 (the contract 
price for the second quarter of 2011). The contract price for the third quarter 
was supposed to be $279.16. With a total of 4.231 billion m3 of gas delivered 
to Belarus during the third quarter of 2011, the underpayment is about $144.5 
million.
If Belarus were to continue to pay $245 per 1,000 m3 for gas in the fourth 
quarter, the country’s debt may top $490 million by year-end, given that 
Gazprom was due to supply Belarus with a total of 6 billion m3 during the fourth 
quarter at a forecast price of $303 per 1,000 m3 (based on the latest version of 
the company’s budget for 2011).
Note:
Gazprom and Beltransgaz dispute gas payment almost every year. The latest conflict began after Belarus 
continued to pay average 2009 gas prices during the first four months of 2010, instead of the higher contract 
price, which led to a debt of around $190 million. Gazprom threatened to cut supplies and Minsk brought up 
the issue of Gazprom’s debts for gas transit. Gazprom carried out its threat to cut gas supplies to Belarus for a 
few days, which meant Europe also faced a reduction in its gas supplies. Fortunately, the conflict was resolved 
before the EU was affected. This year’s difficulties have not triggered an open conflict between the states. By 
February, Beltrangaz owed Gazprom $70 million but it paid the debt in April, Gazprom stated in its report for 
the second quarter of 2011.
Vedomosti
Belarus sells Beltransgaz to Gazprom 
November 25, 2011 
Intergovernmental agreements on Gazprom’s acquisition of a second 50% stake 
in Beltransgaz for $2.5 billion were signed during the session of the Supreme 
State Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus at the Gorky residence 
near Moscow. Gazprom purchased the first 50% stake in Beltransgaz back 
in 2007 for the same price. Along with $2.5 billion payment for Beltransgaz, 
Belarus was granted a substantial discount on gas prices (in 2012 Belarus will 
purchase gas at $166 per 1,000 m3 compared to the current $250) and a loan of 
$10 billion for 15 years for the construction of a nuclear power plant. The deal 
amounted to a total of $12.5 billion, and with the gas discounts Belarus will be 
able to reduce its current account deficit from $7 billion to $4 billion per year.
Kommersant, Expert Online, Vedomosti
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Russia, Belarus agree upon oil deliveries
December 24, 2011
Russian and Belarusian oil companies agreed terms for Russian oil deliveries 
to Belarus for refining and subsequent export of oil products outside the CU in 
2012-2015. While in 2011 Russia supplied oil to Belarus at a premium of $46 
per tonne (Rotterdam netback), in 2012 a discount of $3.7 per tonne will be 
applied. Moreover, Russian oil companies acquire the right to refine up to 50% 
of pipelined oil based on contracts with the owners of Belarusian refineries. 
Under the CU and SES agreements signed by Belarus, zero-duty deliveries of 
Russian oil were to begin on January 1, 2011, on condition that 100% of export 
duties on oil products exported from Belarus outside the CU territory are paid to 
the Russian budget. The overall loss to the Russian budget is estimated at $2.2 
billion. Another 6-8 million tonnes of oil products produced from Russian oil 
were consumed in Belarus and not subject to export duties. However, Belarus 
did not receive Russian oil in early 2011. The subsequent export of oil products 
gave Belarusian refineries extra revenue of over $100 per tonne and Russian 
companies demanded their share either in the form of a quota on oil refining in 
Belarus for independent exports of oil products or an additional premium on the 
oil price. Eventually, the sides shared the extra income equally, agreeing on a 
premium for Russian companies, which amounted to around $46 per tonne.
However, from October 1, 2011 Russia introduced a new tax regime for the oil 
industry, the so-called “60-66” regime, which reduces export duties on crude 
by around 7% and increases duties on oil products from 55% to 66% of the 
export duty on crude oil with the simultaneous harmonisation of export duty 
rates for light and heavy refined products.
The gap between the duties on crude oil and oil products contracted significantly, 
as did the profitability of Belarusian refineries, giving Russian companies the 
opportunity to snap up processing quotas. By recycling half of the oil they supply 
to Belarusian refineries, Russian companies will collect the difference between 
the export duties on oil and petroleum products. However, in monetary terms, 
it makes virtually no difference.
Kommersant
ukraine
Russian oil companies bear losses in ukraine
February 1, 2011 
Russian oil companies have suspended their refining operations in Ukraine. 
LUKOIL closed its Odessa Refinery for reconstruction in autumn 2010, and 
TNK-BP decided to suspend operations at its Lisichansk Refinery for at least 
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the first quarter of 2011. In January-September 2010 TNK-BP’s Ukrainian 
companies (Lisichansk refinery and TNK-BP Commerce) made losses totalling 
approximately $60 million. If current trends on the Ukrainian oil refining market 
continue, the company’s losses in Ukraine will amount to $150 million in 2011. 
The investment programme for 2011 (about $160 million) is currently frozen.
TNK-BP owns Lisichansk oil refinery (the second largest in Ukraine), 150 petrol 
stations, and around 275 independent petrol stations which are operating under 
the company’s name.
According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Fuel and Energy, imports of oil products 
to Ukraine grew from 3.8 million to 4.5 million tonnes in 2010, accounting for 
about half the market. Because of the “preferential pricing of raw materials”, 
imported oil products have a cost advantage of more than $100 per tonne over 
Ukrainian production. Imports from Belarus to Ukraine, thus, grew by 17% 
during 2010.
The inception of the Single Economic Space and zero-duty Russian oil 
deliveries to Kazakhstan and Belarus will make imports of oil products to Ukraine 
even more profitable, exacerbating the Ukrainian refineries’ situation. The 
smuggling of oil products into Ukraine is increasing and individual companies 
are taking increasing advantage of tax optimisation schemes. Ukraine must solve 
the problem by investigating imports of oil products, preventing smuggling 
and ”back-door” trading, and by imposing import duty on oil products. The 
Ukrainian authorities have already mentioned the possibility of imposing duties, 
but no final decision was taken. Although such duties would help refiners, they 
would also trigger further increases in the price of oil products.
Kommersant
New arguments to support Gazprom and Naftogaz merger
February 21, 2011
Gazprom is trying to persuade Ukraine of the feasibility of its merger with 
Naftogaz. According to Gazprom, the average gas price for Ukraine will reach 
$280 per 1,000 m3 in 2011 ($264 in the first quarter and $275 in the second 
quarter of that year), and around $300 per 1,000 m3 in 2012. Meanwhile, gas 
transit through Ukraine will cost Gazprom $2.7-2.75 billion in 2011, or $100 
million more than in 2010. Gas supplies will increase by 9.7% to 40 billion m3. 
The head of Gazprom, Alexei Miller, stated that the company has no plans to 
revise the stated contract price downwards. 
However, Miller noted that if Ukraine’s state energy company Naftogaz merges 
with the Russian gas giant, gas supplied to Ukraine will be priced the same as 
domestic Russian supplies to households and industry. Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin first proposed the idea of a merger between Gazprom and 
Naftogaz in early May 2009.
2011: DATA AND REVIEWS
265Eurasian Development Bank
Moreover, Gazprom CEO said that Russia would make maximum use 
of Ukraine’s pipeline capacity. The current loading level stands at around 
95 billion m3 per year, but with investment the capacity of Ukraine gas 
transportation system could increase to 125 billion m3 per year. According to 
Miller, the system could potentially carry up to 140 billion m3 of gas annually. 
Miller said that Ukraine’s gas transportation infrastructure requires serious 
investment over the medium term and that the country should decide how 
to develop the industry. In 2010 Ukraine allocated $212 million to the 
modernisation of its gas transportation system and plans to allocate $300 
million more in 2011.
Note:
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin suggested merging Gazprom and Naftogaz at a Ukrainian Interstate 
Commission economic cooperation meeting in April 2010 in Sochi. In December 2010 Gazprom head 
Alexei Miller and Ukraine’s Minister for Energy and the Coal Industry Yuri Boiko agreed to establish two joint 
ventures, one to produce coal-bed gas in Ukraine and the other to develop the Pallas gas field in the Black Sea. 
Gazprom and Naftogaz also signed a memorandum of understanding on the production of methane from coal 
seams. Gazprom’s Board of Directors instructed the company’s executives to continue working with Ukraine 
on establishing hydrocarbon joint ventures.
Kommersant, RIA Novosti
Gazprom: ukraine may benefit from pricing within Customs union
April 7, 2011
According to Gazprom estimates, Ukraine could save around $8 billion annually 
if it joined and benefited from the price regime in the CU. Ukraine currently 
receives gas priced according to a European price formula.
Whether or not Ukraine will join the CU depends on the country’s negotiations 
on a free trade area with the EU.
The Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly said Gazprom’s prices are 
unaffordable for the country’s economy and demanded revision of existing gas 
contracts. Although Kyiv has already received a discount of $100 per 1,000 m3 
of gas, the Government of Ukraine believes the cost is still too high. Ten-year 
contracts for Russian gas supply to Ukraine and its transit through the country 
were signed by Gazprom and Naftogaz in January 2009. The gas contract allows 
for quarterly price changes, which are calculated according to the generally 
accepted European formula. 
In April 2010 the two sides agreed a 30% discount on the gas price for Ukraine 
with a maximum discount of $100 per 1,000 m3. In return, Ukraine extended 
the lease allowing Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to be stationed in Crimea.
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In 2010 Ukraine imported 36.5 billion m3 of gas from Russia and plans to import around 40 billion m3 in 2011. 
During the first half of 2011 Ukraine purchased about 27 billion m3 of Russian gas. According to the summer 
contract between Naftogaz and Gazprom, the gas price is reviewed on a quarterly basis based on an oil price 
matrix. Thus, the gas price for Ukraine may increase to $354 per 1,000 m3 in the third quarter of 2011 and 
$388 per 1,000 m3 in the fourth quarter (prices are $264 per 1,000 m3 in the first and $297 per 1,000 m3 in 
the second quarter of 2011). Ukraine has repeatedly asked for the contract terms to be changed and for the gas 
price to be tied to coal prices.
Expert Online, RBK daily, top.rbc.ru
Note:
Gas issue burdens ukrainian-Russian relations
July 11, 2011 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich has declared there will be no merger 
between Gazprom and Naftogaz of Ukraine. Gas prices remain a major problem 
for Kyiv. However, Gazprom chief executive Alexei Miller explicitly linked the 
possibility of lowering Russian gas prices for Ukraine with the merger of Gazprom 
and Naftogaz. Thus, the parties have come to a deadlock in negotiations, which 
will be very difficult to work through. 
The merger with Naftogaz could enable Gazprom to influence the 
Ukrainian gas transportation system (GTS), and thus significantly reduce the 
export risk on this route. However, its sole participation in modernising the 
GTS is no longer attractive. Belarus ceded control over its pipeline to 
Gazprom in exchange for lower gas prices. Ukraine’s reluctance to follow suit 
is politically motivated.
Raising tariffs for gas transit and becoming embroiled in gas conflicts will 
eventually lead to a further increase in the capacity of alternative transit routes. 
Moreover, Ukraine is unable to provide the substantial investment required 
to modernise the GTS. Kyiv’s insistence on a guaranteed loading level for its 
gas pipeline appears to be the stumbling block in negotiations on a Gazprom-
Naftogaz merger. Given the large-scale transport projects that are aimed at 
reducing the volumes of gas transiting through Ukraine, Gazprom cannot give 
such guarantees. However, the conflict of interests may possibly be resolved 
by Gazprom’s acquisition of a stake in Naftogaz, following the Ukrainian 
President’s efforts to restructure Naftogaz and prepare the company for initial 
public offering (IPO). According to Yanukovich, the company is overburdened 
and does not always function efficiently. He believes its structure should be 
divided up (Naftogaz incorporates 11 subsidiaries) and the different parts 
developed individually. Those individual companies should register on world 
stock exchanges and hold IPOs, he says.
RBK daily
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ukraine ready to help LuKoIL in launching odessa Refinery
July 18, 2011 
Ukrainian authorities are ready to help Russian oil major LUKOIL re-launch the 
Odessa Refinery, which has been idle for nine months. Ukraine’s First Deputy 
Prime Minister Andrei Klyuyev instructed the Ministry of Energy and the Coal 
Industry to hold talks with the management of LUKOIL on launching the refinery 
operations. 
Note:
Due to current conditions in the Ukrainian market for petroleum products it has become uneconomic to operate 
the Odessa refinery. LUKOIL has therefore decided to shift the scheduled maintenance at the refinery from the 
first quarter of 2011 to the fourth quarter of 2010. Oil refining in Ukraine is uneconomic because Ukraine 
imports large amounts of oil products from Belarus at dumping prices. Kremenchug and Lisichansk refineries 
are also making losses due to Belarusian imports. Furthermore the Odessa refinery lost its main oil supply route 
after the Odessa-Brody pipeline switched to transporting Azeri oil to Belarus.
RBK daily
Russian-ukrainian gas conflict nearing resolution
September 27, 2011 
The gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine reached its height in late summer 
2011. On September 1, Ukraine’s Energy Minister announced that from 2012 
Ukraine intends to drastically curtail Russian gas purchases to 27 billion m3 
(compared to a planned purchases of 41.6 billion m3 2011) and to submit 
an appeal to the Court of Arbitration in Stockholm to have the gas contract 
amended.
On September 2, Ukraine resumed negotiations with Gazprom on curtailing 
gas deliveries. In addition, Kyiv proposed amending gas transit terms for 2012. 
By September 5 relations between the two countries had deteriorated further. If 
talks over the current gas contract fail, it is very likely that Ukraine will liquidate 
its national energy company Naftogaz, which will force a review of gas contracts 
between Russia and Ukraine. 
On September 17, the Ukrainian authorities expressed their readiness to make 
concessions on Russian gas supplies in the context of Gazprom’s legally binding 
agreement with its partners to build the South Stream pipeline, which bypasses 
Ukraine. On September 26, Yanukovich visited Moscow to discuss the possible 
establishment of a gas consortium, and finally the parties reached a truce. 
Following talks between the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine, also attended by 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Russia dropped its insistence on Ukraine 
acceding to the CU and was prepared to discuss a trilateral gas consortium with 
the EU on the basis of Ukraine’s gas transportation system. On September 27, 
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Ukraine announced new terms for Russian gas deliveries. Kyiv is bringing down 
the price for gas transit in exchange for gas price discounts for consumers in the 
public and social sectors. The parties’ mutual concessions total $1.5 billion.
Kommersant, Expert Online, RBK daily 
MISCELLANEouS
Russia abolishes duties on exports of oil products to Kyrgyzstan
January 21, 2011
From January 1, 2011, Russia lifted duties on oil products exported to 
Kyrgyzstan. The verbal agreement followed a meeting between Russian 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his newly appointed Kyrgyz counterpart, 
Almazbek Atambayev. Kyrgyzstan and Russia have been in talks on introducing 
preferential duties on exports since mid 2010. Bishkek was keen to reduce 
vehicle fuel prices. Light oil products supplied to Kyrgyzstan became liable to 
customs duties from April 1, 2010, resulting in a price increase of over 30%. 
Kyrgyzstan hoped to cut the purchase price for oil products from the current 
$550-600 to $400 per tonne.
Russia supplied over 900,000 tonnes of oil products to Kyrgyzstan in 2010, with 
Gazprom Neft being Russia’s primary vendor, accounting for around 500,000 
tonnes of the total supplied.
RBK daily
Belarus ratifies oil transportation agreement with ukraine
April 4, 2011
Belarus has ratified an intergovernmental agreement with Ukraine on oil 
transit. According to the Deputy Chairman of Belneftekhim Vladimir Volkov 
the intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in oil transportation 
through Ukraine to Belarus, signed in July 2010, was adopted with the aim 
of diversifying oil supplies to the Republic of Belarus. The agreement allows 
Belarus to significantly cut the cost of oil transportation by using Ukraine’s oil 
transportation infrastructure. The cost of transporting oil by rail has decreased 
from $66 to $42.5 per tonne, while the cost of transporting oil by pipeline has 
gone down to $15 per tonne.
As part of the agreement, Belarus undertakes to import 4 million tonnes of 
crude oil from Venezuela by April 2011, using Ukraine’s oil pipeline and 
rail transportation system. This figure will increase to 10 million tonnes 
subsequently.
The agreement sets the tariff for oil transportation through both countries by 
rail at $0.27 per tonne per 10 km, which is $22 per tonne lower than the 
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previous tariff. Before November 1 the parties are due to agree upon the volume 
and tariffs of oil transportation through the territory of Ukraine in subsequent 
years.
RIA Novosti
LuKoIL to raise funds for projects in uzbekistan
June 7, 2011
LUKOIL, Russia’s largest oil company, intends to raise $500 million to finance 
investment in the Kandym and Khauzak-Shady oilfields in Uzbekistan.
The consortium of lenders is expected to include international financial 
organisations, the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development 
Bank and commercial banks: BNP Paribas (Suisse) SA; Korea Development 
Bank; Crédit Agricole CIB; and UniCredit Group. The commercial loans 
will be underwritten by the ADB and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA).
The project is still subject to approval from the Republic of Uzbekistan. It is 
expected that financing will be secured by the third quarter of 2011.
Note:
The agreement on the Khauzak-Shady-Kandym project was signed on June 16, 2004. The Khauzak gas field 
was commissioned in November 2007. Production is estimated to reach 12 billion m3 of gas per year.
Kursiv.kz 
KMG interested in joint work with Gazprom Neft
June 9, 2011
KazMunayGaz, Kazakhstan’s national oil company, has requested talks with 
Gazprom Neft on implementing joint projects with Russia. Boris Zilbermints, 
Gazprom Neft’s Deputy General Director for Exploration and Production, said 
that Gazprom Neft may offer KMG not only its own assets but third party assets 
as well.
Note:
KazMunayGaz, Kazakhstan’s National Oil Company, is owned by Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund. 
Gazprom Neft (formerly Sibneft) is the oil arm of Gazprom, which owns over 95% of Gazprom Neft’s shares. 
As of 2010, Gazprom Neft’s consolidated oil production totalled around 52 million tonnes. The company 
plans to increase its oil production to 100 million tonnes by 2020 under a $70 billion oil business development 
strategy.
RIA Novosti, Kursiv.kz 
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Kazakhstan, Russia agree to abolish oil duties
July 18, 2011 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has signed a federal law “On Ratification 
of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
in Oil and Oil Product Supplies to the Republic of Kazakhstan”.
The document bans the application of export duties and other similar duties, 
taxes and levies to oil and oil products traded between the two countries. 
According to the new law, the relevant authorities of Russia and Kazakhstan 
will negotiate to balance output, consumption, supply, imports and exports 
of oil and oil products in both states. The countries will also coordinate 
volumes of oil delivered by Russia and Kazakhstan to Belarus, and deliveries 
of crude oil and derivative products between all three states (indicative 
balance). 
RBK, Kursiv.kz
Supplies of fuels to Kyrgyzstan to be resumed
July 20, 2011 
Kyrgyz Prime Minister Almazbek Atambayev visited Moscow to discuss the 
resumption of Russian oil product supplies to Kyrgyzstan. Omsk Refinery, the 
main supplier of Russian fuel to Kyrgyzstan, halted deliveries of high-octane 
AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline to Kyrgyzstan in early July, forcing many petrol 
stations to close, which led to panic buying, petrol queues and price hikes of 20- 
25%.
Experts believe that the petrol crisis has political roots. Should the fuel and 
lubricant crisis be successfully resolved before the elections on October 30, 
it will considerably improve Atambayev’s chances of winning another term in 
office.
Note:
Gazprom Neft Asia, which controls around 90% of gas stations in Kyrgyzstan, made an official statement on 
July 19, saying that the shortages of high-octane gasoline was a result of Russia’s new regulations that tightened 
quality requirements on goods for Russia’s domestic consumption. As a result, Omsk Refinery, which produces 
Euro-3 standard high-octane petrol, appeared to be overloaded with domestic product while deliveries to other 
countries suffered. Gazprom Neft Asia secured supplies of high-octane petrol from other Russian refineries, 
including the Kuibyshev, Salavat and Astrakhan Refineries. The refineries dispatched the petrol in time for a 
first shipment on July 21.
Kommersant-Online
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Bishkek may sell its oil and gas industry to Gazprom
September 8, 2011 
Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller met with Kyrgyz Prime Minister Almazbek 
Atambaev to discuss Gazprom’s work in Kyrgyzstan. Miller announced that 
his company plans to spend 3 billion roubles on oil and gas exploration in 
Kyrgyzstan. Miller indicated that Gazprom and the Kyrgyz government were 
working out the final details of Gazprom’s purchase of majority stakes in 
Kyrgyzgaz and Kyrgyzneftegaz, which together control almost the entire oil and 
gas industry in Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzneftegaz is the only Kyrgyz company involved in exploring and 
developing oil and gas fields, transporting and refining oil and selling oil 
products. Kyrgyzgaz retails gas to domestic consumers and is involved in the 
transit of Kazakh and Uzbek gas.
Kyrgyzstan’s proven natural gas reserves are very limited and amount to a mere 
6 billion m3. Investment in exploration has been insignificant up to now, and 
it is possible that the country’s reserves could be substantially higher, experts 
believe. Rough terrain and poor infrastructure have hindered exploration. 
Annual average gas production of 30 million m3 in Kyrgyzstan is significantly 
below consumption, which amounts to some 750 million m3. 
RBK daily
Kazakhstan to supply gas to Kyrgyzstan
September 29, 2011 
KazTransGaz is to sell 300 billion m3 of gas to Kyrgyzgaz as the government 
of Kazakhstan moves to help its neighbour following Kyrgyzstan‘s failure to 
negotiate gas supplies with Uzbekistan. According to the contract, Kazakhstan 
will sell the gas at a price of $295 per 1,000 m3, which is $15 per 1,000 m3 
lower than the price offered by Uztransgaz for the fourth quarter of 2011. 
According to Kyrgyz Energy Minister, Askarbek Shadiyev, Uzbekistan sold gas 
to Kyrgyzstan for $278 per 1,000 m3 in the third quarter of 2011, but raised the 
price to $310 in the fourth quarter.
In early 2011 Uzbekistan’s actions caused gas shortages in southern Kazakhstan. 
Reduced gas supplies from Uzbekistan and illegal siphoning off of gas in 
Kyrgyzstan led to a gas deficit in the southern regions of Kazakhstan. The state 
managed to make up the shortfall by buying Turkmen gas, delivered through 
the Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline. Potential gas shortages 
in southern Kazakhstan over winter will be averted by using gas from the 
Kazakhstan-China trunk line.
Kursiv.kz
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turkmenistan boosts gas deliveries to China
November 24, 2011
China signed an agreement with the Central Asian nation of Turkmenistan to 
boost its future annual natural gas purchases by 25 billion m3. The deal means 
Turkmenistan’s annual gas sales to China will eventually reach 65 billion m3, 
equivalent to more than half China’s entire natural gas consumption last year. 
The parties did not specify the start date for deliveries of additional volumes of 
gas. However, gas deliveries will probably not begin before construction of the 
third Central Asia-China pipeline is completed. The pipeline has a capacity of 
60 billion m3 of gas per year, and is due on stream in late 2015. Turkmenistan 
currently exports just over 12 billion m3 of gas to China annually (based on 
January-October figures).
A new agreement with Turkmenistan may once again complicate the negotiations 
between China and Russia’s Gazprom, which have been dragging on for several 
years without any successful outcome.
Note:
Until recently Russia was the principle buyer of Turkmen gas. However, relations between the two states were 
strained after an accident on the Central Asia-Centre-4 (CAC-4) gas pipeline in Turkmenistan in April 2009. 
Although the pipeline was repaired, deliveries of Turkmen gas to Russia were not resumed. Russia began 
importing again only in early 2010, lifting 10 billion m3 of Turkmen gas per year, down 80% from the pre-
accident level (50 billion m3 annually). Turkmenistan had to search for other markets. According to the Bank of 
Moscow, Turkmenistan exported 21 billion m3 of gas in 2010, including 10 billion m3 to Russia, 7 billion m3 
to Iran and 4 billion m3 to China.
RBK daily
ENERGY
Kazakhstan ratifies Kazakh-Russian agreement on construction of third unit 
of Ekibastuz GRES-2
January 17, 2011 
The President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev signed the law “On 
Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the Government of the Russian Federation on Construction 
and Operation of the Third Power Unit of the Ekibastuz GRES-2 Power Plant”. 
The agreement was signed in July 2010. Project costs are estimated at $700 
million.
At present the installed capacity of Ekibastuz GRES-2 is 1,000 MW with its two 
power units accounting for 12% of all electricity produced in Kazakhstan. The 
construction of the third power unit will increase the installed capacity of the 
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power plant by 50%. Ekibastuz GRES-2 Station JSC is owned jointly by Russian 
and Kazakh shareholders (half each by Inter RAO UES and Samruk-Kazyna).
The two countries also signed an agreement on integration and cooperation on 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy and a Joint Statement by Rosatom, Russia’s 
State Nuclear Energy Corporation, and Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s National 
Atomic Company.
IA Novosti-Kazakhstan
Russia to invest in Afghanistan’s electricity system 
January 21, 2011 
Russia’s state-controlled energy trader Inter RAO is to invest $500 million in 
a project to supply electricity to Afghanistan, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
said during a meeting with Afghan leader Hamid Karzai. The $680 million 
CASA-1000 project involves the construction of power transmission lines from 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Putin said that if Inter RAO bid successfully to be the project’s operator, 
the Russian company could take an active part in the construction of high-
voltage electric power lines as part of the CASA-1000 project, bringing Russian 
investment to a total of $500 million.
Finam.ru
Nuclear integration
April 4, 2011
Russia and Kazakhstan have signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy, which foresees inter alia the construction of a nuclear power plant in 
Aktau, the first two reactors of which would be commissioned in 2016.
One of the flagship joint projects is a new uranium enrichment centre at the 
Uralsk Electrochemical Plant. Back in 2007 Russia and Kazakhstan had agreed 
to construct the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) on the basis of 
the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex. The IUEC is currently engaged in 
storing enriched uranium. In the longer term it will also recycle spent fuel from 
abroad. However, during the EurAsEC summit in 2010 in Astana Russian atomic 
specialists put forward an alternative proposal for another uranium enrichment 
centre (UEC) at the Uralsk Electrochemical Plant in Novouralsk. 
Russia and Kazakhstan will have an equal stake in the project. Rosatom’s 
subsidiary, TVEL Fuel Company, purchased 50% of shares in UEC on March 
25. The remaining 50% is owned by Kazatomprom. The parties have not yet 
disclosed any information about the cost of Kazakhstan’s share in the joint 
venture, the date construction will begin or the investment required.
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Kazatomprom has become one of the leading uranium handling companies; 
however it is unable to perform the enrichment stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
Under certain agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan may become a co-owner 
of Novouralsk Chemical Plant, gaining access to a guaranteed share of its 
production and the right to use the plant as it requires. In return Russia will 
receive a 50% stake in several companies in Southern Kazakhstan, giving the 
country access to Kazakh raw materials.
Expert Kazakhstan, Expert
Inter RAo resumes electricity supplies to Belarus 
July 4, 2011 
Russia’s electricity supplier Inter RAO UES has resumed electricity supplies to 
Belarus after the latter transferred the third and final tranche of its debt in the 
amount of 611 million roubles. The second tranche of debt was repaid on June 
29. Belarus borrowed from BPS-Bank (a subsidiary of Sberbank) to repay its 
debts for Russian electricity amounting to a total of 1.5 billion roubles.
Chronology of conflict:
Inter RAO UES first announced that Belarus had run into debt for electricity on June 8, 2011. Russia’s electricity 
supplier warned that it would halt deliveries; however the parties managed to negotiate a delay in payment until 
July 5. The debt was to be repaid in several tranches. The first tranche of 600 million roubles was transferred 
within the period stipulated. However, Belarus failed to make the second payment by the June 20 deadline, 
and Inter RAO UES threatened to discontinue electricity deliveries on June 22. Following talks, the parties 
agreed to postpone the second payment for another week. However, Belarus once again defaulted and power 
supplies were cut off on June 29, leading to another crisis in relations between Russia and Belarus.
Unlike gas supply disruptions, power cuts are not critical for Belarus since it produces enough electricity power 
to cover 90% of its domestic consumption and imports the remaining 10%. Because Belarus uses Russian gas to 
produce electricity, the cost of domestically produced energy is 30% higher than that of imported power. HPPs 
produce a small proportion of the country’s energy, and a nuclear power plant is currently in the design phase. 
At present Belarus is working on importing electricity from Ukraine. Minsk has tried to reach an agreement 
with Gazprom on freezing gas prices in 2011 and anticipates a price cut in 2012. Belarus is keen to secure 
pricing identical to Russia’s domestic tariff, since Russia and Belarus will be part of the Single Economic Space 
from January 2012. But prices for Belarus are currently more than twice as high: in the second quarter of 2011 
Belarus was paying $245 per 1,000 m3 of gas and prices are about to rise to $300-$305 per 1,000 m3 by year 
end. Smolensk region, Belarus’ reference point, buys gas for $106-$117 per 1,000 m3. The conflict continues 
to escalate. On July 1 Belarus tried to raise tariffs for the transit of oil products by 15.9% to $1.9 per tonne per 
100 km. The decision was approved by Belarusian Energy Ministry. However, the head of Gazprom stated that 
“price conditions of the operating contract for gas deliveries are not liable to variation”. According to experts, 
Moscow is acting tactically to force Minsk to sell the remaining part of Beltransgaz, the operator of its national 
gas transportation system.
Kommersant, RBK daily, Expert 
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Belarus
Moscow, Minsk resume energy cooperation
January 25, 2011
Rosatom chief Sergei Kiriyenko met with Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail 
Myasnikovich to plan the timetable for drafting agreements on the construction 
of Belarus Nuclear Power Plant and a methodology for costing the project. 
The parties plan to sign intergovernmental agreements on the NPP and parallel 
operation of power grids in February-March 2011. A master contract for the 
NPP construction will be signed by September. The first reactor is due to be 
commissioned by 2017. According to Kiriyenko, the cost of the dual reactor 
NPP with a total capacity of 2.4 GW should amount to $6-7 billion, or $2,500-
2,900 per kW of installed capacity. 
Moscow and Minsk have been in talks since 2009 on constructing the first 
nuclear power plant in Belarus. Negotiations focused on the amount that Russia 
would lend for the project and on creating a joint venture to sell the electricity 
produced. Minsk insisted that Russia should finance the construction of the 
NPP and its infrastructure, and requested a total of around $9 billion. In August 
2010, when the foundations of the joint venture were in place, Belarus suddenly 
pulled out of establishing the company. Now the parties have agreed credit 
terms and the loan agreement may be signed in June 2011.
A joint venture between Belenergo and Inter RAO UES will sell and distribute 
power. Both sides signed the agreement necessary to operate their power grids 
in parallel. The agreement states that electricity produced by the first reactor of 
the Belarus NPP will be directed to the Belarusian domestic market, while the 
second unit will produce for export. Resolving the issues relating to the NPP and 
sales of its output has helped to ease tension in energy relations between Russia 
and Belarus. Moreover, the agreement specifies the resumption of interstate 
cross-flows, which were halted by Belarus in early 2010.
Kommersant
Belarus Npp construction faces difficulties
June 29, 2011 
The licence to construct a Russian-designed nuclear power plant in the 
Grodno region of Belarus should be granted by October 2011, head of the 
Belarusian Energy Ministry’s Nuclear Energy Department Nikolai Grusha 
said. He added that Belarus would go ahead with excavating ground for the 
foundations of the NPP in the fourth quarter of 2011 despite the temporary 
lack of a licence. The senior managers of Atomenergoproekt (a member of 
the Rosatom group of companies), the lead design company for the Belarus 
NPP, announced that the initial construction work (i.e., the plant’s foundations) 
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would begin in autumn 2012, after the technical design had been approved 
and a construction licence issued. The design of the Belarus NPP is identical 
to nuclear power plants being built in the Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions of 
Russia, except for the water supply system. 
Despite stiff opposition from neighbouring Lithuania and occasional 
disagreements between Russia and Belarus on economic issues, preparations for 
the construction of the Belarus NPP, which will reduce Belarusian consumption 
of Russian gas by 25%, are under way. Belarus has simultaneously proposed 
cooperation with the Republic of Korea in the field of nuclear energy. Belarus 
is keen to train nuclear power specialists, and to share Korean technology for 
constructing and maintaining nuclear power plants, and protecting personnel 
from radiation exposure.
Note:
The proposal to build a nuclear plant in Belarus was made by the country’s President Alexander Lukashenko in 
April 2007 when his country was facing the inevitable rise in prices for Russian gas (95% of Belarusian power 
plants are gas-fired) and Lithuania’s plans to decommission the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, its largest source 
of electricity, in late 2009. At the time it was decided that the first Belarusian nuclear power station would 
be constructed by Russia’s Atomstroyexport (part of the Rosatom State Corporation and a leading engineering 
company with expertise in constructing nuclear power facilities abroad). In addition, Russia was to supply 
fuel to the power plant for its whole lifetime, evacuate the plant’s nuclear waste back to Russian territory, and 
provide a loan of $7 billion for its construction. Belarusian contractors were to do most of the construction 
work. In return Belarus agreed to trade in the electricity output of the NPP jointly with Russia. Russia pledged 
to grant Belarus a loan for building the two NPP reactor units of Russian AES-2006 design with a total capacity 
of 2.4 GW. The reactors may be commissioned in 2016-2018.
Expert Online
ukraine
Russia, ukraine agree upon joint nuclear fuel production
February 3, 2011 
In late January the Ukrainian state-run Nuclear Fuel group of companies and 
TVEL Fuel Company of Russia drafted a joint venture agreement to produce 
nuclear fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power plants.
In autumn 2010 TVEL won a tender to build a nuclear fuel plant and signed 
the agreement on October 27, giving TVEL a 50% minus one share in the joint 
venture, while Ukrainian Nuclear Fuel will retain the controlling stake. The 
parties have also resumed technical and economic feasibility studies for the 
plant, which were suspended after the administration of the then President of 
Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko switched to partner with Westinghouse. Rosatom 
and TVEL worked very hard to negotiate the construction of a nuclear fuel 
plant and long-term fuel supply contracts for the country’s four nuclear power 
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stations (15 reactors of Soviet designed VVER type) before the current Ukrainian 
President Viktor Yanukovich came to power.
The parties have not specified any date for signing the agreement and starting 
construction. It was announced earlier that the plant could start operating 
in 2012. However, even the location of the plant is still unclear. Ukraine is 
currently considering four sites, including the Eastern Mining and Processing 
Integrated Works and Pridneprovsk chemical plant in the Dnepropetrovsk 
region, and sites in the Sumy region. 
Kommersant 
ukraine may rival Russia in nuclear fuel production
September 15, 2011 
Ukraine’s state-run Nuclear Fuel group and Russia’s TVEL Fuel Company (part 
of Rosatom) have established a join venture to construct a nuclear fuel plant in 
Ukraine’s Kirovograd region. The plant will supply fuel to Ukrainian nuclear 
power stations. The controlling interest in the joint venture belongs to Ukraine. 
Four Ukrainian nuclear power plants (Zaporozhye, South Ukraine, Rovno and 
Khmelnitsky) are the largest foreign consumers of nuclear fuel produced by 
Rosatom. In 2010 TVEL supplied nuclear fuel to Ukraine’s Energoatom National 
Nuclear Energy Generating Company for a total $608.1 million. As tensions 
between Russia and Ukraine eased, the states agreed that Russia would build 
the two new reactor units at Khmelnitsky NPP to cover the shortfall in generating 
capacity in the western regions of Ukraine. Russia will also grant a discount on 
the nuclear fuel price. It was also agreed that Russia would build a facility 
to help Ukraine develop full nuclear fuel cycle technologies, by licensing 
such technologies on a non-exclusive basis. There were also commitments 
from Russia to provide uranium enrichment services on a long-term basis and 
on favourable commercial terms. At the same time Ukraine is continuing to 
support Rosatom’s rival, Westinghouse, in its efforts to expand its business 
in the country. Under President Viktor Yushchenko Westinghouse signed an 
agreement with Energoatom on nuclear fuel supplies to the three reactors of the 
South Ukraine NPP in 2011-2015 with the prospect of supplying a further six 
reactors at other Ukrainian NPPs. These deals put Russia in a tricky situation. 
On the one hand, TVEL and Nuclear Fuel had made joint statements that the 
construction of a $370 million nuclear fuel production plant based on Russian 
technology was under way. Meanwhile, in early September Westinghouse’s 
fuel had already been delivered to the second reactor at the South Ukraine NPP 
and may be supplied to the Zaporozhye NPP by year-end. Moreover, in August 
the Ukrainian Energy Ministry published a draft Nuclear Code which states that, 
for energy security purposes, Ukraine should purchase nuclear fuel from two 
or more sources, while draft amendments to the Energy Strategy for Ukraine 
to 2030 suggest legislating for at least two nuclear fuel plants constructed by 
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different engineering companies. According to Nuclear Fuel General Director 
Tatiana Amosova, the Russian-Ukrainian plant will not only cover Ukraine’s 
nuclear fuel requirements but will also allow Ukraine to export one third 
of the fuel it produces. So whilst Russia and Ukraine are due to commence 
construction of a nuclear plant in Ukraine and begin licensing nuclear fuel cycle 
technologies, Ukraine appears to be giving assurances to Russia whilst looking 
towards America and possibly considering a Chinese nuclear fuel supply. Thus, 
by building a nuclear fuel plant in Ukraine, Rosatom risks creating a rival for 
itself that will start selling nuclear fuel at dumping prices to other players which 
the Russian nuclear giant traditionally supplies.
Expert Online 
fINANCE
Sberbank expands its activity in Kazakhstan
May 19, 2011 
The Kazakh subsidiary of Russia’s Sberbank plans to be among the top three 
lending institutions in the country, Sberbank’s president German Gref said at 
the Foreign Investors’ Council on May 18 in Astana. Sberbank’s Kazakh arm 
plans to issue bonds totalling 100 billion tenge ($684 million) by the end of 
2012. Currently Sberbank ranks ninth among Kazakhstan’s 39 banks in terms 
of assets. 
During his visit to Astana Gref underlined that Kazakhstan remains an important 
market for Sberbank.
Earlier Sberbank said that the bank’s growth in Kazakhstan may involve the 
acquisition of the local BTA Bank. The final decision on this is still to be taken.
Note:
Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund currently owns an 81% stake in BTA Bank. 
RBK daily 
Development Bank of Kazakhstan, Vnesheconombank sign credit agreement
June 15, 2011
Within the framework of the SCO Interbank Consortium Council meeting, the 
Development Bank of Kazakhstan and Russia’s Vnesheconombank signed an 
Addendum opening a $300 million credit facility to the Agreement on the 
General Terms of Opening a Credit Line concluded on September 22, 2008.
The parties intend to continue financing projects that will ultimately supply 
Russian products, including industrial goods, and services, to Kazakhstan.
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Implementation of the agreements will help promote Russian industrial 
exports, enhance economic ties between Russia and Kazakhstan, and expand 
the use of Russian currency in servicing and funding foreign economic 
activity.
Kursiv.kz
VtB Kazakhstan granted membership of KASE
July 1, 2011 
The Kazakhstan Stock Exchange Board of Directors admitted VTB Kazakhstan, 
the subsidiary of Russian state-owned VTB Bank, as a member of KASE foreign 
exchange market on June 30, 2011. The bank is now entitled to engage in 
trading at KASE. 
VTB opened in Kazakhstan and has been offering a range of banking services to 
corporate and private clients since May 2009.
Kursiv.kz
New participant on Kazakhstan’s banking market
August 4, 2011 
Promsvyazbank, one of Russia’s ten largest banks by assets, is considering 
opening a representative office in Kazakhstan. Promsvyazbank vice president 
Anna Belyaeva expressed the hope that Kazakhstan’s banking market would be 
a lucrative target for the bank’s foreign expansion and noted that the market in 
Kazakhstan is one of the most important in the CIS. For ten years, Promsvyazbank 
has been successfully developing interbank cooperation in the region, servicing 
trade flows between Russia and Kazakhstan.
Kursiv.kz
Belaruskali to hold Ipo
June 30, 2011
Belarus will hold an initial public offering for the potash mining company 
Belaruskali which accounts for around 15% of global potash fertilizer production, 
First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Semashko announced. Belarus is prepared 
to place 10-15% of the shares in Belaruskali, Semashko announced. The 
company is currently 100% state-owned. However, the estimated IPO date 
and the stock value were not disclosed.
In June 2011 the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko valued Belaruskali 
at $30 billion. Previously, the Belarusian authorities had planned to sell up 
to 25% in Belaruskali for $6-7 billion. Sources subsequently revealed that the 
possible sale of a controlling stake in Belaruskali to Nafta Moskva investment 
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group for $15 billion was being planned. However, Uralkali, the Russian potash 
giant, was later thought to be the most likely buyer of Belaruskali. Nevertheless, 
Uralkali’s Director General Vladislav Baumgertner stated that although the 
acquisition of Belaruskali was of interest, it was highly unlikely a deal will be 
closed in the short term.
Reuter
Belaruskali raises credit 
August 15, 2011
Russia’s Sberbank and Deutsche Bank AG agreed to lend $2.3 billion to 
Belarusian potash mining company Belaruskali. The loan will be secured against 
export contracts and a 35% stake in the company as collateral. Belaruskali’s 
annual revenues amount to around $3 billion, and according to analysts the 
35% stake is worth around $5 billion, therefore the collateral would appear 
viable without the need to account for political risk. 
Russia has considered different ways of helping Belarus tackle its financial 
crisis and dwindling gold and foreign currency reserves. Credit financing in 
partnership with western banks minimises political risk. The 35% collateral 
stake in Belaruskali would prevent Belarus selling those shares to companies in 
Asian countries which, as major consumers of potash fertilizers, are interested 
in securing stable deliveries and low prices.
Expert, RBK daily 
Belarus offers 51% of Naftan as loan collateral
September 21, 2011 
The Belarusian government and Sberbank of Russia are continuing to negotiate 
a $1 billion loan to Belarus, which is prepared to offer government guarantees 
and 51% of Naftan Refinery shares as collateral, Deputy Prime Minister of 
Belarus Sergei Rumas said at a press conference in Minsk. Belarus did not 
want to pledge the shares of Belaruskali, one of its most successful companies, 
Rumas said, therefore an agreement was reached with Sberbank that the loan 
would be secured by a government guarantee and shares of another enterprise 
as collateral.
Note:
Belarus had earlier rejected a $2 billion loan from Sberbank and Deutsche Bank on terms offered by the 
Russian bank including 35% of Belaruskali as collateral.
Expert Online
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tRANSpoRt AND LoGIStICS
Russia enters Kazakhstan’s terminal operations and cargo  
handling market 
April 11, 2011 
In mid March TransContainer, the Russian intermodal freight operator, acquired 
a 67% stake in JSC KedenTransService, a leading private cargo handling 
operator in Kazakhstan. KedenTransService operates 17 cargo handling 
terminals across Kazakhstan and owns a fleet of freight locomotives. Kazakhstan 
Temir Zholy (KTZh), the Kazakh state-owned railway company, will retain a 
33% stake in KedenTransService. 
The new business will bring cargo handling infrastructure and facilities 
under one banner, offering door-to-door cargo delivery services. Russia had 
considered the possibility of entering Kazakhstan’s terminal operations and 
cargo handling market in May 2009, when Russian Railways and KTZh signed 
a memorandum of cooperation. 
The Kazakh government is aiming to develop railway infrastructure to boost 
the region’s transit potential (for example, through the construction of the 
Western China-Western Europe International Transit Corridor, development 
of the Khorgos International Centre for Boundary Cooperation, construction of 
the Khorgos-Zhetygen railway and active use of a new Shar-Ust-Kamenogorsk 
railway line).
Penetrating Kazakhstan’s market is part of a long-term plan by RZD, which, 
in late 2010, signed a package of documents in Beijing establishing a joint 
Russian-Chinese venture for railway container traffic. 
RZD is simultaneously working on expanding its presence in Europe (for 
example, laying the 1,520 mm broad-gauge railway line to Vienna; entering 
the terminal operations market in Slovakia and, in the long term, Hungary, 
to develop container traffic between Russia and the Adriatic ports). Russia 
is also pursuing its goal of creating a transport corridor between the Asia-
Pacific region and Europe, and Kazakhstan fits neatly into this global 
scheme.
Analysts predict cooperation between RZD and KTZh in cargo handling could 
eventually lead to the creation of a single company to manage the railway 
infrastructure of Russia and Kazakhstan. Another view is that the carriers’ cross-
penetration in neighbouring infrastructure will be pursued as part of the CU; 
however, under current conditions, it would be almost impossible to unite rail 
infrastructure of both countries.
Expert Kazakhstan 
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Kazakhstan, Russia establish joint venture for grain  
transportation
June 1, 2011 
Rusagrotrans, Russia’s largest transporter of grain by rail, and Kaztemirtrans 
(a subsidiary of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy) have signed a joint venture agreement 
on grain transportation. The agreement was signed on June 1 in Sochi, 
during the Strategic Partnership-1520 railway business forum.  The venture 
will be one of the largest logistics and transport projects implemented in 
the CU.
Kazakhstan, a major grain producer and wheat exporter, faces an acute railcar 
fleet shortage. Current demand for railcars peaks at around 8,700, whereas 
Kaztemirtrans has only 5,200 cars at its disposal, which stand idle during 
less busy times. However, during the off-peak period, the grain cars could be 
used for transporting goods between Russia and Kazakhstan. The joint venture 
agreement targets a fleet of up to 10,000 grain cars. It will be established as a 
50:50 partnership with a capitalisation of $90 million. Part of the JV’s registered 
capital will be paid up in the form of railcars.
Kazakhstan is one of the world’s largest wheat exporters (according to the 
US Agriculture Ministry, the country produced around 17 million tonnes and 
exported 7.87 million tonnes of wheat in 2009-2010); however the lack of 
grain cars limits the country’s export potential. By creating a joint venture 
exporters of Russian grain will gain an additional opportunity to enter Asian 
markets using Kazakhstan as a transit route.
Vedomosti, Kursiv.kz
KtZh, VGK agree on freight-car circulation in Kazakhstan
September 27, 2011 
Russia’s Second Freight Company (VGK) and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy have 
agreed that VGK’s freight cars may now be used within Kazakhstan. The parties 
agreed that all VGK freight wagons listed in the automated fleet registration 
inventory system, which are leased out and circulate abroad, will be subject to 
unified tariffs and must carry all relevant documents of carriage when entering 
and travelling through Kazakhstan.
Note:
Russian Railways established the Second Freight Company (VGK) rail business in 2010. As of late 2011, 
the company’s total railcar fleet is around 180,000 wagons. VGK provides transport logistics and other 
services.
RIA Novosti, Kursiv.kz
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MACHINE BuILDING INDuStRY
Kazakhstan, RuSAL to create joint venture to produce railcars 
June 10, 2011
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has met with RUSAL CEO Oleg 
Deripaska. The parties discussed the signing of a letter of intent to create a 
joint venture to produce railcars. The parties agreed to launch an assembly line 
within 18 months of signing the letter of intent, and a full production cycle in the 
longer term. According to Deripaska, Russia and Kazakhstan have decided to 
upgrade facilities in order to increase production capacity by 20%. The parties 
have also introduced new technologies to reduce emissions from coal burning 
by around 40 times. Deripaska also briefed Nazarbayev on the performance of 
the Samruk Energy-RUSAL joint venture at the Bogatyr coal mine.
Note:
RUSAL is Russia’s largest aluminium producer and the world’s second largest producer of aluminium and 
aluminium oxide (as of 2009). The company was established in 2007. RUSAL’s total capacities are 4.4 million 
tonnes of aluminium and 12.3 million tonnes of aluminium oxide per year.
Kursiv.kz
Kostanay launches uAZ production project
June 10, 2011
A new plant to manufacture UAZ automobiles has been launched in Kostanay. 
The first 9,000 cars may be produced by 2015.
The plant is owned by the Sary-Arka Automotive Industry joint venture 
between Sollers of Russia and Kazakhstan’s Tobol Social and Entrepreneurial 
Corporation.
The project to mass-produce UAZ branded motor vehicles will cost $2.4 
billion. Tobol is allocating 210 million tenge (around $1.4 million) from its 
own resources. It was initially thought that the Kazakh government would assist 
with financing, but this is yet undecided, slowing down implementation of the 
project. 
Kursiv.kz
ukrainian and Russian air companies resume merger talks
November 7, 2011
Ukraine’s largest aircraft manufacturer, ANTONOV, is seeking joint-venture 
partners to produce AN-148 and AN-158 aircraft. The joint venture may include 
Voronezh Aircraft Company (VASO, Russia) and Russian financial institutions. 
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Russia decided to consolidate aircraft manufacturing assets in 2010, but 
the merger was impossible at the time because the Ukrainian assets are 
state-owned, and their corporatisation would take at least two years. The 
two parties currently own a joint venture, which coordinates the production, 
marketing and sale of aircraft but they have not transferred assets to the joint 
venture.
According to ANTONOV officials, the aircraft manufacturing concern does not 
have the resources necessary to independently develop mass production of 
AN-148 and AN-158 aircraft. Ukraine and Russia have not yet met their declared 
target of producing 12 and 24 AN-148 aircraft per year respectively.
Experts believe that an aircraft manufacturing joint venture will face fewer 
difficulties in attracting funds. Nevertheless Ukrainian analysts expressed 
concern that, given its superior production capacity, Russia is primarily 
interested in Ukrainian technologies. As a result, some ANTONOV assets may 
remain unsold. A complete integration of air companies is more profitable to 
Ukraine.
Kommersant Ukraine
AvtoVAZ to build assembly plant in Kazakhstan 
November 11, 2011
AvtoVAZ, Russia’s largest car maker, has announced plans to build a $500 
million assembly plant in Kazakhstan in 2015. The plant will focus on production 
of the next generation of Lada cars, as well as two models built on Renault-
Nissan global platforms. The new plant will have a capacity of 120,000 cars per 
year and will be located in the East Kazakhstan region of the country.
AvtoVAZ signed a memorandum on strategic cooperation with Kazakhstan’s 
ASIA AUTO car assembly plant and Yertis Social and Entrepreneurial 
Corporation on November 10, 2011. The memorandum foresees the 
establishment of a full-cycle car production plant, including welding and 
assembly lines, and the production of components.
The first assembly line producing 90,000 cars per year is due to be completed 
in 2015, and the second line in 2017. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of 
Industry and New Technologies, AvtoVAZ and Yertis will each take a 25% plus 
one share in the joint venture, while ASIA AUTO will be entitled to 50% minus 
two shares. The Kazakh authorities have provided land for the plant and have 
promised to build infrastructure for the site. 
The Kazakh-assembled cars will be sold in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Siberia 
and the Far East region of Russia.
RBK daily, Vedomosti, Finam.ru
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Kazakhstan develops light aviation
November 25, 2011
A new aircraft manufacturing plant, KazAviaSpektr, has been established in the 
Karaganda region of Kazakhstan. The plant will produce light aircraft under 
licence from Russia’s MVEN. The total cost of the project amounted to 1.648 
billion tenge (349 million roubles or around $11.2 million). In exchange for 
granting a licence, MVEN was given a 10% stake in the new plant. KazAviaSpektr 
will produce light aircraft, including Farmer-2 and Farmer-500 aircraft used for 
treating agricultural land with chemicals. The plant will reach its initial estimated 
capacity of 36 Farmer aircraft per year in 2012.
The Kazakh government will become the plant’s major customer. At present 
80% of Kazakhstan’s aircraft park consists of Soviet-era planes, which are 
obsolete.
KazAviaSpektr is Kazakhstan’s first aircraft manufacturing plant. 
Vedomosti
Kazakhstan’s plant to produce Kazan aircraft
December 28, 2011 
Kazakhstan’s first aircraft manufacturing plant will make 12 Farmer-2 agricultural 
aircraft, designed by Russia’s MVEL (Kazan), in 2012.
Plans to build Farmer agricultural aircraft were included in Kazakhstan’s 
Industrialisation Map and therefore the project received state support. The 
project helped create 125 new jobs. Initially the factory will assemble aircraft 
from kits. It also has facilities for moulding polymer composite components. 
Initially some parts and plane units will be supplied from Kazan. However, 
the Kazakh plant will eventually be able to produce the entire aircraft, with a 
capacity of around 50 planes per year. Kazakhstan’s demand for Farmer aircraft 
is estimated at approximately 500 planes; the plant has already received its first 
100 confirmed orders.
Kursiv
CoMMuNICAtIoN
Belarus sells stake in MtS JV
September 7, 2011 
The State Property Committee of Belarus has announced an auction to sell 
the Belarusian government’s 51% stake in mobile operator MTS Belarus. The 
auction has been scheduled for December 1, 2011. Bids are being accepted 
until November 15, 2011. In July, the State Property Committee Chairman 
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Georgy Kuznetsov said the Belarusian government valued the 51% stake in 
MTS Belarus at $960-970 million. 
Note:
The Belarusian-Russian limited liability company Mobile TeleSystems (MTS) has been providing GSM 900/1800 
mobile communication services in Belarus since 2002. UMTS-based services have been available since 2010. 
The founders are the Belarusian landline communication monopoly Beltelecom (51% of MTS’s registered 
capital) and the Russian mobile company Mobile TeleSystems (49%). 
Expert Online
otHER SECtoRS
Kazakh-Russian space cooperation
January 17, 2011
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has signed into law the ratification 
of the Russian-Kazakh intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in space 
research and the use of space for peaceful purposes, which was signed on May 
22, 2008. 
The agreement aims to create the necessary legislation and institutions to support 
mutually beneficial cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space. It 
regulates the partners’ use of intellectual property, confidential information, 
export controls and customs regulations. It also provides for tax breaks and 
preferential trade partnerships on goods from countries that are not party to the 
Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
The implementation of the agreement will facilitate joint space projects, the 
application of joint research and development work, and, consequently, the 
creation of a space industry in Kazakhstan. Russia and Kazakhstan will work 
together in Earth remote sensing; the development of spacecraft, launch vehicles 
and other equipment; the creation of ground-based space infrastructure; and in 
other spheres.
IA Novosti-Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan signs KazSat-3 agreement with Russia
June 21, 2011 
Kazakhstan’s National Space Agency (Kazkosmos) and Russia’s Reshetnev 
Information Satellite Systems (ISS) have signed a deal to build the KazSat-3 
telecommunication satellite.
ISS announced that it had contracted Thales Alenia Space, the European leader 
in satellite systems, to supply the KazSat-3 communications payload. The 
satellite will be based on the Express-1000N platform developed by ISS and 
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will be integrated and tested in ISS’ premises at Zheleznogorsk, Russia. The 
satellite is expected to be ready for service within 2.5 years and will have a 15-
year service life and provide TV, radio, and broadband internet services.  
Thales Alenia Space and ISS began jointly marketing satellites based on 
ISS’ Express-1000 platform in the early 2000s. Combining ISS’ and Thales 
Alenia Space’s products and skills to serve the Kazakh market emulates other 
important international projects, e.g., Amos-5 (an Israeli satellite) and Telkom-3 
(Indonesia).
Kursiv.kz
KazSat-2 launched
July 16, 2011 
Russia’s Proton-M booster rocket with a Breeze-M upper stage carrying a 
KazSat-2 geostationary communications and broadcasting satellite was 
launched from Baikonur on July 16, 2011.
The KazSat-2 satellite was placed into geosynchronous orbit at 86.5 degrees east 
longitude. The satellite has 16 active transponders; four of them will provide 
continuous TV broadcasting and the remaining 12 Ku-band transponders will 
handle fixed communications. Its launch mass was 1,330 kg, and its expected 
lifetime is 12.5 years. The contract to build the second KazSat-2 national 
satellite was signed in 2006 by the Kazakh Republican Space Communication 
Centre and the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Centre. French 
company EADS-Astrum developed the satellite control system. 
Kursiv.kz
pharmstandard acquires 55% stake in ukraine’s Biolek 
January 19, 2011 
Leading Russian pharmaceutical company JSC Pharmstandard has announced 
the acquisition of 55% stake in the Ukrainian company Biolek. The move 
followed the Ukrainian Antimonopoly Committee’s decision in November 
2010 to grant permission for the purchase of over 50% of the shares of Biolek. 
The deal was financed from Pharmstandard’s own funds.
Biolek, one of Ukraine’s top-20 pharmaceutical companies, produces 
immunobiological products, vaccines, serums, diagnostics products, culture 
mediums and blood products, as well as hormonal, antiviral, antibacterial and 
enzymatic agents.
According to unaudited data, Biolek’s sales reached $13.3 million in 2009, 
while 2010 projected sales will reach $17.7 million (a 23.3% increase year-on-
year). Exports account for 23% and domestic sales for 77% of the company’s 
revenue.
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Pharmstandard Director General Igor Krylov noted that Biolek is the company’s 
first acquisition in Ukraine. The Ukrainian market is the second largest after 
Russia in terms of sales volume. Pharmstandard’s current product range will be 
diversified with vaccines and serums, oncological and immunobiological drugs. 
Biolek’s products are largely sold in Russia; Pharmstandard plans to increase 
sales on the Russian and overseas markets.
Finam.ru
RuSAL may stop aluminium production in ukraine
April 11, 2011
Due to unresolved electricity pricing issues, RUSAL may disable all electrolysis 
units at the Zaporozhye Aluminium Plant, leaving only the foundry division 
functioning. RUSAL has long been trying to negotiate differentiated electricity 
tariffs for the plant. Due to the high cost of electricity, aluminium production 
at Zaporozhye Plant is unprofitable. In order to reduce losses to breakeven 
point RUSAL had to raise its prices in March. However, this made its products 
uncompetitive, and stocks began to accumulate, leading to a gradual shutdown 
of the plant’s electrolysis units. 
Note:
RUSAL, one of the world’s leading aluminium producers, accounts for around 10% of both the global aluminium 
market and the global aluminium oxide market. The company operates in 19 countries and exports its products 
mainly to Europe, North America, South East Asia, Japan and Korea.
RIA Novosti
AGRICuLtuRE
Russia halts milk powder exports from Belarus
May 19, 2011 
Russia has limited shipments of milk whey and milk powder from Belarus, but 
has placed no restrictions on the supply of butter and cheese. In late 2010 
the agriculture ministries of both countries signed a food balance for 2011, 
defining the precise amount of mutual supplies of foodstuffs. According to the 
document, Belarus would supply to Russia 65,000 tonnes of skimmed milk 
powder (compared to 32,000 tonnes in 2010), 20,000 tonnes of whole milk 
powder (12,000 tonnes in 2010), 50,000 tonnes of concentrated milk (40,000 
tonnes in 2010), 70,000 tonnes of butter (50,000 tonnes in 2010), 125,000 
tonnes of cheese and cottage cheese (116,000 tonnes in 2010).
Belarus suspended deliveries of milk whey and milk powder to the Russian 
market from May 18, 2011. Belarus is abiding by the commitments it made 
under a dehydrated milk agreement with Russia, and does not export such 
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products to Russia so as not to harm the interests of Russian farmers, Russian 
Minister of Agriculture Elena Skrynnik said. 
Note:
The current tensions between the two countries came as no surprise to the market since they arise every year 
during the “big milk” period. In June 2009 the Federal Service on Customers’ Rights Protection and Human 
Well-being Surveillance (Rospotrebnadzor) banned exports of 1,500 types of Belarusian dairy products to 
Russia. Belarus responded by introducing partial customs controls at its border with Russia. The “Milk War” 
was brought to an end after the two governments agreed technical terms and the volume of dairy imports into 
Russia. In mid May 2010 supplies of powdered milk from Belarus were stopped again until July. This year, due 
to the macroeconomic situation, the Belarusian Agriculture Ministry is taking a tougher stance in negotiations. 
The Belarusian rouble has been devalued, the country needs currency, and dairy products are the country’s 
major export commodities.
RBK daily, Kommersant
Kazakhstan squeezes Russian grain traders 
October 3, 2011
Russian grain exports have reached a record high of more than 9 million tonnes 
in just three months. To maintain the flow of exports, the Russian government 
is ready to reduce the tariff on transporting grain by rail to seaports. However, 
further expansion of Russian grain exports may be hampered by Kazakhstan, 
which is expecting a record grain harvest this year. Last week, for example, Egypt 
purchased 120,000 tonnes of grain from Russia and another 120,000 tonnes 
from Kazakhstan. The Kazakh government is subsidising rail transportation via 
Russia to the Mediterranean markets. The number of grain carriers is expected 
to double as Russian transport companies lease further rolling stock. According 
to the Kazakh Minister of Transport and Communications, Berik Kamaliyev, 
Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, the state-owned railway company, agreed to lease 
5,500 Russian grain cars, including 4,000 grain carriers from Rusagrotrans, 
1,000 cars from Tekhnotrans, and 500 cars from Baltic Grain House.
RBK daily
MILItARY AND poLItICAL CoopERAtIoN
CSto promotes collective security initiatives
February 16, 2011
Kyrgyz President Rosa Otunbayeva welcomed a delegation of the CSTO 
Secretariat headed by CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha. She 
acknowledged the urgent need to strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s state border. 
Otunbayeva said that Kyrgyzstan regards the CSTO as a key regional organisation 
ensuring the security of its member states. One of the country’s vital tasks is to 
protect and strengthen its borders. Decisions made by the CSTO on providing 
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military and technical aid and equipping border troops are also important, she 
noted.
Following a meeting with senior officials in the Kyrgyz Defence Ministry the 
parties evaluated the results of Kyrgyzstan’s military and technical cooperation 
with CSTO countries during the tragic events in the summer of 2010, discussed 
the prospects of further cooperation within the CSTO, and exchanged opinions 
on the current social and political situation in Kyrgyzstan. Bordyuzha said 
the purpose of his visit was to study Kyrgyzstan’s newly established system 
of governance and discuss a number of procedural issues with members of 
Kyrgyzstan’s government and the Prime Minister.
The CSTO delegation has suggested setting up a committee of chiefs of general 
staff and chiefs of armed service staff of the CSTO member states’ armed 
forces. A special Central Asian military grouping may be created to strengthen 
collective security. The multilateral grouping will comprise the Collective Rapid 
Deployment Forces (CRDF) and CRRF, as well as national military formations 
and troop units.
According to the CSTO Secretary General, the time is right to consider a 
coalition air defence force, as part of a Joint Air Defence System, headquartered 
in one of the region’s states.
www.dkb.gov.ru
Joint Air Defence System
April 14, 2011 
Kyiv hosted a meeting of the CIS Air Defence Coordination Committee of the 
CIS Defence Ministers’ Council to harmonise draft interstate agreements on 
establishing regional air defence systems in the Caucasus and Central Asian 
regions. Russia’s Defence Ministry did not specify a date for the possible signing 
of the agreements.
Expert Online
ukraine
Russian Defence Ministry plans to buy ANtoNoV AN-70
April 19, 2011 
On April 17-19, 2011 Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov met with 
his counterpart Mikhail Yezhel in Ukraine. The sides discussed military and 
technical cooperation between Russia and Ukraine and visited several military 
enterprises and military facilities in Crimea. The Defence Ministers met with 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich to discuss Russian-Ukrainian military 
relations.
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Serdyukov visited the NITKA ground-based naval pilot training centre, which 
Russia uses for training pilots of deck-based aircraft. The Ministers discussed 
the possibility of training cadets on Russian and Ukrainian naval vessels, and 
opportunities for the military academy faculty staff in both countries to exchange 
expertise. 
The two Defence Ministers toured the Black Sea Shipyard and the Shipbuilding 
Plant named after 61 Communards. In addition, the Russian Minister visited the 
ANTONOV State Aircraft Manufacturing Concern in Kyiv, where he discussed 
the Russian-Ukrainian project to build AN-70 medium military freighter and 
modernise AN-124 heavy military transport aircraft. According to Serdyukov, 
Russia’s Defence Ministry is interested in procuring AN-70 aircraft and is 
currently working on a joint venture to produce the planes in Russia. Russia will 
be ready to buy AN-70 aircrafts from 2015-2016, he said.
RIA Novosti
Black Sea fleet remains controversial 
May 13, 2011 
The April 2010 “Kharkov agreements” on extending the lease of a naval base 
to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet until 2042 have not resolved all outstanding issues. 
Russia and Ukraine have therefore agreed to establish a commission on Black 
Sea Fleet operations. The commission, made up of representatives from the 
Defence and Foreign Ministries of both states, will deal with contentious issues, 
such as the movement of Russian military units beyond the range of permanent 
deployment in Sevastopol.
In January 2011 the parties agreed that the two fleets could use lighthouses in 
Crimea (previously, navigation facilities have been the subject of heated debate). 
In addition, experts are considering options for Russia’s greater participation in 
the social and economic development of local communities close to where 
Black Sea Fleet military personnel are stationed.
Russia and Ukraine also agreed to draw up an inventory of land and real estate 
rented by the Black Sea Fleet. According to the 1997 Big Treaty, Russia leases 
3,312 ha of land in Sevastopol and around 15,000 ha in Crimea. The Black Sea 
Fleet may now be in a position to relinquish five land plots covering a total 749 
ha in the centre of Sevastopol because they are no longer strategically significant. 
If the Sevastopol authorities find investors for their development, Moscow will 
release this land. However, the plots may be placed at Russia’s disposal at short 
notice once again. The estimated cost of investment projects, which could be 
located on former naval land, amounts to $1.7 billion. Ukrainian investors do 
not have such sums, and foreign investors appear reluctant to invest in Crimean 
real estate. Russia therefore remains the only qualified potential investor in such 
large-scale commercial projects.
Expert Online
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ukraine to charge more rent for hosting the Black Sea fleet
November 18, 2011 
Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers has recommended that the authorities in 
Sevastopol should set the rental charges on land used by Russia’s Black Sea 
Fleet at a rate of 3% of their regulatory and monetary value in 2013 and at 
4% in 2014. The Cabinet also believes that Ukraine’s State Land Resources 
Agency, its Foreign and Defence Ministries and the State Property Fund should 
harmonise agreements on inventory and valuation of land used by the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine by 2013.
Inventory of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s non-military facilities in Crimea 
began, as agreed, on October 6, 2011. The Cabinet intends to compensate local 
authorities for any shortfall in their budget revenues caused by the deployment 
of the Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine’s Finance Ministry 
has suggested that the draft law on state budget should include additional 
subsidies.
In April 2011, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Gryshchenko said that 
the market value of the facilities leased to the Fleet will be calculated after the 
inventory of real estate is concluded.
Note:
From May 28, 2017 Russia will pay Ukraine $100 million annually in return for stationing the Black Sea Fleet 
in Crimea. Russia’s reduced rent will be calculated as 30% of the price of gas supplied to Ukraine.
Expert Online
Central Asia
Russia to extend lease of tajikistan military base
September 2, 2011 
The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the Tajik President Emomali 
Rahmon have given their Defence Ministries the task of preparing an agreement, 
for signature in early 2012, extending Russia’s lease of a military base in 
Tajikistan by 49 years. Following bilateral negotiations in Dushanbe, Medvedev 
noted that this agreement must be put together carefully, and must balance the 
interests of both Tajikistan and Russia. 
Note:
The Russian base in Tajikistan was set up in 2005 on the premises of the former 201st Motorised Rifle Division, 
a remnant of the Soviet period. The initial agreement signed in April 1999 and implemented in 2004 allowed 
the base to function until 2014. Russian military units are located in Dushanbe, Qurghonteppa and Kulab.
Expert Online, RBK daily 
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Central Asian states create joint disaster response centre
September 12, 2011 
The Minister of Emergency Situations of the Republic of Kazakhstan Vladimir 
Bozhko, and the Minister of Emergency Situations of the Kyrgyz Republic 
Bolotbek Borbiyev have signed the Agreement on Establishing the 
Intergovernmental Central Asian Centre for Disaster Response and Risk 
Reduction. Tajikistan’s State Committee for Emergency Situations and Civil 
Defence will sign the document later.
The Centre will be headquartered in Almaty and its remit is to improve regional 
cooperation and coordination in responding to disasters and reducing risk, 
thereby enhancing solidarity and improving the safety of people living in the 
Central Asian region. 
The Centre will regularly assess regional risk and response to transborder 
emergencies. Information and communication systems will be established 
to ensure effective risk assessment. The real-time gathering, processing and 
analysing of information will help monitor and prevent emergencies, and 
will be vital in launching early warning systems. A decision has been taken 
to create a data and geoinformation system to assess natural and man-made 
hazards to the population, infrastructure and geographic areas. All systems and 
databases will be integrated into international monitoring systems and networks 
for natural and man-made disasters. The Centre will also hold international 
exercises, rescue missions and humanitarian operations in Central Asia and other 
countries.
It is anticipated that the Central Asian Centre for Disaster Response and Risk 
Reduction will strengthen member states’ national platforms or other multi-
disciplinary mechanisms for reducing disaster risk in the region.
Expert Kazakhstan
Russia, Kazakhstan to set up joint air-defence system
September 22, 2011 
According to Colonel General Valery Gerasimov, deputy chief of the General 
Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces, Russia and Kazakhstan are planning to set up a 
joint air defence system in the near term. 
Russia already operates bilateral regional air defence systems with Belarus and 
Armenia and is planning a similar arrangement with Kazakhstan. Gerasimov 
noted that a bilateral air defence system with Kazakhstan could be created “in 
the nearest future”. At present Kazakhstan’s air defence system is part of the 
Joint CIS Air Defence System. 
Expert Online
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uS military base to remain in Kyrgyzstan till 2014 
November 23, 2011
The Manas US military base will remain in Kyrgyzstan till the year 2014, as 
agreed by Kyrgyzstan and the United States, Kyrgyzstan’s outgoing president 
Roza Otunbayeva said. She stressed that the base is vital for the international 
coalition force in Afghanistan. The fate of the Manas base after 2014 will 
depend largely on the situation in that country. Otunbayeva said that President-
elect Almazbek Atambayev had suggested that the base should be closed when 
the lease expires and the capital’s main airport, Manas, should be transformed 
into a civilian transit centre. Otunbayeva backed this proposal, noting that 
Kyrgyzstan needs a big transport hub to handle goods shipped from west to 
east and vice versa.
Note:
The Manas base was established in late 2001 after the United States went to war against the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The military base, which was subsequently renamed the Transit Centre, now 
accommodates about 1,200 American soldiers. 
Expert Online
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CIS countries: primary 
macroeconomic indicators
In 2011, the world’s debt problems, which became particularly critical in the 
Eurozone countries, had a negative effect on most of the economies of the CIS 
region and their short-term outlooks. The year was characterised by increased 
turbulence on financial markets, caused by a string of negative economic and 
financial outcomes. Deterioration of the economic situation in developed 
countries affected developing economies, which experienced a drop in external 
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demand for their products and a slowdown in foreign investment, resulting in 
the decline of the annual economic growth rate of China – the key driver of 
economic processes in the Asian region in 2011 – to below its 2010 level. 
As a result, global trade growth declined from 12.7% in late 2010 to 2.4% in 
December 2011, and the world GDP growth rate fell from 4.9% in 2010 to 
3.3% in 2011.
The CIS economies managed to resist the global trend, increasing their combined 
growth rate from 4.4% in 2010 to 4.6% in 2011 with the highest growth rate 
figure 14.2.
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recorded in Turkmenistan (14.7%) and the lowest in Azerbaijan (0.1%). A 
record high agricultural crop in CIS countries in 2011, in addition to the low 
base effect caused by the droughts in 2010, led to a weighted average increase 
of 20% in the region’s agricultural output following a 9% drop in 2010. Signs of 
recovery were also observed in the construction and financial sectors, especially 
in the second half of 2011. However, industrial output growth slowed down in 
the region’s largest economies, primarily due to a rise in prices for industrial 
products and a fall in demand.
Throughout 2011, the dynamics of current account balances were above all 
determined by significant fluctuations in prices for raw material resources and 
foodstuffs. In particular, the average annual price of Brent crude futures rose 
by 38.1% from $80.3 per barrel in 2010 to $110.9 in 2011. The price of gold, 
which was viewed by investors as a “safe haven” amid the unpredictability and 
volatility on the markets, also reached record highs. The trade surpluses of net 
exporters of raw materials grew significantly, bringing in additional revenues 
and helping to increase their gold and foreign exchange reserves. On the other 
hand, net importers of petroleum products and foodstuffs registered an increase 
in their trade deficits, which were to a considerable extent compensated for by 
a rise in cash remittances from labour migrants. This risk-sharing mechanism 
allowed most of the CIS countries to largely alleviate the growing risks and 
withstand the slowdown in the world economy.
The region’s balance of payments account in 2011 was characterised by an 
outflow of surplus capital in the form of direct and portfolio investment from 
net oil-product-exporting countries, and by an inflow of direct investment and 
credit to the labour-exporting countries that are also net importers of crude oil 
and foodstuffs. According to the balance of payments data, the region’s overall 
net capital outflow (the current account balance excluding changes in central 
bank reserves) exceeded $80 billion in 2011.
Therefore, the region’s 2011 balance of payments dynamics led to a net 
increase of $33 billion (about 1.5% of the region’s GDP) in the reserve assets 
of the central banks. The largest increase in foreign exchange reserves occurred 
in Azerbaijan, where reserves grew by 19.3% of GDP, while in Ukraine they 
decreased by 1.7% of GDP. In 2011, the real effective exchange rate of the 
national currency appreciated by 6.9% in Kyrgyzstan, 5.9% in Moldova and 
4.8% in Russia, and fell by 12.7% in Belarus and 1.4% in Armenia.
An increase in foreign currency proceeds and the economic revival in the region 
had a favourable effect on CIS countries’ public revenues, facilitating increases 
in social spending and public sector wages. Increased public revenues from 
exports and a moderate fiscal policy led to the emergence of significant budget 
surpluses in Kazakhstan and Russia. In the countries with chronic budget 
deficits, external public debt was high. Nevertheless, the economic situation 
made it possible to decrease external public debt in most of the CIS countries. 
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figure 14.3.
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Public debt decreased by 6% of GDP on average in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Ukraine.
The rise in prices, which was mainly caused by a surge in world prices for raw 
materials and foodstuffs, slowed down significantly in late 2011 and early 2012, 
partially due to tightening of monetary policy in all CIS countries. In March 
2012, the lowest inflation rates were observed in Kyrgyzstan (0.2%), Azerbaijan 
(1.8%) and Armenia (1.9%). The Belarusian economy, which suffered from a 
severe balance of payments crisis in 2011, showed signs of stabilisation due 
to a sharp depreciation of the national currency and anti-crisis measures taken 
by the government, allowing to stop the Belarusian ruble’s devaluation , and 
decelerate  price growth, which reached 106.5% year on year in March.
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Commercial banks revived their lending activities in 2011. The volume of loans 
issued in roubles increased by more than 25% in Russia, substantially exceeding 
the 2010 growth rate of 5.6%. In Kazakhstan, lending in tenge rose by 21.5%. 
The 2011 credit expansion was characterised by a relatively slow rise in foreign 
currency lending, at least in major CIS economies. In the latter half of 2011, 
companies increased their investment activity; however, it remained restrained 
given the private sector’s uncertainty over the risks associated with negative 
external factors. The share of problem loans in the loan portfolio of the CIS 
countries’ banking sectors gradually decreased but remained significant. 
figure 14.5.
State budget: 
consolidated budget 
balance (% of GDP)
Source: the CIS 
Statistics Committee, 
national agencies
figure 14.6.
Monetary sphere: 
CpI growth  
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Source: national 
agencies
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In the second half of 2011 and early 2012, many experts made a downward 
revision of their forecasts for world economic growth. National agencies in the 
CIS countries also lowered their forecasts. Consensus GDP growth forecasts 
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were considerably lowered in Belarus (a decrease of 3.5% from 4.6% to 1.1%); 
Ukraine (a decrease of 0.9%); Russia (down 0.5%), and Moldova (0.4%). At 
the same time, GDP growth forecasts for Central Asian countries were revised 
upward. As a result, while in the middle of 2011 the region’s economic growth 
forecast for 2012 was 4.6%, at present the weighted average consensus forecast 
is 4.1% for 2012 and 4.3% for 2013.
Given the continuing recession in the world economy, some external risk does 
remain, due to the high dependence of the region’s large economies on external 
demand for the raw materials that constitute the bulk of their exports. The debt 
crisis in European countries may seriously affect the stability of the global financial 
system, and also poses a threat to the growth of the CIS economies. According 
to the EDB’s forecast, if oil prices remain at the current level of around $115 
a barrel or decline slightly, the region’s weighted average economic growth 
rate would amount to 4.9% in 2012 and increase to 5.2% in 2013. A more 
figure 14.7.
Azerbaijan: 
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
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pessimistic scenario assumes further deterioration in the economic situation 
in the Eurozone and a further slowdown of the global economy, affecting oil 
prices that would presumably fall to $90 per barrel on average in 2012 and 
2013. This would slow the CIS economies’ growth to 3.2% in 2012 and to 
3.9% in 2013.
Azerbaijan: 
primary indicators 
(statistics and 
estimates by national 
agencies and the 
IMF)
2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP growth (% yoy) 10.8 9.3 5.0 0.1
GDP per capita ($) 5,213 4,798 5,713 6,125
CPI growth (% yoy) 20.8 1.8 7.8 5.5
State budget balance (% of GDP) 20.3 6.8 13.6 9.8
Current account balance (% of GDP) 35.5 23.0 29.0 22.6
figure 14.8.
Armenia:  
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
a) Economic growth: GDP growth and forecasts 
by national and international institutions (%)
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Armenia: 
primary indicators 
(statistics and 
estimates by national 
agencies and the 
IMF)
2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP growth (% yoy) 6.9 -14.2 2.6 4.6
GDP per capita ($) 3,606 2,647 2,840 3,012
CPI growth (% yoy) 5.2 6.5 9.4 4.7
State budget balance (% of GDP) -0.7 -7.5 -4.9 -1.5
Current account balance (% of GDP) -11.8 -16.0 -14.5 -11.7
figure 14.9.
Belarus: 
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
a) Economic growth: GDP growth and forecasts 
by national and international institutions (%)
b) Savings and investments (% of GDp): balance of private investment 
and savings (Sp-Ip), state budget (Sg-Ig), current account (X-M)
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Belarus: 
primary indicators 
(statistics and 
estimates by national 
agencies and the 
IMF):
2008 2009 2010 2011 Q1 2012
GDP growth (% yoy) 10.2 0.2 7.6 5.3 -
GDP per capita ($) 6,372 5,171 5,811 5,854 -
CPI growth (% yoy) 13.3 10.1 9.9 108.7 -
State budget balance (% of GDP) 1.4 -0.7 -2.6 2.4 -
Current account balance (% of GDP) -8.2 -12.6 -15.0 -10.2 -
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figure 14.10.
Kazakhstan: 
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
a) Economic growth: GDP growth and forecasts 
by national and international institutions (%)
b) Savings and investments (% of GDp): balance of private investment 
and savings (Sp-Ip), state budget (Sg-Ig), current account (X-M)
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Kazakhstan:
primary indicators 
(statistics and 
estimates by national 
agencies and the 
IMF):
2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP growth (% yoy) 3.3 1.2 7.0 7.5
GDP per capita ($) 8,713 7,127 8,980 11,163
CPI growth (% yoy) 9.5 6.2 7.8 7.4
State budget balance (% of GDP) 1.3 5.2 8.0 10.3
Current account balance (% of GDP) 4.8 -3.7 2.0 5.9
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figure 14.11.
Kyrgyzstan: 
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
a) Economic growth: GDP growth and forecasts 
by national and international institutions (%)
b) Savings and investments (% of GDp): balance of private investment 
and savings (Sp-Ip), state budget (Sg-Ig), current account (X-M)
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Kyrgyzstan: 
primary indicators 
(statistics and 
estimates by national 
agencies and the 
IMF):
2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP growth (% yoy) 8.4 2.9 -0.5 5.7
GDP per capita ($) 949 856 832 1,093
CPI growth (% yoy) 20.0 0.0 19.2 5.7
State budget balance (% of GDP) 0.8 -1.5 -4.9 -5.0
Current account balance (% of GDP) -13.7 -2.3 -8.4 -7.7
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figure 14.12.
Moldova:  
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
a) Economic growth: GDP growth and forecasts 
by national and international institutions (%)
b) Savings and investments (% of GDp): balance of private investment 
and savings (Sp-Ip), state budget (Sg-Ig), current account (X-M)
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2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP growth (% yoy) 7.8 -6.5 6.5 7.0
GDP per capita ($) 1,667 1,509 1,624 1,945
CPI growth (% yoy) 7.2 0.5 8.0 7.8
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Current account balance (% of GDP) -17.0 -9.9 -9.8 -9.9
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figure 14.13.
Russia: 
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
a) Economic growth: GDP growth and forecasts 
by national and international institutions (%)
b) Savings and investments (% of GDp): balance of private investment 
and savings (Sp-Ip), state budget (Sg-Ig), current account (X-M)
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2008 2009 2010 2011 Q1 2012
GDP growth (% yoy) 5.2 -7.8 4.3 4.3 4.9
GDP per capita ($) 11,919 8,852 10,811 12,986 -
CPI growth (% yoy) 13.3 8.8 8.8 6.1 3.7
State budget balance (% of GDP) 4.9 -6.3 -3.5 1.6 -
Current account balance (% of GDP) 6.2 3.9 4.8 5.5 -
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figure 14.14.
tajikistan:  
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
tajikistan:
primary indicators 
(statistics and 
estimates by national 
agencies and the 
IMF):
a) Economic growth: GDP growth and forecasts 
by national and international institutions (%)
b) Savings and investments (% of GDp): balance of private investment 
and savings (Sp-Ip), state budget (Sg-Ig), current account (X-M)
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2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP growth (% yoy) 7.9 3.4 6.5 7.4
GDP per capita ($) 755 716 797 858
CPI growth (% yoy) 11.8 5.0 9.8 9.3
State budget balance (% of GDP) 1.6 -0.5 0.4 0.8
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.9 -3.7 -6.5 -3.6
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figure 14.15.
turkmenistan: 
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
turkmenistan: 
primary indicators 
(statistics and 
estimates by national 
agencies and the 
IMF):
a) Economic growth: GDP growth and forecasts 
by national and international institutions (%)
b) Savings and investments (% of GDp): balance of private investment 
and savings (Sp-Ip), state budget (Sg-Ig), current account (X-M)
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figure 14.16.
uzbekistan: 
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
uzbekistan: 
primary indicators 
(statistics and 
estimates by national 
agencies and the 
IMF):
a) Economic growth: GDP growth and forecasts 
by national and international institutions (%)
b) Savings and investments (% of GDp): balance of private investment 
and savings (Sp-Ip), state budget (Sg-Ig), current account (X-M)
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2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP growth (% yoy) 9.0 8.1 8.5 8.3
GDP per capita ($) - - - -
CPI growth (% yoy) 12.7 14.1 7.3 7.6
State budget balance (% of GDP) 10.7 3.1 2.7 3.3
Current account balance (% of GDP) 8.7 2.2 6.7 8.0
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figure 14.17.
ukraine: 
Economic situation
Source: national 
agencies, estimates 
by the ADB, the 
World Bank, the
EBRD, the IMF and 
the CIS Statistics 
Committee
ukraine: 
primary indicators 
(statistics and 
estimates by national 
agencies and the 
IMF):
a) Economic growth: GDP growth and forecasts 
by national and international institutions (%)
b) Savings and investments (% of GDp): balance of private investment 
and savings (Sp-Ip), state budget (Sg-Ig), current account (X-M)
2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP growth (% yoy) 2.3 -15.1 3.4 5.2
GDP per capita ($) 3,914 2,565 3,003 3,624
CPI growth (% yoy) 22.3 12.3 9.1 4.6
State budget balance (% of GDP) -3.2 -6.3 -5.7 -2.8
Current account balance (% of GDP) -7.0 -1.5 -2.2 -5.9
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Multilateral and Regional 
Development Banks in Northern 
and Central Eurasia: overview  
of Activities in 2011
Ella Baybikova
This paper aims to analyse the activities of the international and regional 
development banks in the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as Armenia, Belarus, Russia 
and Ukraine. The international financial organisations engaged in the region 
include the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank (WB), the 
Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Islamic 
Development Bank (IsDB). The legal ground for any multilateral development 
bank (MDB) activities in the country is, primarily, the country’s membership in 
the bank, which is also provided with immunity and the special legal status of 
international organisation.
While analysing the MDBs’ activities, this paper proceeded from the information 
listed on the websites of the aforementioned MDBs. The first part of the overview 
dwells upon the thematic initiatives and analytical activities of the multilateral 
development banks, while the second section of the current paper focuses on 
cooperation and coordination for the purpose of boosting the efficiency of the 
provided assistance. The third part is devoted to the MDBs’ investment activities 
in the countries of the region.
It should be noted, however, that the annual reports for 2011 had not been 
published when this article was written, so it is based on the data published by 
the MDBs on their official websites. At the same time, this paper does not aim 
to compare the quantitative index of investments.
15
2011: DATA AND REVIEWS
312 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012
pRIoRItY AREAS of ACtIVItY IN 2011
The year 2011 may be characterised as a year of the post-crisis revival of the 
region’s economies, leading to an upsurge in the region’s demand in investments. 
On May 11, 2011, London hosted a meeting of the MDBs’ leadership to discuss 
issues of the post-crisis recovery of economies and their subsequent growth and 
development. The participants of the meeting noted the increase in disparity 
and a high level of unemployment, and underlined the need to develop, in 
coordination with the G-20, a joint action plan aimed at reducing the volatility 
of food prices and increasing food and water security.
Moreover, 2011 was notable for the development of bilateral cooperation 
between the MDBs. The Asian Development Bank and the OPEC Fund for 
International Development (OFID) signed a memorandum to expand cooperation 
between the two organisations. A framework agreement on cooperation has also 
been signed by the International Financial Corporation (IFC) and the Eurasian 
Development Bank.
In addition to providing direct financing, the MDBs focused their attention on 
joint initiatives to boost aid efficiency both in general and in certain fields. 
Some initiatives resulted in the establishment of a number of special funds to 
underline the targeted nature of the assistance. Moreover, issues of providing 
development assistance to some of the region’s countries were also on the 
agenda of the MDBs.
Thus, the EBRD’s Board of Directors has approved a new country strategy for 
the Kyrgyz Republic, which is designed to ensure continued EBRD support for 
the recovery of the country’s economy and sustainable growth after a period of 
social and political unrest in the recent past. The EBRD’s key priorities under 
the new country strategy will be supporting local private enterprises (with a 
particular focus on the agribusiness sector) stabilising and developing the 
country’s financial sector, and strengthening vital infrastructure.
The World Bank Board of Directors discussed a new Interim Strategy Note (ISN) 
for the Kyrgyz Republic. The strategy was adopted a year earlier and focuses 
on supporting the stabilisation and recovery of Kyrgyzstan. The ISN has been 
guided by the insights of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 
“Conflict, Security and Development”.
The survey of Ukraine’s investment climate, conducted by the IFC with the 
support of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Agency 
for International Business and Cooperation of the Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (EVD), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) and the Swiss Confederation through its State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs (SECO) among managers and owners of over 2,000 enterprises and 
sole proprietors in Ukraine, assessed the efficiency of the reform process and 
provided short-to-medium term policy recommendations.
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Energy efficiency and environmental issues, as well as the public private 
partnership, have traditionally been on the MDBs’ agenda and will be discussed 
hereafter in this section of the paper. 
Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency is of key importance to the sustainable development of the 
Eurasian region, given the relatively high energy intensity of its economies.
The EBRD and the Grantham Research Institute have published the joint report 
on switching to a low-carbon economic model. The Low Carbon Transition 
report puts forward structural reforms and measures to encourage private 
investments, and stands for the implementation of energy efficiency norms and 
standards. The report underlines, that the transition to low-carbon economy 
may be costly particularly for the energy importers in the region.
In order to implement the corresponding programmes and coordinate their 
efforts, the MDBs establish strategic partnerships. Thus, the Eastern Europe 
Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership Fund (E5P), a €90 million multi-
donor fund managed by the EBRD, has been put into effect, and reported 
about financing energy efficiency projects in Moldova, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Ukraine, as well as Latvia and Estonia during the period under review.
Moreover, the EBRD implements a specialised energy efficiency initiative in 
Ukraine – the $160 million Ukraine Energy Efficiency programme (UKEEP), 
which is nearing completion. UKEEP has to date financed almost 40 individual 
energy efficiency and renewable energy projects worth nearly $110 million. 
Collectively, UKEEP funded projects achieved energy savings of up to 2.2 
million MWh per year. Total CO2 savings as a result of UKEEP implementation 
stand at 520,000 tonnes per year – the equivalent of the emissions from 220,000 
passenger cars. The programme is supported by several important technical 
assistance components financed by the governments of Sweden and Austria.
In addition, the EBRD supports the development of Ukrainian machine building 
companies through financing the modernisation of their production complexes 
and improving the systems of energy management and consumption. The project 
is supported by technical cooperation funds provided by the UK government.
The World Bank is also active in financing energy efficiency projects. The 
World Bank’s Board of Directors has approved a $200 million loan to Ukraine 
to finance investments in energy-saving programmes in industrial companies, 
municipalities and municipal-owned companies, as well as energy service 
companies in 2011.
IFC, a member of the World Bank Group, held the Energy Efficiency Expo 2011 
in Armenia that aims to develop the market of energy efficiency projects, raise 
public awareness of the energy efficiency innovation technologies, and develop 
cooperative ties between manufacturers.
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Moreover, IFC announced it has teamed up with the Russian Energy Agency 
and signed an agreement with the Ukrainian State Agency for Energy Efficiency 
to launch an awareness campaign and create a knowledge-sharing platform 
for entrepreneurs to promote best practices in resource management and 
use of renewable energy in the agribusiness sector, where IFC supports 
the entire value chain from farm production to collection, processing and 
distribution.
The EDB announced the launch of a special energy efficiency and resource 
conservation programme, which will be implemented via financial institutions 
– the EDB clients. The EDB and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) have 
signed a memorandum of understanding in the spheres of energy efficiency, 
energy conservation, environmental protection, food safety, water resources 
management and rural development. The EDB and the UNDP will focus on 
renewable energy projects in rural areas of Central Asia with an emphasis on 
the small hydro. In addition, the organisations will conduct a joint study of the 
challenges of joint management of the hydropower potential of the Central 
Asian cross-border rivers, and support the interstate Russian-Kazakh cooperation 
addressing conservation and sustainable management of the Ural River Basin 
transboundary ecosystems.
Given that Uzbekistan has one of the highest electricity consumption per GDP 
in the world, aggravated by heavy transmission and distribution losses, the ADB 
is financing the Advanced Electricity Metering Project for the installation of 
modern electricity meters. The project will also fund skills training for the staff 
of Uzbekenergo state-owned power utility company.
Environmental Issues and Mitigation of Climate Change
Environmental issues top the agenda of the MDBs. The international donor 
community contributed an additional €550 million to the efforts to transform 
the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant into an environmentally safe site and create 
the conditions for a long-term solution for reactor 4, which was destroyed in 
the 1986 accident at Chernobyl. The additional financial means will replenish 
the Chernobyl Shelter Fund and the Nuclear Safety Account – the two EBRD-
managed funds through which the Shelter Implementation Plan for reactor 
4 and the Spent Fuel Storage Facility for reactors 1-3 are funded. The total 
cost for the Shelter Implementation Plan will be €1.54 billion. Moreover, 
the EBRD launched the new website www.chernobyltwentyfive.org which 
provides comprehensive information about the international efforts to transform 
Chernobyl into an environmentally safe site. 
MDBs have established a new partnership to combat global warming and support 
cities in adapting to and mitigating climate change. The five MDBs (ADB, 
EBRD, Inter-American Development Bank, WB and African Development Bank) 
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said they would develop a common approach for cities to assess climate risk, 
standardise greenhouse gas emissions inventories, and encourage a consistent 
suite of climate finance options.
The world’s coastal marshes became a point of interest for the World Bank. In 
its new report, written jointly with the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) and wetland specialists ESA PWA, the WB warned that 
drainage and degradation of coastal wetlands causes them to emit significant 
amounts of carbon dioxide directly to the atmosphere, and leads to reduced 
carbon sequestration. 
The World Bank launched two new financial initiatives – the Carbon Initiative 
for Development (Ci-Dev) and the third tranche of the BioCarbon Fund (BioCF 
T3) – to help the least-developed countries access financing for low-carbon 
investments and purchase certified emission reductions (commonly called 
‘carbon credits’) from a diverse range of projects. The Ci-Dev, aiming to raise 
$120 million, is a partnership of donor and recipient countries where public 
and private sector entities are pledging their support to capacity building and 
carbon market development in the poorest countries of the world. The BioCF 
T3 will focus on reforestation and agriculture projects that go hand in hand with 
co-benefits such as decreased soil erosion and increased land fertility.  
EBRD joined the World Bank-led Global Gas Flaring Reduction partnership 
(GGFR) to help governments in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan 
introduce energy efficiency measures to improve business competitiveness and 
environmental standards in oil and gas operations. 
IFC has become the first multilateral development bank to sign the United 
Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI), extending its efforts 
to mobilise capital for investments that are environmentally and socially 
responsible and adhere to high standards of corporate governance. As part of 
their collaboration, IFC and the UNPRI will initially focus on joint organisation 
of events in emerging markets to help raise awareness of the business case for 
responsible investment. 
Moreover, IFC launched a new financial mechanism to promote homegrown 
“green” innovation in developing countries while encouraging the transfer of 
clean technologies from developed to developing countries. The $60 million 
Cleantech Innovation Facility will target small, highly innovative start-up 
companies that offer products or services that mitigate carbon emissions.
In 2011, IFC closed the IFC Post-2012 Carbon Facility after it was fully subscribed 
for €150 million. The fund will extend carbon markets to help increase access 
to finance for projects that promote environmentally friendly economic growth 
and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.
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In addition, IFC held its fifth annual Community of Learning, a knowledge-
sharing forum aimed at strengthening the environmental and social risk-
management of financial institutions and supporting sustainable ways of doing 
business for companies in emerging markets. Starting January 1, 2012, IFC will 
put into effect its updated Performance Standards that were revised in critical 
areas such as climate change, business and human rights, consultations with 
project-affected communities (including indigenous peoples), and supply-chain 
management. 
ADB released a report on sustainable development, which describes the wide 
range of measures taken to improve environmental sustainability in the Asia-
Pacific region. ADB supports programmes for low-carbon development and 
adaptation to climate change, as well as resilience of agricultural systems and 
natural resource management.
The EDB published a new analytical review, The Safety of Hydroworks in 
Central Asia: Problems and Approaches, which was prepared jointly with 
the group of experts of the Executive Committee of the International Fund for 
saving the Aral Sea (EC IFAS). Hydroworks are necessary for the comprehensive 
use of water resources, including drinking, industrial and agricultural water 
supply; irrigation, hydropower, fishery, navigation, recreation, and ecosystems 
maintenance. The paper provides a brief overview of the best practice of state 
regulation of hydroworks’ safety and status monitoring in Central Asia, Russia 
and other countries, and discusses the prospects of regional cooperation in this 
field. 
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) signed a new agreement 
with the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) opening a loan facility aimed at 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the BSTDB member countries. The new 
loan programme has a 10-year maturity and totals €30 million. At least 70% of 
the loan programme is to be allocated for the purpose of reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases in countries around the Black Sea. Sub-projects are expected 
to be implemented in the sectors of renewable energy, energy efficiency and 
energy saving as well as public transportation.
public private partnership (ppp)
The WB published a new report, Public Private Partnerships in Europe and Central 
Asia: Designing Crisis-Resilient Strategies and Bankable Projects, which finds 
that despite the challenges of the past three years, public private partnerships 
(PPP) globally, and in the Europe and Central Asia region in particular, can still 
bring value to the economy. The report also calls on governments in the Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia region to look not just at private investors, but to also 
seek a larger role for international partners, which may play a more crucial 
role in helping the design and financing of projects, strengthening institutional 
capacity and mitigating risks. MDBs’ lending and guarantee instruments can 
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help mitigate key government and project risks, making them more attractive to 
private investors and improving financial sustainability.
Moreover, the MDBs held a series of seminars and forums on issues of the 
public private partnership. BSTDB sponsored the Southeastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean PPP Forum organised jointly by the Greek Ministry of Regional 
Development and Competitiveness and the World Bank Institute. ADB held 
two thematic seminars, The Role of the Private Sector in Promoting Regional 
Integration: Trade and Cross-Border Infrastructure and Bridging the Gap: 
Catalyzing Private Capital for Investment in Infrastructure. The participants of 
both seminars noted that the PPP issue is relevant to all organisations. Public and 
private sectors should work together; with governments and development banks 
unable to finance the gamut of investments needed in the region, private sector 
participation is key. Development finance institutions around the world should 
encourage greater use of risk-sharing models like public-private partnerships to 
ensure critical infrastructure gets built in developing countries. The institutions 
should do that by helping create the right regulatory and market environment 
and offering risk mitigation instruments to spur private capital.
Integration Studies
ADB and ADBI recently published a new book, Institutions for Regional 
Integration: Toward an Asian Economic Community. The authors of the 
joint study believe that more effective and efficient institutions are needed 
to complement Asia’s market-driven regional integration and to manage the 
challenges of Asia’s expanding role in the global economy. The institutional 
architecture needs to be strengthened to consolidate Asia’s hard-won economic 
gains, extend the benefits of cooperation beyond East Asia, and ensure the 
compatibility of regional and global integration. The book also offers three 
specific recommendations: strengthening and rationalising existing institutions 
for regional integration such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and the Pacific 
Islands Forum; further developing existing institutions to exploit functional 
opportunities; and establishing new pan-Asian institutions and empowering 
existing ones. 
The EDB Centre for Integration Studies, established in 2011, presented a 
new study, Scientific and Technological Cooperation between Russia and 
Ukraine: Forecasting Opportunities and Mechanisms for Their Implementation, 
conducted by the Institute of National Economy Forecasting of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Economics and Forecasting of the 
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine on the initiative of the EDB. The 
study stressed that reviving cooperation in science and technology will give 
both economies a real chance of becoming prominent players on international 
markets of science-intensive products.
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ADB published a new issue of its flagship annual economic publication that 
provides a comprehensive analysis of macroeconomic and development issues 
of the developing Asia, Asian Development Outlook 2011. The report focused 
on its new special theme of South-South economic linkages.
Business Activity Support
In addition to standard programmes for supporting microfinancing and small 
and medium enterprises (SME) through targeted funding of commercial banks 
and non-bank financial institutions, the MDBs are looking for new ways to 
support businesses in developing countries. 
The EBRD launched a new venture capital investment programme for early and 
growth stage companies operating in technology sectors. The programme is a 
long-term commitment to technology financing in the EBRD region – including 
the future region of the southern and eastern Mediterranean – with the Bank 
setting up a €100 million capital pool, dedicated team, and an advisory 
committee including outside experts and approval process. The region, in which 
the Bank operates, despite being home to an educated population and many 
technological innovations, is under-served by venture capital investment.
IFC invested $100 million in a capital release fund, marking the first time IFC 
has joined private investors to help banks free up existing capital and use it 
to boost loans to small and medium enterprises in emerging markets. The 
fund, established and managed by New York- and London-based business 
Christofferson, Robb & Company, aims to help big international banks reduce 
the capital that new international rules (Basel III) will force them to set aside 
against loans to small companies in emerging markets by offering risk protection 
for specific SME loan portfolios. This can lower banks’ capital costs of lending to 
SME, and therefore free up capacity for them to do new SME credit business.
trade and trade financing
While changing market conditions are threatening the availability of trade 
finance in the regions of the world where it is needed most, the MDBs have 
taken several steps to alleviate the lack of financial resources and spur economic 
growth in emerging markets and developing countries worldwide.
In 2011, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Trade Centre 
(ITC), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
World Bank, in cooperation with the UN Statistics Division (UNSD), launched 
the Transparency in Trade Initiative (TNT), a global programme that will give 
more access to influential trade data. The TNT is a joint project that will help 
eliminate the transparency gap resulting from the lack of access to data on 
country-specific trade policies. Free access to data will make it easier for 
exporters and policy-makers to meet relevant standards and requirements and 
better monitor and analyse trade-related projects.
2011: DATA AND REVIEWS
319Eurasian Development Bank
IMpRoVING tHE oRGANISAtIoNAL EffECtIVENESS  
of DEVELopMENt BANKS IN 2011
The leaders of 31 development finance institutions joined the Corporate 
Governance Development Framework, a common set of guidelines created to 
support sustainable economic development in emerging markets. Through the 
Framework, the signatories hope to answer the G-20’s call for development 
finance institutions to strengthen their coordination and ensure accomplishment 
of certain key institutional reforms, such as an increased commitment to 
transparency, accountability, and good corporate governance, as well as 
raise awareness, both at the private and public sector levels. Each institution 
that adopts this Framework undertake to provide training to ensure capacity 
building and share knowledge on corporate governance, collaborate with other 
signatories to share experiences and resources on training and implementation, 
and report annually on the implementation of the Framework. The MDBs are 
expected to implement the Framework at their own pace and at a level that suits 
their institutions.
Nearly 2,000 senior officials from over 100 countries attended the three-
day Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea. In 
preparation for the forum, the multilateral development banks, including the 
WB, EBRD, the Inter-American Development Bank, ADB and IsDB, prepared a 
Joint Note that highlighted their performance on aid effectiveness, transparency 
and accountability matters and what needs to be done in this regard in the 
future. Similarly, the members of the Coordination Group jointly prepared a 
Statement of Resolve to highlight the improvement of foreign aid effectiveness 
and underline the Group’s readiness to agree on a new monitoring framework 
that will routinely assess aid delivery and performance at the country level.
Moreover, MDBs deepened their bilateral interaction in several spheres of their 
activities.
The World Bank and the EDB signed the Implementation Plan for the 
Framework Cooperation Agreement between the WB and the EDB for 2011-
2013 that foresees collaboration between the World Bank and EDB in the 
following key areas: strengthening of the analysis of economic situation in the 
EurAsEC member countries; joint preparation and implementation of projects 
in infrastructure, energy and government institutions development; promoting 
regional collaboration in trade, investment and labour migration to the benefit 
of the client countries and so on. Within the framework of the Implementation 
Plan, the WB and the EDB held their first joint conference on economic 
developments and prospects of EurAsEC countries in December 2011 in Almaty. 
The conference focused on the impact of current global developments on the 
EurAsEC countries, integration trends in the CIS and the EurAsEC, and issues of 
employment and migration in the region.
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The EBRD and ADB signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen 
and deepen cooperation in the organisations’ common countries of operation: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
The IsDB and ADB signed a framework co-financing agreement for a total of 
$6 billion to jointly support projects in such areas as agriculture, food security, 
rural development, human development, education and health, private sector 
development and credit insurance.
IFC and the EIB signed an agreement to strengthen their collaboration when 
financing private sector development projects in emerging markets. Greater 
cooperation will directly benefit public-private partnerships and project finance 
operations. Areas of cooperation and coordination include the execution of 
mandate agreements, the appraisal and due diligence process, monitoring 
visits, and the handling of client requests.
On November 25, 2011 Baku hosted a forum that brought together ministers 
and senior representatives of development agencies to discuss support for the 
new 10-year strategy for the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 
(CAREC) Programme. Established in 2001, CAREC brings together Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, the People’s Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It promotes 
the implementation of regional projects in energy, transport and trade. Six 
multilateral institutions support the work of CAREC: ADB, EBRD, IMF, IsDB, 
United Nations Development Programme, and World Bank. Since 2001, 
CAREC-related investments have totalled $17 billion in over 100 projects in 
energy, trade and transportation.
Securities offerings
The debt securities markets offered favourable market conditions for the MDBs 
in 2011, allowing some banks to raise additional funding.
The ADB placed a $2.75 billion five-year global benchmark bond issue. The 
bonds, with a coupon rate of 2.50% per annum payable semi-annually and a 
maturity date of March 15, 2016, were priced at 99.603% to yield 24.65 basis 
points over the 2% US Treasury notes due January 2016. By investor types, 
52% of the bonds went to central bank and government institutions, 28% to 
banks, 16% to fund managers and 4% to others.
EDB accessed the securities market several times throughout the year. In February 
2011, the bank placed its fourth issue of 7-year bonds with a six-month coupon 
for a total of 5 billion roubles. In accordance with the terms of this issuance, the 
bonds may be redeemed in three years.  The 1-6 coupon rate was set at 7.70% 
per annum. In May 2011, the Bank issued $25 million (maturity of 184 days) 
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and €32 million (364-days maturity) under the euro commercial paper (ECP) 
programme established earlier. On November 18, the EDB placed another issue 
of its ECP worth $40 million with a maturity of one year.
The EBRD launched its first ever syndicated transaction in the Sterling market in 
an amount of GBP 200 million. The issue carries an annual coupon of 1.875% 
and has a final maturity date of December 10, 2013. The bond was priced at a 
spread of 55 basis points over the UK Gilt, with an issue price of 99.826%. 
IFC launched its first renminbi-denominated bond, using the proceeds to 
finance a clean technology project in China. It marked the first such issue by 
a supranational. The five-year bond has a 1.80% per annum interest rate and 
raised CNY 150 million (around $23 million) to support technology that helps 
to promote energy efficiency and to lower greenhouse gas emissions. 
In April 2011, IFC announced the pricing of a five-year $2 billion benchmark 
issue, part of its regular programme of raising funds for private sector development 
lending. This was the first sub-Libor five-year issue by a supranational since the 
fall of 2008. The bonds, which mature on April 11, 2016 and carry a semi-annual 
coupon of 2.25%, were priced to yield 18.4 basis points over the benchmark 
five-year U.S. Treasury bond.
Moreover, IFC issued a series of Uridashi Green Bonds, denominated in a 
foreign currency. Funds raised from IFC Uridashi Green Bonds are set aside 
in a separate account for investing exclusively in renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, and other climate-friendly projects in developing countries. Projects 
that may be funded by the Green Bonds include rehabilitation of power plants 
and transmission facilities to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, solar and 
wind installations, and funding for new technologies that result in significant 
reductions in emissions. In total, the four tranches raised $135 million. The 
first tranche of AUD 42.3 million with a fixed annual coupon rate of 4.860% 
was placed in February 2011. The second tranche of ZAR 175.7 million with 
a fixed annual coupon rate of 6.100% was placed in May 2011, as well as the 
third tranche of €15.8 million with a fixed annual coupon rate of 1.430% and 
the fourth tranche of AUD 41.3 million with a fixed annual coupon rate of 
4.750%.
EIB placed several bond issues for a total of €70 billion during the period under 
review. First of all, the Bank placed several €3 billion benchmark Euro Area 
Reference Note (EARN) issues in the 10-year sector. Moreover, the EIB priced 
a new €3 billion benchmark Euro Area Reference Note (EARN) in the 7-year 
sector. The issue carries an annual coupon of 2.50% and has a final maturity of 
October 15, 2018. The bond was priced at a spread of mid-swaps plus 18 bps, 
which was in line with initial price guidance. The transaction represents EIB’s 
first EARN in the 7-year sector since 2009 and the fifth new EARN benchmark 
of 2011.
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Asian Development Bank
The ADB is an effective, transparent, client-focused organisation, and should 
continue with current efforts to further improve its effectiveness, says a new 
donor assessment report. The report, commissioned by the Multilateral 
Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) consisting of 16 
donor countries, gives ADB satisfactory to high marks in most key performance 
indicators, including in areas such as making transparent decisions in allocating 
resources, focusing on achieving results, reporting results information clearly, 
and harmonising procedures with other development partners. Over 100 
respondents, comprising mostly donors and governments, took part in the 
survey.
In 2011, the ADB set up a new multi-donor trust fund to support participation 
of developing countries at the next global forum on aid effectiveness. The 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness Trust Fund, to be administered 
by ADB, will take contributions from bilateral, multilateral and individual 
sources, including corporations and foundations. The fund will contribute 
towards ADB efforts to support developing countries to take ownership of the 
aid effectiveness agenda. It reflects ADB’s continuing strong commitment to the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Contributions to the fund will be on an 
untied grant basis, with money pooled together in one account. The fund will 
be held and invested at the discretion of ADB and will terminate once the bulk 
of money has been disbursed.
The development of the CAREC Transport Corridors was a top priority in the 
ADB investment activities in the region in 2011 as in previous years.
the World Bank Group
With the aim of raising its operating efficiency, the WB approved a new 
mechanism that will allow the world’s poorest countries to expedite access to 
funding following a crisis. The Immediate Response Mechanism complements 
longer-term emergency response tools available to members of the International 
Development Association (IDA), the Bank’s fund for the poorest, offering 
countries financial support within weeks rather than months of an emergency. 
The WB launched global public consultations (March-May 2011) on a proposed 
new lending instrument – Programme-for-Results (P4R) – that would support 
government programmes and link disbursements to the achievement of results. 
The guiding principles and key elements of this proposed new instrument are 
discussed in the Concept Note – A New Instrument to Advance Development 
Effectiveness: Programme-for-Results Lending. The P4R instrument responds 
to demands from the Bank’s client governments, who are implementing their 
own development programmes and increasingly want partners for finance and 
expertise to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of those programmes in 
achieving results.
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Moreover, the WB launched the Justice Peer-Assisted Learning (JUST-PAL) 
Network, a cooperative peer-based learning and knowledge-sharing resource 
on justice issues for all countries in Europe and Central Asia. An internet-based 
JUST-PAL Knowledge Portal was also launched on April 12, 2011 (www.justpal.
org). The JUST-PAL Network comprises four main directions for exchange of 
experience: budgeting, physical infrastructure, information systems, and court 
management and administration.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
In 2011, the three leading international rating agencies - Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch - reaffirmed their AAA ratings for the debt of the EBRD, 
underscoring the Bank’s stability at a time of turbulence in financial markets. 
The agencies also described the outlook for the Bank’s debt as stable. They 
referred specifically to the EBRD’s strong capital position, which has been 
bolstered by a capital increase to which all of the EBRD’s major shareholders 
have now subscribed.
During the period under review the EBRD launched the Private Sector for Food 
Security Initiative to help address the global challenge of food security via 
greater involvement of the private sector in efforts to match the rising demand 
for food with adequate supplies from the agricultural sector. The programme 
will aim specifically to:
1. Address bottlenecks along the whole food value chain by providing an 
effective menu of commercially viable responses;
2. Match more effectively the supply and demand from food exporters and 
food importers;
3. Provide greater opportunities for private-public sector dialogue to address 
the needs of the private sector;
4. Enhance coordination among the relevant international financial institutions 
and multilateral development banks to address both food as well as water 
security issues.
The private sector involvement is key to unlocking the agricultural potential in 
countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – three producer nations that 
could supply half the world’s grain needs.
Moreover, the EBRD launched a new venture capital investment programme 
for early and growth stage companies operating in technology sectors. The 
programme is a long-term commitment to technology financing in the EBRD 
region. Even Russia and Turkey, home to promising technology industries, 
do not have access to sufficient venture capital financing. To implement the 
programme the Bank set up a €100 million capital pool, dedicated team, and an 
advisory committee including outside experts and approval process. The Bank 
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estimates that it will invest in 10-20 companies in the region over the next four 
years and will seek to invest alongside leading local and international venture 
capital investors. The programme will aim to back companies which already 
have early revenues and/or strategic partnerships and can demonstrate strong 
growth potential.
The Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership (E5P) Fund 
was put into operation in 2011. E5P is a €90 million multi-donor fund managed 
by the EBRD designed to promote energy efficiency investments in Ukraine and 
other eastern European countries. E5P is expected to provide grant funding to 
Ukraine as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova, where 
high energy intensity is widespread and there remains wide scope for efficiency 
improvement across all economic sectors. In addition to promoting energy 
efficiency in district heating projects, funding will also support other investments 
aimed at making substantial energy savings. Environmental projects, such as 
waste water or renewable energy, will also be within the scope of the grant 
funding.
Islamic Development Bank
In 2011, the three leading international rating agencies reaffirmed the IsDB 
ratings. Accordingly, on August 24, 2011 Moody’s Investors Service reaffirmed 
the IsDB’s “Aaa” long-term foreign currency issuer rating with a stable outlook. 
Moody’s stated that IsDB’s rating reflects the presence of strong shareholder 
support, a high level of liquidity and a low level of debt. 
At a ceremony in Washington the IsDB signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the International Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI) and the donor community. The IsDB is the sixteenth 
development partner organisation to join the Memorandum, which represents a 
global effort to encourage donor countries to engage in financial management 
of public funds. The INTOSAI-Donor Memorandum aims at scaling up and 
enhancing the support provided to supreme audit institutions in developing 
countries. Since it was signed in 2009, the Memorandum has played an 
important role in securing donor funding for several regional supreme audit 
institutions capacity development initiatives. The signatories to the INTOSAI-
Donor Memorandum are INTOSAI, the African Development Bank, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the IMF, Ireland, the IsDB, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, the USA, and the WB.
Eurasian Development Bank
The leading international rating agencies reaffirmed the EDB ratings in 2011. 
Moody’s Investors Service assigned the EDB a long-term foreign currency rating 
of A3 and a short-term rating of P-2. The outlook on the bank’s ratings is stable. 
Fitch Ratings changed the EDB’s outlook to Positive from Negative. It also 
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affirmed EDB’s long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at “BBB” and upgraded its 
short-term IDR to “F2” from “F3”. In addition, Standard & Poor’s published its 
new ratings for the EDB, affirming the Bank’s current ratings at BBB (long-term) 
and A-3 (short-term) with stable outlook, which reflects that on the Russian 
Federation. According to S&P report, the current ratings confirm the Bank’s 
stable capital position and strong shareholder support.
In June 2011, the EDB launched the Centre for Integration Studies aimed at 
conducting the research work and drafting reports and recommendations to 
the governments of the EDB member states on the issues relating to regional 
economic integration. The Centre’s research priorities include trade, economic 
and corporate integration; foreign exchange and financial integration; theoretical 
comprehension of the Eurasian integration.
Moreover, EDB expanded its membership as the EDB Council unanimously 
approved accession of a new member to the Bank, Kyrgyzstan, on June 27, 
2011.
On October 13, 2011 the EDB held its 6th International Conference, Customs 
Union and EurAsEC’s Single Economic Space: Prospects for Further Integration. 
The EDB’s annual conferences on issues of Eurasian integration traditionally 
gather heads of state administration bodies of the EDB member states, leading 
researchers, experts and specialists from the EurAsEC and the CIS member states 
and foreign countries, as well as representatives of mass media. The participants 
of the conference focused on the best practices of economic integration in 
the EurAsEC and CIS member states, a search for new ways of multilateral 
cooperation, evaluation of the prospects for the expansion of the Customs Union 
and formation of the Eurasian Single Economic Space, the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis 
Fund activities and coordination of joint anti-crisis strategies in the region.
In addition, the EDB took part in its first ever transaction arranging one-year 
syndicated Islamic finance for Russia’s AK BARS Bank. The syndicated facility 
totalled $60 million, including the EDB’s share of $20 million. The EDB acted 
as a mandated lead arranger for the project. The transaction was arranged with 
the participation of Citibank N.A., London, and the Islamic Corporation for the 
Development of the Private Sector as joint lead arrangers and bookrunners. The 
specifics of Islamic finance are that it must be consistent with Sharia laws, in 
accordance with which money cannot and should not be made out of money. 
In particular, this principle prohibits interest-bearing loans. For this reason, 
the transaction was structured in accordance with the Murabaha Agreement, 
a product of Islamic finance that provides for the purchase and sale of Sharia-
consistent goods. 
On December 21, 2011 the Bank’s Council revised the EDB Strategy for 
2011-2013 to include new sections on country priorities and interaction with 
international organisations.
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3. MDB’S pRoJECtS IN 2011 IN tHE REGIoN BY CouNtRY
Armenia
Asian Development Bank 
The Asian Development Bank provided financial assistance to help Armenia 
upgrade its urban transport services to improve living conditions and bolster 
economic opportunities in the country’s major and secondary cities. In May 
2011, the ADB Board of Directors approved a multitranche financing facility for 
a Sustainable Urban Transport Project in Yerevan. The first tranche of $48.64 
million is earmarked for the construction of a 5.3 km ring road in Armenia’s 
capital, Yerevan, which will divert traffic from the center and support increased 
economic development in outer areas.
Moreover, within the framework of its Trade Finance Programme, ADB signed 
trade finance agreements with six banks in Armenia, a move that is expected to 
further bolster the country’s trade sector and help ensure sustainable economic 
growth in the Central Asian country. The agreements were signed with 
Ameriabank CJSC, Anelik Bank CJSC, Ardshininvestbank CJSC, Armeconombank 
OJSC, Converse Bank CJSC, and Unibank Armenia CJSC.
Under its Armenian SME Finance Programme ADB has approved loans of up to 
$65 million to four Armenian banks – ACBA Credit Agricole Bank ($20 million), 
Ardshininvestbank ($15 million), Ameriabank ($20 million), and Inecobank 
($65 million).
In addition, ADB provided financing for the reconstruction and widening of 
the Ashtarak-Talin road section within the framework of the North-South Road 
Corridor Investment Programme in the total amount of $170 million.
the World Bank Group 
IBRD and IDA, members of the World Bank Group, have invested a total of 
$110 million in six projects in Armenia during 2011.
The World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved an $18 million loan 
for the Additional Financing of the Irrigation Rehabilitation Emergency Project 
(IREP) for Armenia. The Project’s total financing amounts to $21.6 million. 
The IBRD loan carries a maturity of 25 years including a grace period of 
10 years.
The WB approved a package designed to help Armenia protect the poor and 
support greater human capital development, and also strengthen competitiveness 
and private sector development. The Second Development Policy Operation 
(DPO) for Armenia includes an IDA credit equivalent of $21 million and an 
IBRD loan of $4 million. The IDA credit carries a maturity of 20 years including 
a grace period of 10 years and the IBRD loan has a maturity of 25 years including 
a 10-year grace period.
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A $39 million loan for the Electricity Supply Reliability (ESR) Project was 
allocated for improving the capacity of the power transmission network backbone 
infrastructure by replacing a section of around 230 km of transmission line from 
the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant (TPP) to Vorotan Cascade of hydropower 
plants. Total financing of the Project amounts to $52 million, of which the 
Government of Armenia will finance $13 million. The IBRD loan carries a 
maturity of 25 years including a grace period of 10 years.
In mid May 2011, IFC, a member of the World Bank Group, and the Ministry 
of Energy and Natural Resources of Armenia, signed a cooperation agreement 
to increase the efficiency of Armenia’s energy system by introducing new 
renewable energy sources within the framework of the IFC Armenia Sustainable 
Energy Finance Project, designed to establish a sustainable market for energy 
efficiency and renewable energy investments and contribute to the energy self-
sufficiency of Armenia.
Moreover, WB provided $5 million for construction of small hydropower plants 
in Armenia. EBRD and Cascade Universal Credit Organisation co-financed the 
project in the amount of $7 million and $3 million respectively.
Within the framework of the Community Agricultural Resource Management 
and Competitiveness (CARMAC) Project the WB approved a $16 million IDA 
credit with a maturity of 20 years including a grace period of 10 years. This 
project will introduce innovative community-based pasture/fodder-based 
livestock production practices in selected mountainous communities where 
livestock production is the main source of cash income and livelihood. The 
project will also provide grants to farmers for enhancing farm sales of livestock 
products.
Within the SME financing programme, IFC provided loans of $5 million 
and $20 million to Armeconombank and ACBA-Credit Agricole Bank 
respectively.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Apart from the aforementioned project for construction of small hydropower 
plants, financed in collaboration with the World Bank, the EBRD supported the 
expansion of financing services in Armenia with a 750 million Armenian Dram 
loan ($2 million equivalent) to Araratbank for on-lending to small and medium 
enterprises (SME). The Bank’s first local currency loan in Armenia launched the 
EBRD’s new Local Currency Lending Programme in Early Transition Countries.
EBRD extended a €6.5 million loan to the state-owned Armenian Water and 
Sewerage Company to improve water supply and wastewater services in 17 
municipalities across Armenia and build two wastewater treatment plants.
Moreover, EBRD supported the development of the telecoms, information 
and media sector in Armenia with a $2.2 million quasi-equity investment 
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in Interactive TV LLC, a digital cable TV service provider, for expanding its 
broadband internet services.
The Bank has arranged a loan to Araratbank for on-lending to small businesses in 
Armenia and secured the participation of three international commercial banks. 
The EBRD will contribute $3 million to the total $12 million financing package, 
with the balance syndicated to Russia’s Promsvyazbank, VDK Spaarbank nv of 
Belgium and Lebanon’s Byblos Bank S.A.L.
Eurasian Development Bank 
The EDB has not participated in the projects in Armenia in 2011.
European Investment Bank
The EIB approved financing for two projects in Armenia in 2011 for a total 
amount of $23 million equivalent. Resources of the Direct Investments Fund 
(€1.25 million) were allocated for renewable energy project, while another €15 
million (equivalent to $21.45 million) was channeled to SMEs via the financial 
institutions.
Belarus
the World Bank Group
On February 14, 2011 the IBRD, a member of the World Bank Group, approved 
the allocation of a $5 million nonrefundable subsidy to the Belarusian Economy 
Ministry for restructuring and privatisation of state-owned enterprises. In the 
second half of 2011, the Belarusian authorities together with the WB and 
international advisors selected ten companies ready to go private, including 
the Baranovichi Reinforced Concrete Plant (99% owned by the state), Brest 
Electromechanical Plant (83,8%), Belsantekhmontazh-2 (77,4%), Construction 
and Mounting Trust No.8 (85,3%), Avtomagistral (83,5%), Belgazstroi (50,6%), 
Medplast (99,9%), Barkhim (99,6%), Konfa (25%), and Minsk Margarine Factory 
(93,8%). 
IFC, a member of the World Bank Group, continued to actively support the 
development of the country’s real sector by providing a corporate package 
of long-term loans for a combined amount of up to $21 million comprising 
a loan of up to $15 million for IFC’s own account and a syndicated loan for 
financing the Rublyovsky-II project in the field of wholesale and retail sales of 
food products.
Moreover, IFC agreed to finance the establishment of a new soft drinks plant 
located near Minsk, Belarus. The proposed IFC investment is in the amount 
of $10 million, consisting of an estimated $8.2 million loan for the plant’s 
construction and a $1.8 million IFC participation in the capital increase of DB 
Juice (Cyprus) Limited, which is the holding company. 
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In addition, in May 2011 IFC launched a new training programme for Belarusian 
food producers within the framework of its Belarus Food Safety Project in order 
to increase awareness of international food safety standards and their benefits 
for food processing companies.
Eurasian Development Bank
On June 4, 2011, the Council of the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund (ACF, managed by 
the EDB) approved a financial credit to Belarus in the amount of $3 billion. The 
funds will be disbursed in tranches during 2011-2013 as Belarus implements 
its governmental programme aimed at stabilising the balance of payment and 
increasing the competitiveness of the Belarusian economy. The loan has a 
maturity of 10 years including a 3-year grace period. The financial terms of 
the loan conform to standard conditions that are approved by the ACF for the 
participating countries with average incomes.
EDB provided financing for six projects in Belarus in 2011 for a total of over 
$307 million, including the project for construction of Polotsk Hydropower 
Plant on the Western Dvina River ($99.8 million).
In April 2011, EDB signed a loan agreement with the Osipovichi Wagon 
Works, under which the plant received a $63.5 million facility for eight years 
to arrange cutting-edge hi-tech production of freight cars and tank containers 
in Osipovichi.
EDB extended $100 million to Belaruskali in a syndicated loan with Russia’s 
Sberbank. The loan was provided against guarantees from the Belarusian 
government for the company’s general corporate purposes. The $1 billion 
syndicated loan agreement was signed by the EDB and Sberbank with 
Belaruskali on November 18, 2011 in Minsk. The project is in line with the 
EDB strategic goals to foster sustainable growth, modernisation and economic 
competitiveness of the EDB member states.
Within the framework of its Trade Financing Programme, the EDB signed 
agreements with two Belarusian banks, Belgazprombank and Belinvestbank, 
for $20 million each. In addition, the bank approved $4 million financing to 
Belarusian Paritetbank as part of a syndicated loan together with a group of 
banks.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EBRD long-term loans totalling €26 million will help Vakaru Medienos Grupe, 
a Lithuanian-owned wood-processing company, build a large plant in Belarus 
for what is planned as the first stage of a furniture-making cluster whose output 
is ear-marked for large retailers in the region. An eight-year EBRD senior loan of 
€19.5 million and an eight-year subordinated one of €6.5 million will support 
the construction of an integrated plant for production of particleboards, plywood 
and furniture in the Mogilev free economic zone. 
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Moreover, in order to encourage the development of private enterprise in a 
country where the public sector accounts for 70% GDP, EBRD issued a loan 
of $50 million to Belpromstroybank for lending to micro, small and medium 
enterprises.
In addition, EBRD extended a loan of €50 million to Kronospan FLLC, Belarus 
to finance construction of a melamine faced particleboard production plant at 
Smorgon in Grodno region.
Kazakhstan
Asian Development Bank
ADB extended a loan of $95 million for construction of a 65-km road section in 
Zhambyl Oblast between the cities of Taraz and Baipas within the framework 
of the CAREC Transport Corridor-1 Investment Programme. Moreover, ADB 
supported the Astana Light Rail Transit Project and provided technical assistance 
in the amount of $565,000.
the World Bank Group
The IBRD issued the adaptable programme loan of $22.81 million for 
Kazakhstan’s Statistics Agency to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the national statistical system to provide relevant, timely and reliable data in 
line with internationally accepted methodology and best practices. 
IFC provided a long-term local currency loan of $25 million to refinance the 
existing short-term obligations, improve the current debt structure and help 
closer match the structure of assets and liabilities of JSC Kazpost.
Moreover, in late August, IFC signed an agreement with the National Bank 
of Kazakhstan to expand IFC’s capacity to provide local currency loans to 
companies operating in Kazakhstan and support growth of the country’s private 
sector.
Eurasian Development Bank
During the period under review, the EDB invested in six new projects and 
increased its financial support for the previously approved project in Kazakhstan. 
The total EDB commitments in Kazakhstan stood at $355 million equivalent in 
2011.
The EDB signed a $50 million loan agreement with Ivolga-Holding LLC to fund 
purchases of fertilizers, chemical defense equipment, fuels and lubricants and 
other goods and services necessary for sowing and harvesting campaigns.
Moreover, the EDB provided financing for KazExportAstyk Holding’s programme 
to optimise its balance sheet in the amount of $35.2 million.
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The Bank increased the financing of the APK-Invest Corporation’s project for 
purchases and exports of grain harvested in 2010-2012 from $50 million to 
$75 million.
Moreover, the EDB agreed to extend a $44 million loan to Astanapromstroy-M 
for construction of a hotel and office complex in Astana. 
The EDB allocated $98 million to fund JSC Altynalmas’ investment project for 
developing gold production in Kazakhstan. This investment project is being 
implemented in accordance with the State Programme for Boosting Industrial 
and Innovation Development in Kazakhstan and Kazakhstan’s Mining and 
Metallurgy Development Programme for 2010-2014.
In December 2011 the EDB signed a loan agreement with Bogatyr-Komir LLC to 
provide investment financing in the amount of up to $50 million to Kazakhstan’s 
largest coal mining company.
The EDB opened a ten-year loan facility for the Kazatomprom Sulphuric Acid 
Plant in the amount of $52.486 million for sulphuric acid plant reconstruction 
and purchases of modern equipment to ensure uninterrupted supplies of 
sulphuric acid to Kazatomprom’s uranium mining companies.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
During the period under review, the EBRD financed six projects in Kazakhstan 
for a total amount of over $340 million.
EBRD supported the modernisation of oil drilling services in southern Kazakhstan 
with a $10 million loan, and modernisation of district heating networks in 
Pavlodar, Ekibastuz and Petropavlovsk with a facility totalling of up to €21.7 
million co-financed by the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) for an amount of up 
to $10 million.
Moreover, EBRD provided a senior secured loan of 3.1 billion Kazakh tenge 
(equivalent to €15 million) for 10 years with a two-year grace period to 
finance the reconstruction of Sogrinsk TPP near Ust-Kamenogorsk to increase 
its electricity production, significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
enhance environmental security in the region.
EBRD helped to modernise the transmission of electricity in Kazakhstan with 
a $156 million loan that will improve energy efficiency in the system and 
increase electricity transmission capacities with the rehabilitation of a high-
voltage power transmission line in Ossakarovka in Karaganda region.
In addition, the EBRD provided a €80 million loan to the Kazakh subsidiaries 
of METRO Group, the major German retailer, to finance the expansion of its 
wholesale facilities in the country.
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EBRD extended a new $20 million trade finance guarantee facility to VTB 
Kazakhstan, a subsidiary of OJSC Bank VTB of Russia, to support Kazakhstan’s 
exporters and importers and facilitate the financing of foreign trade.
Together with the Kazakh power distribution company KEGOC the EBRD 
provided a €160,000 grant ($229,000 equivalent) to improve energy efficiency 
at the School No.25 in Astana. Working with the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection of Kazakhstan, the EBRD’s Energy Efficiency and Climate Change 
team developed an investment programme especially designed for the school.
Moreover, EBRD approved an equity investment of up to $50 million in 
Petrolinvest S.A. in Kazakhstan to complete second stage oil exploration works 
in two of its most relevant prospects (OTG and EMBA fields), and adopt best 
practice corporate governance standards in preparation for an IPO.
In November 2011, the EBRD and the Ministry of Industry and New Technologies 
of Kazakhstan signed a Memorandum of Understanding, in which the two 
sides agreed to support the Business Advisory Services (BAS) that the EBRD 
will provide in Kazakhstan. Over three years the EBRD will aim to provide 
consultancy services to about 450 small and medium businesses in Kazakhstan 
and to develop the local market for business advisory services.
Islamic Development Bank
In 2011, the IsDB agreed to provide a 10-year $10 million loan to a subsidiary 
of KazAgro National Holding, JSC Fund for Financial Support of Agriculture, to 
finance Kazakhstan’s agriculture micro-lending programme.
Kyrgyz Republic
Asian Development Bank
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has approved a $55 million loan to 
finance the construction of the 60-km Beit-Torugart section of the highway 
connecting the Kyrgyz Republic with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 
project is part of the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) 
Programme. 
Moreover, in September 2011, ADB allocated a grant of $20 million to 
Kyrgyzstan for Improving Business Environment Programme – Subproject-2. The 
funds will be spent on improving credit information exchange between financial 
institutions with regard to lowering credit risks, boosting leasing development as 
a means of financing expansion, and promoting the establishment of favourable 
conditions for public private partnership.
In addition, ADB provided a loan of $10 million to Kyrgyzstan’s two financial 
institutions, Kyrgyz Investment and Credit Bank, for boosting the development 
of small and medium-sized enterprises.
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the World Bank Group
In June 2011, the WB approved Second Additional Financing to support the 
ongoing Health and Social Protection Project (HSPP) in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
The funding in the amount of $24 million consisted of a $13.2 million highly 
concessional IDA credit with a maturity of 40 years and a 10-year grace period, 
and a $10.8 million IDA grant. 
In August 2011, the WB provided a $30 million additional financing (IDA credit 
of $16.5 million and IDA grant of $13.5 million) for the Economic Recovery 
Support Operation (ERSO) for Kyrgyzstan to support Government’s reforms 
for improving governance and strengthening accountability mechanisms, and 
for post-conflict recovery, transition to medium term growth and poverty 
reduction.
Moreover, WB approved an additional grant in the amount of $1 million to 
support the Disaster Hazard Mitigation Project in Kyrgyzstan to minimise the 
exposure of humans, livestock, and riverine flora and fauna to radionuclides 
associated with abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste rock dumps in 
the Mailuu-Suu area; improve the effectiveness of emergency management and 
response by national and sub-national authorities and local communities to 
disaster situations; and reduce the potential loss of life and property in key 
landslide areas of the country.
IFC approved a $2.5 million loan to Magic Box, the leading producer of small 
cardboard packages in the Kyrgyz Republic with exports to Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan. The funds will help finance the Company’s expansion.
On April 21, 2011 IFC approved a $6 million senior loan (or local currency 
equivalent) to FINCA MicroCredit Company, a leading microfinance company 
in Kyrgyzstan. Proceeds of the loan will be used to finance the expansion of 
FINCA’s lending to micro and small entrepreneurs.
Eurasian Development Bank
Kyrgyz Republic completed the necessary procedures for joining the EDB 
and became its sixth full-fledged member in 2011. Thus, the EDB has not 
commenced the financing of investment projects in the country that year. 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
During the period under review, the EBRD financed six projects in the Kyrgyz 
Republic for a total amount of around $56 million.
The EBRD provided a $10.1 million sovereign loan, accompanied by a $5.5 
million grant from the EBRD’s Shareholder Special Fund for development of the 
public transportation system in Kyrgyzstan, including the acquisition of about 44 
high-floor and 32 low-floor (accessible for disabled passengers and passengers 
with prams) trolleybuses, and partial upgrade of related infrastructure.
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The Bank extended a new €8 million additional loan to Interglass, the largest 
industrial glass producer in Central Asia, to complete the upgrade of the plant’s 
facilities in Tokmok, northern Kyrgyzstan.
The largest furniture-maker in the country, Lina Ltd., raised the EBRD loan of 
$650,000 to finance the purchase of new mattress-making equipment and 
install better ventilation in the factory to improve health and safety. The EBRD 
also provides the company with technical cooperation worth over $50,000, 
associated with the loan, for energy efficiency and accounting improvement.
Moreover, the EBRD issued a series of loans to support banks and financial 
institutions in their drive to expand access to finance for micro and small business. 
So, the Bank boosted its support to the financial sector in the Kyrgyz Republic 
with two loans for a total of $7 million to a microfinance company, Kompanion 
Financial Group; a $6 million loan in local currency to Bai Tushum and Partners, 
one of the country’s leading non-bank microfinance institutions; a second 
tranche of $10 million to UniCredit Bank (formerly ATF Bank-Kyrgyzstan); a $2 
million senior loan in local currency to the micro-lending company Frontiers 
LLC; the first ever syndicated local currency loan in the Kyrgyz Republic for 
a total of $9 million to Mol Bulak Finance non-bank microfinance institution, 
arranged together with FMO, the Netherlands Development Finance Company 
($6 million).
Islamic Development Bank
The IsDB approved a $23 million loan to finance the project for improvement 
of electric power supply in Kyrgyz cities of Bishkek and Osh.
Russia
the World Bank Group
IFC, a member of the World Bank Group, approved financing of five projects 
in Russia in 2011.
So, IFC provided two loans to Energomera Concern, including a senior loan of 
$20 million for refinancing of its short-term loans and a senior loan of up to $15 
million to support the growth of company’s operations in 2011.
IFC approved a local currency senior loan of up to 150 million roubles 
(approximately $5 million) to Mytischi Housing and Utilities municipal unitary 
enterprise to support the reconstruction of the district heating infrastructure 
of the city of Mytischi. The project is expected to finance installation of 178 
automated individual heat substations. The total project cost is estimated at 365 
million roubles (approximately $12 million). The City will fund the rest of the 
programme from its own sources.
Moreover, IFC provided €16.8 million in equity investment to Idavang A/S 
Danish holding company (previously named Danish Lithuanian Holding A/S) 
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for construction of a greenfield pig farm in Pskov region and development of 
another pig farm in northwest region, and expansion of the pig farm in Leningrad 
region. The total project cost is estimated at €86.5 million.
IFC approved financing of $60 million to Russia’s Transcapitalbank for energy 
efficiency loans to SME.
In addition, IFC and EBRD arranged a syndicated loan of $250 million to 
Russia’s Credit Europe Bank. IFC and EBRD each committed to a three-year A 
loan of $50 million for their own account while 17 commercial banks, led by 
Raiffeisen Bank International, Standard Bank and VTB Deutschland, provided a 
one-year B loan totalling $150 million. The pricing of the B loan is 2.5% over 
3-month LIBOR. The B loan’s one-year maturity can be extended for a further 
year at the lenders’ discretion.
Eurasian Development Bank
During the period under review, the EDB invested in five new projects and 
increased its financial support for the previously approved project in Russia.
EDB extended a loan of 2.8 billion roubles ($100 million equivalent) to 
Yakutugol Holding Company for the construction of a 315-km route of the 
railway link from the Elga coal deposit to Baikal-Amur Mainline’s Ulak 
station.
Moreover, the EDB provided additional $115 million to CJSC Tikhvin Freight 
Car Building Plant for the construction of a high-technology production facility 
on the basis of the new railcar building plant.
In addition, the EDB took part in its first ever transaction arranging one-year 
syndicated Islamic finance for Russia’s AK BARS Bank. The syndicated facility 
totalled $60 million, including the EDB’s share of $20 million.
In March 2011, the EDB and the Bank BCC-Moscow signed a loan agreement 
for $16 million (in rouble equivalent) for on-lending to small and medium-sized 
enterprises in Russia.
In the second half of 2011, the EDB increased its targeted credit facility to OJSC 
Bank Saint-Petersburg from $10 million to $25 million and extended the loan 
agreement for 12 months until January 2013.
The EDB took part in syndication of a $110 million loan to Bank Zenit to finance 
the bank’s trade operations.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
The EBRD allocated over $2 billion for 31 projects in Russia in 2011.
Within its largest project in Russia in 2011 the EBRD committed to provide 
a 10-year loan of 8 billion roubles (the equivalent of €192 million) to fund 
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balance sheet optimisation of OJSC Energy Systems of the Far East (ESV), 
RusHydro’s subsidiary in Russia’s Far East region. RusHydro will use the loan 
to refinance ESV’s short-term debt as part of a major corporate restructuring 
which will include the unbundling of the company’s electricity networks from 
its generation capacity.
The EBRD signed a loan agreement to provide $155 million in long-term 
financing to promote environmental safety in Russian seaports as part of a drive 
to establish internationally competitive port infrastructure and professional port 
management systems in these key gateways for Russia trade. A 10-year EBRD 
loan to Rosmorport, the state body in charge of managing and developing 
Russian port infrastructure, will fund the acquisition of equipment and vessels 
needed to upgrade its environmental fleet, including those for collecting oil 
spillage and bilge water as well as those for maintenance dredging of the sea 
floor.
Moreover, the EBRD signed a loan agreement under which it will lend $110 
million to the country’s fourth-largest non-life insurer, RESO Garantia, to support 
its acquisition of an equity stake in another Russian insurance company, VSK. 
The deal, the first such operation on the Russian insurance market, will advance 
the consolidation of Russia’s insurance sector.
The EBRD’s equity investment of up to 1.9 billion roubles in Russia’s 
RosEvroBank gave the EBRD an 11% stake in the bank, making it the largest 
international minority investor in RosEvroBank.
EBRD joined a multifacility loan agreement for an amount of €750 million 
to finance the construction of Russia’s biggest integrated polyvinyl chloride 
(PVC) plant in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod region. The financing will be 
provided by a group of Russian and foreign financial institutions for a period 
of up to 12.5 years. The project’s total cost is estimated at €1.25 billion. The 
EBRD’s contribution is an 11-year loan for the rouble equivalent of €150 
million.
Moreover, the EBRD backed the establishment of a new leasing company in 
Russia by Deere & Company, the world’s leading manufacturer of agricultural 
equipment. A five-year EBRD loan of up to 4.7 billion roubles (equivalent to 
€114 million) will support the new venture, which will also target the forestry 
and construction industries where renewing farm equipment is likely to account 
for most of the business. The loan represents the first part of a planned EBRD 
financing package for this project.
On June 14, 2011 the EBRD Board of Directors voted in favour of a funding 
increase which will boost EBRD’s investments under its largest and oldest 
lending programme for micro and small businesses, Russia Small Business Fund 
(RSBF) to $450 million. A 4.5-year extension of the fund’s activities up to the 
end of 2015 will give the programme a chance to help bridge an enormous gap 
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between supply and demand in terms of micro and small business lending in 
Russia.
Another EBRD’s important project focused on modernising district heating and 
water treatment systems in two Russian cities, Lipetsk and Vologda, as part 
of a strategy which brings the Bank’s total investments in the renewal of the 
country’s municipal infrastructure to over €750 million. The EBRD signed two 
10-years loan agreements to provide a total of 778 million roubles (equivalent 
to €19.2 million) for infrastructure investments. Vologda is getting a loan of 467 
million roubles for urgent work on its district heating network. Lipetsk will get 
up to 311 million roubles to renew its main wastewater treatment plant.
The Bank’s investment portfolio in Russia was complemented with such diverse 
projects as a long-term loan of €10 million to support the post-crisis balance 
sheet restructuring of Mir Detstva, a leading Russian distributor and producer of 
branded children’s goods; a purchase of a 15% equity stake in Russia’s SDM-
Bank for $11.4 million (in rouble equivalent); a loan of €24 million (in rouble 
equivalent) to Russia’s Monetka retail chain for the construction of the second 
phase of a modern distribution centre in Ekaterinburg, as well as the opening of 
a distribution centre in the northern part of the Urals; acquisition of a minority 
stake in Hlebprom, a leading Russian cake and biscuit producer for €10 million, 
and others.
European Investment Bank
In the second half of 2011, the EIB extended €100 million ($143 million 
equivalent) to finance the modernisation and expansion of an integrated pulp 
and paper mill in Syktyvkar in the Russian Federation. This is the first EIB loan 
provided by the Bank under the €1.5 billion Eastern Partners Facility (EPF) with 
a ceiling of €500 million for projects in Russia. 
Islamic Development Bank
Though the Russian Federation is not a member of the IsDB, the Bank provided 
a grant of $370,000 from the IsDB Waqf Fund for the construction of Rashidah 
Islamic Institute in Kazan, Tatarstan.
tajikistan
Asian Development Bank
The Asian Development Bank approved two grants for a total of $165 million 
and $1.5 million from its Technical Assistance Special Fund for improving 
flood risk management in Khatlon region.
ADB provided a $120 million grant to help Tajikistan upgrade a vital road 
linking the capital Dushanbe with the Uzbekistan border. The grant will be 
sourced from the Asian Development Fund. 
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The ADB Board of Directors has approved the $45 million grant assistance 
that will be used to support two new government pilot programmes aimed at 
improving the effectiveness and targeting of social benefit payments. It will 
also help the government push ahead with an ongoing development plan to 
modernise and improve tax policy and administration. The ADB grant will help 
the government preserve social safety net spending in the country’s budget for 
2011- 2012.
the World Bank Group
The World Bank Group allocated $30 million to finance three projects in 
Tajikistan in 2011.
IDA launched the Second Dushanbe Water Supply Project for a total amount of 
$16 million equivalent to improve water utility performance and water supply 
services in selected areas of Dushanbe through water treatment and distribution 
infrastructure upgrades, metering programs and improved billing and collection 
systems.
In June 2011, IDA approved the Fifth Programmatic Development Policy Grant 
Programme (PDPG5) in the amount of $10 million to support the government’s 
actions in five spheres, including education, transport, agriculture, financial 
sector and public administration.
In December 2011, IFC and Tajikistan’s State Committee on Investment 
and State Property Management launched the Single Electronic Registry of 
Tajikistan, a website for entrepreneurs that provides information on licensing 
procedures. The initiative was supported by Switzerland through the State 
Secretariat for Economic Affairs and the United Kingdom’s Department 
for International Development. The project aims to improve the business 
environment in Tajikistan by removing key regulatory barriers to business entry 
and operations.
In May 2011, IFC provided a senior loan of up to $4 million to CJSC AccessBank 
Tajikistan to finance the expansion of micro-lending in Tajikistan.
Eurasian Development Bank
During the period under review the EDB approved a second financing of $10 
million to Olim-Textile for purchases of raw cotton from Tajik farming units, its 
processing at the spinning mill and subsequent exports of the cotton yarn.
Moreover, the EDB provided a credit facility of $3 million to CJSC Tajprombank 
to finance the micro-lending programme in Tajikistan.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
During the period under review the EBRD extended $39.45 million equivalent 
for eight projects in Tajikistan. The EBRD focused on developing agriculture, 
banking sector, municipal infrastructure and small businesses.
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After the successful refurbishment of the water supply system in the north 
and south of the country, the bank announced its participation in the Central 
Tajik Water Project, lending up to $7 million for new clean water projects 
in four more cities at the request of the central government. The new EBRD 
loan with a sovereign guarantee to the State Unitary Enterprise “Khojagii 
Manziliyu Kommunali” will be used for on-lending to water companies in 
Gissar, Shachrinav, Somoniyon and Tursunzoda. The project cost will be 
supplemented by grants. The EBRD Shareholder Special Fund has approved 
a grant of $2.6 million for the project. The EU Investment Facility for 
Central Asia is considering a grant of €6 million ($8.1 million) for the same 
project.
The EBRD provided a €7 million loan to rehabilitate the low and medium voltage 
distribution network of Tajikistan by equipping it with new electricity meters, 
meter-reading and automated billing systems. The project is co-financed by 
the EIB, which will make available a parallel loan of up to €7 million, and the 
European Union, through its Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA), with a 
possible grant of €7 million.
The EBRD extended an additional $300,000 credit line to Makolli Bakery, 
a local bread and pasta manufacturer in Tajikistan, to finance its increased 
working capital requirements. The investment supplemented the EBRD’s direct 
financing facility extended to Makolli in 2009, bringing the total loan amount 
provided to the company to $2 million.
Moreover, the EBRD launched its new Local Currency Lending Programme 
in Early Transition Countries (ETC) in Tajikistan. Tajikistan became the first 
country to benefit from this new Programme in Central Asia. A 4-year senior 
loan of 13.6 million Tajik somoni ($3 million equivalent) to Micro-lending 
Organisation IMON International was disbursed within the framework of the 
new Programme and in line with a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 
April 2011 between the EBRD and Tajik government. In addition, the EBRD 
provided another three loans within the Local Currency Lending Programme 
in Tajikistan, including a loan of $6 million to Accessbank; a syndicated loan 
to Bank Eskhata ($2 million from EBRD’s own funds and $6 million syndicated 
to commercial banks); and a lending facility of up to $4 million (equivalent) to 
First MicroFinance Bank Tajikistan.
Islamic Development Bank
The IsDB provided two grants for a total of $4.3 million. One of the grants in the 
amount of $2.2 million was allocated to finance the construction and technical 
equipment of a modern general education school in the village Zarkamar, 
Jamoat Miskinobod, Faizobod district. The second grant of $2.1 million was 
provided for the water supply project in Dushanbe.
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In addition, the IsDB signed an agreement with the National Bank of Tajikistan 
to provide technical assistance on the formulation of legal, regulatory and 
administrative base for developing Islamic banking in the country.
turkmenistan
Asian Development Bank
During the period under review the Asian Development Bank provided a 
technical assistance grant of $1.3 million to Turkmenistan for the preparation of 
documents on Afghanistan and Turkmenistan: Regional Power Interconnection 
Project, which is expected to be approved by the Board in 2012. The estimated 
amount of financing may make up $100 million.
ADB provided $125 million in a loan to Turkmenistan for improving its 
railway network. The financing will be used to fund power, signaling, and 
telecommunication systems on a 311 km stretch of the 934-km long North-South 
Railway Corridor. The line will improve Turkmenistan’s access to neighbouring 
Kazakhstan, as well as Persian Gulf Countries, the Russian Federation and South 
Asia. The loan from ordinary capital resources will make up 75% of the total 
project cost of $166.7 million. The loan will have a 25-year term, with a five-
year grace period.
the World Bank Group
The WB didn’t finance any projects in Turkmenistan in 2011.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The EBRD financed two projects in Turkmenistan for a total of $3.6 million 
equivalent, including the loan to a printing services company, Intek Media, for 
a technological upgrade; and a loan to a private construction services company, 
Shazada, for the purchase of new heavy machinery and trucks.
Islamic Development Bank
The IsDB provided a special investment loan to Turkmen government in the 
amount of $121.17 million for improving the quality of water supply services 
within the Balkan Velayat Water Supply Project.
uzbekistan
Asian Development Bank
The Asian Development Bank approved 13 projects for a total amount of 
$988.87 million in Uzbekistan in 2011, including a number of multitranche 
financing facilities for major projects in transport and social spheres.
In its first private sector operation undertaken in Uzbekistan, ADB invested 
$8 million in equity capital of two private banks, Ipak Yuli Bank and Hamkor 
Bank.
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The loan of $100 million to LUKOIL Overseas Uzbekistan Ltd. is to finance 
development of the Kandym gas field.
The ADB Board of Directors has approved a $240 million loan to Uzbekistan 
within the CAREC Corridor 2 Road Investment Programme multitranche 
financing facility. Moreover, the multitranche financing facility for the Second 
CAREC Corridor 2 Road Investment Programme has also been approved. The 
first tranche of $130 million will be used to rehabilitate a 74-km section of 
A373 highway running through the Fergana Valley. In addition, ADB extended 
a $100 million loan for the Railway Electrification Project which will finance the 
electrification of a 140-km stretch of rail line between Marakand in Samarkand 
province and Karshi in Kashkadarya province. The railway is part of the Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Corridor 6. 
In June 2011, the ADB Board of Directors approved the multitranche 
financing facility for the Housing for Integrated Rural Development Investment 
Programme, with a first tranche payment of $200 million. The Programme will 
help to strengthen the impact of the government’s Rural Housing Scheme (RHS) 
to improve rural livelihoods and living standards. In the medium term it will 
increase the capacity of local government staff to prepare and carry out effective 
rural development and investment promotion plans, and support policy reforms 
that will accelerate private sector development and the establishment of micro 
and small rural businesses. 
ADB has also approved three projects in the field of energy, including a loan of 
$150 million for the installation of modern, accurate, theft-proof digital meters 
for one million residential and small commercial power users in the cities of 
Bukhara, Jizzakh and Samarkand. The meters will operate using an automated 
management system that makes it possible to cut distribution losses and boost 
Tajikistan’s energy efficiency. The technical assistance grant of $225,000 was 
allocated for the preparation of the Design and Strengthening of the Solar 
Energy Institute project. Another technical assistance grant in the amount of 
$1.5 million was provided for boosting the development of solar energy in 
Uzbekistan and attracting investments in the field.
A third tranche worth $58 million was allocated to implement a programme to 
modernise water supply in Karakalpakstan autonomous republic (the cities of 
Jizzakh and Khorezm), as well as to restore waste water systems of Andizhan.
the World Bank Group
The WB Group approved the allocation of $291 million to Uzbekistan in 
2011, including the $93 million IDA credit for Uzbekistan’s Health System 
Improvement Project; the $110 million IBRD loan for Talimarjan Transmission 
Project; and the $88 million IDA credit for the Syrdarya Water Supply Project.
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Islamic Development Bank
The IsDB didn’t finance any projects in Uzbekistan in 2011.
ukraine
the World Bank Group
Within the framework of the Second Export Development Project (EDP2) 
the WB approved the additional financing of $150 million IBRD loan to the 
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine (Ukreximbank) to support export-import 
operations of Ukrainian exporters. Moreover, Ukreximbank raised a $200 
million loan for the Energy Efficiency Project.
Ukraine became the only country to win the WB grant at the second meeting of 
PMR Assembly on October 27-28, 2011 in Istanbul: Ukraine received a grant 
of $5.35 million within the framework of the Partnership for Market Readiness 
(PMR).
Together with several banks IFC arranged a financing package to support major 
Ukrainian petrol station operator Galnaftogaz. IFC and the EBRD provided two 
$65 million corporate loans each, with sub-participations by ING Bank and 
FMO, the Netherlands Development Finance Company, of $30 million each. 
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) will provide a parallel 
corporate loan of $30 million. In addition, the EBRD will invest $30 million 
of equity in Galnaftogaz equity. The financing package will help acquire or 
construct up to 75 filling stations, thus bringing Galnaftogaz network of filling 
stations to over 380 across the country.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
During the period under review, the EBRD extended $1.16 billion equivalent 
for 19 projects in Ukraine. 
The EBRD provided a €200 million 15-year sovereign loan to Ukrgidroenergo 
(UHE), Ukraine’s state-owned operator of large hydro generating and 
pump storage facilities. This is the largest renewable energy project 
financed by the Bank in Ukraine to date, which will see the upgrades of hydro- 
and electro-mechanical equipment at UHE’s hydropower plants. The EBRD 
loan is part of a larger project which envisages similar-sized parallel financing 
from the European Investment Bank. Technical cooperation funds for the 
project were provided by the EU Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the 
UK government.
The Bank approved four projects in the agricultural sector for a total amount of 
$135 million equivalent.
Together with IFC the EBRD took part in arranging a financing package to 
Galnaftogaz, and joined forces with the EIB and Ukraine’s national oil and gas 
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company, NAK Naftogaz, to finance the modernisation of the country’s Soviet-
era gas transportation system ($154 million).
The Bank took part in three projects in the production and services sector and 
provided a total of $95 million.
Moreover, the EBRD approved two projects for $58 million in the field of 
developing transport and transport infrastructure.
The EBRD launched a $100 million lending facility for micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises in Ukraine to support the development of new loan products, 
including rural and agricultural lending through local commercial banks. Credit 
Europe Bank Ukraine (CEB) became the first bank to use the facility through a 
$10 million loan.
European Investment Bank 
In 2011, the EIB approved financing of two projects in Ukraine for a total amount 
of $404.5 million, including a joint EIB-EBRD project for modernisation of 
Ukraine’s gas transportation system with the EIB participation of $154 million, 
and a loan of $250.5 million to Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s National Power Company, 
to optimise the use of existing electricity generation capacity.
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Journal of Eurasian Economic Integration 
The Journal of Eurasian Integration is a quarterly academic and analytical journal published in Russian by 
the Eurasian Development Bank. The members of Editorial Board and Advisory Council are distinguished 
academicians, practitioners and experts in regional integration. Eurasian Economic Integration brings 
together academic and analytical articles, reviews of books relating to regional integration, interviews 
and quarterly chronicles of regional integration. With its focus on economics, the journal is a rich source 
of material addressing a broad range of issues specific to Eurasian integration. These include integration 
theory and its relevance to the development context; economic integration (trade, investment, financial 
institutions); institutional integration; cooperation issues in the post-Soviet space; and international 
experience of regional integration. The first issue was published in the third quarter of 2008. 
Requirements for submissions. Papers should be sent by e-mail to editor@eabr.org for blind review. There 
are no strict limitations on the length of articles. However, the Editorial Board recommends authors to 
adhere to 6000-8000 words or 30000-40000 characters. In addition to the main text, authors must a 
brief author(s)’ biography (100-150 words), executive summary (100-150 words) and bibliography. These 
materials must be attached in a separate file. 
EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 
Eurasian Integration Yearbook publishes wide range of articles and other materials in English language 
on theory and practical aspects of Eurasian integration. The major part of the annual Yearbook consists 
of English versions of selected articles published in the Journal of Eurasian Economic Integration and 
other analytical publications of EDB. These are supplemented by integration chronicles for the respective 
year. The Yearbook improves access of the world  community to the best papers on various issues of 
regional integration published in Russian language. Apart from papers published in the Journal of Eurasian 
Economic Integration, papers written specifically for the Yearbook are also welcome (submission in English 
or Russian). 
Industry Reports 
The EDB’s Analytical Department publishes industry and country reports. Electronic versions are available 
at http://www.eabr.org/rus/publications/AnalyticalReports/. To date, these reviews include:
Consulting services
The Bank provides consultancy services to its strategic partners and clients. The Bank’s Strategy and 
Research Department has in-house expert resources and can involve specialists from other departments, 
such as project managers, corporate financing, treasury, legal department. External experts from the 
extensive pool of CIS countries’ experts could be mobilised to work on consultancy projects. 
Areas of expertise:
• Analysis of current status and dynamics of development in selected sectors in the member states of the 
Bank and other EurAsEС countries; 
• Financial markets analytical reviews in the EurAsEC countries; 
• Economic and legal analysis of integration agreements and institutions in the Eurasian space; 
• Development banks’ operations and activities in the CIS countries and issues of cooperation. 
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Report no.1
uKRAINE AND tHE CuStoMS uNIoN
Comprehensive assessment of the macroeconomic effects of various forms of 
deep economic integration of Ukraine and the member states of the Customs Union 
and the Common Economic Space 
The authors of the report indicate that ongoing development of the largest 
economies within the post-Soviet area (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) 
is associated with structural change, whereas the potential for significant 
economic growth based on raw exports and outdated manufacturing industries is 
nearing exhaustion. For the first time in the last 20 years, the study formulates an inter-
industry set of analytical-forecasting models for the region’s four leading countries. 
The notable merit of the work lies in the fact that it applies a single methodology to 
its inter-industry analysis. Taking such an approach has allowed the authors to model 
common economic dynamics and structural changes, as well as to obtain sound 
assessments of possible integration scenarios throughout the post-Soviet area.
Available in Russian and English
Report no.2
StuDIES of REGIoNAL INtEGRAtIoN IN tHE CIS  
AND IN CENtRAL ASIA: A LItERAtuRE SuRVEY
This work by Alexander Libman represents a high-quality and detailed critical 
review of the research literature on post-Soviet integration that has been 
published in the last 20 years. Being affiliated with research institutions in 
Frankfurt am Maine, Moscow and Shanghai, the author of the review is a reputed and 
active researcher of post-Soviet integration.
He tries to look at the subject from both the outside and the inside, which 
is especially important in the context of the work. The author analysed the 
major trends of research of the regional integration processes in the post-Soviet 
region and Central Asia that have been carried out by both the Russian and international 
academic communities.
Available in Russian and English
Report no.4
EDB INtEGRAtIoN BARoMEtER 2012
The report presents the results of a comprehensive research study of public attitudes 
towards integration in the post-Soviet space. The report is based on monitoring surveys 
of public opinion in former Soviet Union countries on a diverse range of issues, such 
as multilateral economic cooperation, interstate political relations, social and business 
contacts and cultural interactions. A detailed picture of public attitudes, including the 
dynamics, fundamental regularities and forecasts of future developments in integration 
processes, as well as public evaluation of the degree of integration between the post-
Soviet countries are presented in the report. 
Given the importance of the long-term forecasting regarding public perception of 
integration processes in the region in question, it is supposed to conduct annual 
research within the EDB Integration Barometer project. In future, the project can also 
be supplemented with the study of integration preferences of the business elite.
Available in Russian and English
All publications available at: 
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/
Sector Reports
INtEGRAtIoN pRoCESSES IN tHE ELECtRIC poWER 
SECtoRS of tHE EDB MEMBER StAtES
The objective of this sector report no.15 is to study integration processes in the electric 
power sectors of the EDB member states: the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of 
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and 
the Republic of Tajikistan. 
The report analyses the power sectors, in particular, changes that have occurred 
in recent years, key trends in the development of generating capacities and power 
grids, and electricity exports and imports. It also examines the main challenges to 
development and the key drivers of electricity demand. The report studies power transit 
and cross-border trade in electricity, system effects of the national power systems’ 
integration, mutual investment in the power sector, and supplies of power-generating 
and electrical equipment. In addition, the report analyses joint interstate initiatives, 
including the future establishment of a common electric power market, and examine 
possibilities of introducing uniform technical and environmental standards and a legal 
framework, regulating the common market. Recommendations are provided on how 
to deepen integration in the region and foster the creation of the common electric 
power space, with an emphasis on the EDB’s role in this process.
Available in Russian and English
Analytical Reports
tHE SAfEtY of HYDRoWoRKS IN CENtRAL ASIA: 
pRoBLEMS AND AppRoACHES
This analytical report was prepared by a group of experts of the Executive Committee 
of the International Fund for saving the Aral Sea (EC IFAS) based on a regional report 
on the same subject and with technical assistance from the Eurasian Development 
Bank.
Hydroworks are necessary for the comprehensive use of water resources, including 
drinking, industrial and agricultural water supply; irrigation, hydropower, fishery, 
navigation, recreation, and ecosystems maintenance. Central Asian hydroworks 
that have a direct bearing on infrastructure development bring multiple benefits and 
ultimately foster regional development. This paper is a contribution to the future 
development and improvement of national rules, laws and technical documents, 
personnel training, exchange of expertise, and long-term cooperation between Central 
Asian states in hydroworks safety on a regional footing.
Available in Russian and English
Monographs
pRIoRItIES of CoopERAtIoN IN tRANSBouNDARY RIVER 
BASINS of CENtRAL ASIA
V. Yasinsky, A. Mironenkov, T. Sarsembekov (2012)
The natural and geographical conditions of Central Asia give rise to the unique 
character of the formation of run-off within the river basin, just as political and 
economic realities dictate its use. The state of the region, whose countries have no 
access to the sea, entails the necessity of expanding trade-and-economic relations 
and the strengthening of integration processes. In order to adapt to the changing 
hydrological systems of transboundary rivers so as to ensure a sustainable and reliable 
system of interstate water management, there must be improved access to hydrological 
and hydrometeorological information, including access to the rapid exchange of that 
information between the countries in the region. One of the priorities of regional 
cooperation should be the enhancement of capacity and readiness to respond to the 
impact of climate change and hydrological changes. 
The principles of basin management are becoming a major feature of cooperation 
between Central Asian countries in transboundary river basins, thus bringing together 
the interests of each state in the region within the river basin on the basis of generally 
accepted international and legal norms concerning the common use of transboundary 
water flows. This books presents interest to researchers, specialists, and be a valuable 
tool for students. Its relevance is also related with the UN International Decade «Water 
for Life» (2005-2015), the achievement targets of which is essential for the sustainable 
development of Central Asia.
Available in Russian and English
All publications available at:  
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/
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